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Abstract
During the 1920s, chain stores exploded in numbers throughout the country. 
Chains claimed to provide mass distribution for a mass production age. According 
to their executives, traditional retailing raised the cost of living and interfered with 
prosperity. Small retailers countered these claims by arguing that corporate retailing 
endangered prosperity because it concentrated ownership in the hands o f a few  and 
stripped wealth from the local community.
In 1929 and 1930, anti-chain radio broadcasts sparked popular interest in the 
chains. Critics accused the chains of using their financial might to sell products 
below cost and drive competitors out o f business. They also alleged that chains 
bilked the public by selling shoddy or short weight products, evading taxes, and 
cutting services like credit and delivery. Encouraged by these attacks, trade 
associations throughout the nation sponsored boycotts of the chains.
When these campaigns failed to close the chains, retailers shifted their focus 
to government action. The Capper-Kelly bill would have allowed manufacturers to 
set retail prices, but it failed to pass through Congress. On a state level, storeowners 
succeeded in passing special taxes against the chains in more than half o f the states, 
but independent retailers continued to falter.
Many storeowners hoped President Roosevelt’s recovery efforts would 
protect them against chain growth. Although the National Recovery Administration 
disappointed most storeowners, the experience encouraged them to push for other 
legislation. After the demise o f the NRA, small retailers lobbied for the Robinson-
iv
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Patman Act and the Miller-Tydings A ct These laws controlled chain buying and 
selling practices. As the 1930s progressed, however, small retailers realized that 
these laws would not stop the growth o f the chains. Because o f concerns about 
consumer prices and the efficiency o f the economy, the Roosevelt administration 
resisted attempts to control the chains further. Independent retailers could no longer 
hope for government attacks on the chains.
v
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Introduction
During the 1920s corporate chain stores grew at fantastic rates in 
America At the start of the decade, companies like A&P, Walgreen’s and 
Woolworth’s had 30,000 stores. At its close, they operated more than 
150,000 units—a dramatic and visible change over a period of ten years.1 
Even the Lil Rascals watched as a grocery chain bought out their favorite 
storekeeper.2 Chain officials, flushed with success, heralded this growth as 
natural evolution: mass distribution for a mass production age. They argued 
that their stores provided merchandise at the lowest possible price, enabling 
consumers to buy more products and generating unprecedented prosperity. 
For small retailers, worried about the survival of their businesses, the rapid 
growth was frightening. This dissertation examines their persistent campaign 
to slow chain growth. In their crusade small retailers and their supporters 
sought to convince America that chains endangered the nation and its 
standard of living. They claimed that chains threatened prosperity because 
they defrauded consumers and concentrated wealth in the hands of a few,
1 Godfrey Lebhar, Chain Stores in America, 1859-1952 (New York: Chain Store 
Publishing Corporation, 1952), 57-58.
2 See Helping Grandma, Volume 7 of the Cabin Fever Collection with Leonard Mai tin, 
videocassette.
l
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stripping money from local communities and depositing it in Eastern 
metropolises.
Local merchants groups, occasional ad hoc anti-chain organizations, 
and national trade associations argued that the chains did not offer true 
bargains. According to these retailers, chains pursued predatory pricing to 
drive competition from a market. Their absurdly low prices on some 
products showed that they sold them at a loss to drive out nearby stores. In 
part they could do this because they raised prices on other products. But the 
chains, with large capital reserves, could also afford to operate one store at a 
loss, waiting for it to eliminate competitors. Once the other stores 
disappeared, retailers argued, the chains would raise prices. Small retailers 
said that the chains used other underhanded techniques to give the 
appearance of lower prices. For example, the chains engaged in short 
weighing, substituted inferior products for advertised brand names, evaded 
taxes, and cut out services like credit and delivery.
Although the chains defrauded the public, their truly insidious 
influence came more quietly and at the expense of the entire community. 
According to anti-chain activists, chains stripped the final profit from towns, 
fimneling local wealth to New York City and other metropolises. Unless this 
dangerous trend reversed itself, independent retailers predicted the land
2
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would be bled dry, and the bulk of Americans turned into wage slaves for a 
financial elite. The growth of the chains, according to anti-chain activists, 
threatened to destroy all opportunity from the country, depriving America of 
its greatest blessing and shaking democracy to its core.
This dissertation begins with an explanation of the problems of 
distribution and the way in which chain stores offered a solution to them. 
Chapter One also shows some of the early responses to the chains, setting the 
stage for the anti-chain mania of 1929-1930. During that period, W. K. “Old 
Man” Henderson of Shreveport, Louisiana, ignited a flurry of discussion 
about the chains through his radio broadcasts heard throughout the South and 
Midwest. His harangues against the chains fostered a host of colorful 
imitators. Because these rabble-rousers spread criticisms of the chains, the 
controversy even became the national debate topic for 1930—the same year 
the Lil Rascals film featured the chains.3
Inspired by the national ferment, local groups throughout the nation 
sponsored boycotts of the chains, encouraging consumers to shop at local
3 Carl Ryant, “The South and the Movement Against Chain Stores,” Journal o f  
Southern History 39 (May 1973): 207-222; David Horowitz, “The Crusade Against 
Chain Stores: Portland’s Independent Merchants, 1928-1935,” Oregon Historical 
Quarterly 89 (winter 1988): 340-368; F. John Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement in the United States, 1927-1940, “ (Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Warwick, 1981); F. John Harper, “A New Battle on Evolution: The Anti-Chain Store 
Trade-At-Home Agitation o f 1929-1930,” Journal o f American Studies 16 (December 
1982), 407-426.
3
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stores. The agitation of 1929-1930 chain stores has been most studied by 
historians. Studies by Carl Ryant, David Horowitz, and F. John Harper 
approach the movement as another battle in the organizational revolution 
described by Robert Wiebe. According to Wiebe, the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries featured a reaction to increasing corporatization.4 
Harper describes chain opponents lashing out at a strange new order, which 
they feared would undermine community life. He and Ryant both treat 
opposition to the chains as a rural movement of the South and Midwest. 
This interpretation, however, ignores the large number of chain opponents 
from major cities like Chicago and New York. It also implies that anti­
chain agitators opposed all modernizing trends in society. Harper even 
entitled his article “A New Battle on Evolution,” suggesting that chain 
opponents fought against all of modem society. Yet, as this dissertation 
demonstrates, many small retailers embraced modernization, renovating 
their stores and promoting retail efficiency, which they, as well as the 
chains, embraced. As their use of radio suggests, chain store opponents 
were willing to accommodate to new technology.
Because past histories have focused on the early period of opposition 
to the chains, they also miss another important qualification to their
4 Robert W iebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 
xiii-xiv.
4
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portrayal of activist community campaigns as the heart of the movement. 
Anti-chain agitators quickly discovered that local organizations could not 
slow the growth of the chains. As they failed to convince consumers (and, 
for that matter, retailers) to stop shopping with the chains, their state and 
national trade associations turned to government for protection.
In lobbying efforts by small retailers, an attack on corporate 
domination, not defense of the consumer, became the main focus.
Independent retailers envisioned an America in which small proprietors could 
conduct their business without fear of destruction by corporate predators. 
They believed America could best ensure its wealth by rejecting the 
corporate model of retailing and called for government action to protect 
them. In his recent work on small retailers in Canada during this period,
David Monod argues that small retailers there believed prosperity could best 
be preserved through small retailing and that government should intervene to 
protect the small retail store.5 American retailers, as an organized, 
professional group, sought to promote this vision of prosperity to the nation, 
and they looked to the federal government to insure the survival of small 
town life. Alan Brinkley, in Voices o f Protest, notes similar efforts by Huey 
Long and Father Coughlin. Long and Coughlin, he writes, felt local forces
5 David Monod, Store Wars: Shopkeepers and the Culture o f  Mass Marketing, 1890- 
1939 (Toronto; Buffalo: University o f Toronto Press, 1996), 172.
5
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could no longer contend with corporatization and they looked for support 
from the national government As Brinkley writes, independent retailers 
formed an important part of the constituency of Long and Coughlin. Many 
shopkeepers supported their condemnation of corporate growth.6
Retailers tried several different approaches to government 
intervention. Chapter Three studies an attempt to promote retail price 
maintenance. Storeowners hoped that legislation would outlaw sales below 
cost and take from the chains one of their important weapons. Despite strong 
support from retailers and some manufacturers, the bill failed to pass on a 
federal level. In the states, as Chapter Four recounts, independent retailers 
had more success, passing special taxes on chain stores that increased as the 
number of stores grew. Chain taxes became law in half of the states by the 
close of the decade.
With the election of Franklin Roosevelt, retailers hoped for a new 
burst of legislation. When Roosevelt proposed the National Recovery 
Administration, storeowners worked to get certain controls passed to stabilize 
the retail market Chapter Five examines their most important initiatives that 
focused on controlling the rebates given to chains. After the demise of the 
NRA, these retailers succeeded in passing legislation against rebates in a bill
6 Alan Brinkley, Voices o f  Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin and the Great 
Depression (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 145-146, 165-168.
6
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called the Robinson-Patman Act This act continues to govern buying 
practices and control the way in which manufacturers can give price breaks to 
customers.
In government in the 1930s, politicians discussed the retailer’s vision 
of prosperity grounded on small business. By the close of the 1930s, 
however, they decisively rejected it. In his book The End o f Reform, 
Brinkley discusses the process by which New Dealers moved toward a 
model in which government cooperated with business in order to ensure the 
greatest level o f purchasing power and prosperity in the country. Jonathan 
Bean, in Beyond the Broker State, a study of small business, concludes that 
the government chose to provide a positive form of assistance to small 
business, rather than attempt to restrict corporations. This impulse led the 
government into grant programs to aid small business and away from anti­
chain crusades and other attempts to attack corporate structures.8 When 
government anti-trust focused on increasing economic efficiency, the anti­
chain movement lost much of its force. Although small retailers have 
continued to fight chains in recent years, including high profile campaigns
7 Alan Brinkley, The End o f  Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 58. See also Ellis 
Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f Monopoly (Princeton, N.J..: Princeton 
University Press, 1966).
o
Jonathan Bean, Beyond the Broker State: Federal Policies Toward Small Business, 
1936-1961 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1996), 98.
7
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
against Wal-Mart, Barnes and Noble and Starbucks, the notion that these 
chains could be eliminated through campaigns or government action has 
long since passed.
s
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Chapter One: Evolution in Distribution
In the 1920s Americans spoke of a “new era” of business. A mass 
production economy could now flood the market with goods, improving the 
American standard of living. Many businessmen and economists worried, 
however, that the distribution system jeopardized this potential prosperity.1 
Although retailing and wholesaling underwent some change in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the sector still lagged behind the rest 
of the economy. Many small, undercapitalized, and inefficient stores 
dominated the field. Chain stores claimed to revolutionize retailing. They 
offered, according to chain executives, mass distribution for a mass production
1 Lyn Dumenil, The Modem Temper. American Culture and Society in the1920s (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1995); Paul Nystrom, The Economics o f Retailing (New York:
The Ronald Press Company, 1915); Richard Tedlow, New and Improved: The Story of
Mass Marketing in America (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Thurman Arnold, 
“Fragility o f Distribution,” speech delivered to the National Economic League, May 15,
1937, box 10 "Correspondence General-May 1937,” Thurman Arnold Papers, American 
Heritage Center, University o f Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming. David Monod, Store 
Wars: Shopkeepers and the Culture o f Mass Marketing, 1890-1939 (Toronto; Buffalo: 
University o f Toronto Press, 1996), 172; David Embree to Julius Rosenwald, January
13, 1928, box 12 folder 10, Julius Rosenwald Papers, University o f Chicago, Chicago, 
Illinois; Robert Wood, "Distribution,” box 45, "Sears and Roebuck, 1939-1946," Robert 
Wood Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa; Robert Wood,
"Speech before the Wilmington, Delaware Chamber o f Commerce," p. 3, box 45,
“Sears and Roebuck, 1939-1946,” Wood Papers; Joseph Palamountain, The Politics o f 
Distribution (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1955).
9
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2
age. Large retail operations could move huge quantities of products to the 
consumer at low prices, helping them to make the most of their purchasing 
power. The chains claimed to be the wave of the future, a new force that 
would bring efficient retailing to every Main Street in America. As evidence of 
their power, they pointed to their rapid growth. Non-chain, or independent, 
retailers, who felt threatened by these boasts, denied the claims. They, along 
with other anti-corporate crusaders, argued that hometown merchants provided 
better service to the communities of America. Independent retailers could 
improve retail efficiency and modernize the economy. Chains were not needed. 
Independent retailers and their trade associations, such as the National
Association of Retail Grocers and the National Association of Retail
•  "2 Druggists, acknowledged the failings of retail distribution. Following World
War One, inflationary conditions had provoked numerous protests against
retail prices, particularly of food products. Consumers and farmers, alike,
complained about mark-ups. Shoppers demanded to know why they had to pay
2 Godfrey Lebhar, Chain Stores in America, 1859-1952 (New York: Chain Store 
Publishing Corporation, 1952); Walter Hayward and Percival White, Chain Stores: 
Their Management and Operation (New York: McGraw Hill, 1922); Ralph Gwin, 
“Advantages o f the Chain Store,” New York Herald Tribime, February 3, 1929; E. C. 
Sams, “The Chain Store as Public Necessity,” Printer's Ink, October 31, 1929, 168-171.
3 Susan Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed: the Making o f the American Mass Market 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 203.
10
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
high prices at the grocery. 4 Farmers wondered how retail prices could be so 
exorbitant with commodity prices so low.5 Studies o f retailing blamed three 
factors for high retail prices. First, wholesalers stood between producers and 
retailers and added a layer of cost to consumer goods. Second, many small, 
undercapitalized stores, because of their slow turnover, had to charge more 
per sale in order to survive. Third, retailers often had little knowledge of 
retailing and proved incapable of running their shops in an effective 
manner.
In the opinion of many economists, the dominance of wholesalers held 
back the progress of retail distribution. Critics of retailing argued that 
middlemen cost the consumer money, placing a layer of expense between the 
producer and consumer. Wholesalers employed office and warehouse staffs 
and large numbers of salesmen, who scoured the countryside in search of 
clients. They would battle with competing firms to gain business, dragging 
huge trunks of goods with samples for merchants. In their desperation to find 
outlets for their products, salesmen hunted for retailers to become their clients.
4 Monod, Store Wars, 253-255; Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store 
License Law: Reference Book o f  Fully Documented Facts (Denver, Colorado: Colorado 
Chain Store Association, 1938^, 58-59.
5 Aaron Sapiro, ‘Tarmers and Cooperatives,” World’s Work, May 1923, 86; Edwin 
Witte, “Speech,” February 26, 1928, box 254, “Articles and Addresses,” Edwin Witte 
Papers, University o f Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In many cases, they offered credit to prospective owners with few, if any 
resources.6 If these stores failed, as they often did, wholesalers had to increase 
prices to pay for the credit extended to them.7 As a result, independent retailers
o
paid higher prices for their goods and consumer prices rose.
In addition to the costs associated with wholesaling, a second reason for 
increased consumer prices was the inefficiency of smaller stores. They charged 
higher prices because of slow turnover. Over a million retail outlets existed in 
the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. One retail store operated for every 
125 Americans! Such stores served a neighborhood clientele and sometimes 
acted as social centers more than places of business. The owners often lived 
above die store and entertained a variety of guests while they minded the shop. 
Neighbors might come to gossip, listen to the radio, use the telephone, or, 
perhaps, buy something.9 According to the Census of Distribution, only eleven 
percent of retailers did more than $50,000 a year in business. An amazing
6 Merchant's Journal, August 2,1924, 23; Lloyd J. King interview, Western Business 
History Center, Colorado Historical Society, Denver, Colorado; M. A. Johnson, Fifty 
Years o f  Country Storekeeping (Brainerd, Minnesota: Lakeland Color Press, 1955), 97.
7 Paul D. Converse, Business Mortality o f  Illinois Retail Stores from 1925-1930, no. 31 
(Urbana, Illinois: Bureau o f Business Research, 1932), 29.
8 Richard Ely, Monopolies and Trusts (New York: MacMillan, 1910), 158;
Palamountain, The Politics o f  Distribution, 54.
9 North Wichita Times, December 16, 1931.
12
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twenty-eight percent of stores did less than $5,000 a year in trade. If the stores 
managed to earn a two-and-a-half percent profit, the owners netted $2.50 a 
week for their labor, less than unskilled workers.10 With such a gloomy profit 
picture, storeowners often had a difficult time earning enough money to 
support their families.11 In a desperate attempt to stay in business, some of 
them engaged in deceptive practices. For example, many small stores preserved 
the age-old art of haggling. Instead of writing down a price, storekeepers 
would banter with the customer in an effort to get as much profit as possible.12 
While advertising lower prices, grocery owners would often engage in short 
weight to increase their profit on sales—even tampering with their scales in 
order to cheat the customer out of a few ounces.
Because of slow turnover and low capital investment, independent 
stores were often dirty, poorly lit and run down with second hand equipment 
and fixtures. If something broke, the retailers could not afford to repair it. They 
jammed their inventory into the store in a random fashion and their goods had
10 Edward Holsey, "Address to the National Negro Labor Conference January 28,1930,” p. 
2, Claude Barnett Papers, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois.
11 Edmund D. McGrary, Mortality in Retail Trade (Buffalo, New York: University of 
Buffalo Bureau o f Business and Social Research, 1930), 5.
12 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 206.
13
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13flyspecks or were worn. Nora, the heroine of Sinclair Lewis' Main Street 
complained of the dirtiness of stores in Gopher Prairie.14 She described one 
grocery store as having "...black, overripe bananas and lettuce on which a cat 
was sleeping," and turned up her nose at a filthy and bloody meat market
Many consumers considered small storekeepers to be lazy, shiftless and 
inept.15 Quite a few retailers merited this low opinion. Their incompetence was 
a third reason for high retail prices. The wholesaler system encouraged 
individuals to enter retailing with little or no experience, and many 
storekeepers opened a shop as a hobby or with dreams of easy money. Failed 
retailers had held a bewildering range of occupations before their flirtation with 
shop keeping. One survey of fifty such businessmen found sixteen former 
grocers, four clerks, nine farmers, two laborers and two salesmen. The rest of 
the individuals surveyed held a variety of jobs, ranging from musicians to 
wagon salesmen.16 Inexperienced retailers made numerous errors. They did not 
know the art of buying, or the danger of costly overhead, and often made ill-
13 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 266.
u Sinclair Lewis, Main Street (New York: Signet Classic, 1920, 1980), 38.
15 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (New York: Scribner Paperback Fiction, 1925, 
1992), 29, 144; Holsey to Barnett, May 26, 1930, p. 7, box 251, folder 6, Barnett 
Papers.
16 University o f Nebraska Committee on Business Research, Some Aspects o f  Grocery 
Store Failures Bulletin No. 14 (January, 1926), 10. See also Lewis, Main Street, 239.
14
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advised purchases. One retailer from the Great Plains, M. A. Johnson,
confessed in his memoirs that wholesale salesmen took advantage of his
naivete and left him with tremendous stores of products.17 Johnson remembers
being so entranced by offers of premiums and quantity discounts that he
bought an amount of baking powder that would have taken years to sell. The
purchase paralyzed his warehouse space and kept him from using it for quicker
turning, higher profit merchandise. He made a similar mistake with
watermelons. Luckily, a merchant from a nearby town helped him by buying
some of his stockpile.
Small storeowners often lacked a rudimentary knowledge of
bookkeeping. For that reason, they failed to understand the costs of doing 
18business. If retailers kept better informed, they might have re-examined their 
decision to offer costly services. Although retailers provided credit and delivery 
to increase business, that placed their businesses in jeopardy because both 
entailed large costs. Credit posed the bigger danger. Although small shop 
owners allowed customers to charge items so that they could live paycheck-to- 
paycheck or crop-to-crop, many customers would not or could not pay their
17 Johnson, Fifty Years o f  Country Storekeeping, 97-98.
18 “Accounts Book,” Bongers Collection, Western Business History Center, Colorado 
Historical Society, Denver, Colorado; Voices o f  a Black Nation: Political Journalism in 
the Harlem Renaissance, ed. Theodore G. Vincent (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World
15
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bills. Unpaid bills added to the pressures on small retailers by forcing them to 
increase their prices to cover the additional cost19 Delivery of products could 
also involve substantial economic waste. Customers pressed for delivery of 
even the smallest and least expensive objects, and storeowners did little to 
resist them. Yet, this service forced them to pay for delivery boys and, in some
cases, delivery vehicles. Many commentators accused consumers of abusing
20the system. In his film, The Pharmacist, W.C. Fields parodied the practice. 
His character, the pathetic proprietor of a small pharmacy, was desperate for 
customers who did more than play checkers at the store. Fields took any 
business he could find. It was sad when he agreed to deliver a box of cough 
drops to a customer. It was pathetic when the customer lived on a farm twenty 
miles out of town.21
Because of the cost of expensive services, low turnover, and the control 
of wholesalers, retailers had promoted change for decades. Department stores 
offered the first challenge to traditional distribution, introducing tremendous
Press, Inc., 1973), 248.
19 Monod, Store Wars, 162-3; Phoenix Magazine, May 1980, 81; Strasser, Satisfaction 
Guaranteed, 239-241.
20 Gerald Madden, ‘Tailings o f Retail Stores,” p.2, Barnett Papers; Strasser,
Satisfaction Guaranteed, 238-39.
21 The Pharmacist, 1933,RKO.
16
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changes in the middle of the nineteenth century. Alexander Stewart developed 
the first American department store in New York City. His firm set the 
standard for hundreds of companies, including Macy's and Wanamaker’s.22 
Although these stores began in large metropolitan centers, by the final decade 
of the century such “palaces of consumption” had expanded throughout the 
nation. They occupied large spaces and offered an amazing array of goods at 
low prices. The department store magnates prided themselves on offering the 
lowest prices available. John Wanamaker, the founder of the Philadelphia 
department store, best expressed the viewpoint of these businessmen in an 
address on department stores before the American Association of Political
23Science. In the course of his speech, Wanamaker boasted that department 
stores would revolutionize retailing by targeting the weaknesses of the retail 
system. They cut costs by applying "scientific" principles of retailing increased 
turnover, and eliminated the middleman. Instead of paying for another profit 
margin, Wanamaker’s, for example, took over some wholesaling functions, 
lowering prices through vertical integration. It also promoted sales volume by 
reaching out to a city-wide audience through advertisements in the local paper.
22 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 206-209
23 Wanamaker, "On the Department Store," in An American Primer: 1890-1900 A 
Citizen's History, ed. Daniel Boorstin (New York: The PaperBack Press, 1995), 22.
17
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Because of the large customer base, the store sold tremendous numbers of 
goods and could afford to make less profit per transaction than smaller 
retailers. Wanamaker’s instituted additional advances in retail record keeping. 
The store monitored each department to ensure they contributed to 
profitability. Unprofitable goods and products were dropped. It hired experts to 
control credit and delivery and guarantee more efficient operation. Because of 
these radical steps, Wanamaker’s and other department stores offered a 
significant, early challenge to the traditional system of retailing.24
Another response to the problems of distribution was mail order 
retailing. Montgomery Ward began the first mail order sales in the 1870s, and 
Sears and Roebuck developed in the next decade. They bypassed the 
wholesaler to sell large volumes of goods to a national customer base without 
the expense of operating retail stores. This form of shopping became 
enormously popular in rural America, where consumers felt frustrated by the 
poor selection and expense of crossroads general stores.25 National firms sold 
for cash only but offered a money-back guarantee to reassure customers
24 Wanamaker, “On the Department Store,” 22-23; Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 
206-210; Beardsley Ruml, "Macy's Place in the Scheme o f Things," p .l, Series II box I 
folder 21, Ruml Papers, University o f Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
25 Boris Emmet and John Jeuck, Catalogues and Counters: A History o f  Sears, Roebuck 
and Company (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1950), 5.
18
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26worried about purchasing items they had never examined. By the 1890s 
these companies expanded, purchasing in increasing quantity and offering the 
largest selection of goods in the nation. In 1906 Sears filled 100,000 orders 
daily. According to the economist Richard Ely, Sears and Montgomery Ward 
held a major share of the market throughout rural America.27
Chain stores offered a third response to the crisis of retailing. They 
offered another way to build volume, lower prices and maximize purchasing 
power by combining the national approach of the mail order corporations with 
storefront retailing operations.28 Chains like Woolworth and A & P had existed 
since the mid-nineteenth century, but only A & P operated a large number of
29stores, around five hundred by the turn of the century. Only the most careful 
of observers understood the importance of chain stores before the 1920s
26 Richard Warren Sears, "Cheapest Supply House on Earth (1894)," in Daniel Boorstin, 
An American Primer: 1890-1900 A Citizen's History (New York: The PaperBack Press, 
1995), 11-12; Robert Wood, "Distribution," pp. 2 ,4  box 45 "Sears and Roebuck, 1939- 
1946," Wood Papers.
27 Steven Diner, A Very Different Age: Americans o f the Progressive Era (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1998), 44-45; Richard Ely, Monopolies and Trusts (New York: 
MacMillan, 1910), 158.
28 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 204-206; Charles W. Hurd and M. Zimmerman, 
"Why Advertisers Must Give Chain Store Growth Their Serious Attention," Printer’s 
Ink, September 10,1914, n.
29 Diner, A Very Different Age, 45; Harper, “The Anti Chain Store Movement in the 
United States, 1927-1940,” 1-2,4; Monod, Store Wars, 211,227-28; Rural Trade, July 
1926,9; Palamountain, The Politics o f  Distribution, 67.
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because they were small and confined to regional trade. However, the number 
of chain outlets exploded in that decade, increasing from 30,000 to 150,OOO.30 
The chain store idea built after A&P showed the financial benefits of stripping 
down services and offering low cost goods. Kroger in the Midwest and 
Safeway in the West led a host of competitors aspiring to the nationwide 
success of A&P.31 The world war slowed their growth, but post-war inflation 
promoted discontent with traditional retailing and contributed to the rapid
32growth of the chains. Students of retailing particularly pointed to the strength 
of chain groceries in urban centers. In 1914, according to one retail observer, 
chains had 10 percent of the grocery sales in Philadelphia and New York. By 
1925, they controlled 65 percent of the sales.33
Such phenomenal growth in grocery store chains attracted interest from 
other retailers. Drug stores, dime stores and variety stores saw an opportunity 
for development These firms pushed aggressive expansion policies fueled by 
investment from a booming Wall Street34 The Walgreen's drug chain, based in
30 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaraneed, 222, 283; Rural Trade, July 1926, 9; Lebhar, The 
Chain Store in America, 57-58.
31 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 224; The Booster, September 1, 1927, 1; Phoenix 
Magazine, May 1980, 80.
32 Whittier Bulletin, January 25, 1929, 1.
33 Rural Trade, July 1926, 9.
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Chicago, catapulted into national prominence during the 1920s. It sold a wide 
variety of goods, not just prescription medication.35 Walgreen’s attracted its 
own regional competitors aspiring to the same success.36 Other retailers 
increased the size of their stores and the number of products they offered.37 
Woolworth and its sister dime stores also expanded in the period. They were 
joined by a host of similar firms that distributed a wide array of goods. Among 
the most prominent of these was the J.C. Penney Company.38 Because of the 
success of firms like Penney’s, especially in rural areas, mail order companies 
decided that they had to expand their operations to maintain market share, 
especially since cars and paved roads encouraged farmers to shop in towns 
rather than rely on package delivery. 39 Sears and Roebuck and Montgomery
34 Edward Perkins, From Wall Street to Main Street: Charles Merrill and Middle Class 
Investors (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1, 119-121; J. E. Davis, Don’t 
Make A&P Mad (Butte, Montana: J. E. Davis, 1990), 100.
35 Richard Ely, Monopolies and Trusts (New York: MacMillan, 1910), 157, 159.
36 Diner, A Very Different Age, 48; Walter Sedgely, A History o f  the Owl DrugStore in 
Reno, Nevada (NC 694), Special Collections, University o f Nevada-Reno, 23-24; The 
Booster, October 13, 1927, 1.
37 Kansas City, Missouri, Store 1001-A, “Photos o f K.C. store 1001-A, “ Retail Store 
Files,” Sears Corporate Archives, Hoffman Estates, Illinois; Merchant's Journal,
August 2,1924, 1.
38 Robert McCracken, "These Men from Wyoming James Cash Penney: The Merchant 
Prince and the Golden Rule," p. 11, Penney File, American Heritage Center, University 
of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming; Denver Post, June 10, 1981.
39 Wood, "Distribution," p. 3, box 45, Wood Papers; Robert Wood, ’’Speech before
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Ward both entered the retail market during the mid-1920s, attracting 
widespread attention and prompting expressions of concern.40 These firms 
used their immense capital to expand at a terrific rate. During a twelve-month 
stretch of 1928 and 1929, for example, Sears expanded at a rate of one store 
every other business day 41 Over the course of a decade, the face of American 
retailing changed drastically.
Chain executives presented themselves as the wave of the future in 
retailing, the modem, scientific way of purchasing consumer goods. During 
the 1920s, they became aware of themselves as a distinct segment of retailing. 
The National Chain Store Association, which brought the industry together for 
conventions, promoted this new awareness, producing a magazine, Chain 
Store Age, and acting as a resource on distribution. The chains claimed to 
serve the public better because they could sell at the lowest possible cost and 
force other retailers to do the same.42 They lowered the expense of distribution
Wilmington, Delaware Chamber o f Commerce,” p. 2, box 45, "Sears and Roebuck, 
1939-1946" Wood Papers; Studs Terkel, Hard Times: An Oral History o f  the Great 
Depression (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979, 1986), 442.
40 Rural Trade, September 1926, 22; Winfield Caslow, The Sob-Squad, (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: The Grand Rapids Calendar Company, 1928), 236.
41 E. J. Condon, “Speech to Real Estate Group,” November 20, 1947, “Kansas City,” 
Retail Store Files, Sears Corporate Archives; “Grand Rapids,” ibid.
42 Bruce Barton, “Speech before the National Chain Store Association Convention,” p.
4, box 122, “National Chain Store Association, Chicago, 1929,” Bruce Barton Papers,
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because of two advantages. First, the chains freed retailing from the control of 
large wholesalers, capitalizing their stores better than small merchants and 
selling goods in high volume.43 The chains argued that a second strength 
helped them to buy and sell at low price: their expertise. Dedicated pursuit of 
the best retail practices brought about success.
Chain stores suggested that the immense size of their operations 
represented another important development in retailing. They noted that their 
rate of expansion and rapid accumulation of capital brought about tremendous 
cost-savings to the American people. They promised to liberate America from 
its bondage to wholesalers and the small, inefficient traditional store.44 As 
firms expanded, they could afford to buy trainloads of products.45 As a result, 
they could ask for quantity discounts and exert pressure on farmers and
Wisconsin State Historical Society; Julius Rosenwald to Thomas F. Holgate, December 
9,1925, box 12 folder 9, Rosenwald Papers, University o f Chicago, Chicago, Illinois; 
Julius Rosenwald "Value o f Mail Order Stores to the Nation," in Rosenwald to M. H. 
Lewis, February 8, 1906, Rosenwald Papers; Condon, “Speech to Real Estate Group,”
3; Donovan Speech, National Chain Store Association, 4.
43 Albert Morrill to Huber, February 17, 1931," 1931 February” Huber Papers; 
Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 3d Session, 1931, volume 74:4000.
44 Wood, "Speech Before the Wilmington, Delaware Chamber o f Commerce," p.3, box
45 "Sears and Roebuck, 1939-1946," Wood Papers; Palamountain, The Politics o f  
Distribution, 62-3, 70; Rosenwald to Capper, December 8, 1924, box 31, "R," Capper 
Papers.
45 “Kroger Advertisement,” March 21, 1897, Shops and Stores. Food. Kroger,
Cincinnati Historical Society Photographic Collection; Wood, "Distribution," pp.3-4, 
box 45, Wood Papers.
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companies to sell at lower prices. They demanded extensions of credit and 
financed their operations, in part, through manufacturer credit. In some cases, 
these companies took over manufacturers or bought the entire output of a 
company to ensure low prices. Economists asserted that these changes offered 
substantial savings over the old wholesaler system.46
Since chain retailers bought in high volume, they had to sell goods at the 
same brisk pace. Chains avoided large inventories, which endangered turnover 
and sapped the finances of the firm. They struggled to perfect inventory control 
so they could minimize the size of their holdings and avoid wasteful stockpiles. 
In order to accomplish this goal, they used trucks and the new highway system 
to transport goods between stores and move products to areas where they 
might sell.47 The most important innovations, however, concerned pricing 
techniques.48 Chains sold at one low price to all consumers, eliminating 
bartering. Chains could afford to charge low prices on each transaction
46 Heath Onthank to Herbert Hoover, July 1, 1926, box 583, “Commerce A,” Herbert 
Hoover Pre-Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch,
Iowa; Harper, “The Anti-chain Store Movement,” 35-36; Strasser, Satisfaction 
Guaranteed, 226-221.
47 Monod, Store Wars, 160.
48 Arnold to the National Economic League, May 15, 1937, box 10 "Correspondence 
General-May 1937, Thurman Arnold Papers, American Heritage Center, University o f 
Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming; Dr. Glenn Barrett, Kemmerer, Wyoming: The Founding 
o f  an Independent Coal Town, 1897-1902 (Kemmerer, WY: Queely Services, Inc.,
1972.), 44-45.
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because of their high volume o f sales and rate of turnover, which, in some 
cases, tripled the turnover of a typical store. In order to ensure higher volumes 
of sales, chains would even sell certain products below cost. They called these 
products “loss leaders.” 49 Although many branded goods had been protected 
by price agreements between manufacturers and retailers, a 1911 Supreme 
Court case, Dr. Miles Medical Company v John D. Park and Sons Company, 
had struck down these contracts and greatly increased the number of products 
that could be used as loss leaders. Stores exercised this opportunity and 
routinely sold some items below cost. These sales lowered overhead and 
prevented large stockpiles from forming in warehouse, but also attracted 
consumers who might purchase other products.50 The strategy produced 
overwhelming results. For example, the Owl Drug Company had to install 
guardrails in order to control rabid crowds inundating stores in search of 
bargains. In order to stop other retailers from purchasing low cost soap and 
reselling it, they defaced the labels. If Owl Dmg damaged the packaging, other 
retailers could not sell them at their stores.51
49 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 225-227.
50 Whittier Bulletin, Jan 25, 1929, 1-2.
51 Sedgley, “The History o f the Owl Drug Company,” 18-19,23-24, 34.
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The appeal of low price served as the best advertising for the chains, but 
the chains also worked to create an image of expert control. In their public 
statements, the chains celebrated their modernity and the role of the expert in 
their organization. They carefully crafted a visual impression of modernity. 
Although chain stores were the same size as their so-called "mom and pop" 
competitors, they worked with architects to create a different image, an image 
that emphasized the power and size of their corporations. The chains 
underscored their size and power through creating identical storefronts
52consumers could easily associate with a particular chain Inside the stores, the 
chains sought to produce attractive, bright and clean shopping areas. Instead of 
the shabby appearance and pell-mell clutter of the old stores, the chains 
provided a modem layout.53 The chains improved retail lighting, hoping to 
show the vitality and spirit of the firm and contrasting it with the darkness of 
older stores.54 Sears used its tremendous resources to push for architectural 
change and modem building styles. It insisted on having large parking lots to
52 Winfield Caslow, Sob-Squad, 161-164,224.
53 The Booster, December 8, 1927, I; Monod, Store Wars, 151-155; Strasser, 
Satisfaction Guamteed, 246-248; Sedgley, “The History o f the Owl Drug Company,” 1.
54 Sedgley, "A History o f Owl Drug Store," 22, 34; National Retail Clothier, June 
1937, 14-15.
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accommodate the new driving customer and also built the first windowless 
store, an innovation unthinkable before the development of air conditioning.55
Chain advertising also emphasized their vitality. In part, the chains 
appeared so virile, because their advertising budget dwarfed that of most small 
retailers. Their print and radio ads argued that they provided the modem 
housewife with the sane, modem solution to purchasing. In a nation obsessed 
with newness, power and vigor, with the ideal of bigger and better, the chains 
claimed to be the future of consumption.56 The A&P corporation ran a series 
of ads in the 1920s that exemplified this approach. In one advertisement, a 
housewife is described as a "buying agent" for the home, a trusted individual 
responsible for marshalling resources to stretch precious household dollars. 
Throughout the campaign, the grocery chain emphasized its “scientific” 
approach to the problems of retailing.
In an effort to broaden their appeal and demonstrate their superiority 
and modernity, the large chains also emphasized efficiency and the role of the 
expert in their organization. Because of their immense size, chain retailers
55 Condon, “Speech to Real Estate Group November 20, 1947," pp. 1 ,3 -4 , Sears 
Corporate Archives.
56 The Community Builder, March 2, 1931,1; Lessing Rosenwald to Barton August 17, 
1931 box 79 "Sears and Roebuck” Barton Papers; Barton to Rosenwald August 4, 1931 
ibid.
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could afford to hire specialists in all aspects of retailing: store layout, 
advertising, purchasing and real estate.57 Real Estate experts, for example, 
selected the sites of future stores through "traffic studies," which sought busy
58locations to attract customers. The chains emphasized the importance of 
uniformity of rules and standardization of practices.59 The central offices 
dictated policies, including, in many cases, cutting expensive services like 
credit and delivery.60 They also developed manuals with procedures for dealing 
with employees and the public.61 The chains implemented these retail policies 
through a  bureaucracy of regional managers and overseers that limited the 
autonomy of the local manager, even listing prices for products. 62 Through 
attention to these rules, the chains believed they could streamline the process of 
distribution and ensure low prices and excellent service throughout the country.
57 Richard Ely, Monopolies and Trusts (New York: MacMillan, 1910), 157; Condon, 
“Speech to Real Estate Group November 20,1947," 3- 4; Diner, A Very Different Age, 
230.
58 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 226.
59 The Booster, December 8,1927, 1.
60 Empire Magazine, July 8, 1962 in the Penney File, American Heritage Center, 
University o f  Wyoming; Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 249-250.
61 Sedgely, "History o f Owl Drug Company," 21-22; Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 
226; "West Side Retail Store December 31, 1925," box 45, "Sears 1924-1925," Wood 
Papers.
62 Holsey to Barnett, January 11, 1930, box 251 folder 6, Barnett Papers.
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The chains asserted that the nation received better service from them 
and their corporate efficiency. As the chains expanded across the country and 
trumpeted their growth, independent shopkeepers condemned them as an 
assault on the American way of life. The entry of mail order companies into 
chain retail particularly encouraged storekeepers to focus on the chains as a 
new threat to community life.63 Veterans of the progressive campaigns joined 
the retailers as vocal opponents. By the mid- 1920s, a hodge-podge of critics 
condemned the chains, including union members, farmers, the Ku Klux Klan 
and black activists.64
These groups had different concerns. Trade unionists worried about the 
low wages and long hours in chain stores. Although they appreciated lower 
prices in chain stores, some unionists feared chain buying practices would 
force down union wages in the manufacturing sector.65 For their part, farmers 
had been the bulwarks of anti-monopoly forces since the Populist movement. 
They worried that strong corporate interests would use their market power to 
lower agricultural prices.66 Farmers had just fought a bitter battle to stop large
63 Chicago Tribune, October 26, 1926.
64 Diner, A Very Different Age, 46.
65 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 114-115; Monod, Store Wars, 133.
66 Rural Trade, September 1926, 14.
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meat packers from entering into the grocery business because they feared
67corporate intrusion into distribution. Racial activists, including Black 
socialist A. Philip Randolph and the Ku Klux Klan, opposed the chains 
because they brought foreign intrusion into local communities. Randolph
warned African-Americans that chains would strip opportunity from Black
68people and leave them at the mercy of white corporate interests. The Ku Klux 
Klan, one of the most powerful movements of the 1920s, criticized the chains 
for threatening the communities of America. Much like Randolph, the Klan 
argued that trade and money should be kept within the racial community and 
away from outsiders. The Klan promoted “Trade with Klansmen”, or "TWK,” 
a booster program that encouraged members to shop with one another. The 
pages of their newspapers reveal a large number of small merchants as 
members, and in sporadic editorial campaigns the Klan criticized the chains.69
67 Capper, "Speech in Congress March 23, 1920," p.7, box 48 "Speeches 1920," Capper 
Papers; Capper, "The Farmer’s Place in American Business January 15, 1920," p. 10, box 
48 "Speeches 1920," Capper Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 34.
68 A. Philip Randolph, "The Crisis in Negro Business," Messenger, March 1922, 246- 
247; Broad Ax, January 11, 1919 in box 149, folder 4, Barnett Papers; Holsey to 
Barnett, n .d , box 251, folder 6, Barnett Papers.
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the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s (Urbana, Illinois: University o f Illinois Press, 1992), 237; 
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Of course retailers had an even greater interest in the chain stores. Large 
trade associations articulated their official voice. The National Association of 
Retail Grocers (NARGUS) and the National Association of Retail Druggists 
(NARD) were the two most prominent national trade organizations. Both 
groups had been founded in the late 1890s as part of a surge of 
professionalization. They represented the interests of retailers in government 
and promoted high standards of conduct and performance by their members, 
disseminating information on retailing through trade shows and the trade
70press. Both NARGUS and the NARD had state and local chapters that 
cooperated with them, and local trade organizations and chambers of 
commerce organized groups in towns throughout the nation. Such groups 
sponsored programs to boost trade in the community or control retail trade 
practices, including wages and hours.71 Despite the significant role played by 
these groups, many retailers refused to join them because they believed the 
organizations failed to act in their interests or they did not want to pay 
membership fees. In fact, the national organizations consistently organized 
fewer than ten percent of all merchants. Even local trade associations found
70 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 246; Rural Trade, June 1926, 3.
71 The Man You Ought To Know, September 1928, 1, 2, 12; The Booster, July 19, 
1929,1; Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 219-221.
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opposition from merchants unwilling to donate money or suspicious of efforts 
to control trade practices and hours of operation.72
The rise of the chains sparked numerous controversies in these 
associations.73 Some retailers believed the stores would crush the independents 
unless immediate legislative action was taken against their unfair trade 
practices; others proved more confident that modernization would save them 
from the new competition.74 Although retailers and their trade associations 
sought outside help to counter the growth of the chains, they also attempted 
reforming themselves in order to meet the challenge. Retailers and their trade 
organizations developed a number of educational initiatives to counter the 
chain challenge.75 Trade magazines covered all facets of retailing from 
purchase of the product to final sale, and encouraged modernization that 
emulated the techniques of innovative retailers. For example, they discussed 
the importance of inventory control and urged retailers to study their rate of
turnover and carry better selling items. Other articles discussed accounting
72 Monod, Store Wars, 229, 342.
73 Sedgley, “The History o f the Owl Drug Company,” 3.
74 Diner, A Very Different Age, 42, 49; Rural Trade, July 1926, 17.
75 Rural Trade, June 1926, 17; The Booster, December 8, 1927,1; National Clothier, 
June 1937, 14-15. Monod, Store Wars, 341; Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 230-232, 
235,249; Harvard University Bureau o f Business Research, Expenses in Operating 
Retail Grocery Stores, bulletin no. 5 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915).
32
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
techniques and covered methods that could help in the calculation of adequate 
profit m argins. They also suggested improvements in layout and advertisement 
that would lead to increased patronage. Although some of these techniques 
could be done quite easily, others required considerable capital outlay. Some 
retailers could not afford the cost of these changes and did not follow through
76with the reforms.
Other independent retailers joined together, often with the help of 
wholesalers, to create so-called "voluntary chains." Voluntary chains 
emulated their corporate opponents by pooling buying resources and sharing 
advertising campaigns, publicity materials, and information on improved 
retail techniques. 77 The most famous of the voluntary chains was the 
Independent Grocers Association (IGA). J. Frank Grimes created this 
organization in Chicago to protect small retailers against the massive 
inroads made by corporate chains. As Grimes later bragged, “The IGA came 
into being when a small group of men banded together to whip collectively 
the problems we could not whip as individuals. At that time it was
76 Monod, Store Wars, 187.
77 Monod, Store Wars, 148, 181-183, 240; Merchant’s  Journal, August 2, 1924, 9; 
Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 229; WISCO Hardware, A History o f  the WISCO 
Hardware Company (Madison, Wisconsin: WISCO Hardware, 1932), 186; J. Frank 
Grimes to Roosevelt, September 29,1936, PPF 3977, Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt 
Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York.
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commonly accepted that the independent merchant was doomed because of 
the great strides being made by his highly organized corporate competition.” 
The IGA prospered, and still organizes independent grocers throughout the 
country. Because of their success, retailers combined in the drug and hardware 
fields.78
One of the most interesting voluntary chains was the Colored Merchants 
Association (CMA), established by the National Negro Business League, an 
organization founded by Booker T. Washington. The League sought to build 
economic prosperity through Black business and believed Black purchasing 
power should support good paying jobs for African-Americans.79 The CMA, 
like many other projects of the National Negro Business League, relied on help 
from white businessmen, politicians, and bureaucrats to organize its 
operations. These leaders offered expert advice and investment capital. But the 
organization always emphasized that Black members held the majority of
SOinvestment. The CMA modeled itself on the IGA, pooling buying power and 
advertising dollars and passing along the latest techniques in retailing.
78 The Booster, September 14, 1928, 1; The Booster, March 15, 1929, 1.
79 Holsey to Barnett, May 26, 1930, pp. 4-5, box 251, folder 6, Barnett Papers; H olsey, 
"Address to the National Negro Labor Conference," January 28, 1930, p.2, ibid.
80 Holsey to Barnett, January 22, 1929, box 251, folder 5, Barnett Papers; Holsey to 
Barnett, June 3, 1929, ibid.
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Unfortunately, it dissolved after several years because of inadequate financing 
and infighting.81
In addition to pushing to increase their efficiency, the CMA, IGA and 
other voluntary chains condemned the chains in their advertising and other 
public statements.82 Their criticisms mirrored attacks made by retail trade 
associations. Chain stores, according to these groups, endangered the 
community by threatening the stability, openness and equality of the American 
economy. The retailers argued, in addition, that chain stores did not contribute 
to civic improvement activities, which they referred to as “boosting.” Small 
retailers prided themselves on their donations to charity and efforts to improve 
the quality of life and economy of their towns through the road building and 
electrification projects they sponsored. In contrast, they said, the chains sought
83to suck as much money as possible from the pockets of local consumers. 
Small retailers emphasized that citizens should trade at home and build up their
81 "A Message o f Real Importance to Negro Retail Grocers," pp. 2-3, box 238 folder 4, 
Barnett Papers; Barnett to Moton, September 22, 1930, pp.l -2, ibid; Barnett to Holsey, 
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46.
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
communities by patronizing local storeowners. They condemned chains for 
driving small retailers out of business, eliminating opportunity, and 
concentrating wealth in the hands of the few.
Because of their hatred for the chains, independent retailers made direct 
attacks on the stores. Their assaults took two forms. They promoted boycotts, 
and shopkeepers urged government action against corporate retailing. Local 
groups led the boycotts. Their trade organizations had been active for decades 
in promoting local trade and civic boosterism. As Wayne Fuller discusses in 
his study of mail order businesses, the trade organizations had already 
responded to the rise of mail order and department stores with boycotts, which 
featured bonfires and marching bands. Emotions became so heated in some 
communities, that mail order catalogs arrived in plain brown wrappers. With 
chain stores as a new target, retailers started similar campaigns. They 
distributed anti-chain educational materials and also organized protests, 
complete with parades and community dinners to encourage consumers to 
withhold dollars from the chain.84
84 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 215; Wayne Fuller, RFD: The Changing Face o f  
Rural America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), 199-227; Casiow, Sob- 
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Independent retailers also championed attempts to get the federal 
government to control predatory behavior by the chains. National trade groups 
had not responded to the boycotts because they shied away from controversial 
tactics and preferred to remain in the background. In addition, NARGUS and 
the NARD had no history of involvement with boycotts because Sears and 
Montgomery Ward had little effect on their trade. Such direct action was
85foreign to their experience and outside their expertise. Because they could 
more readily coordinate lobbying of the federal government, the national 
associations concentrated their efforts in Washington. NARGUS and NARD 
passed on complaints against the chains to the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and lobbied it to apply existing law to the chains in order to curb their 
growth. The associations also promoted new legislation to strengthen the anti­
trust laws and, in particular, permit price maintenance, or the right of 
manufacturers to set minimum retail prices.
The FTC did not take action against the chains for two reasons. First, 
and most important, the agency saw no violation of the Clayton Act, the 
applicable statute. It regulated purchase of stock, not outright takeovers. As 
such, the chain mergers, usually by purchase of assets, were not scrutinized. 
Furthermore, the act made no condemnation of predatory pricing. It prevented
85 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 78-80.
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manufacturers from discriminating based on locality but permitted quantity 
discounts. Although the FTC attacked predatory pricing in a 1927 report, there 
was neither a belief that chains were solely responsible for such pricing nor a 
conviction that there was a legal basis on which to attack them.86 Second, the 
FTC had entered a more conciliatory period in its relations with business. 
During the Republican administrations of the 1920s, the commission came 
under the control of administrators who were friendly with business. 
Commissioners believed that industry had proved its service to the nation and 
vowed to reward this service with a new policy. This approach, termed 
"associationalism1 by historian Ellis Hawley and others, sought to promote 
business efficiency through support by the FTC and other governmental 
agencies.87 The FTC sponsored trade practice conferences to foster productive 
behavior by business and make the economy function as smoothly as possible. 
Through these meetings, the agency hoped to promote purchasing power. 
Following the advice of staff economists, the FTC concluded that chain stores
86 Whittier, "Observations on the FTC Report, December 12, 1927, p. 2, box 39, "Fair 
Trade 1930," Capper Papers; W. P. Johnson, "1929 Price Maintenance Bulletin,” ibid.
87 Ellis Hawley, The Great War and the Search for a Modem Order: a History o f the 
American People and their Institutions, 1917-1933 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1979); Brotherhood o f  Locomotive Firemen and Enginemans Magazine, August 1927, 
p. 12, reel 5 volume 17, Irving Fisher Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University, New 
Haven, Connecticut.
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improved the efficiency of retailing and acted as a positive force for social 
change, lowering the price of retail goods to the consumer.88
Small retailers and wholesalers criticized the FTC for its policy on chain 
stores. These groups complained that the FTC failed to attack growing chain
89corporations. They believed that differences in sales costs could not account 
for the sharp discrepancy in prices, and they alleged that chain units, dubbed 
“fighting stores,” deliberately sold below cost in order to drive competitors 
from business. Most o f the states had moribund laws against such predatory 
pricing, and a small retailer, H. S. Riddle, filed suit against A & P for loss 
leader pricing in Topeka, Kansas.90 Riddle’s suit energized militants in 
NARGUS, and they called for the association to investigate A & P’s prices in 
various cities nationwide. The association concluded that they needed to take 
action and urged a congressional investigation of chain price-cutting. In 1928, 
Iowa Senator Smith Wildman Brookhart pushed this resolution through the 
Congress, starting an investigation that would not conclude for another five
_  91years.
88 Palamountain, The Politics o f  Distribution, 34, 72.
90 Voices o f a Black Nation, 248-249; Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 251.
91 George William McDaniel, Smith Wildman Brookhart: Iow a’s Renegade Republican 
(Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1995), 243-244; Congressional Record, 70 
Congress, 1 Session, 347; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 30-36.
39
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The retailers also called for legislation to restore the right to price 
maintenance. In the same 1911 session that dissolved the Standard Oil and 
American Tobacco trusts for predatory pricing, the Dr. Miles Medical 
Company case had invalidated sales contracts.92 Manufacturers, particularly 
Kellogg’s, Gillette, and Cream of Wheat, tried various legal maneuvers to 
restore these contracts and protect their products.93 Because their efforts failed, 
manufacturers and retailers urged price maintenance legislation during the 
Wilson administration. The advocates of price maintenance legislation believed 
that price-cutting demoralized the economy and threatened prosperity. They 
urged the government to act before devastating economic consequences, 
including massive retail failure and depressed wages, resulted. Famed 
progressive Louis Brandeis drafted that legislation, and he also handled the 
public relations campaign to promote price maintenance, championing it as a 
way to protect small business.94 The House Committee of Interstate and
92 Monod, Store Wars, 159; Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 281; Harper, “The Anti- 
Chain Store Movement,” 45-48; Charles H. March, “Address Before the National 
Association o f Retail Grocers, June 22,1937,” p. 8, 110 E. 6. 8. F, Benson Papers, 
Minnesota History Center, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Charles I. Miller, Legal Status o f  
the Maintenance o f  Uniform Resale Prices (New York: American Fair Trade League, 
1916).
93 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 227-228; New York Times, October 12, 1915;
Diner, A Very Different Age, 43.
94 Monod, Store Wars, 287, 348-349; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 53.
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Foreign Commerce held hearings for the next three years of the Wilson 
presidency.95
Supporters of price maintenance legislation formed the American Fair 
Trade League. The League, dominated by manufacturers, enlisted the support 
of retailers and consumer advocates to lobby for the bill. Manufacturers, for 
their part, testified that they needed protection from unscrupulous retailers who 
used products for bait, selling them at low prices to attract customers. Loss 
leaders, according to the manufacturers, made their goods appear cheap and, 
perhaps, substandard. They complained that this practice might lead other 
retailers to stop carrying their products, either because they feared handling 
shoddy products or they worried that customers would suspect them of price 
gouging.96 Independent retailers supported the bill because of their opposition 
to predatory pricing. They promoted price competition but not loss leaders 
designed to use market power to destroy competition.97 Storekeepers warned 
Congress that small businessmen could not survive the onslaught of giant
95 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 282.
96 ibid., 228, 270-274
97 Lehn and Fink Products to Capper, October 11, 1926, p.2, box 39 "Fair Trade, 1925- 
1929," Capper Papers; Richard Weatherly to Capper, November 21, 1927, p.2, box 39 
“Fair Trade 1925-1929,” Capper Papers.
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98corporations bent on their destruction. Famed home economist Christine 
Frederick, a consulting editor of Ladies' Home Journal and wife of the editor 
of Advertising and Selling, testified as a consumer advocate for the bill. She 
argued that too many consumers wasted “thousands of calories of energy and 
car fare” in an effort to save a few cents on a toothbrush. Price cutting, she 
declared, was not economically rational. Her credibility suffered, however, 
when it was revealed she had received financial compensation from several 
manufacturers who had promoted price maintenance." Although President 
Wilson supported the bill, the revelations about Frederick’s ties to 
manufacturers and concerns about additional costs to the consumer 
undermined it. The rise of high wartime inflation only exacerbated the 
situation100
After a few years the legislation returned to the fore with Arthur Capper 
of Kansas as a new sponsor. Capper, a leader of the farm bloc and well-known 
progressive, pushed forward with new hearings in 1926. Capper warned that 
price cutting threatened retailers and manufacturers. Retailers might be
98 Whittier Bulletin, March 1, 1928,1; Whittier Bulletin, December 17, 1928, 1;
Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 224,250-251.
99 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 268-271; Whittier Bulletin, January 25, 1929, 1; 
House Judiciary Committee, Hearings on Trust Legislation, 63d Congress, 2d Session, 
February 1914,725-733; Caslow, Sob-Squad, 94.
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destroyed by large competitors using loss leaders to gain market share. 
Manufacturers, he said, could not operate without an adequate profit, and, he 
added, price-cutting threatened their products by making them appear cheap, 
or inferior. Upscale retailers, those providing a better price, might no longer 
want to handle the items. Capper amended the bill to allow for certain sales 
below price, such as sales ordered by a bankruptcy court. Capper's legislation 
once again won strong support from manufacturers and retailers.101 Proponents 
o f the bill, especially druggists and pharmaceutical companies, supported it 
with the same fervor that had sparked boycotts against the chain stores in 
various parts of the country. These retailers believed the bill offered the only 
hope for the continued survival of independent retailing. Independents 
developed twin themes that were expressed in the local boycotts. They 
complained that chains used nefarious techniques to drive them out of business 
and boasted that they had offered solid retail service and built up the nation’s
100 Monod, Store Wars, 263
101 George A. Baker, A History o f  Arizona Pharmacy (Tuscon, AZ: Arizona Pharmacy 
Historical Foundation, 1985), 62; Capper, “Speech Before the Kansas Retail Grocers 
Association in Topeka, Kansas November 1927,” pp. 1-2, box 49, "Speeches 1927,” 
Capper Papers; W. P. Johnson, "1929 Price Maintenance Bulletin," box 39, 'Tair Trade 
1930,” Capper Papers; Capper, "Resale Price Legislation,” p. 12, box 39, "Fair Trade 
1925-1929," Capper Papers.
102 O. J. Schmitz to Capper, April 17, 1928, box 39, "Fair Trade 1925-1929," Capper 
Papers; Capper to Schmitz, April 20,1928, ibid.
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towns. One Kansas wholesale grocer, J. G. Thompson, described a Safeway 
Store opening with a big “hurrah” in his town. In the past sixty days, he said, 
he had seen why retailers throughout the country reacted so sharply to the 
chain threat. Safeway sold products cheaper than their own stores in the 
nearest large town—in his opinion, an effort to attract business through loss 
leaders. Thompson questioned the prices offered and the quality of the 
products and accused the chains of deceptive advertising, including broken 
slices of pineapple pawned off as a higher-grade product. J. F. Tatman, a 
storekeeper from Clare, Michigan, wrote Capper that he had been a pioneer 
merchant who had built his town from nothing. He resented the intrusion of 
the chains now that the town had grown and stumps no longer clogged its
103streets. Retailers begged for support.
Although a solid base of support existed, the bill could not overcome 
strong opposition. Many congressmen worried that this sort of legislation 
would reduce purchasing power and hurt the consumer. They wondered 
whether the bill would interfere with improvements in retailing and questioned 
excessive government control over the decisions of private business.104
103 J. G. Thompson to Capper, October 31, 1928, pp. 1-3; J. F. Tatman to Clyde Kelly, 
January 16, 1928; H. J. Hodge to Capper, January 30, 1928. All in box 39 “Fair Trade 
1925-1929,” Capper Papers.
104 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 271-272; Kelly to Whittier, June 23,1928, box
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Although retailers failed to win this legislation, small storeowners had 
succeeded in developing an effective critique of the chains by the close of the 
1920s. They argued that they offered productive, effective retail service and 
bragged that they had built the prosperity of their towns. In contrast, they said, 
the chains offered false bargains and had no interest in the welfare of the local 
community. Chains endangered the consumer. They were a cancer in 
economic life. Those criticisms found fullest expression and seized the 
attention of the nation when a series of radio campaigns galvanized public 
opinion in 1929 and 1930.
39, "Fair Trade 1925-1929," Capper Papers; Whittier Bulletin, October 10,1928, 1.
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Chapter Two: Radio and Retail
In 1929 and 1930 opposition to chain stores reached national 
consciousness as a number of controversial radio campaigns attacked the 
chains and attracted the attention of the national media. After the collapse of 
the stock market, economic issues in general attracted even more attention, and 
for about a year it became a fad to discuss the chains and their impact on 
America's economy. As one Minnesota newspaper complained, "What a 
nation for crazes we are, anyway! A few years ago folks were bugs about the 
Ku Klux. We went hogwild about the land boom. . . . Now we're going wild 
about the chain stores."1 Even the Lil Rascals made a film, Helping Grandma, 
that dealt with the chain store takeover of a small neighborhood store. In that 
short, a kindly old grocery woman finds herself the target of a chain store buy 
out. The film ends well with the chain store giving grandma a large sum of 
money to enjoy her retirement2 Outside of Hollywood, the effects of chain
1 Quotation attributed to the Worthington Times, a Minnesota newspaper, in Break the 
Chains, April 26,1930,4.
1 See Helping Grandma, Volume 7 of the Cabin Fever Collection with Leonard Maltin, 
videocassette.
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growth generated more controversy. Because of widespread public attention, 
the chain store issue became the national debate topic for 1930 as high school 
and college debate teams argued the merits of the chains.3
Those academic debates honed the reasoning and speaking skills of 
participants, but an argument with higher stakes developed between small 
shopkeepers and corporate retailers. Independent storeowners and their trade 
associations challenged chain claims to be the future of retailing. They denied 
that chains offered superior efficiency and service and instead depicted chains 
as a threat to independent retailing and a danger to the community. Customers 
needed to consider more than the dollar cost of merchandise, local retailers 
argued, more even than their own pocketbook. They should contemplate the 
repercussions of their actions for the community as a whole, since chains 
sucked prosperity and wealth out of them. In the Depression many Americans 
responded to local retailers’ calls to action. Boycotts of the chains sprang up 
around the country, ultimately failing to stop the growth of the chains, because 
consumers sought bargains where they could find them. The campaigns did,
3 Winfield Caslow, The Sob-Squad, 256; Huber to Daniel Andre Drotning, December 11, 
1930, box 7, "1930 November-December," Huber Papers, Wisconsin State Historical 
Society, Madison, Wisconsin; Break the Chains, February 15, 1930, 2; ibid., March 8, 
1930, 25; ibid, May 2, 1930, 9; University Debaters Annual 1929-1930, ed  Edith 
M.. Phelps (New York: H  W. Wilson and Company, 1930); The Reference Shelf, 7, no.6, 
ed. Daniel Bloomfield (New York: H  W. Wilson and Company, 1931).
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however, more fully develop critiques of the chains that would be used to 
promote legislation on a federal, state and national level.
Although foes had attacked the chains for more than a decade, a series 
of controversial radio broadcasts brought the issue to national attention, 
dramatizing the growth of the chains and criticizing them with great passion. 
W.K. "Old Man" Henderson pioneered these diatribes, bringing the plight of 
the independent merchant to greater prominence. His broadcasts over 
Shreveport, Louisiana, station KWKH repeated attacks made by retailers in 
earlier boycotts of chain stores. When Henderson delivered them, however, he 
used a clear channel radio station, which reached throughout the South and the 
Midwest Listeners warmed to this vibrant new voice that offered a powerful 
critique of a widespread institution. He became a cult figure. A newspaper in 
Wichita, Kansas, reported that his broadcasts were topics of conversation 
throughout the city. Some Georgia businessmen chartered a special train car to 
meet him in person. The public enthusiasm spawned a host of imitators and 
attracted the attention of national newspapers and business magazines.4
4 Wichita Booster, February 7, 1930; Grocers' Commercial Bulletin, February 1930, 8; 
Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 102-103,446; So The People May Know: A 
Publication Favoring Lower Gas and Electric Rates, March 1930,2-4; Shreveport 
Times, May 29, 1945.
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Henderson’s criticism of the chains grew out of his long-standing anti­
corporate convictions- The m illionaire owner of a Shreveport iron works, 
Henderson supported Huey Long in his 1928 campaign for Governor of 
Louisiana, donating free airtime over KWKH and ten thousand dollars to the 
Long campaign. The station gave Long a powerful platform to broadcast his 
message, and Long employed it to address the public directly, without going 
through the daily newspapers he correctly perceived to be hostile to his 
interests.5 After Long’s election, Henderson supported the governor in his 
populist attacks on corporations. Because of Henderson's opposition to big 
business, he allowed his friend, Phil Lieber, the chairman of the Shreveport 
Chamber of Commerce and President of a Building and Loan, to deliver the 
first broadcast critical of the chains. Lieber’s speech received an 
overwhelmingly positive response, and the resulting barrage of letters and 
telegrams convinced Henderson to launch an ongoing crusade against the 
chains.
Henderson sensationalized his attacks, portraying his broadcasts as the 
last defense of independent business. He promoted a homespun message that
5 Glen Jeansonne, Messiah o f the Masses: Huey P. Long and the Great Depression (New 
York: HarpeiCollins College Publisher, 1993), 54-55.
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other media outlets refused to deliver: Boycott the chains or risk the future 
prosperity of America6 Listeners heard Henderson sign on the air with his 
folksy "Hello World How the Doggone are you?" Then they sat back and 
listened as he waged war with tremendous ferocity. His antics provided plenty 
of entertainment. When Henderson once mocked Clarence Saunders, the 
Memphis based founder of the Piggly Wiggly chains he sparked a batde royal. 
In response to being called an effeminate liar and a cheat, Saunders threatened 
Henderson with a lawsuit for slander and, for good measure, placed full-page 
ads in several newspapers that referred to Henderson as a “shiny-eyed rat.”7
Henderson's dramatic approach and large radio audience attracted 
politicians to KWKH to address residents of the South and Midwest. Because 
of his relationship with Henderson, Huey Long became the first political figure 
to attack chain retailing over the station, and he emphasized the issue in his 
1930 campaign for the Senate. Politicians from throughout the region flocked
6 L. M. Mott, "Self-Preservation: An Address on the Foreign Chain Systems," Modem 
Minute Men Literature, 3 in box 37A, folder 3, Patman Papers, Lyndon Baines Johnson 
Presidential Library, Austin, Texas; H  F. Wachter to Henderson, October 5 1932, box 618 
"W.K. Henderson File," Secretary's File, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, 
Iowa; Henry Huber to ML P. Campbell, July 24,1930, box 6, folder 5, Henry Huber Papers, 
Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.
7 Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement," 85,99; Memphis Commercial Appeal, March 
14,1930; Anti-Chain World, February 15,1930,5; Louisiana Progress, May 1,1930,5.
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to the mike in Shreveport: Attorney General C. A. Sorenson of Nebraska, 
Senator Morris Sheppard from Texas, Representative Clyde Kelly of 
Pennsylvania, and Governor Phil La Follette from Wisconsin all spoke on 
Henderson broadcasts.8 The popular response to these criticisms led 
Henderson to create his own organization dedicated to preserving independent 
business in the United States: the Merchant's Minute Men. The group included 
small merchants and their sympathizers from throughout the United States. 
Although the national retail organizations refused to join the association, some 
state retail organizations signed up and many local organizations affiliated. 
More retailers joined Henderson's group than were members of the National 
Association of Retail Grocers (NARGUS), the largest retail association at that 
time.9
In 1930 the Minute Men held a convention in Shreveport; thousands of 
delegates from dozens of states assembled to listen to speakers and propose
8 Jeansonne, Messiah o f the Masses, 54-55; Louisiana Progress, March 27,1930; Louisiana 
Progress, April 10, 1930; Huey Long, “The Chain Gang and How to Fight It,” April 23, 
1930, in Louisiana Progress, May 1, 1930; Louisiana Progress, April 3, 1930, 6; Anti- 
Chain World, February 15, 1930, 5; M. H  Cavanaugh to Huber, February 5, 1931, box 6, 
"1931 February," Huber Papers; “Governor Andy Lee,” Biographical File, South Dakota 
Historical Society, Pierre, South Dakota.
9 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 102-110; Montaville Flowers, America 
Chained, 146-159.
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solutions to the chain store crisis. Huey Long urged the retailers to stay the 
course and resist corporate forces. They had truth and God on their side, Long 
assured them, no matter what earthly power opposed them.10 Although the 
convention goers cheered Long’s speech, they bristled when Charles Brough, 
former Governor of Arkansas, rose to tell them that chain stores were there to 
stay. He advised retailers to improve their retailing  techniques and cooperate in 
order to survive.11 Many of the attendees regarded such remarks as positively 
rude in present company—a major breech of etiquette. Most of the discussions 
at the convention centered on strengthening federal anti-trust law since 
Henderson and his supporters believed long-term boycotts would be difficult to 
manage and unlikely to succeed.12
In addition, Henderson urged the convention to memorialize Congress 
to protect the broadcast rights of his station. Henderson condemned the 
encroachment of chain radio. In the late Twenties, the National Broadcasting 
Corporation and Columbia Broadcasting System had begun to tie together 
chains of stations, as they were then known. Henderson complained that the
10 Shreveport Journal, October 4,1930; Shreveport Journal, October 22, 1930.
11 Louisiana Progress, October 30, 1930; New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 23, 1930; 
New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 24,1930; Shreveport Journal, October 22,1930.
12 Shreveport Journal, October 4,1930; Shreveport Journal, October 21, 1930.
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Federal Radio Commission, forerunner of the FCC and responsible for the 
airwaves, authorized more power to chain members than to independent 
stations. He also attacked the commission for discriminating against Southern 
stations. Henderson threatened to ignore the Commission rulings and operate at 
a higher broadcasting power.13
Henderson and his broadcasts came under increasing criticism. Stung 
by his attacks, the Federal Radio Commission responded to complaints lodged 
by chain stores about claims made in his broadcasts. In addition, they reacted 
to citizens offended by Henderson’s vulgar language, which included liberal 
use of the “d” and “h” words.14 In turn, supporters of Henderson wrote their
13 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 86; Louisiana Progress, October 16, 1930, 
3; 8; W. K. Henderson to Senators Brookhart and Sheppard, January 20, 1930,27-11-02-03 
"Radio and Music January-Februaiy 1931," Henry Woodring Papers, Kansas State 
Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas; Shreveport Journal, October 23, 1930,15.
14 Mrs. Grace Cooper to Hoover, January 18, 1930, box 618 "W.K. Henderson file," 
Secretary’s File, Hoover Papers; Emmanuel Stoltenberg to Gov. Henry Woodring, February 
13, 1931, 1-2; A. E. Chapman to Woodring, February 5, 1931, 2-4; A.E. Chapman to 
Woodring, February 5, 1931, pp. 2-4; C. E. Dougan to Woodring, February 4,1931, p.3; A. 
N. Bullard to Woodring, February 14, 1931, Nettie Rodgers to Woodring, February 13, 
1931, p.2; H. R. Ramsey to Woodring, February 16, 1931; T. H. Otis Atchinson to 
Woodring, February 14, 1931; Mrs. Margaret Edgenib to Woodring, February 14, 1931, 1- 
2; Lannie W. Stewart to Woodring, February 15, 1931. All in 2-11-02-03 “Radio and Music 
January-February 1931” Henry Woodring Papers; Webb City Leader, January 1, 1931; 
Webb City Leader, January 29, 1931; Woodring to Irene Hamerle, n.d Pate February]; 
Woodring to F. C. Pickell, February 11, 1931, "Radio and Music Mar-Dee 1931;" 
Woodring to Mrs. May Hurr, February 24, 1931; McGugin to Woodring, April 14, 1931; 
McGugin to Woodring, April 9, 1931, 2; C. Mack Saltzman to Woodring, February 25, 
1931. All in 27-11-02-03 "Radio and Music January-February 1931," Henry Woodring 
Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 96; New York Times, January 17, 1930;
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governors and others to complain about the actions of the Federal Radio 
Commission. As one listener remarked, if Henderson played jazz music, "the 
delirium tremens of music" or talked against prohibition, he would not have 
been attacked.15
In addition to the chains and individuals upset by Henderson's vulgarity, 
other groups attacked the broadcaster. Unions condemned him for breaking a 
strike at his iron works with scab labor.16 Even more important, small retailers 
began to criticize his conduct. In particular, they resented his efforts to market 
goods over the radio. Henderson had developed a range of products, including 
his best seller, "Hello World" coffee. Small retailers considered it colossal 
hypocrisy for him to attack mail order companies and chain stores for 
subverting local merchants and yet sell goods of his own over the air.17 Trade 
associations especially questioned Henderson's priorities. The California Retail
ibid. ', January 25,1930.
15 Dr. B. F. Slusher to Gov. Henry Woodring, May 28, 1930, 27-11-02-03, "Radio and 
Music January-February 1931," Henry Woodring Papers.
16 Louisiana Progress, April 17, 1930, 2; Jeansonne, Messiah o f the Masses, 54-55; Anti- 
Chain World, February 15,1930,4.
17 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 87, 131-132, 136; Anti-Chain World 
February 15,1930.
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Grocers Association, which had already expressed opposition to Henderson,
T f iblasted him for his schemes and questioned his handling of donations.
Questions about his financial propriety and criticism of his vulgar 
language limited Henderson's effectiveness as a leader of the anti-chain store 
movement, and he soon turned to other topics, including appeals to help cotton 
farmers suffering from the agricultural depression.19 Although Henderson 
slowly withdrew from the movement, he had had tremendous influence, 
spawning dozens of imitators on radio stations throughout the nation. These 
other broadcasters spread the criticisms of the chains, sparked debate on the 
chain store issue, and along with Henderson brought it to the forefront of 
national debate. Some of the more famous of these commentators received 
national attention, including Robert Duncan of Portland, Oregon; Winfield 
Caslow of Grand Rapids, Michigan; and Montaville Flowers of Pasadena, 
California. Robert Duncan received the most national attention. Although 
Duncan modeled his radio broadcasts on those of Henderson, he started his 
agitation against the chain stores as the publisher of his own trade newspaper 
in the mid-1920s. During that period, Duncan organized a boycott of
18 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 133; New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
December 4,1930.
19 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 136-137.
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manufacturers serving chain stores. He had also promoted a voluntary chain
20with a thousand members that emphasized modernization of stores. When 
Duncan heard about the Henderson broadcasts, from friends in Texas, he 
rushed to the new medium. Duncan celebrated the power of radio, which 
allowed him to bypass the local newspapers and reach directly to the people of 
the region with his anti-chain message.21 Referring to himself as the "Oregon 
Wildcat," Duncan prided himself on being a loud-mouthed fanatic. He joked 
that he would be making a public appearance at a meeting of the independent 
Meat Dealers. He would be in a "glass case," like some sort of exhibit from a 
freak show.22 Duncan reveled in his notoriety and the negative reaction he 
received in certain quarters. He once told his listeners that anonymous callers 
had threatened to dynamite him but bragged that the ladies or Portland loved 
an aggressive man like him and would revolt if he were injured. He even 
claimed that a chain in Portland had offered to pay for his police protection 
because they worried about such an occurrence.23 Despite his boasts, Duncan's
20 Duncan Radio Broadcasts, transcripts, pp. 305-306, 337, Special Collections, University 
o f Oregon, Eugene, Oregon.
21 Duncan Radio Broadcasts, transcripts, 245 253,272,293-294,351-352,290-1.
22 ibid., 224,230,232-34,236,251,257,281,284-85,312,315,322-324,342.
23 ibid., 255,257,259,289; Louisiana Progress, June 1931.
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campaign lost force over the course of 1930. The FRC fined Duncan for using 
“dam n” and “hell,” and he had problems finding a strong radio station to 
broadcast his program.
The other radio broadcasters, Caslow and Flowers, attracted less 
attention than Henderson and Duncan, but they still garnered mention in the 
national trade press and added a new element to the campaign by publishing 
books attacking the chains. Winfield Caslow broadcast against the chains in 
Grand Rapids, Michigan. Like Duncan, he had criticized corporate retailing for 
years. Caslow wrote the anti-chain movement’s only novel: The Sob-Squad. 
The hokey, romantic novel describes the crusade of a newspaper editor to 
protect his community from the effects of chain and mail order retailing. In the 
end, the passionate young man leads a campaign to close the chains, survives a 
near-fatal assassination attempt, and gets the girl, his trusty secretary. After 
finding slightly less success in his own Michigan campaign, Caslow moved his 
anti-chain crusade to Chicago, where he broadcast against the chains into the 
1930s. The other broadcaster to write a book was Montaville Flowers. Flowers, 
a long time Progressive who owned a public relations firm, began a spirited set
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of public broadcasts against the chains on the West Coast and then published 
them as The Chain Menace24
Because of the success of radio campaigns by men like Henderson, 
Duncan, Caslow, and Flowers, many local retail trade organizations developed 
campaigns against the chains. These local campaigns resembled the anti-mail 
order and booster campaigns of the early 1920s, but they often produced their 
own radio programs in order to inspire local consumers to action. 25 
Participants promoted the local economy by urging retailers, other business 
people, and consumers to support community institutions. The groups 
encouraged ethical business practices and campaigned against predatory price- 
cutting and short weight.26 In addition, organizations initiated other sorts of 
civic improvement, including beautification drives and projects to increase
24 Montaville Flowers to Phil La Foilette, December 21, 1931, box 14, folder 1, Phil La 
Follette Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society; Montaville Flowers, America Chained: 
A Discussion o f  What's Wrong with the Chain Store (Pasadena, California: Montaville 
Flowers, 1931); Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 107.
25 Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement in the United States," 76-78,103.
26 See "Forward Springfield Scrapbook," May 20, 1931, May 6, 1931, box 2, “Combined 
Retailers,” Papers o f the Association o f Commerce and Industry o f Springfield, Illinois, 
Illinois State Historical Society, Springfield, Illinois; "Annual Financial Needs o f Chamber 
o f Commerce," July 21, 1931, ibid; Charles A Horrell, "Forward Springfield 1931," box 1, 
folder "Combined Retailers,” Papers o f the Association o f Commerce and Industry of 
Springfield; “Minutes, El Dorado County Chamber of Commerce,” September 19, 1938, 
June 3, 1930, December 13, 1929, box 2, El Dorado Chamber o f Commerce Papers,
Special Collection, University o f Nevada-Reno.
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community morale. Although anti-chain organizations appeared in every part 
of the country, they were particularly strong in Minnesota, Wisconsin, Texas 
and Nebraska.
Two organizations promoted anti-chain activities in Minnesota. In 
Minneapolis, "Break the Chains" broadcast anti-chain messages and published 
their own eponymous magazine. The group promoted a booster campaign for 
Minnesota products as well.27 The cover of its first magazine showed two 
muscular forearms, marked "truth" and "publicity" ripping apart a chain 
linking several stores to each other. The image announced the arrival of a new 
organization to inform the public about the chain threat.28 "Break the Chains” 
accused the local media of ignoring chain opponents and suggested the
29newspaper bowed to the interests of large advertisers. When supporters 
questioned local newspapers about their silence on the issue, one editor 
complained that he had never heard of the new trade paper and that
27 Break the Chains, February 15, 1930,4; ibid., February l .,5 ,1930,6; ibid., April 5,1930, 
4; ibid, April 19,1930, 13.
28 ibid, February 15,1930,2,4, 14.
29 ibid., March 1, 1930, 8; ibid., March 29, 1930; Omaha Journal o f Progress, January 28, 
1928; Break the Chains, April 26, 1930,4; ibid., February 22, 1930, 3; Harper, “The Anti- 
Chain Store Movement,” 113; J. .J. Ellis, "The War on the Chain Store," Nation's Business, 
December, 1930; Recent Economic Changes, 331-341.
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Henderson’s broadcast came from Louisiana, so he felt no obligation to 
support his campaign. The association countered that the paper was hopelessly 
out of touch if it had not heard Minnesotans mention the anti-chain issue.
Both the radio broadcasts and the magazine featured a variety of attacks 
on corporate retailing. The radio program included the "Chain Store Quartet" 
for a musical interlude, and the association hired a former black-faced 
comedian to spread their message. Despite the editor's claims that it had not 
been heard, Break the Chains published dozens of letters from listeners in the
30upper Midwest. Their magazine showed similar attempts to reach out for a 
larger audience. Instead of cram m ing  their publication with statistics on 
retailing or relying solely on transcripts, of broadcasts or articles from leading 
anti-chain figures, Break the Chains created a general interest publication. It 
packed its pages with features designed to attract a female readership, 
including short fiction, a regular cooking column, and assorted household 
hints. Even these items, though, featured an anti-chain message. One serial 
was entitled "Love Letters of a Chain Store Clerk." The story is told through a 
series of letters between two chain store employees, but the writer uses the 
forum to mock chain stores for thievery, fraud, and mistreatment of workers
30 Break the Chains, March 22,1930, 15,30; Break the Chains, March 15,1930,5.
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31(and the young workers for ignorance and apathy). Another column featured 
the musings of "Auntie Chayne" who poked fun at chain stores but spent most 
of her time cracking jokes about her oldest niece who was living out her final 
years of flapperdom as a sexpot divorcee.32 The stories reflect the tension in 
the period between youth culture and traditional values. Despite some success 
with their publication and radio show, the organization endured repeated 
problems. Its secretary and magazine editor resigned in order to pursue other 
opportunities, and the group was sued because of an unpaid balance with their 
radio station. During the trial the president of “Break the Chains” became so 
enraged that he attacked the former editor in the courtroom, earning himself a 
stint in jail for contempt.33
Another anti-chain organization in Minnesota was the Association of 
Independent Merchants. It later changed its name to the Association of 
Independents to reflect its inclusion of farmers and other interested citizens. 
For a $1.50 fee, members received a subscription to the Community Builder, 
its publication. The group sought economic justice for all members of society,
31 Break the Chains, May 3, 1930, 22; ibid., April 26, 1930, 8; ibid., March 8, 1930, 2, 10; 
ibid., May 3,1930, 10; ibid., April 26,1930,17; ibid., May 3, 1930.
32 ibid., February 15,1930,2.
33 ibid., April 12,1930,27; ibid., May 9,1930,4; ibid., April 26,1930,4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
including laborers and farmers. It also boosted economic products from the 
"Great Inland Empire," Minnesota, and urged Minnesotans to purchase local 
products with their "economic weapon," the dollar. The group championed full 
enforcement of the anti-trust laws or "other laws where the spirit or intent of 
the law is evaded or violated." (i.e. prohibition). Through concerted effort, they 
hoped to stop "centrally dictated economic control" and "wage slavery and 
peonage for all classes."34
The neighboring state of Wisconsin hosted a similar effort to fight off 
central economic control. Two associations left records in that state. Samuel 
Sigman, a lawyer and Progressive Party politician, organized merchants in the 
Appleton, Wisconsin area into an anti-chain store organization, building the 
group after Henderson stirred up excitement through his broadcasts.35 The 
organization, first named the Fox River Valley Home Merchants Association, 
later changed its name to the Menasha and Neenah Home Merchant's
34 Association o f Independent Merchants, “Pamphlet,” pp.2-4 in the Pamphlet Collection of 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison; M. F. Murray to Huber, May 5, 1931, box 8, folder 
7, Huber Papers; United States Daily February 10,1930.
35 Sigman to W. K. Henderson, January 20,1930, box 4, "Orgs-Fox River Valley Merchants 
Association," Samuel Sigman Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society; La Follette 
Progressive Republican Campaign, “Extract o f Letter from Northern Wisconsin," n.d,. box 
4, T ile Misc.," Huber Papers; Fred Huntington to OMahoney, November 13, 1939, 
"TNEC Correspondence #2," OMahoney Papers, American Heritage Center, University of 
Wyoming Library, Laramie, Wyoming; Appleton Post January 22, 1930; Appleton Post
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Association to reflect its desire to form organizations in other towns. As the 
merchant’s association grew, it served as a regional umbrella for these groups. 
Because of its rapid expansion, Sigman even had pretensions of turning it into 
a statewide group because of its rapid expansion. Membership fees would be 
split evenly between local groups and the regional organization and Sigman’s
36own $1 per month retainer. The retailers also sent money from their 
organizational meeting to support Henderson’s Merchants Minute Men 
organization. In his donation letter to the “Old Man,” Sigman wrote that local 
groups should band together with national broadcasters to maximize protection 
for the independent retailer.37 Although his organization started with retailers, 
Sigman wanted to unite the people of Wisconsin, combining the power of 
farmers, workers and home merchants. In educational campaigns, he 
emphasized that independent retailers fought for the needs of the community. 
In an effort to promote these sentiments, speakers from the group addressed 
local service organizations like the Rotary, Kiwanis and Lions Club and
January 15,1930.
36 "Constitution and Articles o f Agreement o f the Wisconsin Home Merchants Association
and ________ Home Merchants Association," p.3, box 4, "Fox River Valley Home
Merchants Association, 1930," Sigman Papers.
37 Appleton Post, January 15,1930.
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sponsored an essay contest to teach children the benefits of purchasing through 
independent retailers. First prize for the contest brought an impressive $50.38
The second Wisconsin organization, called “Community Builders,” 
attacked chains from the state capital of Madison. The group sponsored the 
"Voice of Independence," a radio program featuring Ben Saunders. Saunders 
attacked local newspapers, claiming they refused to print the truth about the 
chains, but he also urged local merchants to advertise in them to offset the 
tremendous power of corporate retailing 39 Like the other organizations, the 
Community Builders promoted a continuous campaign for membership and 
dues.40 The Community Builders of America issued official-looking 
application forms marked as "Summons and Cause for Action for the Court of 
Business Relations in the State of Prosperity and County of Cooperation.” 
Members paid on a sliding scale with large manufacturers and wholesalers 
paying more than storeowners 41 In return for their payment, members received 
a Community Builders insignia to place on their window, door or track.
38 Appleton Post, Januaiy 15,1930; Appleton Post-Crescent, January 22,1930.
39 The Community Builder, March 2, 1931,4.
40 The Community Builder, March 2, 1931,2.
41 “Community Builders o f America Application Blank, 1931,” box 26, folder 5, William
Evjue Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.
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Saunders and the campaign found a receptive audience and built their 
influence, receiving positive letters from portions of Iowa and Illinois as well 
as Minnesota42 Saunders claimed that chains attempted to intimidate the radio 
station from which he broadcasted. Flushed with success, his supporters 
targeted the media and threatened the Capital Times newspaper, saying they 
would find alternative sources for news unless decisive action were to be taken 
against the chains.43 Their gambit backfired, and the editor, although a 
progressive, campaigned against the movement Despite a strong start, the 
organization collapsed after the spring of 1931.44
Similar anti-chain movements existed outside of the upper Midwest 
The Texas Anti Chain (sic) Store Association developed in that state in the 
wake of the Henderson campaign to fight chain stores.45 The group included 
an array of wholesalers and retail dealers, including owners of movie theaters, 
who faced new competition from film company chains. It published a
42 Community Builders, March 2, 1931, 6; Ben Saunders to P. W. Ramer, March 19, 1931, 
box 26, folder 5, Evjue Papers.
43 J. Dalton to Capital Times, April 4, 1931, box 26, folder 5, Evjue Papers.
44 Ben Saunders to P.W. Ramer, March 19, 1931 box 26, folder 5; Ben Saunders to P. W. 
Ramer, April 18, 1931, ibid ; W. F. Rock to Evjue, n.d. box 26, folder “Community 
Builders.” All in Evjue Papers; The Capital Times, April 14,1931.
45 Anti-Chain World February 15, 1930,6.
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newspaper, The Anti-Chain World and held mass meetings in various Texas 
towns in an effort to fight chain entry into the state.46
Another important group of anti-chain activists operated out of Omaha, 
Nebraska. The Omaha Journal o f Progress reached beyond the chain issue to 
attack other injustice it found in the state of Nebraska, criticizing gambling, 
drinking, and government corruption.47 Opponents of the chains sponsored a 
special radio campaign in the city as well. The broadcasts anchored a 
weeklong educational campaign on the chains that promoted independent 
retailers. Newspaper ads promoting the event featured the liberty bell in the 
background with the word “Independence” emblazoned across it. The 
broadcasts starred a nine-year-old "boy orator" and the Attorney General of the 
state, C. A. Sorensen.48 Because of Sorensen’s support, the Omaha group 
succeeded in getting an investigation of the chains that garnered national 
attention. Its study of pricing techniques by the Safeway grocery chain 
uncovered evidence of predatory tactics in small communities. According to 
surveys of prices, the firm sold below cost in order to build market share in
46 Anti-Chain World February 15,1930,4,7; Break the Chains, February 22,1930,3.
47 Omaha Journal o f Progress, February 6, 1931, 1.
48 C. W. Watson to C. A  Sorensen, May 23, 1930, box 6, folder 231, C. A. Sorensen 
Papers, Nebraska Historical Society, Lincoln, Nebraska; Omaha News April 23, 1930 in
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new communities. Former employees confirmed this practice and accused the 
firm of short weighting and otherwise defrauding the public. Sorensen’s 
investigation found its way into Henderson’s broadcasts and was reported 
throughout the country as proof of the chain threat.
The campaigns o f 1929 and 1930 popularized attacks that had been 
made for several years. These criticisms of chain stores can be broken into 
five sorts. The first three involved charges that chains had been spreading 
because of unfair advantages and deceptive practices. First, retailers accused 
the chains of misleading consumers. Although chains claimed to offer lower 
prices, they substituted inferior merchandise and provided shortweights. 
Second, independent retailers said that the chains could offer lower prices 
because they did not provide necessary services, like credit and delivery, to 
their customers. Third, independent retailers suggested that chains avoided 
taxes, which rightfully belonged to local communities. Chains, they 
claimed, could shift merchandise from store to store in order to avoid 
paying property tax in a given market and thus enhance their profit. The 
remaining two criticisms related to the chains’ long-term effects. Fourth, the 
independents warned that the chains, because they sent their profits to
box 60, Scrapbook XIV, Sorensen Papers; Louisiana Progress, March 1931,2.
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distant financial centers, would drain local communities of wealth and leave 
them destitute. Fifth, the chains would destroy independent retailing and 
undermine American opportunity.
Of these claims, independents in 1929 and 1930 placed special attention 
on the first issue: that of short weight.49 Alleging that chains cheated 
housewives, they warned consumers that lower advertised prices per pound did 
not necessarily signal better bargains.50 Small retailers hoped to undermine 
consumer trust in the chains and encourage consumers to shop with their 
hometown dealers. According to the chain opponents, obsessive inventorying 
forced chain managers into short weighing. Chains demanded that managers 
get one hundred one-pound bags of sugar from a hundred-pound bag of sugar. 
Although this seems reasonable at first glance, shrinking and spillage meant 
that the managers lost some of the product. As a result, employees had to short 
weight consumers in order to meet their quota of bags.51 The "Break the 
Chains" organization focused particular attention on A&P in Minneapolis.
49 Anti-Chain World, February 15, 1930, 6; Break the Chains, February 22, 1930, 8; C. M. 
Sandstron to Capper, November 28,1930, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1930," Capper Papers.
30 Appleton Review, March 14, 1930 in Sigman Scrapbooks; Anti-Chain World, February 
15, 1930, 2; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 104-05, 90-91; Chain Store 
Progress, May 1930, 3, 7; Anti-Chain World February 15, 1930; ibid., February 15, 1930, 
8.
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According to several recent customers, a manager at one location had cheated 
them. When he had been fired, representatives of the company went around to 
injured customers, offering gifts of regret in hopes of retaining their business. 
Break the Chains poked considerable fun at the public relations effort, 
reporting that one of the women "was the recipient of an unexpected chicken," 
which was delivered to her home in her absence.52 But contrary to their claims, 
and those of other activists, the chains did not develop short weight. One can 
find references to dubious weights and measures in Plato and the Book of 
Deuteronomy in the Hebrew Bible. Some chain employees certainly defrauded 
customers. Countless chain store managers faced prosecution under city and 
state weight ordinances. In fact, government reports demonstrated that chains 
committed more violations than independents. However, the disparity between 
chain and independent was hardly so large as implied by anti-chain activists. 
Chains followed no clear policy of short weighing.53
51 Caslow, Sob-Squad, 169; Duncan Radio Broadcasts, transcript, 278-279,288.
52 Break the Chains, February 15,1930,3,11.
53 Sedgley, “History o f the Owl Drug Company,” 12-13; Break the Chains, March 8, 1930; 
Interstate Grocer, January 11, 1930; ib id , February 8, 1930; ibid., August 30, 1930; ibid., 
December 13, 1930; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 92; Harvard Business 
Review, July 1931; Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 254, 260-263, 266; Our Country, 
March 4,1936, in box 302, folder 3, Lucas Papers.
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Li addition to their complaints about short weight, small retailers warned 
about other tactics to defraud shoppers. Chain stores sold some products in 
smaller sizes than those available to independent stores because canning 
companies and other manufacturers provided them with special sizes of 
products. Since, at this time, containers did not have the net weight printed on 
them, these packages offered the chains ideal opportunities for fraud. If they 
sold smaller size products, the chains could obviously offer lower prices.54 
According to anti-chain activists the chains would also substitute products in 
order to get a higher profit margin. Stores would sometimes advertise popular 
brand names at low prices but purchase only a small number of the items. 
When customers came for the specials, stores would offer other, inferior 
products, a classic "bait-and-switch" scheme. This practice occurred in 
independent stores as well, and was, furthermore, difficult to prove, but 
independents contended that chains specialized in these schemes.55 According
54 The law changed in 1938. See Helen Dallas and Maxine Enlow Read Your Labels, 
Public Affairs Pamphlets, no. 51 (New York: Public Affairs Committee, 1943), 8-11; 
Interstate Grocer, February 1930; Appleton Post-Dispatch, January 24, 1930 in Samuel 
Sigman Scrapbook, Wisconsin State Historical Society; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement,” 90-91, 104; Tobacco Leaf, May 31, 1930, 24; Duncan Radio Broadcasts, 
transcript, 224.
55 M  A. Johnson, Fifty Years o f Country Storekeeping (Brainerd, Minnesota: Lakeland 
Color Press, 1955), 127; Helping Grandma, videocassette; Break the Chains, April 12,
1930, 28-29, 31; Democrat (Johnstown, Pennsylvania), March 4, 1930 in box 39, "Fair
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to Bob Duncan, they handled shoddy merchandise and treated it in a 
disgraceful manner. He even accused Safeway and the McMarr chain of 
Portland of storing meat in their bathrooms.56 Aside from these lurid charges, 
retailers warned cocrucinsumers to beware low advertised prices on certain 
products for another reason: they only disguised higher prices throughout the 
store. Loss leaders served to draw crowds, but the chains made up the
57difference, and more, by charging more for other items. Beyond the danger to 
the consumer, chain opponents warned customers that cut prices hurt farmers 
and union workers because they lowered the prices manufacturers and farmers 
could charge.58 Duncan made a special point of this criticism, attacking brands 
for having anti-union policies.39 Because of these many underhanded tactics, 
anti-chain activists accused the chains of fostering immorality in their
Trade, 1930," Capper Papers; Break the Chains, April 12, 1930, 31; Allen Hupp to C. A  
Sorensen, January 2,1931, box 6, folder 238, Sorensen Papers.
56 Break the Chains, February 22, 1930, 8; Break the Chains, March 8, 1930, 16; Duncan 
Radio Broadcasts, transcript, 234,241-242,337.
57 Caslow, Sob-Squad, 166-171.
58 Caslow, Sob-Sqnad, 296.
59 Duncan Radio Broadcasts, transcript, 224,276,280,306,332-334.
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employees, enticing managers to forget business ethics and make money at any
* 6 0cost
Although opponents emphasized these unethical practices, a second 
theme was that the chain stores offered lower prices because they cut out 
important services like delivery and credit Because of the reduction in 
overhead, chains could charge less for their goods.61 According to opponents 
of the chains, these stores demonstrated a reluctance to cater to the needs of the 
community by eliminating free delivery. Anti-chain activists saved their 
harshest criticism, however, for the chains’ refusal to offer credit to customers.
The chains, with a few exceptions, considered credit a wasteful expense and
62shunned it. Anti-chain activists argued that this policy showed a distressing 
lack of concern, a “cold-blooded indifference,” for the needs and welfare of 
others. Many consumers relied on credit for food between paychecks.63 In an
60 Break the Chains, February 22, 1930, 2; Monod, Store Wars, 280-281; Louisiana 
Progress, March 27, 1930, 3; Break the Chains, April 12, 1930, 6; Anti-Chain World, 
February 15, 1930, 3, 8, 9; Duncan Radio Broadcasts, transcripts, 296; Fred Cunningham, 
"Awake Ye Americans," May 9, 1934, box 230, "Federal Licensing-General #1," 
CMahoney Papers.
61 Duncan Radio Broadcasts, transcript, 280; Break the Chains, April 19, 1930, 5; Helping 
Grandma, videocassette.
62 Duncan Radio Broadcasts, transcript, 235; Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, rlT l; W. A. 
Achilles and Company, “Receipt,” "Folder 2 1934 Correspondence," Walter Prescott Webb 
Collection, Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas.
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era before credit cards, the good will of a grocer meant quite a bit 
Unfortunately, some consumers did not pay their bills. As mentioned in the 
first chapter, these past-due accounts receivable hurt the profitability of the 
stores and were frequently mentioned in bankruptcy proceedings.64 Still, 
independent retailers defended the practice as an important humanitarian 
contribution to the community and bragged that independents provided charity 
for the indigent when chain stores refused.65
A third issue used against chain stores by the independent retailers was 
the lower tax burden of chain stores. According to the anti-chain activists, 
chains used loopholes in the law and deliberate subterfuge to pay a lower tax 
than independent retailers. The differential accounted, in part, for lower prices 
in the chain stores. Although this attack might seem to be without merit, state
63 Anti-Chain World, February 15, 1930, 8; Break the Chains, February 15, 1930, 13; 
Mondovi Herald News, January 31, 1930 in Sigman Scrapbook, Sigman Papers; Louisiana 
Progress, May 1,1930.
64 Wichita Independent, April 26, 1932, 1,4; Caslow, Sob-Squad, 69.
65 Anti-Chain World, February 15, 1930, 4; Helping Grandma, videocassette; “Minutes,” 
box 1, "Sheepshead Bay Independent Civic Association,” Joseph Milgram Papers, 
Brooklyn Historical Society, Brooklyn, New York; Coney Island Times, November 29, 
1930; Flatbush Observer, January 9, 1931; Coney Island Times, February 7, 1931; Coney 
Island Times, November 20, 1930; Coney Island Times, January 15, 1931; Royal Copeland 
to Joseph Sicker, December 27, 1930, box 20, 'December 1930," Royal Copeland Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Sicker to 
Copeland, December 22,1930, ibid:, Willoughby McCormick to Huber, February 5,1931, 
box 6, "1931 February," Huber Papers.
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tax laws in the 1920s and 1930s actually did permit chain corporations to 
avoid taxes in all towns but their city of incorporation. Independent retailers 
resented this rule because they felt that their competitors did not pay for city 
services.66 In addition, retailers complained tbiat the chains manipulated
67assessments to minimize their tax bills. According to chain opponents, chains 
sent inventory to other stores outside of a city or county when the assessors 
came. This trick lowered the property assessment and enabled them to lessen 
their tax burden. Governmental investigators conformed claims that chains paid 
lower taxes. In response, opponents complained tliat lower tax burdens meant
that the chains acted as parasites, living off previous work by independent
68retailers. Anti-chain organizations worked to increase assessments in order to 
narrow the gap in tax burdens.69
Fourth, anti-chain activists warned consumers that the growth of the 
chains would have a devastating long-term influence on American prosperity.
66 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 227.
67 “Minutes,” box 1, "Sheepshead Bay Independent Civile Association," Joseph Milgram 
Papers Brooklyn Historical Society; Coney Island Times, January 16,1931,3; The Booster, 
March 7,1930, 1.
68 C. Morse to LaFollette, March 18, 1931, box 17, folder 1, Phil LaFollette Papers; J .F. 
Tatman to Clyde Kelly, January 16, 1928, box 39, 'Tair Trade, 1925-1929," Capper Papers; 
J. G. Thompson to Capper, October 31,1928, ibid
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Chain stores stripped wealth from communities, they argued, and even if they 
offered better prices, a disputed point, they still undermined the local economy. 
Instead of profits remaining in town, where they could be invested, chains sent 
their money to a central headquarters. Instead of concentrating on better streets
70and a thriving downtown, chains worried about their own profits.
Chain opponents argued that, in contrast, local retailers built up the 
community. Some small retailers, especially from the Midwest and South, 
liked the image of the pioneer, the independent, rugged spirit responsible for 
taming a distant wilderness. Some small retailers remembered when they came 
into the community, before the age of chain stores, or even automobiles. They 
mentioned dirt streets with stumps in them, horses tied to posts in the front of
71the stores, and even bandit raids. In the pages of the Anti-Cham Worlds the 
image of the independent pioneer blended with that of the freedom warrior. 
Writers compared themselves to the famed warriors of the American
69 Break the Chains, February 15, 1930, 12; Interstate Grocer, February 1, 1930; 
Shreveport Journal, October 23,1930, 15; Appleton Review, April 4,1930.
70 Anti-Chain World, February 15, 1930,6.
71 "Dave Jones Catalog o f Western Merchandise (n.d., 1935?), p. 3, box 1, "Mail Order 
Catalogues," Dave Jones Collection; “Handbill, 1941,” Dave Jones Biography File, 
American Heritage Center, University o f Wyoming; J. F. Tatman to Clyde Kelly, January 
16,1928, box 39, "Fair Trade, 1925-1929," Cajjper Papers.
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Revolution and the Texas War for Independence, patriots dedicated to the 
protection of their homeland.72
If chain stores were to be permitted to control the community, the city 
and state would be destroyed as purchasing power flowed into the hands of 
out-of-state predators.73 Some speakers worried that chains might create ghost 
towns, cities that dried up and blew away when local industry collapsed.74 
Small savings on prices might therefore lead to terrifying consequences.75 This 
fear had strong roots in American economic history. Residents of the South 
and West had frequently voiced suspicions that the East profited from their 
hard work. Populists made this claim a rallying cry for their challenge of the
11 Anti-Cham World, February 15,1930,2-3,5.
73 Anti-Chain World, February 15, 1930, 1, 3, 12; Break the Chains, April 19, 1930; ibid, 
February 15, 1930, 6; Edelbhne's Drug News (Topeka, Kansas) January 1928, 1; Duncan 
Radio Broadcasts, transcripts, 281 313; Break the Chains, March 22, 1930; ‘Tire 
Department Banquet,” box 1, "Miscellaneous," Dave Jones Collection; Brooklyn Times, 
December 17, 1930 in box 1, "Letters and Press Notes Covering Looking through Life's 
Window-1931," Henry A. Meyer Papers, Brooklyn Historical Society; Flatbush Observer, 
April 4, 1936 in box 7, "Sidewalks," Henry A. Meyer Papers; Break the Chains, April 26, 
1930,33; The Community Builder, March 2,1931,6; Break the Chains, February 15,1930, 
6; Break the Chains, March 22, 1930; Break the Chains, May 2 , 1930, 8; ibid, March 8, 
1930,2.
74 L. M. Mott, "Self-Preservation: An Address on the Foreign Chain Systems," pp.5-8, box 
37A, folder 3, Patman Papers; Huber to Otto P. Kugler, June 12, 1930, box 6, folder 5, 
Huber Papers.
75 Break the Chainst February 15,1930,5-6; ibid., March 15,1930,5.
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American economic system; In Coin's Financial School, one of the most 
popular populist books, a cartoon depicts a cow feeding off of agricultural 
products from the West and South but being milked in New York. This 
metaphor reflected populist fears that wealthy financiers could dominate the 
financial markets and credit supply. If this happened, the circulating medium— 
money—would be stripped from the hands of honest working people in the 
countryside and concentrated under the control of greedy businessmen in the 
major metropolitan areas. Henderson used this cartoon in his campaign against 
the chains.76 At another time, the Anti-Chain World warned that the country 
faced crucifixion on a cross of chain store gold, clearly alluding to William J. 
Bryan's speech before the 1896 Democratic National Convention.77 These 
claims seemed validated by the experience of bankers. Many bankers 
complained that the chains kept minimum balances and shipped their money 
out of town as soon as possible, preferring central accounts in larger cities to 
holdings in small town banks. The bankers also alleged that chain store 
accounts endangered their institutions because they required frequent transfers 
and expense—with little potential for profit because the banks could not loan
76 J. E. Davis, Don't Make A&P Mad (Butte, Montana; J. E. Davis, 1990), 95. See also 
William Harvey, Coin's Financial School (Chicago: Coin Publishing Company, 1894), 91.
77 Anti-Chain World, February 15,1930,14-15.
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7gmoney that remained in their hands for just a few days. Because of the 
growth of chain banking in this period, many bankers worried that the era of 
small community banks had ended. Chains would prefer to bank with a branch 
of a larger bank High bank failure rates intensified this fear.79 Interestingly, 
the problems of these banks mirrored those of retailers. The cashier of a 
Parkston, South Dakota, bank summed up these problems in the title to his 
presentation at a conference on commercial bank management: "How Much 
Should a Bank of $25,000 Capital Earn?" Bankers hoped to evade failure by 
improving their business techniques and adopting the same "scientific" 
approach expounded by retailers.80
If this process of corporate growth continued, the independent retailers 
warned, chains threatened the future of America. If they continued to grow at 
the same tremendous rate, independent retailers would be crushed out of 
existence and the sons and daughters of America would be prevented from
78 W. C. Rempfer, "How Much Should a Bank o f $25,000 Capital Earn," March 29, 1929, 
p. 2, box 1, folder 3, Market/Rempfer Collection, South Dakota Historical Society 
Collection, Pierre, South Dakota; M  C. Market to Simmonds, December 6, 1929, pp. 1 ,7  
ibid; "Committee on Relationship with Chain Stores,” November 4, 1929, pp. 1, 4, 9, 12, 
15 ibid. ', Break the Chains, March 29, 1930; Rochester Journal, March 7,1930; Anti-Chain 
World, February 15, 1930, 6; Break the Chains, April 19, 1930, 5; "Notes on Bank 
Conference—J.R.C," pp. 1-2, box 2, folder 4, Market/Rempfer Collection; Duncan Radio 
Broadcasts, transcript, 237-239.
79Omaha Star, December 5,1929, box 58, Scrapbook IX, Sorensen Papers.
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81earning a decent living. Anti-chain activists warned Americans that chains
threatened to eliminate the small retailer. Small retailers exaggerated the threat
of the chains when they spoke of a crushing onslaught Although chains grew
at an impressive rate during the period, the independents were in no immediate
danger of destruction. According to federal statistics, independents continued
to hold the majority of the retail business. Retail mortality rates hovered around
the same range they had held for decades. In many areas of the country, the
number of independent stores increased as the unemployed tried to go into
82.business on their own.
According to the independents, the result of this growing economic 
tyranny would be an end to democratic government and the utter destruction of 
the American experience; Small retailers used these fears to great effect. The 
current situation in retailing might not be that threatening, particularly to those 
outside of the industry, but what if the trends continued and no one had an
80 W. C. Rempfer, "How Much Should a Bank o f $25,000 Capital Earn?" 1-2.
81 Break the Chains, May 2, 1930, 8; Anti-Chain World, February 15, 1930, 4; Duncan 
Radio Broadcasts, transcript, 331; Sinclair Lewis, Babbitt with an afterword by Mark 
Schorer (New York: Signet, New American Library, 1922, 1980), 41; Helping Grandma 
videocassette; Break the Chains, April 12,1930,27.
81 Our Country, March 4, 1936, in box 302, folder 3, Scott Lucas Papers, Illinois State 
Historical Society, Springfield, Illinois.
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opportunity to enter the retail market? What would be the consequences for 
America? Opponents of the chains predicted that continued chain growth 
would destroy independent merchants. Within a few short years, according to
S3their propaganda, chains would control the entire industry. J As chains 
expanded, American children could hope for fewer opportunities. The chains 
had already wiped out jobs as traveling salesmen. In the future, children would 
be lucky to be low-paid clerks.84 They would have no chance to exercise their 
own creativity and initiative and would become tools of the chains, following 
the guidelines sent out from corporate headquarters instead of profiting on their
85own.
Small retailers condemned this concentration of wealth. According to 
them, chains destroyed an old America of prosperity for many and replaced it
83 The Booster, January 31 ,1930 ,1, Break the Chains, April 12, 1930, 15.
84 Appleton Post-Crescent, January 15, 1930; Anti-Chain World, Februaiy 15, 1930, 5; 
W.A. Masters; Anti-Chain World, February 15, 1930, 7; Anti-Chain World, February 15, 
1930, 3-4; M  A  Johnson, Fifty Years o f Coioitry Storekeeping, 127; Omaha Journal o f  
Progress, February 6, 1931,1; Rural Trade, September 1926, 22; Anti-Chain World, 
February 15,1930.
85 Break the Chains, April 19, 1930, 5; H. A. Sanger, "The Chain Gang," Break the Chains, 
May 3, 1930, 25; Break the Chains, April 12, 1930, 15; Omaha Evening Journal, May 15, 
1929 in box 58, Scrapbook IX, Sorensen Papers; Break the Chains, March 15, 1930, 5; 
Louisiana Progress, October 30, 1930, 1; Break the Chains, April 12, 1930, 13; MacLean, 
Behind the Mask o f  Chivalry,1%.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
with wealth for a few.86 The openness of the frontier had allowed men the 
freedom to pursue their dreams and permitted them independence. This unique 
system contrasted with the European, feudal experience, a depressing old order 
with limited opportunity and freedom—an oppressive world in which the rich
87dominated the rest of society. As Winfield Caslow wrote in The Sob-Squad’ 
"We cannot build up an Empire in Business and hope to maintain a democracy 
in government."88 Retailers warned that the rise of monopoly would lead to
89dictatorship, a powerful leader controlling millions of disfranchised citizens. 
The small retailers vowed, however, that red-blooded American citizens would 
not permit such destruction to take place.90
86 The Community Builder, March 2, 1931, 6; Anti-Cham World, February 15, 1930, 2; 
McLean, Behind the Mask o f Chivalry, 77.
87 Break the Chains, May 2, 1930, 8; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 89; 
Congressional Record volume 72 part 3 71st Congress Second Session: 2479-2481; 
Louisiana Progress, March 27, 1930, 1; Caslow, Sob-Squad, 183-186; The Booster, 
February 28,1930.
88 Caslow, Sob-Squad, 285; McLean, Behind the Mask o f Chivalry, 78; Louisiana Process, 
March 27, 1930; Caslow, Sob-Squad, 207, 209, 239, 259, 261, 268, 279, 281, 289, 299; 
John W. Grobshmidt to Evjue, September 25,1929, box 51, folder 7, Evjue Papers.
89 Break the Chains, April 26, 1930, 4-6, 9; M. F. Murray to Huber, May 5, 1931; Anti- 
Chain World February 15,1930.
90 Mott, "Self-Preservation," p. 4 in box 37A, folder 3, Paiman Papers.
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In their broadcasts and other efforts, anti-chain groups portrayed chain 
and independent retailers as radically different In independent shops, honest 
merchants provided hometown customers, their friends and neighbors, with the 
best bargains. In chain stores, corporate pawns schemed, substituted, and short 
weighed. Even if they did offer some bargains, their corporate nature 
endangered communities around the nation. They threatened to concentrate 
ownership in a few cities, undermining American prosperity and, ultimately, 
American democracy.
Although such provocative criticisms rested on a base of truth, this stark 
dichotomy proved unrealistic. In addition, reforms made by both chains and 
independents led to their increasing similarity. The independents created 
voluntary chains and promoted "scientific retailing.” Perhaps the most 
interesting phenomenon was the inability of some listeners to tell the difference 
between voluntary chains and corporate chains. New style independent 
retailers resembled chains more than old style retailers, and chains made 
concerted efforts to control predatory practices and otherwise improve their 
public image.91
91 William Kirstein to Sherill, November 4, 1936, box 89, "Sherill 1936-1937," Kirstein 
Papers; George William McDaniel, Smith Wildman Brookhart: Iowa's Renegade 
Republican (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1995), 243.
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Retailers, if they modernized, possessed a powerful defense against the 
chains. Although they did not emphasize it during booster campaigns aimed at 
consumers, the trade press and leadership urged all retailers to reform
92themselves to meet chain competition. As mentioned in Chapter One, small 
retailers perished because they proved under-capitalized and under-prepared.93 
These stores rotated in and out of business, rarely joining the trade 
associations.94 Perhaps, because of this, they realized that retailers in their 
cities failed to follow "scientific retailing."95
92 Break the Chains, March 15, 1930,4; Anti-Chain World, February 15, 1930; Break the 
Chains, April 26, 1930, 14, 23; Caslow, Sob-Squad, 72-73, 151; Phoenix Magazine, May 
1980; Break the Chains, March 22, 1930, 14; The Booster, March 14, 1930, 2; Break the 
Chains, March 22, 1930, 7; North Wichita Times, November 19, 1931, 8; Wichita 
Independent, February 6, 1931, 3; Michigan Tradesman May 27. 1931, 31 in box 39, "Fair 
Trade 1931," Capper Papers; The Pharmacist, 1933 R.K.O.; Rural Trade, August 30,1924; 
Bulletin o f the Associated Merchants ofMontana, January 20, 1934, p.2 in box 7, folder 8, 
Sherburne Mercantile Company Papers, University o f Montana Archives. Missoula, 
Montana; "To County Chairmen," November 8, 1933, box 6, folder 30, Sherburne 
Mercantile Company; "Annual Window Display Competition, Announcing Fourth Annual 
Show Window Contest," Press Release, Wednesday, December 23, 1930, pp.2-3, 5, box 1, 
Downtown Brooklyn Association Papers, Brooklyn Historical Society.
93 Break the Chains, February 15, 1930, 2; Paul C. Olson to Scott Lucas, n.d, box 303, 
folder 7, Lucas Papers; O. H. Crisp to Robinson, April 30, 1934, box 150, folder 2, 
Robinson Papers; Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f Monopoly, 248; Albert 
Morrill to Huber, February 17; 1931, “1931 February,” Huber Papers.
94 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 260-266. William Bongers, “Ledger from 1925,” 
box 1 William Bongers Collection, Western Business History Center, Colorado 
Historical Society, Denver, Colorado; “Lloyd J. King,” Oral History 303 Colorado 
Historical Society.
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Opponents urged retailers to be “like a housewife with her house 
cleaning” and place their stores in order, cleaning dirt and grease off windows, 
shelves and floor stock. They called on owners to encourage their clerks to 
dress well and “meet the customer with a smile.” Some retailers remarked that 
chain stores brought more intense competition and forced merchants to 
improve their service.96 According to the trade press, leading retailers practiced 
scientific retailing in modernized stores that had high turnover. They could
97meet chain competition. Some independent retailers used price appeals and 
bragged about their massive purchasing power just like the chains, while 
others eliminated credit and delivery because of the expense. Many of these
98“cash and cany” stores condemned the chains.
99Retailers also pushed for voluntary chains. These institutions 
combined the streamlined distribution of chain stores with local ownership of
o r
Harold Featherstone to Ray Park Chase, May 23, 1930, box 6, "Carley Investigation- 
Chain Stores," Ray Park Chase Papers, Minnesota History Center, St Paul, Minnesota;. The 
Community Builder March 2, 1931, 6; P. W. Ramer to Ben Saunders, April 21, 1931, box 
26, folder 5, Evjue Papers.
97 Duncan Radio Broadcast, transcript, 233; The Booster March 7,1930,1.
98 Louisiana Progress, July 3,1930, 1; Break the Chains, May 3, 1930, 31; The Community 
Builder March 2, 1931; The Community Builder March 2, 1931, 6; P.W. Ramer to Ben 
Saunders, April 21,1931, box 26, folder 5, Evjue Papers.
99 Break the Chains, April 19, 1930, 5; Philip Lieber, "The God o f the Phenecians;”
Louisiana Progress, August 28, 1930, 2; Herbert M. Sommers, My Recollections o f the
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stores. Although they obviously borrowed from the chain store idea, these 
members attacked chains as vociferously as their non-chain compatriots.100 J. 
Frank Grimes, the founder of the Independent Grocers of America (IGA), 
mentioned in Chapter One, lashed out at the chains for sucking out die life­
blood of communities. Similarly, early advertisements from WISCO, a 
voluntary chain of hardware stores in Wisconsin, featured cartoons mocking 
the chains as dens of thievery. Despite these attacks, the appearance of 
voluntary chains, and other “scientific retailers,” confused the consuming 
public. Anti-chain broadcasters received frequent queries about the ownership 
of voluntary stores.101 Some independent retailers warned against the spread of
Associated Grocers o f  Colorado, Inc (Colorado Springs, Colorado: Associated Grocers 
Company, 1967), 1 ,2 , 3, 5; M. A. Johnson, Fifty Years o f Country Storekeeping (Brainerd, 
Minnesota: Lakeland Color Press, 1955), 28, 71; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement,” 105; New York Times April 27, 1930; Tulsa Daily World, February 14, 1930; 
"Barrage o f Bricks Thrown" in box 238, folder 9, Barnett Papers; "Negro Editor Betrays 
Race Business," n.d, Associated Negro Press Release in box 238, folder 8, Bamett Papers; 
Holsey "Confidential Memo to National Officers" February 21, 1931, box 252, folder 2, 
Bamett Papers; "Minutes of the Meeting o f the Executive Committee National Negro 
Business League," February 24, 1933; Break the Chains, March 1, 1930, 9; Break the 
Chains, March 8, 1930, 2, 4; Louisiana Progress, June 19, 1930, 8; WISCO, The WISCO 
Hardware Company, 25-26.
100 Break the Chains, March 1, 1930, 3; Break the Chains„ March 8, 1930, 11; The 
Pharmacist 1933 R.K.O.
101 Duncan Radio Broadcast, transcript, 249, 229, 274, 297-309, 317; Caslow, Sob-Squad, 
164-165; Robert McCracken, "These Men from Wyoming James Cash Penney: The 
Merchant-Prince and the Golden Rule," pp. 3-4, J.C. Penney file, American Heritage 
Center, University o f Wyoming; 'Dave Jones Catalog o f Western Merchandise," n.d.,
[1935], p.3, box 1, "Mail Order Catalogues," Dave Jones Collection; Thomas Millen to
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voluntary chains, especially wholesaler owned chains. These critics argued that 
the wholesalers exercised such control over the retailer that the merchant could 
not even be called independent They further complained that mass buying by 
voluntary chains had the same depressing effect on farm prices and wages as 
chain purchasing.102 Other factors blurred the line between the chains and 
independents. Some retailers moved between chain jobs and independent jobs, 
or vice-versa. The manager of a chain store, for example, might be a former 
independent.103 In addition, did chain stores include small local chains of a few 
stores, or just the large national retailers? Wouldn’t local chains keep wealth in 
the community? Was such a retailer any more dangerous than other 
independents?104 No one could provide a definitive answer.
At first the chains mocked the anti-chain movement. After all, 
customers voluntarily shopped with them. How could they be such a menace?
Dave Jones, August 31, 1936, ibid.; "Kemerer-The Growing Gateway of Lincoln County,” 
Kemerer File, American Heritage Center.
102 Break the Chains, May 9,1930; Caslow, Sob-Sqvad, 187-189,192-198,206-7.
103 Lloyd J. King Oral History 303,7-8.
104 The Spring 1927 year book,” box 1, "Miscellaneous,” Dave Jones Collection; Dave
Jones, "Write Friendly Copy for a Friendly Community," National Clothier, June 1937, 17
ib id ; Louisiana Progress December 1930; Billings Gazette, November 30, 1953; Johnson,
fifty  Years o f  Country Storekeeping, 121, 124; Kirstein to Sherill, November 4, 1936, box
89, "Sherill 1936-1937," KirsteinPapers; Sherill to Kirstein, November 6,1936, ibid.8 6
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105 Because of the vehemence of the campaigns, however, the members of the 
National Chain Store Association (NCSA) decided to respond. They derided 
the claims of broadcasters in a series of advertising promotions. Rather than 
allowing chain prices to speak for themselves, these campaigns emphasized the 
modernity and vitality of the chains. The NCSA voted in 1930 to use $12 
million to promote their form of merchandising in public schools. They also 
produced debate books to be used to defend them in those contests.106 Leading 
chain retailers, like J. C. Penney and Robert Wood, the President of Sears, 
reassured Americans that they had no desire to drive their competition out of 
business. They only wanted to offer the best possible price on products.107 J. C. 
Penney told audiences that the chains saw themselves as only one method of 
distribution. Both men argued that their corporations were improving the 
general quality of retailing.108 The chains refused to condemn independent
105 Break the Chains, April 12, 1930, 13.
106 Anti-Cham Store World, February 15, 1930; Chain Store Process, March 1929, 83; 
Break the Chains, March 29, 1930, 1; L. L. Rentschler, “Chain Stores Are Campaigning," 
Printer's Ink, October 3, 1929, 3; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 110; 
Nystrom, Economics o f Retailing, 113, 171-172; Break the Chains, March 29, 1930, 3; W. 
C. T. Carter to Guilford County’s Elected Legislators January 5, 1931, OF 288, "Chain 
Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers.
107 Wood, “Distribution,” p.3, box 45, "Distribution," Wood Papers; Break the Chains, May 
9,1930,20.
108 Ruml, “The Function of the Retailer,” 2.
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retailing as a whole, attacking the weak retailer alone. Competent, efficient 
small retailers could have success as well.
Although the chains argued that they were advancing retailing, they did, 
as an industry, admit the need to improve on aspects of their performance. To 
create a better atmosphere, the NCSA urged their members to play a greater 
role in the community, joining chambers of commerce and participating in 
charity events. Although corporate executives themselves had a reputation for 
civic activism, chain corporations had ignored chambers of commerce in 
smaller town109 Many of the small town chambers, according to the chains, 
had been hostile toward chains and had demanded exorbitant membership 
fees. In addition, chambers often tried to woo factory jobs away from nearby 
towns. Chains with stores in both towns had nothing to gain from such 
attempts.110 Despite these factors, the chains increased their memberships in 
local chambers of commerce, allowing them to deflect some criticism that they 
were transients uninterested in the fate of the community. During this period, 
many chains also began philanthropic endowments to support community
109 Rosenwald to Insull, January 19, 1926, box 55, folder 2, Rosenwald Papers; Richberg to  
Rosenwald, September 11,1930, ibid. -, Merchants Journal, August 2,1924.
110 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 82; Nation's Business, May 1928, 17, 116- 
118.
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causes.111 As part of this self-evaluation, chains attempted to curb short weight 
abuses, and some chain supporters even warned against the excessive use of 
the loss leader.112 In addition, the chains worked to improve their relationships 
with small town bankers in order to avoid attacks for looting the town of 
money.113 When combined with revenue sharing plans meant to increase 
compensation for employees, these actions presented a new image for the 
chains that emphasized the connection between the chains and the local 
community. Pointing to these changes, chains portrayed themselves as places 
of opportunity for local people. If a man joined their team, he could find 
endless opportunities for advancement and growth—far beyond what he could 
have had as a small town merchant.114
111 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 110; Ray DovelL, "Chain Stores Can be 
Good Citizens," Nation's Business, June 1931; Break the Chains, April 26, 1930, 4; 
Sedgely, "The History o f Owl Drug Store," 29; Davis, Don’t Make A&P M ad (Montana: J. 
E. Davis, 1990), 99,114.
112 Anti-Cham World, February 15, 1930,2.
113 Wood, The Passing o f Normalcy (New York: B. C. Forbes Publishing Company, 1929), 
215.
114 Robert McCracken, "The Penney Idea: Foundation for the Continuing Growth o f the 
J.C. Penney Co,” 8, 10-12 Penney File, American Heritage Center; Associated Negro Press 
Release, October 22,1930, box 260, folder 7, Bamett Papers; Sedgley “The History of Owl 
Drug,” 28,30.
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Despite these initiatives by the chains, anti-chain advocates fantasized 
about putting them out of business. The idea appealed to romantic notions of 
community solidarity and resistance. In Winfield Caslow's Sob-Squad, he had 
imagined a campaign in which the American people organized against the 
chains, crushing the corporations with a wave of outraged public sentiment. 
W. K. Henderson and his staff also promoted this idea.115 These anti-chain 
activists hoped they could use their broadcasts, publications and public events 
to halt the growth of the chains. Their boycotts resembled earlier anti-mail 
order campaigns. Although chains and their supporters often derided the 
assaults as mindless, the broadcasts mobilized retailers in communities around 
the nation.116
117Retailers reached out for support from their neighbors. The 
campaigns served as advertising campaigns for independent retailers, allowing 
them to pool their resources and pay for large-scale advertising. The campaigns
115 Caslow, Sob-Squad, 304-307; Grocers' Commercial Bulletin, February 1930, 8; 
Elizabeth Salassi, "Hello World," Shreveport Magazine April 1950; Harper, “The Anti- 
Chain Store Movement, 102-103; M. H  Cavanaugh to Huber, February 5, 1931, "1931 
February" Huber Papers; United States Daily, February 2,1931.
116 Break the Chains, 4; Minneapolis Tribune, February 26, 1930, 5; Break the Chains, 
February 22, 1930, 3; L. M. Mott, "Self-Preservation: An Address on the Foreign Chain 
Systems," 2, 6 Modem Minute Men Literature enclosed in Geo. C. W. to Friend Phil, 
October 21, 1930, LaFollette Papers; Break the Chains, April 19,1930, 1.
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gained the attention of certain preachers and revivalists, who championed the
independent retailers in their battle against chains that several identified with
118the mark of the beast. The retailers made common cause with other 
Americans threatened by the new corporate order, including some 
representatives of labor and farm organizations. Both of these groups felt 
cheated by the developments of the 1920s, and neither believed they had 
benefited from the new economy. The wave of merger mania and boom 
economy had left them behind, desperate to join the economy of abundance. 
Retailers hoped that farmers and organized labor might offer support, but both 
groups offered tepid support for the boycotts. While some members of the 
labor movement urged members to shop at local stores, other union members 
believed the chains offered superior bargains and hoped that chains would be 
more open to organizing than small stores.119 A long history of conflict 
between farmers and town merchants hindered that alliance. The situation 
improved in the 1920s because cars ended the isolation of rural areas. Retailers
117 "Why Do You Buy Here?" Anti-Chain World, February 15,1930,3.
118 Anti-Chain World, February 15,1930,3-4.
119 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 105-118; Printer's Ink, February 20, 1930, 
3; New York Times, February 2, 1930; Break the Chains, March 22,1930, 8; Lewis Lincoln, 
"The Growing Peril o f Monopoly in Distribution," in the Anti-Chain World, February 15, 
1930,4; Shreveport Journal, October 22,1930; Shreveport Journal October 23,1930,15.
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warned farmers that the chains might encroach into their business in addition
to lowering crop prices. They also warned about the threat of "chain," or
120corporate farming. Although many complained about the effect of chain 
purchasing on crop prices, others felt that the chains lowered the spread 
between retail cost and production cost, increasing consumption and 
improving the economic position of agriculture.121
Ultimately, the anti-chain activists could not generate enough support to
close the chains. Opponents of the chains received criticism from consumers
122.skeptical of trade at home sentiment. Some observers remarked that this 
mindset ignored the important connections between the local community and 
the corporate economy. They reminded consumers of the many products
120 The Community Builder, March 2, 1931, 1; Lewis Lincoln, "The Growing Peril of 
Monopoly in Distribution," in the Anti-Chain World, February 15, 1930; The Booster, 
March 7, 1930, 1,4; La Follette Progressive Republican Campaign, "Extract o f Letter from 
Northern Wisconsin," n.d., box 6, 'Tile Misc.,," Huber Papers.
121 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 124; Marvis Hogen, Fifty Years On Main 
Street (Kadoka, South Dakota: Marvis T. Hogen, 1996), 3-7; M  F. Murray to Huber, May 
5, 1931, box 6, folder 5, Huber Papers; Caslow, Sob-Squad, 172, 254; Duncan Radio 
Broadcasts, transcript, 232, 240; Community Builder, March 2, 1931, 1; Anti-Chain World, 
February 15, 1930, 2, 3, 5, 6; Association o f Commerce and Industry, ”Minutes, July 1, 
1931, box 1, "Combined Retailers," Association o f Commerce and Industry Papers; 
"Minutes, November 7,1932,” ibid.; Huber to C. W. Warner Co-Operative Commonwealth 
July 11, 1930, box 6, folder 5, Huber Papers; Lloyd J. King, 1 Oral History 303, Colorado 
Historical Society, Denver, Colorado; Break the Chains, February 22, 1930, 12; Break the 
Chains, March 1,1930,11; Break the Chains, May 9, 1930,18-19.
122 Rural Trade, June 1926,4; Harper, ‘The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 110-113.
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produced elsewhere that they enjoyed. They also pointed out the many 
consumers in other areas of the country using products made in their
123community. Consumers wanted to know why they should turn down lower 
prices and why they should worry about the problems of storekeepers.124 
Opponents’ hopes for a quick destruction of the chains came to nothing. 
Studies of chain retailing in 1929 and 1930 show a drop in chain sales, and 
opponents took this as a sign of their campaign’s efficacy.125 Unfortunately, 
they never achieved more than slight victories.126 Perhaps the most 
authoritative study came from Robert Lyons in the industry magazine 
Advertising and Selling. Lyons researched chain sales and discerned no 
noticeable, chain-wide effect. S. H. Kress and Company, a Southern chain 
exposed to numerous anti-chain campaigns, expanded its number o f stores and 
increased sales during the period. Chains such as A&P and H. G. Hill opened 
more stores in Louisiana. Some stores, including Montgomery Ward, Kroger, 
and National Tea, experienced drops in sales, but their problems could be
123 Break the Chains, February 15,1930,6; Break the Chains, April 12, 1930,6.
124 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 117; Nystrom, Economics o f Retailing, 26- 
27; Break the Chains, March 22,1930,8,11.
125 Omaha Journal o f Progress, February 6, 1931; Duncan Radio Broadcasts, transcript, 
246,345; Louisiana Progress, January 193,1; Break the Chains, February 22, 1930,12.
126 Harper; “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 126-129,138.
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traced to management problems or the depression, which gripped the nation.127 
Even in major centers of anti-chain sentiment, corporate retailing thrived. In 
Shreveport, the home of W.K. Henderson, for example, the chains continued 
to grow. As one example, a Sears store opened in May of 1928 and relocated 
to larger quarters by August 1930, during the height of the Henderson
L28broadcasts. Not surprising, considering that even delegates to the MMM
129convention shopped in Shreveport chain stores! Lapses by independent 
retailers presented an ever-present problem for boycotts.130
Despite boastful rhetoric about crushing the chains, opponents soon 
realized that other steps would be needed to slow chain growth. Both 
Henderson and Duncan told listeners that government offered the chief 
protection, and they urged citizens to elect representatives opposed to the
127 Lyons, "Are the Radio Attacks Hurting the Chain Stores?" Advertising and Selling, June 
11, 1930; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 130; Business Week, May 7, 1930; 
New York Times, August 10, 1930; Monod, Store Wars, 222; E. J. Condon, "Address to 
Real Estate Group," November 20, 1947, pp. 3-4, Sears Corporate Archives, Hoffman 
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128 “Shreveport Louisiana,” Sears Retail Store Files, Sears Corporate Archives.
129 Shreveport Journal, October 23, 1930, 15.
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pp. 1-2, box 6, folder 1, Huber Papers; Caslow's Weeldy, January 5, 1935, 6; Caslow, Sob- 
Squad, 256; Leroy Spence to Capper, December 4, 1933, box 38, "Advertising," Capper 
Papers; Boris Emmet and John Jeuck, Catalogues and Counters: A History o f Sears, 
Roebuck and Company (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press,) 151.
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chains.131 in the national trade associations, retailers had long complained that 
die boycott was flawed from the beginning. They were suspicious of some of 
the anti-chain broadcasters and worried that "racketeers" were preying on
P 2retailers for easy profit. J The head of NARGUS approved moderate 
campaigns sponsored by organized trade groups if they did not make radical
133claims about the chains and their business practices. But trade association 
executives had believed this sort of agitation would fail because the public 
could not be driven to reject low prices and the campaigns would only serve to 
convince customers that the chains really offered lower prices, serving as free 
advertising campaigns for the enemy. Besides, the boycotts, to be effective, 
would have to continue in perpetuity.134 Experience proved them correct. As
131 Wichita Booster, February 14, 1930, I; Duncan Radio Broadcasts, transcript, 281,353.
132 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 109; Break the Chains, March 1, 1930, 6; 
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Zidmars to Lower West Side Advancement Association, May 22, 1930, pp. 1-2, box 1, 
folder 2, Huber Papers; "Minutes o f the Sheepshead Bay Independent Civic Association,” 
September 15, 1932, p.4, box 1, “Minutes of the Sheepshead Bay Independent Civic 
Association,” Joseph Milgram Papers, Brooklyn Historical Society, Brooklyn, New York. 
“Minutes of the Sheepshead Bay Independent Civic Association,” October 20, 1932, pp. 4- 
5, ibid.
133 C. M  Sandstron to Capper, November 28, 1930, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1930,” Capper 
Papers.
134 Shreveport Journal, October 22, 1930; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 78- 
80,107, 125,131-132; Printer's Ink, August 7,1930.
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has been discussed in Chapter One, national trade associations had been 
created, in part, to lobby government Now they spearheaded efforts to get 
action by federal state and local government, calling on federal and state 
government to enforce anti-trust laws, control predatory chain practices, and 
pass anti-chain legislation.135 At the June 1930 NARGUS convention, John 
Cunningham, the Iowa Secretary, pushed through a motion pledging a more 
aggressive, if undefined, approach to the chains. As will be discussed in the 
next two chapters, a bevy of politicians flocked to the cause, eager to help the
136independent retailers in their war against the chains. Retailers worked 
through their trade associations on two fronts. On a national level, they lobbied 
for price maintenance legislation to fight loss leader sales. State associations, 
on the other hand, pressed for legislation to address the tax differential between 
chains and independent retailers. These battles serve as the focus for the next 
two chapters.
135 The Booster, January 31, 1930,1; Break the Chains, February 15, 1930,1,5.
136 Louisiana Progress, August 28,1930, 5; Louisiana Progress, August 18,1931.
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Chapter Three: The Capper-Kelly Bill
Herbert Hoover rode the prosperity of the 1920s to the White House. He 
made a glorious entrance, but when prosperity crumbled, he left in a 
humiliating defeat. Americans had hoped that the former Secretary of 
Commerce, the architect of Twenties prosperity, could provide a solution to the 
Great Crash and ensuing economic devastation of the early Thirties.1 Hoover's 
initial response and image as a friend of business encouraged many Americans 
to conclude that he offered the solution for the nation. Retail merchants, in 
particular, responded to his calls for continued purchasing and his pro-business 
rhetoric. In addition, they anticipated he would act to improve their situation 
because of statements he had made when accepting the 1928 Republican 
nomination. Hoover had said that independent business was the backbone of 
the American economy, and small retailers hoped he would work with them to 
ensure their continued survival and slow the growth of the chains. But Hoover 
disappointed them when he did little more than sponsor studies of retailing. He 
even neglected the Capper-Kelly price maintenance bill, which had been 
bandied about Congress for years and remained the most significant piece of
1 George C. W. to Friend Phil, October 21, 1930, pp. 9-10, box 57, folder 3, Phil LaFollette
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anti-chain legislation during his presidency. The Hoover program to end the 
depression buoyed small retailers’ hopes. Herbert Hoover responded to the 
crisis of the Crash and Great Depression in two primary ways. First, he sought 
to bolster consumer confidence and promote spending. Hoover knew that a 
drop in spending would lead to production declines and unemployment, 
triggering a massive Depression. Hoover's second response was to work with 
trade associations to collect information on economic conditions and 
disseminate it to business. Hoover hoped his work with industry would 
encourage efficiency and stability and improve the economy. Although he 
promoted a free market economy, he urged stability in business rather than 
championed pure competition. In a crisis, Americans had to cooperate to 
ensure economic survival.
Hoover’s first fear was that the Stock Market Crash threatened 
consumer spending. According to his view, purchasing power and 
consumption had fueled the business prosperity of the New Era, and without it, 
business gains would be wiped out2 Economists expressed concern that
Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.
2 Henry S. McKee, Degenerate Democracy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 
1933), 100-101.
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Americans were hoarding their dollars, refusing to spend them.3 in response, 
Hoover urged businessmen to plan prosperity campaigns to encourage 
consumer spending. Retailers, always eager for new business, responded 
enthusiastically to these “Buy Now” movements, which resembled trade 
booster activities of the 1920s. In these promotions, retail associations 
cooperated to sponsor giant downtown sales and festivals. In Springfield, 
Illinois, for example, the Association of Commerce and Industry pushed a 
“Spend for Prosperity” program that mobilized the population for economic 
war. Merchants held a kick-off banquet and other festivities arranged around a 
military theme.4 Hoover authorized the Department of Commerce to assist 
such campaigns, although he refused requests to endorse prosperity drives. He 
worried that it would be improper for the President to appear in an 
advertisement for private organizations.5
3 Edwin Witte, "Economists on the Depression in its Early Years and On the Way Out,” 
Commonweal, April 6, 1932.
4 "To Retailers," n.d. (1931), box 1, “Combined Retailers,” Association o f Commerce and 
Industry, State Historical Society o f Illinois, Springfield, Illinois. See also Robert Cotner, 
Texas Cities in the Great Depression (Austin, Texas: The Texas Memorial Museum, 1973), 
192.
5 P. A. O'Connell to Hoover, November 23, 1932, box 179, Presidential Personal Papers, 
Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa; Hoover to O'Connell, December 3, 1932, 
ibid.’, Julius Rosenwald to Hoover, December 12, 1929, box 55, folder 2, Rosenwald 
Papers, University o f Chicago, Chicago, Illinois; Matthew Wohl, “Matthew Wohl Radio 
Speech September 15, 1932” in box 88, "Economic Correspondence 1932,” Presidential 
Subject Files, Hoover Presidential Library,
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Some retailers concluded that additional efforts needed to be made to 
increase the purchasing power of the community. They complained, as had the 
anti-chain broadcasters, that chain stores and large financial institutions sucked 
wealth out of American communities and centralized it in the hands of a few 
individuals.6 They therefore believed that more money needed to be in 
circulation. So they printed so-called “scrip” money and pronounced it legal 
tender for their trading area. Scrip money would substitute, in part, for U.S. 
currency during the crisis. Consumers would receive it from their local trade 
association, hi order to use the money, they would affix a stamp, purchased 
from a retailer that activated each scrip dollar so it could be spent. Most stamps 
cost two and a half cents, and a bill would be taken out of circulation after it 
had changed hands fifty times and more than covered its value. The Evanston, 
Illinois, Merchants Association issued some of the first Depression era scrip. 
These scrip campaigns proved to be the most interesting attempt by local retail 
organizations and other activists to promote purchasing by the American 
public. Throughout the nation, towns, especially towns where the banks had 
faltered, produced scrip money to allow business to continue. Noted Yale 
economist Irving Fisher wrote on the subject and encouraged various schemes
6 Richard Edmonds to Hoover, June 13, 1929, box 88, “Economic Correspondence 1929,” 
Presidential Subject Files, Hoover Presidential Libraiy.
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to build purchasing power. He urged towns and cities throughout the nation to 
promote scrip and fight against deflation.7
Many retailers were, nonetheless, disappointed by the scrip efforts and 
“Buy Now” campaigns, but they still hoped to benefit from the other major 
approach Hoover took to the Depression: associationalism.8 During his days as 
Secretary of Commerce, Hoover had emphasized the need for stability in 
American business. In his view, a smoothly functioning economy required 
cooperation between government and industry. Associationalism encouraged 
judicious pooling of business information and government regulation to 
enforce competitive standards. Hoover hoped the Department of Commerce 
could work with business groups to create trade agreements. When a Supreme 
Court decision in 1925 declared that this cooperation did not violate anti-trust 
laws, the number of trade groups quintupled.9 Larger firms took the decision 
as a signal to release information on sales, purchasing habits of customers, and
7 Irving Fisher, Mastering the Crisis, with Additional Chapters on Stamp Scrip (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1934), 5; Irving Fisher, Stamp Scrip (New York:
Adelphi, 1933), 31.
See Ellis Hawley, The Great War and the Search for a Modem Order: a History o f the 
American People and their Institutions, 1917-1933 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1979).
9 "Department o f Commerce Press Release June 24, 1929,” box 8, "Commerce 
Correspondence 1929 June-September,” Cabinet Offices, Hoover Presidential Papers; 
“Executive Committee, January 23, 1930,” box 96, "Chamber o f Commerce National 
Business Survey Conference," Presidential Subject Files, Herbert Hoover Papers.
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basic operating principles. Hoover kept a close watch on these retail trade 
statistics in order to determine the health of the American economy, and 
national chain stores proved particularly helpful for gauging consumption 
because they centralized purchase information for hundreds, even thousands, 
of stores. Instead of having to contact each small merchant, the government 
could gather pertinent information by speaking with a few executives 
nationwide. Comparative sales by region were used to assess the impact of the 
Depression on different portions of the country. 10
Small retailers and their trade associations liked associationalism 
because it promised greater stability in business. They hoped that trade practice 
conferences, which set standards of competition for industries, and surveys of 
business could protect them from the competitive excesses of chain retailing.11 
Some businessmen and politicians wanted to call a temporary truce on 
competition until the economy righted itself.12 They hoped that trade practice
10 E. C. Hastings to Hoover, January 27, 1930, box 179, Presidential Personal Papers, 
Hoover Papers; Hoover to J. C. Penney, April 2, 1931, box 184, ibid.; Julius Klein to 
Theodore Joslin, September 28, 1931, box 88, “Business Correspondence,” Presidential 
Subject Files, Hoover Papers; Frank Melville to Hoover, November 26, 1930, box 88, 
“November 26-30 Business Correspondence," ibid
11 Frederick Feiker, “Speech Before American Trade Association Executives,” April 5, 
1932, p. 4, box 13, “BFDC Correspondence, 1932,” Cabinet Offices, Herbert Hoover 
Papers.
12 Harry Williams to Richey, June 27, 1931, box 63, Secretary’s Files, Hoover Papers; 
Francis Seiberiingto Richey, September 17, 1931, box 64, "Folder 1932 April-September,"
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conferences could be used to ensure ethical standards in business and prevent 
predatory attempts to crush competition.13
Independent retailers thought Hoover would be an ally in attacks on 
predatory behavior because he had said in his acceptance speech that 
independent business was central to the health of the nation. Anti-chain 
activists seized on these words as evidence of a deep commitment to their 
cause.14 Hoover’s administration did address the issue. During his four years in 
office, three significant examinations of the retail sector were conducted. First, 
the Federal Trade Commission had begun an investigation of chain stores in
Secretary’s Files, Hoover Papers; Malcolm D. Whitman to the President, March 17, 1932, 
box 64, folder "1932 March 16-20," Secretary’s Files, Hoover Papers; E. W. Gross to 
Walter Newton, November 19, 1930, box 711, Press Secretary’s Files,, Hoover Papers; W. 
E. Humphrey to Hoover, June 23, 1931, box 154, “Correspondence FTC 1931,” President’s 
Subject Files, Hoover Papers; New York Times, March 30, 1929; Donald Richey to Gordon 
Corbalely, January 25, 1932, box 90, "Business Correspondence 1932 January-February," 
President’s Subject Files, Hoover Papers; William Donovan, "Is Our Constitution Flexible 
Enough to Meet Changing Social and Economic Conditions?" September 18,1931, pp. 2-6, 
8,10, box 18, “Donovan file” Bruce Barton Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society.
13 Charles Burlingham to Hoover, November 20, 1929, p.2, box 9, “Charles T. 
Burlingham,” Presidential Personal Files, Hoover Papers; Kiplinger Washington Letter, 
July 12,1930, p.4 in box 167, “Kiplinger, ” Presidential Personal Files, Hoover Papers.
14 La Crosse Tribune, January 6, 1930 in Huber Scrapbook, Huber Papers, Wisconsin State 
Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin; Break the Chains, March 8, 1930, 27; Anti-Chain 
World, February 15, 1930, 7; Whittier Bulletin, November 16, 1928; Bulletin from People's 
Legislative Service, n.d. in box 7, folder 3, Huber Papers; Huber to G. W. Hamwell, 
December 5, 1929, ibid,; “Bay Council, Michigan Resolution" in Vin O'Brien to Comstock, 
Reed, Smith and other possible candidates,” n.d, box 18, "June 1928," Royal Copeland 
Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University o f Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan; V. W. 
O'Brien to Copeland, June 16,1928, ibid.
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1928 at the urging of Congress. Activists anticipated the study would be 
completed in short order and that predatory practices could be stopped.15 
Unfortunately for chain store opponents, it took years to complete.16 The 
Commission decided to collect as much information on the retail structure as 
possible, and that quest led the FTC into a mammoth survey of retail 
conditions in the United States. As part of the study, the FTC prepared several 
reports on the use of price-cutting by mass retailers.17 This study proved 
frustrating to most retailers because its complexity required them to submit 
tremendous amounts of information that overwhelmed their record keeping 
ability.18
Second, the Department of Commerce promoted the census of retail 
business during the Hoover Presidency. This study surveyed all of the retail 
establishments in the country and studied profit margin, turnover and other 
aspects of business. The census provides the best statistical picture of retailing
15 Whittier Bulletin, December 15,1928, 1.
16 Newton to Chairman Garland Ferguson, n.cL, box 154, "FTC Correspondence, 1930,” 
President’s Subject Files, Hoover Papers.
17 FTC report "Resale Price Maintenance" issued to House on June 22,1931,” pp. 1-2; John 
Scott to Vandenberg March 18, 1932, box 39, ‘Tair Trade 1932,” Capper Papers.
18 Francis Walker to "Gentlemen," in “1927 Ledger,” box 1, Bongers Papers, Western
Business History Collection, Colorado Historical Society, Denver, Colorado.
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in the period. The Department supplemented this census with additional 
reports on retailing.19
Third, the President's Committee on Recent Economic Changes studied 
the development of the chain stores, along with many other issues. That 
committee had been assigned to determine the true status of the economy 
through objective social-scientific inquiry.20 It sought to come to an 
understanding about the nature of the chains and their development over the 
last decade. The chapter in the report on the chains indicates that economists 
showed interest in the topic. The writers of the study considered the rise of 
chains to be one of the major economic developments of the twentieth century, 
ranking with suburbanization as an influence on the country.21 But they 
showed little sympathy for attacks on the chains or attempts to slow their 
growth. Economists pushed for efficiency. They wanted to see hard figures, 
and they adhered to a rigid free trade ideology. The economists, in other words, 
followed the chain position on their importance in the economy. Interestingly,
19 R. P. Faust to Hoover, May 28, 1931, box 11, "BFDC Correspondence, 1931,” Cabinet 
Officers, Hoover Papers; New York Evening Post, July 3, 1931; Hampton Institute, "Survey 
o f Negro in America, 1932” in box 259, folder 1, Barnett Papers; Wesley Mitchell to 
Hoover, December 30, 1929, box 11, "Wesley Mitchell 1929-1930,” Presidential Personal 
Papers, Hoover Papers.
20 E. E. Hunt to Akerson, April 15,1929, box 119, President’s Subject Files, Hoover Papers.
21 Howard Odum to French Strother, February 5, 1930, box 3, "Committee on Recent 
Social Trends Correspondence, 1930-31," French Strother Papers, Hoover Presidential
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Sears President Julius Rosenwald, well known for his philanthropic activities, 
helped to subsidize the publication of the findings of this committee and 
supported its research. He did not seem to be firmly committed to the project 
and, in fact, apparently forgot his promise of funds to pay for the work. 
Rosenwald's forgetfulness proves a distressing obstacle to a conspiratorial 
interpretation of the report.22 Of course the social scientists and the cult of 
efficiency they worshipped seemed more than ready to assure the country’s 
leading retailers that they were doing the work of the just These fact seekers, 
these hard-boiled students of the social sphere, were not likely to shed a tear 
for some pathetic back street trader who lost his business. They knew the path 
to progress, and it ran over little back street shops, bulldozing the individual 
entrepreneur. Nothing should stand in the way of the rising standard of living 
of the American people. Sympathy came in short supply.
The Department of Commerce promoted economic efficiency. The 
Department’s Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (BFDC) 
determined United States policy toward the chain stores. Dr. Julius Klein, the 
head of the Bureau, had been a long-time adviser to President Hoover. Hoover 
even turned to Klein when he wanted research on past presidential responses to 
depressions. Klein dutifully reported back that they had done nothing. Some
Libraiy.
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might think this report had too much of an influence on Hoover’s 
administration.23 At any rate, Klein supported efforts to lower the cost of 
distribution so as to increase consumption. He did not support attacks by small 
retailers upon big business, and he specifically criticized anti-chain campaigns. 
In Klein's view, the problems for retailers were, for the most part, the result of 
incompetence. He did not believe chain stores would force small retailers out 
of business. Investigations of the sector demonstrated, in his opinion, that the 
expansion of chains had slowed or stopped.24
Klein expressed his opinion in a variety of public forums, including 
magazine articles and his own radio broadcasts. In Pathfinder magazine, he 
wrote that the problems of small retailers "are due almost entirely to their own 
incompetence and not to competition." He further argued that the chains 
actually helped the independent retailer by providing a model of efficient
operation.25 Klein did admit that the chains restrained trade on occasion, but he
26felt they had an overall positive effect on the quality of distribution.
22 Raymond S. Rubinow to J. H. Dion, box 11, folder 17, Rosenwald Papers.
23 Julius Klein to Walter Newton, September 29, 1931, box 10, “BFDC,” George 
Akerson Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library.
24 Omaha Journal o f Progress, February 6, 1931.
25 William Cooper to J. A. Hughes, January 8,1930, box 94, "Chain Stores, 1929-1930," 
President’s Subject Files, Hoover Papers; D. M. Newlon to Hoover, April 10,1930, ibid.
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Klein thought the best way to meet the threat of the chains was to teach 
the shopkeepers to become better retailers, and he hoped small retailers would 
understand this stance and see the department as a friend.27 Klein cooperated 
with trade associations to survey business conditions among retailers, discover 
problems in retailing and uncover ways to fight waste. Klein also promoted the 
"model store" movement At a time when retailers faced many changes, the 
progressive or modem retailer had been pushing through modifications of store 
design and behavior. State and local trade associations in towns like Atlanta,
Philadelphia, Harlem, and Des Moines worked with the BFDC to build model
28stores that demonstrated the latest retail techniques. These stores served as 
centers for continuing professional education, places where retailers could 
learn new ways to arrange stock, advertise products and otherwise increase 
turnover. In addition to these technical skills, retailers discussed how to interact 
with difficult or abusive customers and in other ways to deal with the "human
26 Break the Chains, April 12,1930,15.
27 Julius Klein to French Strother, February 19, 1932, box 78, “Detroit Business Pioneers 
Association,” Presidential Personal Files, Hoover Papers.
28 National Negro Business League to National Officers, March 17,1931, box 251, folder 1, 
Barnett Papers; “Associated Negro Press Release June 5, 1931,” box 259, folder 6, Barnett 
Papers.
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element" of retailing. They learned these techniques through drama, using
29scripts designed to simulate actual retailing situations.
Chain opponents wanted Hoover and the federal government to do more 
than teach them how to retail, however. Like generations of trust busters before
30them, these retailers urged concerted government action to attack the chains. 
Henderson wanted the federal government to oppose attempts by meat packers 
to modify an anti-trust consent decree they had signed in 1919. It restricted 
packers to preparing meats for shipping and distribution and prevented them 
from entering other areas of food distribution. The packers, encouraged by the 
success of A & P and other chain groceries, tried to change that agreement in 
1930 so they could open their own stores.31 In a letter to the President, 
Henderson warned Hoover that the modification would give packers full
29 "Manual for Grocery Discussion Program," box 11, President Cabinet Officers, Hoover 
Papers.
30 L. M. Mott, "Self-Preservation: An Address on the Foreign Chain Systems," pp.8-11, 
Secretary's Files, Hoover Papers, folder "Chaf-Chai" October 19, 1929 W. E. Scott to 
Federal Radio Commission from Harry Mayer October 23, 1930 October 26, 1930 C..M. 
Hall October 30, 1930 E. H. Wolff; F.E. Dowler February 7,1931 H.M. Alexander August 
19, 1931; E. B. Osborne of Toledo September 6, 1932 E. Walters January 18, 1933 
December 9, 1931; Esther Schulze and J. H. Hamrick May 2,1932. box 94 Correspondence 
Subject Files "Chain Stores, 1929-1930" Hoover Presidential Library April 18, 1929; 
George Kurtz Retail Meat Dealers April 25, 1929 William Camerford? April 14, 1930 
Henderson April 14,1930 R_ E Rosenberger April 22, 1930 E. J. Huyge May 18, 1929 Mrs. 
Fred Bliesner May 18, 1929 W. E. Lawrence May 21, 1929 Freed Bliesner to Justice 
Department May 9, 1930 February 7, 1930; Richey to Texas Anti-Chain Association April
10,1930.
31 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 34.
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opportunity to saddle the people of the country with a powerful and ruthless 
system. Some retailers worried that the big packing companies would use their 
resources and control over meat products to enter into retail markets with 
cyclonic force. Because of retailer protests opposition, Hoover did not endorse 
the decree.32
Anti-chain opponents extended their criticism beyond the consent 
decree to attack chain operations in general.33 As part of this effort, the 
Reverend James Cox, a Catholic priest from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, led a 
march to Washington in January of 1931. Cox was the parish priest at Old St 
Patrick's Church in Pittsburgh, and he had been reaching out to the 
unemployed as part of a campaign for economic justice. Cox had been named 
honorary mayor of the local Hooverville and begun a series of broadcasts 
attacking the corporate economy for the depression.34 The march, sponsored 
by the Independent Merchants of Pittsburgh, brought twelve thousand
32 Appleton Post-Crescent, January 22, 1930; Henderson to Ackerson, April 11,1930, box 
618, "W.K. Henderson," Secretary’s Files, Hoover Papers; Ackerson to Henderson April 16, 
1930, ibid. Frank Kainnar to Hoover, September 9,1930, box 776, "Packe-Pact 1929- 
1933," Secretary’s Files, Hoover Papers; Henry Lohman to Hoover, September 17,1930, 
ibid. ; J. R. Howard to Hoover, October 1,1930, ibid', Benjamin March to Hoover, January
26,1931, ib id
33 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 141; Samuel Seigle to Phil La Follette, 
December 16, 1931, box 14, folder 1, La Follette Papers; Pittsburgh Post Gazette, 
December 11,1931.
34 M. P. Mclnemey to James C. Collins, January 7, 1932, box 510, “James Cox,”
no
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35unemployed citizens to Washington to dramatize the plight of the nation. The 
march alarmed many right-wing Americans, who compared it to the Coxey's 
Army’s march of the 1890s and an earlier hunger march led by the
36 37unemployed. Many saw Cox as an egomaniac intent on gaining publicity. 
Hoover granted Cox a brief audience, but the two discussed little of 
significance. Still, the reception proved far more favorable than that received 
by the Bonus Marchers later that year.38 Cox later drifted into the fringes of 
politics, running for President in 1932 as a candidate of the Jobless Parly. That 
party mimicked the Fascist Party of Italy with blue uniforms and a promise to 
save the nation from communism.39
Secretary’s Files, Hoover Papers.
o r
Studs Terkel, Hard Times: An Oral History o f  the Great Depression (New York: 
Pantheon Books. 1979,1986), 13.
37 Les Reed to Hoover, December 31, 1933, box 510, “James Cox,” Secretary’s Files, 
Hoover Papers; Dr. Robert Xavier to Hoover, January 5, 1932, ibid.; Mrs. Amanda 
Schmidt to Hoover January 6,1932, ibid.
38 Cox to Hoover, December 31, 1931, telegram, ibid.-, Thomas R. Wrosley to Richey, 
October 18,1932, ibid.; J, H, Stolper to Hoover, May 14,1932, ibid
39 New York Times January 6, 1932; New York Times January 7, 1932; New York Times 
January 17, 1932. Hardware Retailer April 1932, 82; New York Times April 3, 1932; New 
York Times April 18, 1932; New York Times July 17, 1932; New York Times August 15, 
1932; New York Times August 17, 1932; New York Times October 13, 1932; New York 
Times December 25,1932.
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Although the administration paid little attention to the anti-chain 
movement, Congress proved more responsive.40 The publicity surrounding the 
anti-chain movement generated support for the Capper-Kelly price 
maintenance bill, now sponsored by Representative Clyde Kelly of 
Pennsylvania as well as Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas.41 It permitted 
manufacturers to set retail prices for their brand name products, a privilege that 
had been stripped from most manufacturers by the Dr. Miles Medical 
Company case of 1911.
The Aanerican Fair Trade Association, as in the past, served as the 
umbrella organization for those promoting the bill.42 Unlike in earlier 
campaigns, however, the association developed a reputation for inaction.43 
Some price maintenance supporters complained that the director did not return 
their calls and letters and that the organization was understaffed. Most of the
40 Wichita Booster January 24, 1930, 1; J. R. Burrow to Capper, August 30, 1922, box 3, 
"Banking," Capper Papers; Ralph Stodard to Hoover, October 19,1932, box 340, “Relief,” 
President’s Subject Files, Hoover Papers; Ernest Bugh to Hoover, January 1,1932, p.4, ibid.
41 Wichita Booster, February 7, 1930, 1; Wichita Booster, January 24, 1930, 1; Wichita 
Booster, February 12,1930,1.
42 Omaha State Journal, February 14, 1930, p.l in box 60, Scrapbook XIII, Sorensen 
Papers; Nat Schultz to Capper, March 13,1930, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1930," Capper Papers; 
Capper, “Pennsylvania and Atlantic Seaboard Hardware Association,” February 15, 1930, 
ibid.', Herbert Tenzer to Capper, April 6, 1932, box 39, "Fair Trade 1932," Capper Papers.
43 Edward Plaut to Capper, July 2, 1931, box 39, "Fair Trade 1931," Capper Papers.
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lobbying for the bill, therefore, came from manufacturers such as Quaker 
State, Gillette, various cosmetic companies, and retailers—especially druggists. 
These groups believed the bill was essential to their interests. Manufacturers 
hoped to protect their brand names and trademarks. For their part, retailers 
worried that predatory pricing would drive them out of business. Both groups 
feared the destructive effects of loss leader sales. They maintained that 
predatory pricing hurt the economy by depressing wages.
Manufacturers argued that loss leader sales of their products harmed 
them. The companies felt threatened by below cost sales of their products 
because they believed cut-rate prices for their products would make them 
appear cheap and, therefore, inferior.44 John Scott, the president of Quaker 
State, for example, worried that chain stores were selling his oil in five gallon 
drums for “ridiculous prices.” In his opinion loss leader sales would make the 
consumer think they had bought a cheap product. At the very least, the lower 
prices would make customers question why they paid so much for the product 
at other times if there wasn’t a difference in quality. As Scott noted, "I believe 
that the enactment of this piece of legislation will materially curb the chain
44 Frank Collins to Capper, February 1, 1929, p.3, box 39, "Fair Trade 1925-1929," 
Capper Papers; S. Messer to Capper, February 9, 1932, box 39, "Fair Trade 1932," 
Capper Papers; Kelly to Capper, April 12, 1932, ibid.; Frank Collins to Capper, 
February 8, 1932, p. 2, ibid; John Scott to Vandenberg, March 23, 1932, p. 2, ibid. ; 
Kansas City Star, September 25, 1932.
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store effort to smash to pieces the legitimate price of every article offered for 
sale."45 He and other manufacturers urged Congress to support price 
maintenance legislation for brand name goods because they believed this 
legislation would stabilize prices and the market Manufacturers pointed out 
that certain industries, most notably automobile sales, retained control of 
pricing.46 The government permitted these practices to continue because the 
automobile manufacturers had developed a system of authorized dealers. The 
price maintenance supporters pointed out that this system, did not eliminate 
competition. Car manufacturers still fought for sales. The bill merely prevented 
dealers from competing on a price basis.47
Retailers sought protection from competition based on price. Grocers 
found the bill less pressing because they handled unbranded vegetables and 
fruits. Nonetheless, the National Association of Retail Grocers supported the 
bill. Drug retailers, who handled many trademarked items, provided the 
strongest and most consistent support for Capper-Kelly. The National 
Association of Retail Druggists lobbied for the bill, although some price
45 Caroll W. Doten, "What Economists Think o f the Kelly Resale price Bill (HR. 11),” p. 
20 in box 8, folder "Chain Stores," Victor Christgau Papers.
46 Charles Garvin to Bulkley, December 28, 1932; Couzens to Frank Collins, February 4, 
1932; Frank Collins to Capper February 8, 1932. All in box 39, “Fair Trade 1932,” Capper 
Papers.
47 W. E. McCollum to Capper, January 10, 1931, box 39, "Fair Trade 1931,” Capper
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48maintenance supporters criticized its national leadership for a lack of energy. 
Perhaps most surprising of all, this anti-chain bill even won the support of. . . 
chains! Because of pressure from pine board retailers, who ran low overhead 
stores and sold medicine at low prices, chain drug stores supported Caper-
49Kelly. Charles Walgreen, founder of the Walgreen’s drug chain, expressed 
his hope that the Capper-Kelly bill could stabilize the drug business and 
prevent devastating competition. However, he suggested that manufacturers be 
permitted to set a minimum price instead.50
Anti-chain retailers supported the bill because they hoped to avoid 
destruction through predatory pricing and other aggressive practices by chains. 
Independents argued that chains grew because they deliberately sold products 
below price. They pointed to the disparity in price between markets, 
disparities that could not be accounted for by transportation costs or other
Papers; “Flyer on the Capper-Kelly Bill,” p.3, box 25, folder 17, Fischelis Papers.
48 Abraham Fink to the New York Evening World, November 28, 1930, box 39, "Fan- 
Trade 1930," Capper Papers; Robert P. Fischelis to Dargavel, July 7, 1932, box 35, 
folder 14, Fischelis Papers; Dargavel to Fischelis, July 9, 1932, ibid.
49 Roy Reese to Capper, December 22, 1932, box 39, “Fair Trade 1932,” Capper 
Papers; Mortenson to Capper, December 22, 1932, ibid.; Mortenson to Couzens, 
December 21, 1932, Fischelis Papers; George A  Bender, A History o f  Arizona 
Pharmacy (Tuscon, AZ: Arizona Pharmacy Historical Foundation, 1985), 49, 51, 57, 
68, 83, 90; Monod, Store Wars, 278; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 59.
50 Jerry McQuade to Capper, April 6, 1932, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1932," Capper Papers; 
Kelly to Capper, April 12, 1932, ibid. ; Doten, “What Economists Think,” 18,19,24.
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factors in the cost of distribution. For example, as part of its Seventieth 
Anniversary celebration, A&P sold three pounds of coffee for seventy-three 
cents in Minneapolis and fifty-nine cents in Chicago. Freight rate differences 
could not account for such a wide variation. Small retailers concluded that the 
price divergence stemmed from predatory actions by the chains. Small retailers 
worried that chains and their loss leader sales would destroy them. And they 
called for federal action to protect them from the chains.51
Arthur Capper made clear that he did not oppose chains as such.52 He 
believed they were part of the "natural evolution" of the economy: mass 
distribution for a mass production age.53 In a 1932 A & P  radio program
51 Mortenson to Capper, March 2, 1932, pp. 1-2, box 39, "Fair Trade 1932," Capper Papers; 
Roy Reese to Capper, April 18, 1932, ibid.; Directors of the Alliance of Retail Trade 
Associations o f Southern California to Couzens, March 1,1932, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1932," 
Capper Papers; Southern California Retail Druggists' Association Weekly Bulletin, January 
16, 1932, 2, 3; Copeland to M  D. Pelletier, December 29, 1930, box 20, "Correspondence 
December 1930," Copeland Papers; Your Naborhood Who's Who-and What, November 
1930,1, 2,4; Louisiana Progress, May 15, 1930,3; W. A. Chatterton to Costigan, February 
5, 1932, p.2, box 47, "Senate Correspondence-Unemployment," Costigan Papers; Charles 
Garvin to Bulkley, December 28, 1932, p.2, box 39, ‘Tair Trade 1932,” Capper Papers; 
Break the Chains, March 8, 1930, 8; Henry Waldron to Capper, April 22, 1930, ibid; 
Waldron to Capper, April 24, 1930, ibid.; W. J. Rauch to Capper, February 24, 1930, 
ibid.-, Democrat (Johnstown, Pennsylvania), March 4, 1930.; J. F. Tatman to Clyde 
Kelly, January 16, 1928, box 8, folder "Capper-Kelly bill," Victor Christgau Papers, 
Minnesota History Center, S t Paul, Minnesota.
$z Charles Garvin to Bulkley, December 28, 1932, p.2, box 39, “Fair Trade 1932,” 
Capper Papers.
53 Capper, “Radio Address over WIBW,” March 31,1931,” p. I, box 39, Tair Trade 
1931,” Capper Papers; Capper, “Speech before the Retail Grocers Protective Association 
over WJSV,” March 31,1930, p.2, box 38, “Chain Stores,” Capper Papers.
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dedicated to promoting healthy nutrition, Capper, the head of the farm bloc in 
Congress, even admitted the chains had brought tremendous positive change to 
retailing, although he wanted to see a greater reduction in the spread between 
farm prices and retail food costs. The host of the program, Colonel Goodbody, 
must have been pleasantly surprised. He had already cautioned the audience 
that the Senator and A & P  had not always agreed on all issues.54 Capper told 
independents that neither boycott campaigns nor legislation would make the 
chains disappear. The public, Capper said, was studying both chain and 
independent stores in order to determine where to shop. "The independent 
retailer is just as much on trial as the chain store,” he said. “The consumers of 
the country are the jury."55 Capper believed chains had real strengths, but he 
did not believe they were wholly superior to independents.56 He warned small 
retailers they needed to improve their business and form voluntary chains to
57ensure the most efficient service possible. At the same time, he believed the 
chains had become a threat to independent retailing  because o f  their predatory
54 Copeland, “Food Preservation and Modem Refrigeration," pp.2-3, March 31,1931, box 
30, folder "Writings U.S. Senate, 1923-38 Economy 1,” Copeland Papers; Capper, "High 
Profits for Five Cents Bread," March 14,1931, box 15, "Monopoly," Capper Papers.
55 Capper, “Speech before the Retail Grocers Protective Association over WJSV,” 3.
56 Capper, “Speech before the Retail Grocers Protective Association over WJSV,” 4, 5; 
John Scott to Vandenberg, March 18, 1932, box 38, “Chain Stores,” Capper Papers.
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pricing. Fearful that chains might develop monopolistic control over retailing, 
he warned the public cut-throat competition would endanger them.58
Both manufacturers and retailers argued that price-cutting had 
additional harmful effects on the economy and undercut prosperity. They 
complained that large corporate chains were expanding at an exponential rate, 
enveloping the entire nation in a corporate web.59 Following the attacks of 
anti-chain activists, supporters of the legislation suggested the chains had 
produced lower farm prices and wages, thus depressing the economy and 
stripping wealth from the community.60 The chains might well destroy the 
American standard of living. Congressmen urged action to guarantee
58 Capper, “Radio address over WIBW’,” 2, 3, 5-6; Capper, “Speech before the Retail 
Grocers Protective Association over WJSV,” 5.
59 Louisiana Progress, March 1931, 12; Copeland, "We Are Traveling Fast," pp. 3-7, box 
19, "Correspondence June 1930," Royal Copeland Papers; W. B. Yeary to "Governor and 
Senator La Follette,” March 16,1932, p.2, box 18, folder 5, Phil La Follette Papers.
60 League o f Women Voters Program, "Government, Big Business, and Little Business," 
pp. 3-5, January 20, 1931, box 49, "Speeches 193 lea," Capper Papers; Charles Holman 
to Capper, March 13, 1931, box 36, "Oleomargarine," Capper Papers; Shreveport 
Journal, October 23, 1930, 15; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 134; Huber 
to Francis Culkin, June 20, 1930, box 6, folder 5, Huber Papers; Monod, Store Wars, 
171, 287; Break the Chains, February 22, 1930, 5; Samuel Pearson to Copeland, 
September 18, 1930, box 19 folder "Correspondence December 1930" Copeland 
Papers; Copeland, "An Address to the People of the United States,” October 4, 1930, p. 
4, box 30, "Economy 2,” Copeland Papers; Charles Garvin to Bulkley, December 28, 
1932, box 39, “Fair Trade 1932,” Capper Papers; Paoinia Color to Costigan, January 25, 
1932, box 47, “Correspondence-January-February 1932," Costigan Papers; W. A. 
Chatterton to Costigan, February 5, 1932, box 47, "Senate Correspondence- 
Unemployment," Costigan Papers; Edward Plaut to Capper, July 21, 1931, p.6, box 38, 
“Chain Stores,” Capper Papers; Capper, “Speech before the Retail Grocers Protective
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opportunity for Americans and the future of the American standard of living. 
As evidence of this threat, they relied on the work of famed Columbia 
University economist E. R. A. Seligman. Seligman argued that price 
maintenance proved “economically defensible and therefore ethically
desirable."61 Supporters of the Capper-Kelly bill prided themselves on
62Seligman’s support Seligman and his assistant, Dr. Robert Love, prepared 
commentary for the Capper-Kelly forces, including reactions to the FTC 
report, which concluded that price-cutting did not pose a substantive
63problem. Seligman’s publisher even offered a special bargain-basement
price on his work to Arthur Capper. No one gave any indication they 
considered such price-cutting to be unethical, hypocritical, or just plain 
ironic!64
Association over WJSV,” 4.
61 Plaut to Capper, January 28, 1932, p.2, box 39, "Fair Trade 1932," Capper Papers.
62 Southern California Retail Druggists'Association Weekly Bulletin, January 16, 1932, p.
3 in box 39, "Fair Trade 1932," Capper Papers; Plaut to Capper, July 21,1931, box 39,
"Fair Trade 1931," Capper Papers; Plaut to Capper, July 2,1931, ibid.-, Eagle (Brooklyn, 
New York), October 14, 1931.
63 Plaut to Capper, April 8, 1932, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1932" Capper Papers; Plaut to 
Capper, July 2,1931, box 39, ‘Tair Trade 1931,” Capper Papers; John Scott to Vandenberg, 
March 18, 1932, box 39, ‘Tair Trade 1932,” Capper Papers; Whittier to Capper, April 20, 
1931, box 39, ‘Tair Trade 1931,” Capper Papers.
64 Ordway Tread Business to Capper, August 2, 1932, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1932," 
Capper Papers.
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Seligman and his assistant were a minority in the economics profession. 
A Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist, Caroll W. Doten, 
surveyed professional economists about the Capper-Kelly bill. Doten wrote 
that he wanted to publicize the opinions of professional economists to improve 
the level of public debate. In his opinion, legislators too often ignored 
economists when they constructed public opinion and crafted bills. As a result, 
they lacked needed scientific information on the effect of their legislation. His 
survey of professional economists revealed a clear consensus: the bill 
challenged fundamental economic laws. Economists cautioned that the bill 
would increase the cost of distribution. They warned that the bill would 
improve the market position of manufacturers, allowing them to dictate 
prices.63 Needless to say, supporters of price maintenance legislation did not 
enjoy the pamphlet Paul Lovewell, of the Merchant's Journal, criticized the 
questionnaire for being biased and including numerous quotations from 
individuals hostile to the bill. It smelled of "tainted propaganda" to him, and he 
asked who had funded the survey of 557 economists. He conceded, though, 
that, "...it may be true that the college professors are "agin" the fair trade 
bill."66
65 Doten, “What Economists Think,” 1-2,4-8,12.
66 Paul Lovewell to Capper, January 3, 1931, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1931," Capper Papers;
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With the exception of the chain drug stores, supporters of mass 
distribution criticized the bill as an awkward, inefficient attempt to control 
prices. The National Retail Dry Goods Association (NRDGA) served as the
67main source of opposition to the bill. It argued that its stores served the public
through efficient retailing  and urged congressmen to allow the consumer to
benefit from retail competition. It warned Americans about the consequences
of legislation designed to slow change. Such plans threatened to restrict
American business success, limiting change and permitting antiquated systems
68to undermine prosperity. Consumers would pay higher prices.
The NRDGA won the support of the fledgling Consumers Research 
organization, a group that continues to test products and lobby in the interest of 
the buying public. F. D. Schlink, its head, believed that the Capper-Kelly bill 
endangered the ultimate consumer. He praised the NRDGA for releasing 
information on the bill and lobbying against it In his opinion, the interests of
Whittier to Lovewell, January 5, 1931, ibid.; Lee Galloway to Doten, November 21, 1930, 
box 39, ‘Tair Trade 1930,” Capper Papers.
67 "Flyer on Capper-Kelly Bill," p. 2, box 25, folder 17, Fischelis Papers; Capper to 
Charles Coffin, March 4,1930, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1930," Capper Papers.
Penney to Hoover, June 28, 1929, box 184, Presidential Personal Files, Hoover Papers; 
Wesley Mitchell to French Strother, October 10, 1932, box 11,"Wesley Mitchell 1929- 
1930," French Strother Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library.
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the association and consumers coincided in this area of legislation.69 In their 
lobbying against the bills, mass retailers identified themselves with consumers 
and argued that an attack on their style of distribution would hurt the buying 
public, whom they defended One small retailer complained about this “high 
and lofty rhetoric” that they defended the best interests of all involved.70 He 
complained that the NRDGA pretended their only concern was the consumer: 
“It's [sic] only concern, ostensibly, is for poor, Mrs. Average Consumer, not an 
honest argument in their own direct behalf as business men."71
Critics, like the NRDGA, warned that the bill would reward mediocrity 
in business, shielding companies from the need to adapt. As one small retailer 
complained, many small businessmen proved incapable of running their stores. 
They proved to be useless for the community. As an example, he cited one of 
his best friends who owned a drug store. The storeowner would not advertise
69 Women's Wear Daily, September 22, 1930 in box 25, folder 17, Fischelis Papers; 
Thomas Amlie to F. D. Schlink, December 12, 1931, box 77, folder 11, Amlie Papers; 
Schlink to Amlie, February 26, 1931, ibid.; Shreveport Journal, October 17, 1930, 7.
7fi John Scott to Vandenberg, March 18, 1932, box 39, “Fair Trade 1932,” Capper 
Papers; Doten, “What Economists Think,” 24; Capper to Charles Coffin, March 4, 1930, 
p.22, box 39, ‘Tair Trade 1930,” Capper Papers.
71 Scott to Vandenberg, March 23, 1932, box 39, ‘Tair Trade 1932,” Capper Papers; 
Whittier to Capper, April 16,1931, ibid
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and otherwise ignored the lessons of scientific retailing, refusing even to help 
boost the community and otherwise acted as a drain on the town.72
The bill would thus protect retailers who might best be put out of 
business. It would eliminate competition and set the price, as George Soule of 
the New Republic put it, at the “level of the marginal high-cost distributor.”73 
As J. C. Emahizer, a Topeka, Kansas, retailer pointed out, the consequences 
for the consumer might appear minimal, but could have a significant impact 
over the long-term. He gave the example of “Pepsodent,” the toothpaste that 
sponsored the wildly popular “Amos and Andy” program. In Topeka, Kansas, 
Pepsodent, which Emahizer identified as the toothpaste of “Amos and Andy,” 
sold for fifty cents a tube at regular price. The local Kroger’s sold it for thirty- 
three cents. But in Miami, Florida, it could be purchased for twenty-nine cents. 
How much might the consumer benefit from saving one-third on their 
expenses? Such savings could make a significant difference in the nation’s 
standard of living.74
72 J. C. Emahizer to Capper, October 20,1930, p.4, box 39, 'Tair Trade, 1925-1929," 
Capper Papers.
73 Doten, “What Economists Think,” 17.
74 J. C. Emahizer to Capper, October 20, 1930, p. 3, box 39, "Fair Trade, 1925-1929," 
Capper Papers; Studs Terkel, Hard Times, 61.
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The NRDGA argued that the Capper-Kelly bill, as written, would also 
subject retailers to the domination of manufacturers. Many economists 
expressed concern that the legislation extended too much control to 
manufacturers. Manufacturers of nationally advertised goods already had 
advantages over retailers because retailers needed to stock their products. Now 
they could set the prices for which their product would sell, preventing retailers 
from adjusting the price in response to consumer demand or the need to clear 
up space for inventory.75
This complaint proved a real concern for retailers. Emahizer, the Topeka 
retailer, groused about his experience with price maintenance in the 1910s. He 
had ordered too many phonographs and attempted to cut the price on them 
when they sold poorly. The phonograph company heard about his sale and 
stopped it with the threat o f a lawsuit. Emahizer then had to write off his loss 
on the machines.76 Emahizer wanted to know why he and other retailers could 
be told for what price they could sell goods they owned. 77
75 J. C. Emahizer to Capper, October 20, 1930, box 39, "Fair Trade, 1925-1929," 
Capper Papers.
76 Doten, "What Economists Think," 14, 21; "Flyer on Capper-Kelly Bill," p. 1 box 25, 
folder 17, Fischelis Papers; Capper to Kelly, January 21,1931, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1931," 
Capper Papers; J. C. Emahizer to Capper, October 20, 1930, box 39, "Fair Trade, 1925- 
1929," Capper Papers.
77 Doten, “What Economists Think,” 18.
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Because of this opposition from the NRDGA, the Capper-Kelly bill 
went through hearings, but Capper and Kelly could not move it through 
Congress. It was mired in the same predicament it had been in since the 
Progressive Era. As the bill moved toward passage, critics assailed it as easy 
to evade and too vague. Their primary criticism centered on the wording of 
a provision intended to guarantee different prices for commodities of 
varying quality levels. The bill referred to these products as “commodities of
78the same general type.” As economist Lawrence Guild pointed out, this 
phrase could be open to interpretation. In addition to this attack, some 
argued the bill left chains with options to evade the bill. Most obviously, 
chains could manufacture their own products and sell them for whatever
79price they chose. Because of such concerns, a number of critics suggested 
possible alternative bills. However, Capper-Kelly proponents rejected them 
as diversionary tactics.
One of the most surprising attempts came in 1930 when the bill was
80closest to passage. Charles Wesley Dunn, who had resigned as director of 
NARGUS, then announced his opposition to the Capper-Kelly bill. Dunn’s
78 Doten, “What Economists Think,” 22.
79 Doten, “What Economists Think,” 16, 24; J. C. Emahizer to Capper, October 20, 
1930, pp.4-5, box 39, "Fair Trade, 1925-1929," Capper Papers.
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reversal shocked former colleagues because he had not mentioned his 
change of mind to them, even after asking for confidential information on 
the hearings. When Dunn suggested another approach to price maintenance, 
the representatives of the American Fair Trade Association responded with 
utter condescension. One executive suggested derisively that Dunn, a 
lawyer, wanted to complicate the bill so that he could get more billable
hours from his clients.81 Despite Dunn’s reversal, the bill went through the
82House by a voice vote in early 1931. However, the bill stalled in the Senate.
Public opposition and the indifference of the President killed the bill. 
The Capper-Kelly bill received negative press coverage. Hoover’s press office 
surveyed the editorial stances of newspapers on legislation. Their report on the 
Capper-Kelly bill demonstrated clear media contempt for the bill. Out of thirty- 
five newspapers surveyed, only two, the High Point, North Carolina’s
80 Kelly to Whittier, July 5,1930, box 39, Tair Trade 1930," Capper Papers.
81 Whittier to Dunn, October 31, 1930, box 39, Tair Trade 1930," Capper Papers; Whittier 
to Dunn, November 12, 1930, i b i d Doten, "What Economists Think," 13; Whittier 
Bulletin, October 10, 1930; "Statement by Dr. Crichton Clarke, Counsel o f the American 
Fair Trade Association Against Charles Wesley Dunn's Attacks on Capper-Kelly" in 
Crichton Clark to C. H. Janssen, December 11, 1930, box 39, "Fair Trade 1930," Capper 
Papers; Whittier to Capper, November 12, 1930, ibid1; Dunn to Capper, November 24, 
1930, ibid.; Whittier Bulletin, February 6, 1930; New York Times, February 24, 1930.
82 Whittier Bulletin, January 31, 1931, 1; Whittier Bulletin, February 6,1931,1.
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83Enterprise and the Gazette of Billings, Montana, supported the legislation. In 
the days before the Gallup poll, the press office used this as a barometer of 
public sentiment. Hoover would be unlikely to support the bill. By evaluating 
circulation figures for the paper, his staff members reckoned that the editorials 
amounted to a 2,239,000 to 17,000 vote of opposition to the bill.
In addition, Hoover never related well to the antitrust block of the 
Republican Party that championed the Capper-Kelly bill. Although Hoover 
hailed from the trans-Missippi West, his approach to questions of business 
efficiency and anti-trust reflected the attitudes of the big businessman he 
became before he entered public service. Hoover personally knew J. C. Penney 
and other chain magnates. He even vacationed at Penney’s Florida estate. 
Hoover also despised many members of the Party's left wing, and they reacted 
to him with similar disdain. Hoover had particular problems with the Senator 
from his home state, Smith Brookhart, who pushed anti-chain measures and 
criticized Hoover for his inaction in the face of the Depression.84
83 “Report on Capper-Kelly bill, January 31,1931,” "Editorial Analysis A-C," Press 
Relations, Hoover Papers.
84 Lloyd L. Duke to Walter Newton, February 10, 1932, box 459, “Smith W. 
Brookhart,” Secretary's Files, Hoover Papers; G. Logan Payne to Hoover, July 31, 1929, 
ibid; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 118-120.
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Despite the setbacks for the Capper-Kelly bill, retailers and other price 
maintenance supporters continued to hold out hope for passage. Frank 
Mortenson, for example, suggested that action might come in 1932 because 
candidates for office expressed their support of the bill.85 However, many 
retailers and legislators wanted to move beyond this legislation. They 
considered its approach insufficient to deal with the full power of chain
predatory practices. Chains’ selling prices were only one side of their unfair
86practices. Chains also used predatory practices in buying. Paul Lovewell, the 
editor of the Merchant’s Journal suggested that the bill should also penalize 
"secret discounts, allowances or rebates." Lovewell believed the chains 
received rebates beyond the amount justified by economic expediency. C. H. 
Janssen, of the National Retail Grocers Association, shared Lovewell’s 
suspicion that chains benefited from special rebates. All of these critics
87wanted to see an investigation of chain buying and rebates. Lovewell
85 Frank Mortenson to Capper, March 23, 1932, box 39, ‘Tair Trade 1932,” Capper 
Papers; Charles Garvin to Capper, December 28, 1932, pp. 1-2, box 39, ‘Tair Trade 
1932;” Capper to Bob Hall, January 19, 1932, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1932." All in Capper 
Papers; W. K. Henderson to Hoover, July 7,1932, box 618, "W. K. Henderson," Secretary’s 
Files, Hoover Papers. See also Kelly to Capper, May 9, 1932, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1932,” 
Capper Papers; Simeon Fess to Frank Collins, April 12, 1932, ibid.', Collins to Capper, 
April 14,1932, ibid
or
Royal Copeland, “An Address to the People o f the United States,” p. 5, box 30, 
“Economy 2,” Copeland Papers; Break the Chaim, February 15,1930,5.
87 C. H. Janssen to Capper, April 21, 1930  ^|>p. 1-2, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1930," Capper
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supported “reasonable” and public discounts. He did not seek to outlaw all 
quantity discounts, nor did he consider such a policy to be advisable.88
Independent retailers complained about the overpowering market power 
of the chains. The chains could use their power to elicit significant rebates 
from manufacturers and farmers. Independents could not match the resources 
of the chains. Even if they had impressive skills as retailers, the corporate 
monsters might well defeat them. Trade association representatives believed 
the chain stores developed their business because they received special favors 
and rebates. According to some trade officials, these rebates made it possible 
for the chains to offer extremely low prices on certain items. The government 
needed to investigate these charges, according to these retailers.
On a federal level, the Capper-Kelly bill and its approach to the nation's 
economic crisis faded into the background as a new administration arrived to 
take control from Hoover. Roosevelt and his administration offered a new plan 
for economic renewal. The National Recovery Administration borrowed the 
notion of price maintenance from the Capper-Kelly bill. But this reform effort 
proved far more ambitious, seeking to provide wage and hour protections for
Papers; Shreveport Journal, October 23,1930; Copeland to Pearson, November 13, 1930, 
box 39, 'Tair Trade 1930" Capper Papers; Samuel Pearson to Copeland, December 18, 
1930, box 30, “Correspondence December 1930," Copeland Papers.
o o
Paul Lovewell to Whittier, August 28,1930, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1930,” Capper Papers.
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labor and a voice for the consumer. Retail trade would have to adapt to a new 
environment
Opposition to the Capper-Kelly bill on the federal level discouraged 
small retailers. But they continued to fight on other fronts. Perhaps the most 
important battle came in state legislatures where the retailers succeeded in 
passing a wave of chain taxes in the early 1930s. If the national government 
under President Hoover would not act in their interests, perhaps state 
governments would prove more willing. Retailers would eventually succeed in 
passing a modified version of the Capper-Kelly bill through state legislatures.89 
But their first goal was to pass special chain taxes. State governments needed 
to act in some way to meet the demands of the economic crisis. Perhaps they 
could be convinced to punish out-of-state retailers. During the early 1930s, 
attempts to pass chain taxes in the states became the most important expression 
of anti-chain sentiment
oo
Frank Mortenson to Capper, June 17,1931, box 39, "Fair Trade 1931," Capper Papers.
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Chapter Four: State Anti-Chain Taxes
By imposing taxes on multiple stores owned by the same company, state 
governments found a political means to attack chains. States first passed these 
taxes in the 1920s but the number of statutes exploded after 1930 when anti­
chain broadcasters called attention to the plight of small retailers. Although 
adverse court rulings overturned the earliest laws, a Supreme Court decision in 
1931 hastened their spread. The new legal attitude came at an opportune time. 
State governments needed revenue to support the unemployed. At the same 
time, many Americans found it difficult or impossible to meet existing tax 
burdens and lost their house, farms and businesses because they could not pay 
their property taxes. The chain tax offered states a new source of revenue in 
which states could force outside corporations, to bear a larger portion of state 
government and relief. Chain taxes ultimately passed in over half of the states, 
although they had a negligible effect on chain growth.
Retailers had fought for legislation to control the growth of corporate 
retailing since the late nineteenth century, when the target had been department 
stores. Such legislative proposals continued through the progressive era and
131
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into the 1920s.1 Mail order companies, although boycotted, eluded such 
attacks. They did not own property in most states and could avoid conventional 
means of taxation, and without offices in a state, they could not be targeted by 
regulatory measures. Their primary legislative battles involved parcel post 
legislation and rural free delivery, which small retailers fought because they 
made it easier for mail order packages and catalogs to get to rural customers.2 
With the rise of the chain stores, however, shopkeepers sought a more direct 
means of control and focused on state licensing power.3
Storekeepers in St. Louis, Missouri, organized the Association Opposed 
to Branch Stores and promoted the first anti-chain tax in 1923, a so-called 
graduated license plan. It worked through the licensing powers of the state to 
place penalties on chain stores. Each additional license cost a company a larger 
amount This bill placed a $50 fee on the second store of a corporation, which 
rose to a $200 fee on the fifth store. Moreover, it prohibited any organization 
from owning more than ten stores in the state of Missouri, but it received little
1 Steven Diner, A Very Different Age: Americans o f  the Progressive Era (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1998), 44-45.
2 Rural Trade, August 30,1924,3.
3 Two taxes, one in Delaware and the other in North Dakota, placed small taxes on branch 
stores in the 1910s. See Frederick Hardy, The Special Taxation o f Chain Stores (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1939), 128; Shreveport Journal, October 23,1930,15.
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attention and failed.4 In Michigan and Pennsylvania, pharmacists successfully 
lobbied for legislation that required licensed pharmacists, and not corporations, 
to own pharmacies. They argued that corporate control of drug stores 
threatened public safety and was therefore subject to state control. The 
Supreme Court disagreed.5 In 1927, North Carolina, Georgia and Maryland 
passed laws providing for additional taxation for chains of more than five 
stores, although Virginia and Mississippi rejected such proposals.6 Even in 
states which passed legislation, judges struck down the new laws. In the 
Maryland case, anti-chain activists, including representatives of trade 
associations, faced off against chain attorneys. At the conclusion of the trial, 
the judge remarked that chain stores appeared to play an important role in 
distribution. In this and all cases, courts argued that the definition of a chain
4 Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement in the United States,” 148; Godfrey 
Lebhar, Chain Stores in America, 1859-1952 (New York: Chain Store Publishing 
Corporation, 1952), 118-120.
5 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 152-5. See L. K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 
278 U.S. 105; George A. Bender, A History o f  Arizona Pharmacy (Tuscon, AZ: Arizona 
Pharmacy Historical Foundation, 1985), 9; Harry Dockum to Allen, December 28, 1922, 
27-08-08-07, 'Pharmacy, Board of," Governor Henry Allen Papers, Kansas State Historical 
Society; Paul J. Mandabach to Allen, June 15,1922, p.2, ibid.
6 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement in the United States,” 150; Chain Store Age, 
June 1927; Chain Store Age, November 1926; Chain Store Age, October 1927; Hardy, The 
Special Taxation o f  Chain Stores, 146.
7 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 151-152; Wall Street Journal, April 27,1928;
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as consisting of five or more stores was arbitrary. In addition, they said that 
legislators could not justify higher levels of taxation for these stores. Because 
of these failings, the acts violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the 
chain corporations. The courts further argued that the taxes served a regulatory 
and not a revenue raising purpose.8
Despite hostile court decisions, retailers still held out hope for anti-chain 
legislation. Courts could and did change their minds. The anti-chain radio 
campaigns of 1929 and 1930 sparked tremendous excitement for tax bills. W. 
K. Henderson and his imitators prompted politicians to put forward anti-chain 
bills. Indiana passed a last minute tax in 1929, and over sixty such bills were 
introduced in 1930. 9 The anti-chain activists watched these developments with 
real interest, eager to see states adopt substantive law to protect them10 In 
Kentucky, the clerk of the House blurted out, “Hello World,” Henderson’s
Great A&P Tea Company v. Doughton 196 N.C. 145,144 S.E. 701 (1928).
8 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Movement in the United States,” 155-156; Columbia Law 
Review vol. 31; Woolworth v Harrison 171 GA 891,156 SE 904.
9 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 148,168.
10 Break the Chains, April 26, 1930, 12; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 155- 
156; Omaha Star, September 29, 1930 in box 61, Scrapbook XVH, Sorensen Papers, 
Nebraska Historical Society, Lincoln, Nebraska; Break the Chains, March 22, 1930, 8,20; 
Break the Chains, February 22, 1930,13; Anti-Chain World, February 15,1930,2- 3; Break 
the Chains, March 1,1930,3; Break the Chain, April 26,1930,9.
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tagline, when an anti-chain bill was introduced. That bill started a new trend in 
anti-chain legislation. Instead of relying on the licensing power of the state, it 
taxed gross sales of firms at a progressive rate. As sales increased in a state, so 
did taxes. It passed the legislature and became law. 11
Following passage of the Kentucky law, candidates in the campaigns of 
1930 promised to enact bills to stem the tide of chain growth. Politicians, many 
of whom had contact with anti-chain broadcasters, incorporated the criticism 
of the chains first developed by the anti-chain broadcasters. Politicians 
attacked the chains for their short weight offenses and failure to offer credit 
They condemned corporate chains for stripping their states of wealth and 
transferring money to New York and other distant financial centers. They 
warned that continued growth of the chains would endanger American 
opportunity.
In Wisconsin, Progressive Party politicians embraced the chain issue. 
Ever since the days of Fighting Bob La Follette, the party had fought corporate 
intrusions, and the growing chain system caught their attention as a new threat
11 Flem Sampson to Bruce Barton, box 62, "Flem Sampson Folder," Bruce Barton 
Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 
160-161; Louisville Courier-Joumal, February 20, 1930; Louisville Courier Journal, 
March 3, 1930 Louisville Courier-Joumal, March 5, 1930; Tobacco Leaf, March 15, 
1930; Louisville Courier-Joumal, February 25, 26, 28, 1930 Louisville Courier- 
Joumal, March 1,2,3, 1930.
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to Wisconsin democracy. The first o f the Wisconsin politicians to take a stand 
on the issue, Lieutenant Governor Henry A. Huber, began his assaults on chain 
banks before Henderson’s anti-chain crusade.12 The state had been gripped by 
merger mania in its banking community as large Madison and Milwaukee 
banks had begun to take over banks in other parts of the state. The 
consolidation provided Progressives with a home grown threat Huber and his 
Progressive colleagues seized on the issue, in particular, because members of 
their political opposition served on the boards of these banks and, as the 
administration in power, supported the mergers.
After Huber decried the chain banks, he expanded his attacks to include 
chain stores as well. Huber’s attacks brought him national attention W. K. 
Henderson invited him to write a speech to be broadcast over KWKH. Huber 
hoped radio would serve as an effective means to communicate the danger 
faced by the nation, and he urged small merchants to fight back against
12 John W. Grobshmidt to Evjue, September 25, 1929, pp. 1-2, box 51, folder 7, Evjue 
Papers; Evjue to Grobschmidt, October 1, 1929, ibid.; Milwaukee Journal, January 6,1930 
in Huber Scrapbook, Huber Papers; Evening Telegram, December 11, 1929, ibid, 
Sheboygan Press, December 11, 1929, ibid; J. C. Klesges to Henry Huber, December 28, 
1929, p.2, box 7, folder 3, Huber Papers; Huber to Carlton Mauthe, December 5, 1929, 
ibid, Evjue to Carlton Mauthe, May 8, 1930, box 90, folder 18, Evjue Papers; Mauthe to 
Evjue, May 7, 1930, ibid; Evjue to Mauthe, November 11, 1929, ibid', Mauthe to Evjue, 
November 11,1929, ibid, Huber Scrapbook; Capital Times, December 10,1929.
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corporations.13 Following Huber’s criticism, the Progressives in Wisconsin 
made chain stores a major campaign issue in 1930. Phil La Follette, son of the 
late "Battling Bob" La Follette and brother of one of Wisconsin's senators, used 
the chains as a major rallying point Starting in January of 1930, Phil lashed 
out against the chains. He called for a unified movement of independent 
merchants, farmers and labor to back the Progressive Party and end the chain 
threat to economic prosperity. 14 Huber and La Follette headed a statewide 
ticket that attacked the chains for their devastating economic and social 
influence. Chains were growing at a tremendous rate, the progressives warned, 
and if they were not stopped, Wisconsin communities would be destroyed 
economically and even American democracy would be threatened.
Huber and La Follette pointed to the mushrooming sales of the A&P 
corporation in the state The grocery company sold six million dollars worth 
of products in the state in 1924. Its 1928 returns indicated sales of nineteen 
million dollars worth of goods. Huber noted that such growth followed a 
national trend, although he suggested that Wisconsin proved to be 
particularly happy hunting grounds for the chains. Sales had more than
13 Huber to M. P. Campbell, July 24,1930, box 6, folder 5, Huber Papers.
14 James Lorence, Gerald J. Boileau and the Progressive-Farmer-Labor Alliance, 38; 
Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 118.
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doubled in the last four years to forty-three million.15 Huber and La Follette 
argued that this growth came through unfair and predatory tactics and cite 
loss leaders, low wages, dodged taxes and short weighting—and in doing so 
parroted the attacks of anti-chain broadcasters.16
LaFollette and Huber also warned that the chains threatened 
independent merchants. They pointed out that merchant bankruptcies 
increased from sixty a year in the early part of the decade to over two 
hundred each in 1928 and 1929.17 But, La Follette and Huber added, the 
chain tactics hurt all citizens of Wisconsin. In a letter announcing his 
campaign, La Follette suggested that chains would raise prices if they 
eliminated independent competition. Even if they did not, their use of loss 
leaders would hurt farmers, who would receive lower prices for their crops 
from chains. Labor would receive lower wages and have their wages cut by 
manufacturers selling to chains at a loss.
15 Capital Times, April 16, 1930 in Huber Scrapbook; Clintonville Tribime, March 28, 
1930, ibid.
16 ibid.
17 Phil La Follette to "My Friends Everywhere," January 23, 1930, pp. 2-3, 7, box 57, 
folder 3, Phil La Follette Papers.
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According to the Progressives, the chains also sucked money from
18Wisconsin and endangered opportunity in the state. La Follette and Huber 
linked the growth of the chains to drops in bank deposits. Huber accused 
chain stores of tunneling money out of the state to New York and attacked 
the chains as "carpetbaggers," intent on stripping Wisconsin of its wealth.19
If this trend continued, he warned the chains would drain the state of all its
20wealth, crushing it down and turning it into a colony for Eastern interests.
The ultimate effect of these developments would be the destruction of 
Wisconsin. Huber put forward a powerful image of a desolate ghost town to 
remind the citizens of Wisconsin what happened when the economy failed. 
"Some years ago, in travelling through the West, I visited a deserted mining- 
town with its empty buildings and every time that I make a chain store speech I 
see that horrible assemblage of desertion before me. I want none of it for 
Wisconsin." 21 La Follette worried also that the growth of the chains would
18 Henry A  Huber to "My Dear Friend," [n.d. 1930 campaign], box 7, "File Misc.," Huber 
Papers; Huber to Robert Hanson, November 4,1929, pp. 1-2, box 7, folder 3, Huber Papers; 
Huber to George Wahleitner, December 31, 1929, ibid.
19 Capital Times, April 16, 1930 in Huber Scrapbook; Huber to Daniel Andre Drotning 
December 11,1930, pp.2-3, box 7, "1930 November-December," Huber Papers.
20 Huber to W. J. Butler, June 6, 1930, box 6, folder 5, Huber Papers; Huber to George C. 
Schleitner, June 3,1930, ibid.
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strip wealth from the state with devastating consequences. He wrote: "I 
cannot feel that the people of Wisconsin, who have cleared the land, erected 
their homes, founded their schools and churches, built villages and cities 
want the profits of their toil and labor drained to Wall Street." The results of 
this growth, he wrote, would be to destroy their community and the dreams 
of their ancestors. 22
Likewise, both Huber and La Follette warned that the growth of large 
chains endangered American democracy. According to Huber, the loss of 
independent businesses, and economic opportunity, would bring an end to the 
American experiment It would result in Russian-style communism without 
private property. The loss of private property would mean the loss of solid 
citizens who formed the bedrock of the community, undermining the entire
21 Huber to Otto P. Kugler, June 12, 1930, box 6, folder 5, Huber Papers; Capital Times, 
December 10, 1929; Capital Times, April 16, 1930, Huber Scrapbook; Chester Collman 
to Huber, April 24, 1930, box 6, folder 4, Huber Papers; Huber to I. F. Moore, May 13, 
1930, ibid.; Huber to C. G. Marshall, May 9, 1930, ibid, United States Daily, May 7, 
1930; Huber to Ernest Kamemberg, March 26, 1930, box 6 folder 4, Huber Papers; M  
L. Poundstone to Clyde Reed, February 15, 1930, box 1, folder 5, 27-10-02-07, Clyde 
Reed Papers, Kansas State Historical Society; Harold McGugin to Reed, February 22, 
1930, ibid ', M. L. Poundstone to Reed, February 20, 1930, box 1, folder 6, 27-10-04-01 
Reed Papers.
22 Phil La Follette to "My Friends Everywhere," January 23, 1930, pp. 8-9, box 57, 
folder 3, Phil La Follette Papers.
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social and economic system.23 He compared the small retailers to the soldiers 
at Valley Forge, crusaders dedicated to independence, men watchful of their 
country.24 The Progressive Party Platform for 1930 warned of the danger 
posed by corporate intrusion into Wisconsin. If chains continued to grow, 
individual opportunity and prosperity would disappear. Individual liberty 
would follow shortly.25
Although the Progressives made the chains a major issue in the 
campaign, the Stalwarts, their opponents, also condemned the chain stores,
which indicated how widespread hostility to the chains was in Wisconsin at
26the time. La Follette blasted Stalwarts for their attempt to seize the chain 
issue. He argued that the Stalwart administration had permitted the chains to 
grow because of lax enforcement of fair practice and tax laws.27 
Nevertheless, La Follette did receive some criticism on the chain issue. One 
constituent and fellow Progressive, P. W. Ramer lambasted the governor
23 Huber to Murray, April 9,1931, box 8, folder 7, Huber Papers.
24 “Huber Speech at Fond du Lac, Wisconsin,” in Sheboygan Press, August 12, 1930 in 
Huber Scrapbook.
25 "Phil's Rough Draft Progressive Party Platform, 1930," [July 23, 1930], p. 1, box 1, folder 
4, La Follette Papers.
26 Capital Times, June 11,1930.
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because of his stand. Although Ramer said he had once been skeptical of the 
chains, he had come to realize that chain stores improved the quality of 
retailing and the value to the consumer. He pointed to events in his hometown 
as evidence of the benefits chains brought, and he assured La Follette that the
chains owed their tremendous growth to efficiency. Chains promised to
28increase American prosperity, not imperil it. Huber received similar 
comments from a young friend of his family, who agreed with his stand on 
chain banks but cautioned that chain stores seemed to promise real progress in 
retail distribution.29 In a similar fashion, a preacher friend of his attacked
30Huber for romanticizing the contributions of the small town retailer. Huber
31and La Follette won an overwhelming victory in the election.
The Progressives, particularly La Follette, argued that they only 
wanted to take away chain advantages and prevent them from employing
27 'Phil's Rough Draft Progressive Party Platform, 1930," 2-3.
P. W. Ramer to Phil November 6, 1930, box 2, folder 2, La Follette Papers; Lorrence, 
Gerald J. Boileau and the Progressive-Farmer-Labor Alliance, 38.
29 Robert Riggs to Huber, February 16, 1930, p.2, box 6, folder 1, Huber Papers.
30 Rev. R. H. Jones to Huber, March 3, 1930, p.2, box 6, folder 1, Huber Paper; Huber 
to Rev. R. H. Jones, March 5, 1930, p.2, ibid.
31 Bume Pollock to Huber, September 17, 1930, box 7, "1930 August-October," Huber 
Papers.
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unfair practices. No one in the Progressive camp urged retailers to focus on 
legislation as the only solution to their problems. They also promoted 
scientific retailing, in particular the development of a state-sponsored 
voluntary chain, endorsing the cooperative ideal in merchandising as eagerly 
as they did in farming. 32 Progressives also argued that retailing should end 
its old habits. Wisconsin organized its own voluntary chains to permit small 
retailers to compete with the chains. The state Department of Agriculture 
and Markets banded together fifty independent merchants to build a chain 
that would assist with purchasing and other functions.33
In Minnesota, the progressive forces mobilized a campaign similar to 
that in Wisconsin. Floyd Olson, the charismatic and handsome young darling 
of the left wing, championed anti-chain legislation. 34 Unlike in Wisconsin, 
however, in Minnesota the rival political faction opposed anti-chain measures 
and ridiculed them as pathetic attempts to win votes from small retailers.
32 Phil La Follette to "My Friends Everywhere," January 23, 1930, p. 5, box 57, folder 3, La 
Follette Papers.
33 Clintonville Tribune, March 28, 1930 in Huber Scrapbook; Huber to C. W. Warner, July 
11, 1930, box 6, folder 5, Huber Papers; Huber to Daniel Andre Drotning, December 11, 
1930, ibicL\ Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 122; Ben R. Katz to Phil 
LaFoilette, box 7, folder 3, Phil La Follette Papers.
34 Break the Chains, May 9, 1930,4.
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Because of the possibility o f anti-chain legislation, a group of small retailers 
organized to support Olson.35 They sent letters to both candidates for 
Governor, asking them about their stand on chain stores.36 Olson, who had 
already indicated his support for anti-chain measures, repeated his 
statements.37 His opponent, Ray Park Chase, refused to reply to the letter, but 
the meat dealers quoted a recent speech by him in which he criticized attempts 
to slow the growth of the chains.
Following Olson’s endorsement by small retailers, he began to speak 
before anti-chain organizations throughout the state. In one small town, Olson 
spoke before a small group of supporters in the high school auditorium.38 Not 
all of the merchants in town supported him, despite his stand against the 
chains. A grocer who was a friend of Ray Park Chase had already written a 
letter to the local paper condemning Olson’s attacks on the chains. As Harold 
Featherstone, the independent merchant, wrote to his friend Ray Park Chase
35 Irving S. Anderson to "Brother Independent Merchant," n.&, [1930], box 6, "Carley 
Investigation-Chain Stores," Ray Park Chase Papers; G. G. Fageros and H. C. Wessin to 
'Fellow Member," October 22,1930, ibid.
36 Irving S. Anderson to "Brother Independent Merchant," n.d., [1930], ibid; G. G. Fageros 
and H. C. Wessin to "Dear Sir," September 29,1930, ibid.
37 Irving S. Anderson to "Brother Independent Merchant," n.<± [1930], box 6, "Carley 
Investigation-Chain Stores," Ray Park Chase Papers; Floyd Olson to H. C. Wessin, October 
8,1930, ibid
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that state governments could not stop the laws of economics. He pointed out 
that retailers had begun to fight back against the chains by forming voluntary 
groups, which could do something effective to improve retail efficiency and 
meet the chain challenge. Proposed political solutions would not end the 
competitive condition; the devil would still continue to take the hindmost39 
Featherstone found himself in a confrontation with Olson when the 
gubernatorial candidate showed up in his store the afternoon of his speech, 
spoiling for a debate. Featherstone reported on the encounter with glee.40
After Olson began his spirited campaign against the chains, a 
Minneapolis good government organization issued a pamphlet that revealed 
that Olson had patronized a chain store for eight years. The association 
attacked Olson for hypocrisy. He canceled his charge account with the store 
shortly after he won the nomination for governor and began his campaign 
against the chain stores. They also took Olson to task because the National Tea 
Store at which he shopped had been on the union unfair list for a time during
38 Featherstone to Ray Park Chase, May 23,1930, ibid.
39 Ray Park Chase to Harold Featherstone, January 24, 1929, ibid', Featherstone to Chase, 
January 24,1929, pp.2,4-5, ibid.
40 Harold Featherstone to Chase, May 23, 1930, pp. 1-2, ibid
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his patronage.41 Olson replied that his wife had been responsible for shopping 
and that she quit going to the store after she found out about the danger of 
chain groceries. "I am frank to say that before the anti-chain discussion was 
started, my own wife and many of her neighbors thoughtlessly patronized a 
local chain store occasionally. Knowledge of the dangers from the chain store 
system caused them to quit the chain store entirely. What is true of them is true 
of thousands of others." Olson promised to fight for a tax against the chains. 
He won the election, but questions about the constitutionality of chain taxes 
discouraged the legislature from passing anti-chain legislation until 1934. 42
In other states as well politicians flocked to the cause, including Huey 
Long, eager to help the independent retailers in their war against the chains.43 
The Kingfish had close personal ties with W. K. Henderson and used KWKH 
as a platform for his political campaigns. Long made broadcasts from the 
station that could be heard throughout the United States. The value of the
41 Good Government Association flyer, "Floyd B. Olson a Patron o f the Chain Stores," box 
6 "Carley Investigation-Chain Stores" Ray Park Chase Papers.
42 Irving S. Anderson to "Brother Independent Merchant," n.d. [1930], ibid.; "Reprint From 
Floyd B. Olson's "Anti-Chain" Campaign Speeches," ibid
43 Louisiana Progress, August 28, 1930, 5; Louisiana Progress, August 18, 1931, 1; 
Business Week, May 20,1930; M. R  Cavanaugh to Huber, February 5, 1931, box 4, "1931 
February," Huber Papers.
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coverage was impressive. Long made numerous criticisms of the chain stores 
throughout his campaigns.44 But despite enthusiastic support from small 
retailers and Huey's attacks on the chains, the Louisiana legislature failed to 
pass anti-chain legislation until after Long left office45 Of course, Long 
continued to influence state law from the senate, even sitting in the legislative 
chamber. His opposition to the chains accounts for the eventual passage of the 
chain tax bill in 1934.
In contrast to the victories in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Louisiana, 
other opponents failed to win their races. Perhaps the best known of these 
candidates came from Kansas. Dr. John Brinkley, an eccentric doctor with 
dubious credentials, made chain stores an important element of his 
independent campaign for governor. Brinkley first achieved fame because of 
his controversial medical advice. Brinkley's medical practice included a range 
of homeopathic remedies, but his unique contribution to medical science was 
an innovative procedure to treat erectile disfunction in which he sewed a gland
44 Jeansonne, Messiah o f  the Masses, 54-55; Louisiana Progress, March 27, 1930, 
"Governor Attacks Chain Stores and Daily Newspapers," Louisiana Progress, April 10, 
1930, 1; "The Chain Menace and How to fight It before Retail Grocers o f New Orleans,” 
April 23, 1930 in Louisiana Progress, May 1, 1930, 1; Louisiana Progress, April 3, 1930, 
6; Anti-Chain World, February 15,1930,5.
45 Louisiana Progress, August 5, 1930, 1; Louisiana Progress, June 5, 1930,5.
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from a goat into the scrotum of patients, thus restoring dozens of men to 
fighting form Brinkley dispensed that and other medical advice on his radio 
program, broadcast on his own station, and became extraordinarily popular. 
Brinkley then commissioned druggists to dispense his remedies in various parts 
of the state. He worked hard to maintain prices at the same level as he sold 
them at his clinic. As a manufacturer, however, Brinkley found himself 
threatened by price cutting retailers. He worked diligently to ensure that 
pharmacists did not substitute less expensive prescriptions for his own, firing 
off threatening communiques with salutations like: “To My Reputable and 
Accredited Druggists Who Have the Constipation medication.” In return for 
cooperation, Brinkley promised that he would provide pharmacists with 
additional business and free advertising.46 The Kansas Medical Association, 
the AMA and the Kansas Pharmaceutical Association called Brinkley a 
quack.47 All three lobbied the Federal Radio Commission to revoke his license.
46 John Brinkley, "To My Fellow Druggists," n.d.; Dr. Brinkley National Pharmaceutical 
Association, "To All Druggists," March 4, 1930; John Brinkley, to “My Reputable and 
Accredited Druggists Who have the Constipation medication," n.d., Ail in box 7, 
"Miscellaneous Material-Notes Fragments of Letters, Etc.," Brinkley Collection, Kansas 
State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas.
47 Mrs. Blanche Benter to Clyde Reed, June 16, 1930, p.2, 27-10-04-01, folder 1, Reed 
Papers; G. B. Kierulff to Reed, April 2, 1930, p.l, ibid; Journal of the American Medical 
Association, April 12, 1930, 1146; Brinkley to 'My Dear Radio Friend," March 24, 1930, 
box 3, "Contents of Notebooks for Brinkley Druggists," Brinkley Collection; Brinkley to 
Petros Pharmacy, April 3, 1930, box 1, "Correspondence October 1925-September 1932,”
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Brinkley’s supporters claimed that these and other efforts were part of a 
conspiracy by radio chains (now called networks) and the establishment to 
silence a fierce critic. They called for the governor to resist these attempts, as 
Huey Long had done when he supported W. K. Henderson in Louisiana.48 But 
the governor, Henry Woodring, showed no inclination to help Brinkley. 
Brinkley used the experience, however, to craft an all-encompassing critique of 
corporate America, condemning not just chain stores but convict labor, 
centralized credit and corporate farming49 On the subject of chain stores, 
Brinkley convinced his opponent for the Republican nomination to oppose the 
chains as well.50
Brinkley Collection; James Sonders to Brinkley, January 3,1932, ibid.
48 C. E. Dougan to Henry Woodring, February 4, 1931, p.3; A. N. Bullard to Woodring, 
February 14, 1931; Nettie Rodgers February 13, 1931, 2; H. R. Ramsey to Woodring 
February 16, 1931; T. H. Otis to Woodring February 14, 1931; Mrs. Margaret Edgenib 
to Woodring February 14, 1931, pp. 1-2; Lannie W. Stewart to Woodring February 15, 
1931; Webb City Leader, January 1, 1931; Webb City Leader, January 29, 1931; 
Woodring to Irene Hamerle, n,d, [late February, 1931]; C. Mack Saltzman to Woodring, 
February 25, 1931; Emmanuel Stoltenberg to Woodring, February 13, 1931, 1-2; A. E. 
Chapman o f Topeka to Woodring, February 5, 1931, 3-4. All in 27-11-02-03, "Radio 
and Music January-February 1931," Woodring Papers; Woodring to F. C. Pickell, 
February 11, 1931; Woodring to Mrs. May Hurr, February 24, 1931; McGugin to 
Woodring, April 14, 1931; McGugin to Woodring, April 9, 1931, p.2, 27-11-02-03, 
"Radio and Music Mar-Dee 1931,” Woodring Papers.
49 Publicity, November 20, 1930, 4; Publicity, November 28, 1930, 4; Publicity, January 
16,1931,4; Publicity, January 23, 1931,4; Publicity, January 30,1931,2.
50 W. L. Barnes to Reed, July 11, 1930, p.2, 27-10-04-01, folder 5, Reed Papers; Mac 
Childs to Reed, July 9, 1930, ibid.
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Despite the fact that chain stores had become a campaign issue, court 
challenges to the laws still acted as formidable obstacles to legislation. Courts 
maintained that the chain taxes were violations of the Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to due process.51 However, in 1930 in the decision the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court referred to the chains as “knaves.”52 Independent retailers 
hoped that the Court, which some believed was becoming more liberal in the 
early 1930s, might change. In 1931 the Supreme Court did in fact reverse its 
position on chains. In a review of the Indiana tax, the Court ruled by a bare 
majority that the graduated tax was acceptable because chains possessed 
distinct advantages that differentiated them from other stores. The 
classification was not arbitrary and thus acceptable. In theory, any sort of tax 
could be set53 After the Supreme Court upheld the Indiana chain tax in 1931, 
it became harder to criticize them as frivolous.54
51 C. B. Randall to Clyde Reed, February 18, 1930, p.3, 27-10-02-07, folder 5, Clyde 
Reed Papers.
52 Break the Chains, March 15, 1930,4; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement, 
168-169.
53 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 171-173; New York Times, May 20, 
1931; Journal o f  Business, January 1938, 51-69.
54 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement in the United States,” 143, 175.
150
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The court decision prompted small retailers to push for additional 
legislation. State retail associations throughout the country advocated anti­
chain legislation, including licensing laws and graduated sales taxes.55 National 
trade associations refused to support the bills because they feared that 
imposing additional taxes on retailers would have a negative effect. The taxes 
placed additional tax burdens, no matter how slight, on the independent 
retailer. In the opinion of some merchants, they were crude weapons that might 
recoil to hurt independents as well. These retailers believed that a more 
important goal would be to attack unfair trade practices by the chains. In that 
way, unethical behavior by the chains could be punished, unfair advantages 
taken away, and independents would be able to benefit.56
In their efforts to promote anti-chain legislation, political leaders 
picked up the themes from the 1930 campaign and the evolving anti-chain 
sentiment. They warned about the threat to opportunity and championed
57chain taxes as a way to preserve the American way of life into the future.
55 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 179-181; New York Times, July 21, 30, 31, 
October 20, 1931; "Platform in Brief, Tulsa Independent Movement adopted July 21,1931” 
in The Voice o f  Progress, Volume 2 Number 5 [1935], 3.
56 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 162, 175; National Retail Clothier, 
August 7, 1930, 70; Retail Ledger, May 1931, 3; New York Times, October 12, 1930; 
National Grocer's Bidletin, September 1931, 177; Caslow's Weekly, April 27, 1935, 2.
57 Frank J. Weber, "Some Facts," March 18, 1931, box 8, folder 1, Huber Papers; Joseph
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La Follette delivered an address to the Wisconsin legislature that attracted 
the attention of progressives nationwide and prompted predictable 
comparisons to his father.58 La Follette and Olson and the others argued that 
they were working to protect small retailers, many of whom felt incapable of 
remaining in business.59
Phil La Follette tied work relief to an emergency chain tax.60 Aiong with 
independent retailers and anti-chain broadcasters, he argued that chains 
created dangerous economic conditions by sucking away the wealth of the 
community. He held them responsible for undermining the economy of the 
state and generating widespread unemployment. For that reason, hie wanted 
to force chains to pay a portion of the cost of relief.61 These chain taxes 
would compensate for taxation evaded by the chains. They called for a
Rhode to Huber, March 12, 1931, p.2, ibid1; Huber to George Norris, March 5, 1931, ibid\ 
C. L. Clark to Huber, April 29,1932, ibid.
58 A. F. Sweeney to Phil La Follette, December 9, 1931, box 13, folder 6; Montaville 
Flowers to Phil La Follette, January 5, 1932, box 17, folder 1; Montaville Flowers to Phil 
La Follette, December 21,1931, box 14, folder 1. All in the Phil LaFollette Papers.
59 Joseph Slamka to Phil La Follette, January 8,1932, box 17, folder 2, La Follette Papers.
60 Gustav A. Seegerto Senator Ben Gettelman, December 19,1931, box 14, folder 1, ibid.
61 B. J. Hollenbeck to Phil La Follette, December 27, 1931, pp. 1-4, ibid; J. A. Metzger to 
Phil La Follette, April 1, 1931; Albert D. Bolens to Phil LaFollette, March 3, 1931, box 6, 
folder 4, ibid.
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united movement of farmers, union members and independent merchants to
62fight off the power of monopoly.
The Supreme Court’s reversal combined with financial exigency to 
encourage an explosion of anti-chain legislation in 1932 and 1933. States faced 
a foreboding economic future in the early 1930s. Phenomenal numbers of 
Americans had lost their jobs. Without a federal welfare system, the states and 
localities had to feed, clothe and shelter these individuals and their families. At 
the same time, many citizens, even those who retained their jobs, found it 
difficult to pay their property taxes. Foreclosure threatened increasing numbers 
of citizens, and legislatures wanted a solution.63 If a state hoped to care for its
62"Stop, Look and Think!" pamphlet in C. Morse to La Follette, March 18, 1931, box 
17, folder 1, ibid; M. N. Risner to Huber, February 16, 1931, pp. 1-2, box 4, "1931 
February," Huber Papers; R. B. Page to Phil La Follette, January 22, 1932, box 17, 
folder 6, Phil La Follette Papers; Chairman o f the Department o f Markets to O. E. 
Dempsey, n.d., pp. 1-2, box 17, folder 5, ibid; R. B. Page to Phil La Follette, January 16, 
1932, box 17, folder 4, ibid; " C. E. Dougan to Woodring, p. 4,27-11-02-03, "Radio and 
Music January-February 1931,” Woodring Papers; Harold McGugin to Reed, February 
22, 1930, 27-10-02-07, folder 5, Clyde Reed Papers; McGugin to "Representatives and 
Senators o f the State," February 22, 1930, ibid
63 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 165; Bulletin o f  the National Tax 
Association, June 1939; "Political Material Position Paper on Taxation, platform 
corrections," p.2 box 1 Brinkley Collection; Woodring to E. P. Ross, June 18, 1931,27-11- 
02-03, folder 10, Woodring Papers; Woodring to P. A  Lovewell, March 29, 1932, 27-11- 
02-04, "Taxation January-March 1932;" Lovewell to Woodring, n d; T. E. Sabin to 
Woodring February 4, 1931, p.2 Woodring Papers 27-11-02-03 "Taxation Jan-May, 1931" 
Woodring Papers; C. C. Powell to Woodring, June 15, 1931, p.2, ibid; Huber to Jasper 
Stangel, February 5,1931, box 4 ,"1931 February," Huber Papers.
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citizens during the worst depression in memory, it would need higher taxes. 
States had to find some source of revenue to allow them to pay for their relief 
programs. 64
In addition to the chain license taxes, states passed laws designed to 
tax retail sales. These taxes based upon gross sales became another 
approach to the chain problem when they were graduated to ensure that 
corporations and department stores paid more than small retailers. The rate 
of taxation increased with the size of the stores. This form of the tax made it 
more palatable to small retailers, who often resisted sales taxes because they 
worried that it would interfere with their sales and add an additional 
financial burden. In states like Kentucky and Vermont storeowners 
enthusiastically supported graduated sales taxes as a way to attack their 
chain enemies.65
64 "Minutes o f the Board o f Directors," June 20, 1935, Supplementary Papers, Wieboldt 
Department Store Papers, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois.
65 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 157-159; L. ML Purcell to Costigan, 
October 5, 1931, box 47, "Senate Correspondence-Unemployment Correspondence- 
January-December 1931," Costigan Papers, University o f Colorado, Boulder; "Platform 
o f R.T. "Bob" Jones, “Bob Jones File,” p.3, Arizona Historical Foundation, Arizona 
State University; Northwest Associated Merchants News Journal, March 1935, 4; 
Louisiana Progress, April 24,1930,1; Associated Merchants o f Montana to "Members o f 
the Montana State Legislature,” November 6, 1933, p.3, box 6, folder 30, Sherburne 
Mercantile Company Papers; Bulletin o f  the Associated Merchants ofMontana, January 
20, 1934, p .l, box 7, folder 8, Sherburne Mercantile Company Papers; E. L. Brownhill 
to Oscar Webber, April 25, 1935, box 89, "Material Mr. Widman has," Kirstein Papers.
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The chain license and sales tax measures threatened the chains, but 
corporate retailers were slow to develop a response. The Kroger company 
played the most active role in opposing anti-chain legislation. Albeit Morrill, 
the President of the company, wrote Henry Huber a scathing letter in 1931, 
when Senator Smith Brookhart of Iowa read Huber’s caustic comments on the 
chains to Congress as part of the debate over the Capper-Kelly bill.66 In the 
letter, Morrill lashed into Huber for irresponsible leadership and lectured him 
on the price advantages the chains brought to retailing. Kroger did not stop 
with letter writing campaigns. The company also organized lobbying efforts in 
state capitals.67
Numbers of revenue hungry legislatures passed anti-chain store 
measures.68 Mississippi, Kentucky, Vermont, Minnesota, Wisconsin and 
New Mexico levied graduated sales taxes.69 Eighteen other states adopted
66 Albert Morrill to Huber, February 17, 1931, pp. 1-3, box 4, "1931 February," Huber 
Papers; Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 3r Session, 74: 4000.
67 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 251-253; R. W. Tucker to Sorensen, 
November 4, 1930, box 6, folder 236, Sorensen Papers.
68 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 178-179, 183-185; Tax Magazine July 
1938, 403; Ryant, “Kentucky and the Movement to Regulate Chain Stores,” 284; 
Louisiana Progress, July 15, 1931, 4; Northwest Associated Merchants News Journal, 
March 1935, 1.
69 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 163.
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chain license measures. In most states, the governors signed the measures. 
In Michigan, however, William Comstock opposed the chain tax and vetoed it. 
Because of his actions, he won the animosity of a local anti-chain broadcaster, 
Clyde Fenner, who threatened the Governor with a recall. In the next legislative 
session, Michigan eventually passed the anti-chain bill, and Comstock signed it 
into law.70
Chain taxes had a minimal effect. They collected small amounts of 
revenue, and they did not destroy chains in the state. In Wisconsin, the tax 
commission compared the revenue collected through the chain tax to the 
income tax. The combined taxes collected $3,400,000 for the state over the 
course of 1932 and 1933. Of that total, $3,000,000 came from income taxes.71 
In other states, even states like Vermont and Louisiana with the highest rates of 
taxation, the levies had a nominal effect on state revenue.72
70 Clyde V. Fenner to Carl Weidemann, July 28, 1933, p.2, box 1, "Correspondence 
July-August 1933," Carl Weideman Collection, Bentley Historical Library, University 
o f Michigan; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 183-184; Detroit Free Press, 
March 26, 31 April 9, 10, 22, 23, 1931; A. C. Engh to W. A. Comstock, July 6, 1933, 
p.2, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde 
Park, New York.
71 W. J. Conway to C. E. Schaffer, January 25,1932, box 17, folder 2, La Follette Papers.
“ Northwest Associated Merchants News Journal, March 1935, 1-2; Wall Street Journal,
January 2, 1935; Harper, ’The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 164-167.
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In addition to having little revenue generating ability, the chain taxes did 
not have a tremendous effect on the chain stores. Only two significant results 
came from the acts. First, the chains closed marginal stores. David R. Craig of 
the American Retail Federation concluded in a 1937 study of chain taxes that 
chains chose to close less profitable stores in order to avoid taxation on them. 
Craig concluded that chain sales increased at remaining stores, as customers 
shopped at these central locations. In fact, he concluded that chain sales rose at 
a faster rate in chain tax states than non-tax states. This change worked along 
with the late 1930s trend in the food industry to so-called “super markets.” 73 
Second, the pressure on marginal stores spurred another important 
development in twentieth century retailing: franchising. Gas stations had 
notoriously low profits in the period, and the chain taxes place them in a great 
deal of danger. In West Virginia, for example, Standard Oil of New Jersey 
stations showed annual profits of about ninety dollars but would be expected to 
pay $250 in taxes under the state tax.74 As a response to the chain taxes, oil
73 David R. Craig to Fred Lazarus, September 27, 1937, p. 5, box 90, "M," Kirstein 
Papers; Carl Ryant, “Kentucky and the Movement to Regulate Chain Stores,” 283; 
Palamountain, The Politics o f  Distribution, 184-186; Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 
249.
74 Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement," 154-155,200-203; Fox v. Stoddard Oil o f  
New Jersey, 294 U.S. 87.
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companies chose to sell their stations to local owners and charge them fees for 
gasoline and use of the corporate names. Butler Brothers, a dry goods chain,
75responded in the same way. This franchising concept caught on in later
76years.
Despite these developments, state taxes had limited effects on the 
chains. Taxation did not slow their growth. Although retailers continued to 
push to pass taxes or strengthen them, most activists looked for other ways to 
attack the chains. They hoped that Franklin Roosevelt would take steps to 
control the chains and their predatory practices as part of a federal reform 
package. When Roosevelt announced the National Recovery Administration, 
many hoped that it would provide the protection and stability they needed. 
They responded to the NRA with enthusiasm and hope. Unfortunately, their 
dreams for that organization would not be realized.
75 R. C. Scott to Roosevelt, nud, pp. 1-2, OF 288, “Chain Stores, 1933-1934,” Roosevelt 
Papers.
76 Caslow's Weekly, April 27, 1935, p. 2 in box 302, folder 3, Lucas Papers.
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Chapter Five: The National Recovery Administration and the Chains
In Looking Forward, a book written for his 1932 Presidential campaign, 
Roosevelt expressed special concern for small retailers and their plight in the 
face of chain competition. "The unfeeling statistics of the past three decades 
show that the independent business man is running a losing race. Perhaps he is 
forced to the wall; perhaps he cannot command credit; perhaps he is 'squeezed 
out,’ in Wilson's words, by highly organized corporate competitors, as your 
comer grocery man can tell you." 1 Roosevelt believed the challenge to small 
retailing was one facet of the great problem for America in the new centuiy. 
With the close of the frontier, where would Americans find opportunity? In the 
nineteenth century, men could escape the cities and find opportunities in new 
regions. Now the country had been settled, and large corporations, based in the 
great metropolises, threatened to choke out individual initiative. Roosevelt 
believed government needed to counteract these developments, controlling 
corporations and ensuring a decent standard of living for all.2 Because of the
1 Franklin Roosevelt, Looking Forward (New York: John Day, 1933), 30.
2 Roosevelt, Looking Forward, 26, 30, 31-33, 75 111, 139-140; William J. Ross to
Roosevelt, April 21, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers, Franklin
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power of the sentiments expressed in his book and his famed speech 
articulating economic policy before the Commonwealth Club, many merchants 
felt that Roosevelt understood them and their needs. Like millions of 
Americans, they believed he offered a solution to the problems of the so-called 
“Forgotten Man,” who had been ignored during the Hoover years.3 Although 
prominent anti-chain voices like W. K. Henderson and Frank Grimes stood by 
Hoover, the majority of retailers supported Roosevelt.4 He was a President 
who would restore justice to the American economy. In the Hundred Days 
Roosevelt pushed a number of initiatives, but his most important solution for 
business was the National Recovery Administration. This system of voluntary
Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library.
3 William D. Haedler to Capper, September 27, 1932, box 39, "Fair Trade 1932," Capper 
Papers; William Wittefelt to Amlie, May 1, 1936, box 34, folder 4, Amlie Papers, 
Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.
4 W. K. Henderson to Herbert Hoover, October 4, 1932; Henderson to Hoover, October 24,
1932; Newton to Henderson, October 24, 1932; Newton to Henderson, October 31, 1932;
Newton to Henderson, October 24, 1932; Newton to Congressman Ramseyer and Governor
Allen, October 27, 1932. All in box 146, “W. K. Henderson,” President's Personal File,
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library; J. Frank Grimes to Hoover, October 15, 1932; Harper,
"The Anti-Chain Store Movement," 231,234; New York Times, January 6,1932; Mortenson
Bulletin, September 21, 1932, pp. 2-4 in box 39, "Fair Trade 1932," Capper Papers;
American Progress, September 7, 1933, 4; Leroy Spence to Capper, December 4, 1933,
box 38, "Advertising," Capper Papers; Joseph M. Weber to Roosevelt, May 5, 1933, OF
288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; Woul to Johnson, December 18, 1933,
p.3, box 6, “Chain Stores W-Z,” NRA Records, Records Group 9, National Archives,
Washington, D. C.; Joseph M. Weber to Roosevelt, May 5, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores
1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; Joseph Weber to Louis Howe, May 5, 1933, ibidL\ Plato
McCourtney to Roosevelt, April 29,1933, p. 2, ibid.
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industrial self-control seemed to address the desperate needs of the nation. 
Over the next two years, however, storekeepers discovered it had limitations. It 
offered hope, but did little to challenge chain organizations, which, in their 
view destroyed independent merchants and exacerbated, or perhaps even 
caused, the Depression, forcing thousands onto the federal dole. Although the 
NRA failed to provide a safe retail environment, the experience did shape the 
concerns of retailers for the remainder of the 1930s.
hi 1933, small retailers desperately needed help. Consumer purchasing 
had plummeted after the stock market crash.5 According to the retail census of 
1933, the Depression had eliminated one-half of the sector’s dollar business. 
As a result, storekeepers could not generate enough sales volume to survive. 
Even competent and experienced shopkeepers found loans hard to repay. For 
storeowners, the Depression meant longer hours, closer margins of profit, and 
a constant fear that their plans and their energy would not be enough. They 
wanted protection from the devastating effects of the depression. Many of 
them felt helpless and alone. Retailers had to make a living profit in order to 
feed their families. In many cases they had their own life savings and decades
5 Robert Wood, " Speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in London," April 
17, 1934, pp. 1-3, box 45, folder "Sears and Roebuck, 1933-1945," Wood Papers, Herbert 
Hoover Presidential Library.
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of labor invested in the store.6 Retailers feared they would lose their stores and 
join the growing ranks on the bread lines. This thought understandably 
frightened them. It provided an additional burden for older retailers who 
worried, as Princeton, Indiana, storekeeper George Rund remarked in a letter to 
President Roosevelt, that he had "reached the middle age at which no one 
wants to employ him...."7
The growth of the chains heightened retailers’ anxiety. Many believed 
chains were working to destroy them Repeating complaints made since the 
1920s, the retailers pointed, in particular, to the chains’ use of loss leaders to 
attract customers. Although many small stores sold below cost, independent 
retailers condemned loss leaders as a particular chain threat because these 
stores could use their superior financial might to crush their opposition. Small 
retailers saw chain stores popping up on every comer and warned that the 
chains intended to take over retailing.8 They deliberately sold products like
6 A. C. Currie to Roosevelt, May 5, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt 
Papers; Thomas J. Seamans to Roosevelt, January 19, 1933, ibid:, Kansas City Pharmacy 
Organization to Johnson, box 5, folder “G,” NRA Records; S. Winston to Johnson, box 6, 
“Chain Stores W-Z,” NRA Records.
7 George Rund to Roosevelt, February 18, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," 
Roosevelt Papers.
8 Thomas J. Seamans to Roosevelt, January 19, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," 
Roosevelt Papers; George Rund to Roosevelt, February 18, 1933, ibid. ; S. H. Livingston to
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cigarettes at a loss, so that they could wipe out their competition. One retailer, 
Thomas Seamans, wrote Roosevelt, that the chains were playing games with 
loss leaders, using these products as a “football” and making retailers charging 
a regular price for them look to "...the public as though we were robbing 
them."9
Small retailers bemoaned changes in the economy that denied young 
people the opportunity to own their own stores. Both economic circumstances 
and the chain threat promised to eliminate the small store. A retailer remarked 
that he remembered the days when an unemployed boy could enter into 
business. That was no longer the case.10 The failure of the small retailer would 
have ramifications for all Americans, he and other retailers believed. It would 
be the death knell of independent business in America11 Perhaps former
Roosevelt, May 8, 1933, p.2, ibid., W. A  Fawcett to Hugh Johnson, January 3, 1934, 
“Complaints,” “F,” NRA Records; Roosevelt, Looking Forward, 30.
9 Thomas J. Seamans to Roosevelt, January 19,1933, OF 288,"Chain Stores 1933-1934," 
Roosevelt Papers; R. A  Crowder to Robinson, March 18, 1934, box 151, folder 1, 
Robinson Papers.
10 Thomas J. Seamans to Roosevelt, January 19, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," 
Roosevelt Papers; Plato McCourtney to Roosevelt, April 29, 1933, ibid ', William J. Ross to 
Roosevelt, April 21,1933, ibid.
11 Kansas City Pharmacy Organization to Johnson, box 5, folder “G,” NRA Records; S. 
Winston to Johnson, box 6, “Chain Stores W-Z,” NRA Records; R. S. Kline to 
Roosevelt, November 14, 1933, pp. 1-2, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt 
Papers.
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storeowners could work for a chain, but this opportunity, in their mind, was 
insufficient One Kansas man wrote Roosevelt about a young chain store 
manager whose "affability and courtesy" had made him a favorite in Salinas. 
Yet the young man had been fired from his job by the chain, according to the 
writer, because the chain had wanted to give his job to someone else. A local 
outcry led to the reinstatement of the manager. Still, the author asked, what sort 
of opportunities did he face in the future? How much better would his life be 
as owner of his own store. He could buy his own home without fear of 
transfer.12
Small retailers warned that the nation’s communities would be 
destroyed if the chains continued to grow. Chains did not worry about the fate 
of the town. They only worried about profits for the corporation. Small 
retailers claimed that, in contrast, they formed an integral part of the nation's 
life. They built the nation's communities, represented the potential for 
American opportunity, and kept alive the American tradition. Retailers ran 
community organizations, voted, served on juries and otherwise contributed to 
the life of the nation. Retailers served their communities., building them up
12 J. H. Grande to Louis Howe, May 19, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," 
Roosevelt Papers; A. C. Engh to Howe, July 12, 1933, ibid.', Salinas Independent, May 19, 
1933.
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with professional service.13 The wife of one grocer sent Roosevelt a poem that
summarized the plight of the small retailer:
"The old home town has changed a lot since I was 
just a lad. For in those days the home owned stores 
were all we ever had.
I remember how the boss would come and meet us 
at the door. And he always made us feel at home 
when we were in his store.
When roads needed to be built folks went to the 
independent merchants [to] improve the towns.
[...]always credit and delivery chain stores now 
have control. And it seems as if a man don't own his 
body or his soul. [... ] pretty stores, flashy windows.
[...]
For their bosses live on Wall Street and we're a 
bunch of fools, if we think these fellows give a 
damn about our churches and schools.
Let's patronize our local stores and keep the cash at 
home. And let the doggone Chain Stores start a city 
of their own."14
13 Joseph Weber to Roosevelt, May 5, 1933, pp. 1-2, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933- 
1934," Roosevelt Papers; D. M. Hall to A. R. Forbush, October 15, 1933, pp. 1-3, box 6, 
folder “H,” NRA Records; American Progress, February 15, 1934, 1; T. F. McCoy, 
"Poverty or Plenty April 24, 1936,” pp. 1-2, box 34, folder 4, Amlie Papers; H. M 
Wilson to Roosevelt, June 6, 1933, p. 1, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt 
Papers; Brinkley, Voices o f  Protest, 148.
14 Jennie Applegate to Roosevelt, n.d., pp. 1-2, 4-7, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," 
Roosevelt Papers; Louis Howe to Applegate, April 28,1933, ibid.
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Small retailers warned that chain stores endangered all Americans—not 
just store owners. The new system of retailing undermined prosperity for the 
general public by sending profits to distant financial centers, and loss leader 
competition depressed prices for manufacturers and fanners. 15 Although 
consumers thought they saved money in these stores, they lost far more. For 
their part, farmers, whose crops were used as loss leaders to lure consumers 
into chain grocery stores, could not get adequate payment to cover their cost of 
operation. A letter from Roosevelt’s home region Hudson River Valley Grape 
Growers asserted that they had not been able to cover costs for the past two 
years since prices had dropped because chain stores, their biggest customers, 
had been selling grapes for no profit. Anti-chain activists complained that such 
business practices, and not overproduction, produced low agricultural prices 
during the 1920s and 1930s.16 Manufacturers faced a similar challenge. Plato
15 Elmer Sorensen to Roosevelt, October 23, 1933; E. LeRoy Emmanuelson to Roosevelt, 
May 11, 1933, pp. 1-2; George Rund to Roosevelt, February 18, 1933; Herbert Sears to 
Roosevelt, August 21, 1933; M. H. McIntyre to Sears, September 5, 1933; Plato 
McCourtney to Roosevelt, April 29, 1933, p.2; S. H. Livingston to Roosevelt, May 8, 1933. 
All in OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; George Graham to Long, 
January 15, 1934, box 4966, folder 23, NRA Records; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement/' 65.
16 Paul Maunde to Louis McHenry Howe, February 28, 1934, box 6, folder “M,” NRA
Records; The Voice o f Progress, volume 2 number 5 [1935], p. 2 in 110.E. 5.1.B,
Papers o f Governors Olson, Benson, Peterson; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store
Movement,” 231; P. W. James to Roosevelt, December 29, 1933, OF 288, "Chain
Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; J. C. Dills to Long, March 1934, box 4966, folder
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McCourtney, who himself owned a small dry goods chain, attacked loss 
leaders for undercutting profit margins and forcing manufacturers to pay a 
“starvation wage” to their employees. For that matter, the chains themselves 
paid low weekly wages, according to the small retailers. Independent retailers 
accused them of being slave drivers, forcing their employees to work 
ridiculous hours. One retailer wrote President Roosevelt that he knew a young 
man who had dropped from 150 to 120 pounds after three months of working 
for a chain grocery.17 The story could be a metaphor for retailing in the 
Depression.
Retailers trusted that Roosevelt would use government power to curb 
cut-throat competition, restore stability to the retail sector and prosperity to the 
nation.18 They hoped that Roosevelt would offer some sort of solution, a way
24, NRA Records.
17 George Rund to Roosevelt, February 18, 1933; Frank Renick to Roosevelt, May 9, 1933, 
2; S. W. Shaler to Roosevelt, July 1, 1933; James Bums to Roosevelt, May 26,1933. All in 
OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; D. M. Hall to A. R. Forbush, October 
15, 1933, p.3, box 6, folder “H,” NRA Records; Palamountain, Politics o f Distribution, 
245.
18 George Rund to Roosevelt, February 18, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," 
Roosevelt Papers; Herschel M. Cummins to Roosevelt, May 30, 1933, ibid1; Vincent 
Bendix to Roosevelt, telegram, May 9, 1933, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 1933-1936," 
Roosevelt Papers; Homer Cummings to Roosevelt, July 6, 1933, ibid; Edwin Witte, "The 
NIRA What Is It? Speech over WHA Radio,” pp. 2,19, box 254, "Articles and Addresses," 
Witte Papers, University o f Chicago; Daniel Roper to Howe, July 18, 1933, OF 288, "Chain 
Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; W. J. Sturgeon to Roosevelt, March 25,1933, pp. 1-2,
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to protect them from the terrifying retail market Their fears melded with the 
concerns of other businessmen and economists who worried about the 
destructive effects of competition in the economy. Leading executives believed 
predatory practices had undermined the American economy.19 When 
Roosevelt entered office, he sought a government policy to restore prosperity 
through control of unfair practices and promotion of purchasing power. The 
National Industrial Recovery Act, the last major piece of legislation from his 
famed Hundred Days, developed a program of industry imposed trade rules 
supervised by the National Recovery Administration. These rules governed 
competition and enforced basic standards of conduct The act promoted 
purchasing power by stabilizing industry through codes, which regulated 
prices, wages and hours.
A large number of chain executives and trade association heads 
participated in the conferences producing the retail codes, which covered 
general retailing, hardware, drugs and the grocery business and created an
ibid.
19 William H. Stein to Louis Howe, April 12, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," 
Roosevelt Papers; Samuel Reybum to Robinson, December 24, 1934, p.2, box 9, folder 
91, Robinson Supplementary Papers, Special Collections, University o f Arkansas at 
Fayetteville; Alan Brinkley, The End o f  Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 36- 
37.
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20umbrella board to manage this confusing array of policies. The National 
Retail Dry Goods Association, Mail Order Association, Limited Price Variety 
Chains, National Association of Retail Druggists, National Association of 
Retail Grocers and National Retail Hardware Association all played a role in 
the conferences developing the various retail codes. Labor and consumers had 
a place on the boards, but little influence, although the mere presence of 
consumers signaled a tremendous advance for the youthful movement.21
The NRA set out to stabilize retailing through the control of unfair 
practices, especially loss leaders, and the establishment of wage and hour 
standards. The codes specifically rejected predatory behavior and limited 
unfair trade practices, including boycotts, false advertising and substitution of 
inferior products. In the original drafts of the codes, put together by
20 William Dodd to Lebhar, November 3, 1933, box 4966, folder 24, NRA Records; 
Harry Huffman to Edwin Costigan, March 21, 1935, box 43, folder 6, Costigan Papers; 
William MacDonald, The Menace o f  Recovery: What the New Deal Means (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1934), 305.
21 Studs Terkel, Hard Times: An Oral History o f  the Great Depression (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1979, 1986), 224; Witte, "The NIRA What Is It?," p. 18; Julia K. 
Jaffiray to Howe, May 10, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; 
General Federation o f Women’s Clubs, “Report on Centralization o f Industry," OF 466, 
"NRA Codes 1933-1935 F-K," Roosevelt Papers; Samuel Untermeyer, "Address of 
Samuel Untermeyer before the National Council o f Traveling Salesmen's Associations," 
January 4, 1934, pp.7-8, ibid.-, "Price Complaints Guide for County Consumers 
Councils Preliminary Draft," June 1934, p.4, box 44, "Consumer Materials-National 
Emergency Council Project,” Caroline Ware Papers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
Presidential Library; "Retail Food Reporting," October 1934, pp. 1-6, ibid.
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representatives of all segments of retailing, controls were set on the level of 
advertising allowances given to firms in supposed return for in-store 
promotion.22 These sections of contracts had been used to grant chains 
substantial rebates for their products. The codes had also included provisions 
that provided wholesalers with price breaks that chains could not receive 
because they dealt directly with the public. Both o f these elements were written 
out of the codes when a final committee drafted the version submitted to the 
government. Because independent retailers had no representatives on the 
committee crafting the final form, lawyers for large retail stores omitted the 
clauses from the final version.23 Although the codes lacked certain elements, 
they made an important beginning and included important loss limitation 
provisions. In addition to these controls, the codes set wages and hours for 
retail clerks. Managers, however, were not governed by these rules because 
they were counted as executives under the labor section.24 These codes 
controlled business throughout the country, although stores in towns under
22 “Retail Lumber, Lumber Products and/or Building Materials Code Article I 
Declaration o f Policy," box 64, "NRA Codes," Witte Papers.
23 United States Wholesale Grocer Association Bulletin, November 18, 1936, p.l in box 
215, folder 2, Robinson Papers.
24 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 61; Robert Fischelis to Dargavel, July 27, 
1935, box 57, folder 11, Robert Fischelis Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society,
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2,500 in population were exempted25 In some cases, states drafted their own 
versions, but the National Recovery Administration ultimately ruled that these 
provisions could not be more stringent than those required by the national 
administration. 26
In connection with the signing of the retail code in October 1933, 
General Hugh Johnson claimed that chains had killed 400,000 small
27retailers. According to him, the government hoped to promote full, fair 
competition. General Johnson liked the image of boxing rules. Instead of 
allowing the economy to descend into an eye-gouging, nose-biting bar room 
brawl, the government would ensure a fair fight for both parties. It would 
act as a referee, preventing blows below the belt but otherwise allowing 
boxers to compete.28 Retailers hoped to protect their profession with the code
Madison, Wisconsin.
25 Hugh Johnson to Joseph Robinson June 11, 1934, OF 466, "NRA Codes Misc. 1934," 
Roosevelt Papers; Attorney General Cummings to Roosevelt, April 2, 1934, ibid.; Attorney 
General to Roosevelt, April 20,1934, ibid.
26 Wm. G. A  Kroemmelbein to Fischelis, March 12, 1934, p.2, box 114, folder 15, 
Fischelis Papers; Fischelis to Albert S. Woodruff, July 10, 1934, pp. 1-3, ibid.
27 Godfrey Lebhar to Johnson, October 25, 1933, box 4966, folder 24, NRA Records; 
Roosevelt to Mrs. Samuel Johnson, October 9, 1933, PPF 702, Roosevelt Papers; Hugh 
Johnson to Roosevelt, September 24, 1934 ibid.; Roosevelt to Johnson, September 25, 
1934, ibid.
28 L. T. Jorer to Johnson, November 17,1933, box 4966, folder 23, NRA Records; C. L.
171
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and restore fair competition. Pharmacists, in particular, wanted to restore their 
sense of professional standing.29 Small retailers also found hope in the fact 
that the head of an independent retailing organization administered the retail 
code. Trade executives chose Rivers Peterson, who was head of the 
National Retail Hardware Association, to lead the code because his 
organization had the highest percentage of firms in the field represented— 
about one quarter. The National Retail Dry Goods Association, in contrast, 
included less than 4,000 members out of 168,000 stores that could have 
been members. Associations catering to grocers and druggists suffered
30similar problems. Trade executives believed Peterson would give the code 
legitimacy.
Despite concerns, retailing threw itself behind the efforts of 
Roosevelt with the same enthusiasm that led communities to throw parades
Haggen to the NRA, p. 2, box 4966, folder 12, NRA Records.
29 Henry Drechsler to Fischelis, January 22, 1934, box 114, folder 15, Fishelis Papers; Louis 
Parks to Fischelis, January 29, 1934; Parks to Fischelis, January 25, 1934; Parks to 
Fischelis, January 30, 1934; Adolph Kiss to Fischelis, January 26, 1934; Fischelis to Kiss 
January 31, 1934; Prescott Loveland to Fischelis, November 18, 1933; Loveland to 
Fischelis, December 5, 1933; Loveland to Carl Christensen, December 11, 1933; Fischelis 
to Loveland, December 9,1933; Loveland to Fischelis, December 8, 1933; “Minutes o f the 
Fourth District," p.2 in Loveland to Fishelis, December 26, 1933 All in box 114, folder 7, 
Fischelis Papers.
30 “Minutes o f the July 13, 1933 Meeting,” box 6884, folder 'Retailers National Council," 
NRA Records; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 229, 241-242; Lew Hahn to
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and other kick off ceremonies for the code.31 Chains participated actively in 
code activities and advertised themselves as friends of the consumer, trying 
to restore prosperity to America.32 Local retailers organized to support the 
NRA as well. They sponsored mass meetings and formed local committees to 
help the administration enforce the rules of the Retail code.33 Firms signed the 
code, agreeing to abide by its provisions. They also paid an assessment to 
cover the cost of the code. In return, stores received a Blue Eagle to display in 
their window and the protection offered by the code authority. Sometimes 
these organizations offered education for retailers to improve their stores.34
Kirstein, November 28, 1934, p. 2, box 89, "Material Mr. Widman Has," Kirstein Papers.
31 Fooflight Parade, 1933.
32 The Grand Rapids Press, July 31, 1933, August 1, 1933 in OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933- 
1934," Roosevelt Papers; Godfrey Lebhar to Roosevelt, October 22, 1935, OF 288, "Chain 
Stores 1935-1936," Roosevelt Papers; Sears Retail News, August 15, 1934; Caslow's 
Weekly, April 27,1935, p. 2 in box 302, folder 3, Lucas Papers.
33 Sherburne to Martin Jacobson, August 7, 1933; Strain to Sherburne, August 7, 1933; J.
A. Lovelace to 'Members in Bozeman," September 14, 1933. All in box 6, folder 29, 
Sherburne Mercantile Company, University o f Montana, Missoula; Val Bloch to Roosevelt, 
November 10, 1937, OF 466, "NRA Codes 1933-1935," Roosevelt Papers; Roosevelt to 
Bloch, November 22, 1937, ib id ; J. C. Dills to Long, March 1934, box 4966, folder 24, 
NRA Records; Charles Woul to Johnson, Dec. 18, 1933, box 6, “Chain Stores W-Z,” 
NRA Records; H. A. Georgia & B. T Clifford to Robinson, June 10,1936, box 215, folder 
1, Robinson Papers; H. N. Ruud to Amlie, May 12,1936, ibid.
34 C. J. Tanner to Fischelis, [n.d., 1934], box 114, folder 15, Fischelis Papers; Lovelace to 
Sherburne, November 8, 1933, box 6, folder 30, Sherburne Mercantile Company Papers; 
'Rules and Regulations for the Organization o f Local Retail Code Authorities" in Harry 
Carr to A  D. Whiteside, May 9,1935, box 6883, NRA Records.
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Soon the retailers’ enthusiasm gave way to complaints about the codes 
and their performance. Small retailers were among the most prominent critics 
of the National Recovery Administration. Files of the agency bulge with letters 
from merchants enraged by the NRA’s failure to protect small retailers. The 
powerful role of chains in creating the codes frustrated and frightened small 
businessmen. They complained that control of the organization had passed to 
"money changers" and "syndicates." As a result, according to men like C. B. 
Purcell of the Florida Pharmaceutical Association, the small merchant was 
"more helpless than ever."35 Another shopkeeper complained about the role of 
the owner of a chain of shoe stores: "To me Ward Melville and his crowd 
being called in to write the retail code is like calling in Morgan to write the 
Securities Act and our Banking laws. . . ." In his mind, the problem had been 
invited to offer a solution.36 The NRA also frustrated small merchants because 
of its ineffective enforcement; it simply could not control a million retail stores. 
As a result, many firms evaded its regulations.37 One of the first causes for
35 E. F. Babitcht to Johnson, n.d., box 4969, folder 26, NRA Records; C. B. Purcell to 
Johnson, February 29,1934, ibid.
36 C. L. Haggen to the NRA, p. 2, box 6, “Complaints,” folder 12, NRA Records.
37 D. M. Hall to A. R. Forbush, October 15, 1933, box 6, folder “H,” NRA Records; 
David Rising to Roosevelt, March 7, 1934, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934,” 
Roosevelt Papers; John Burke to Kirstein, November 6, 1934, p.2, box 89, “Widman,”
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concern was the assessment itself. In difficult economic circumstances, some 
retailers complained about having to pay an assessment for the operation of the 
code authority on a local and national level. In one area, a retailer led a protest 
of storeowners who opposed the assessment The local administrator of the 
code admitted in a confidential letter that he would not be able to collect from
38all of the firms that evaded the fee.
Many small merchants chafed at the regulations imposed by the 
National Recovery Administration. Although they had high hopes for the 
potential of the agency, they felt overwhelmed by the maze of new rules and 
regulations. In particular, they believed that the wage and hour regulations 
and provisions restricting the hours of operation were a direct threat to their 
businesses. One of the few advantages the small retailers had was that they 
often kept longer hours than the chains.39 E. F. Babitcht of Worthington, 
Minnesota, complained about the hour regulations on his store, which was in a
Kirstein Papers.
38 K. W. Hood to Neustadt, March 29, 1934, box 4967, folder 12, NRA Records; Neustadt 
to Donald Renshaw, September 29, 1934, box 4960, folder 7, NRA Records; Robert A  
Neaiy to G. C. Gamble, March 18, 1935, p.2, ibid.
39 S. L. White Drug Company to Johnson, September 15, 1933, box 6, “Chain Stores W- 
Z ,” NRA Records; Lovelace to Sherburne, October 2, 1933, box 4966, folder 30, 
Sherburne Mercantile Company Papers; Huffman to Costigan, March 21, 1935, pp.2-3, 
box 43, folder 6, Costigan Papers; Sam White to Robinson, May 20, 1935, box 262,
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town slightly larger than 2,500 people. The fanners in his region, he wrote, 
expected longer hours than provided under the code, especially on Saturday 
night.40 One hopeful retailer wrote the administration, asking if the hour 
restrictions for delivery boys included all of their time sitting around the store, 
or just the time they spent actually delivering groceries.41 Without a trained 
legal staff or the benefit of advanced education, small businessmen found the 
codes confusing and confining, even daunting.42
Small shopkeepers also found their hopes for the NRA thwarted by the 
limits of operations in the complex retail sector of the economy. With over a 
million retail stores carrying thousands of products, officials found it 
impossible to monitor trade. Samuel Untermeyer, an anti-trust veteran from the 
Wilson administration and an anti-chain activist in New York, pointed to this 
problem in one of his speeches criticizing the NRA.43 Even NRA officials
folder 6, Robinson Papers; Herbert Sheets to Robinson, May 25, 1935, ibid.; Robert A. 
Neary to Gamble, March 25, 1935, p.2, ibid.
40 E. F. Babitcht to NRA, November 4, 1933, box 4969, folder 26, NRA Records; 
Sherburne to Lovelace, October 4, 1933, box 6, folder 29, Sherburne Mercantile Company 
Records, University o f Montana, Missoula.
41 J. W. Jensen to NRA, October 3, 1933, box 8, "Protests,” NRA Records.
42 Will Akers to Robinson, April 27, 1935, p.4, box 6883, “NRA Complaints,” NRA 
Records.
43 Samuel Untermeyer, "Address o f Samuel Untermeyer Before the National Council of
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admitted that the scope of their task overwhelmed them. Harry Carr wrote that 
compliance checks were a near impossibility because of the number of stores 
and the complex series of exceptions for peak periods and other reasons.44 A 
representative for the Kansas City Pharmacists Association complained that his 
members’ reports to the NRA on prices and loss leaders got no reaction 45 The 
NRA could not keep up with the flood of correspondence from retailers. It 
particularly found irksome form letters issued by trade organizations. 
Eventually they refused to answer them, explaining that responses cost too 
much.46
Because of the difficulty in enforcing the codes, stores flaunted NRA 
rules, staying late at night or opening on Sunday against code regulations.47 
Many complaints centered on violations by the chains and other competitors in 
hour and wage regulations. But the plethora of price cutters frustrated small
Traveling Salesmen's Associations," 8.
44 Harry Carr to A. D. Whiteside, May 9, 1935, p.2, box 5, “F,” NRA Records.
45 Kansas City Pharmacists Organization to NRA, box 5, “G,” NRA Records. .
46 Long to Freed A. Fulle, March 8,1934, box 4966, folder 22, NRA Records.
47 Sherburne to J. C. Prince, [n.d.], box 5, folder 29, Sherburne Mercantile Company 
Papers; S. W. Johnson to John Gross, December 12, 1933, box 10, folder 1, Colorado 
State Federation o f Labor Papers, Special Collections, University o f Colorado, Boulder 
Colorado.
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retailers, who believed loss leaders forced them from business.48 One 
retailer from Medina, New York, sent Hugh Johnson a long summary of a 
local chain’s prices. "As man to man,” he wrote, “how the hell, do you, the 
President, or your organizations, expect a man or merchant to compete with 
devastating prices as these.”49 In his opinion, the pressure of rent and income 
taxes made it impossible for him to survive in business. Charles Woul from 
Elizabeth, New Jersey, remarked that the sixty independent stores in his 
hometown had shrunk to forty. Even old established stores felt pressure. One 
of these firms had cut from eight registered pharmacists to only one.50 All of 
those men had fine reputations as "ethical pharmacists," but they could not 
compete with loss leader attacks that made them look like thieves to their 
customers. Woul himself felt the pressure. Shortly before he wrote, he had 
sold a customer alcohol for fifteen cents. A moment later the customer 
returned with the same bottle of alcohol bought for a fraction of the cost at 
another store. "In the eyes of this customer I was a robber," Woul wrote, "I
48 Long to Younker Brothers Inc., box 4966, folder 23, NRA Records; Egy to Victor 
Sadd, November 1, 1933, box 6, folder “G,” NRA Records; Long to W. H. Pearce, 
November 17, 1933, box 4966, folder 22, NRA Records.
49 Charles Hislop to Johnson January 18,1934, box 6, “H,” NRA Records; American 
Progress, March 1,1934,3; Sheridan Downey to Hiram Johnson, November 1,1933, p.2, 
box 8, "Correspondence 1933 General January-December," Arnold Papers.
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tried to assure my customer that I hadn't made a fortune. It was only my 
legitimate profit I even offered to show him my wholesaler's invoice, but it 
was of no avail."51 The culprit in this case, however, was not a chain store, but 
a "cut rate perfume shop."—another term used for pine board drug stores. The 
Woul story was not uncommon. As an Arkansas grocer wrote, “The chains are 
not the only offenders that make business unprofitable. There is in every town 
someone in business who has no idea of the cost of operation, and they sell on 
a basis that will not make them any money, or permit others to make a profit..
..52
The complaints against price cutters not only overwhelmed the 
administration in terms of volume, they also involved complex legal questions. 
NRA officials had agreed to the general desire of small retailers that loss 
leaders should not be permitted. Especially in an economy that had gone out of 
control with many businesses on the verge of bankruptcy, they believed items
50 Woul to Johnson, December 18,1933, box 6, “Chain Stores W-Z,” NRA Records.
51 J. C. Dills to Long, March 1934, box 4966, folder 24, NRA Records; Charles Woul to 
Johnson, December 18, 1933, box 6, “Chain Stores W-Z,” NRA Records; H. A. Georgia 
to Johnson, October 16, 1933, box 8, “Protests,” NRA Records.
52 Thomas Logan to Robinson, December 21, 1934, box 262, folder 2, Robinson Papers; 
William G. A. Kroemmelbein to Fischelis, March 19, 1934, p.2, box U 4, folder 15, 
Fischelis Papers.
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should not be sold below cost But there were many problems with the
definition of cost, problems that some retailers might not have considered. One 
NRA official wrote that most of the dissatisfaction with the code involved a 
misunderstanding of complex rules for pricing. Most small retailers could not 
complete the complicated paper work requested by the government nor 
understand the forms submitted by chain competitors.53 The NRA defined cost 
as delivered cost plus store wages. If a firm could get low delivered cost, either 
because of quantity discounts or other sorts of rebates, they could sell that 
product for a lower cost.54 Some firms, for example, sold at a lower price 
because they purchased large quantities of goods before the NRA codes took 
effect, raising prices. These firms could then sell those goods for less than their 
competitors.55 Any attack on price-cutting thus depended on confirmation of
53 Long to Charles Woul, December 19, 1933, box 6, “Chain Stores W-Z,” NRA Records; 
Ewin L. Davis to Robert Rogers, March 15, 1935, p .l, box 4953, folder 8, NRA Records; 
Mark Merell to A  S. Donaldson, March 4, 1935, ibid.', Robert A  Neaiy to G. C. Gamble, 
March 18, 1935, p.2, ibid', Samuel Kolin to Sherburne, March 20, 1935, box 9, folder 12, 
Sherburne Mercantile Company Papers; Associated Merchants o f Montana to "Members o f 
the Montana State Legislature, November 6, 1933, p.3, box 6, folder 30, Sherburne 
Mercantile Company Papers.
54 Kenneth Dameron to Paul Maunde, March 14, 1934, box 6, “M,” NRA Records; Mark 
Merrill to A  J. Urbish, April 3,1934, box 8, “Protests,” NRA Records; Whiteside to H. W. 
Lea, Retail Memoranda, box 6, “H,” NRA Records; W. N. Hughes to FDR, October 26, 
1933, box 8, "Protests," NRA Records.
55 “Complaint by John Morgan,” box 6884, "Regional Operation Retail and Wholesale
Codes," NRA Records; Sears Retail News, February 14, 1934, 1; W. G. Graham to
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purchase price. When one proprietor of an electrical store wrote, complaining 
about prices at a nearby Walgreen’s, an administrator remarked: "This office is 
in no position to determine the costs to the Walgreen Company of the various 
items advertised."56
In the opinion of small retailers, the limitations of the NRA 
threatened them and the future of the nation. If chains continued to grow at 
the same fantastic rate, they warned, prosperity would never return to the 
country. The American Progress, Huey Long’s newspaper, cautioned the 
country that a new, chain dominated America was developing. Independent 
merchants predicted the same future. One Kansas City hat manufacturer 
wrote president Roosevelt that he had just returned from a trip around the 
country and that he had been appalled by the preponderance of chains at 
every turn. He wrote: "I found one city after another dying on its feet 
because of chain stores. Every good town had the same stores (A&P, 
Penney, Safeway, Grant, Woolworth, Kresge) The downtown of one city 
was a replica of the downtown of the next one, and for every chain store 
that reared its head, three individually owned stores laid down and died.”
Roosevelt, October 30, 1934, OF 466, "NRA Codes 1933-35 F-K," Roosevelt Papers; 
M. M. Zimmerman to Roosevelt, December 10, 1934, ibid.
56 Long to Ellis Electric Company, n.d., box 4966, folder 22, NRA Records.
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Independent retailers urged government to respond to the crisis.57 In 
response, retail Code officials assured retailers they were aware of their 
problems, and General Johnson promised them they would control unfair 
practices.58 The Recovery staff believed that prices would tend to equalize 
because of markup provisions and wage regulations.59 The President 
criticized unfair business practices and warned about the dangers of small 
men being pushed from business.60
Retailers wanted to see coherent attacks on the chains. Anti-chain 
agitators developed publicity campaigns to fight against corporate domination 
of the media.61 They wanted to find ways to slow the growth of the chains,
57 American Progress, September 7, 1933,4; The Voice o f Progress, Volume 2 Number 
5 [1935], 2-4; Charles Lyon to Roosevelt, March 9,1934, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933- 
1934," Roosevelt Papers.
58 Long to E. Sorensen, December 8, 1933, box 4966, folder 23, NRA Records; Johnson to 
Carter Glass, April 27,1934, ibid. -, B. F. Tillarto Glass, April 3,1934, pp. 1-2, ibid
59 Long to William Habig, box 6, “H,” NRA; Long to Charles Woul, Dec. 19, 1933, p.2, 
box 6, “Chain Stores W-Z,” NRA Records.
60 American Progress, March 8, 1934; New York Times, February 28, April 14, 1934; Long 
to H. E. Robinson, February 9, 1934, box 6, “H,” NRA Records; American Progress, 
March 8, 1934; Kirstein to Miss Meredith, February 21, 1935, Official File 288, "Chain 
Stores 1935-1936," Roosevelt Papers; Merrell Sickles to Early, February 13, 1935, ibid.-, 
Early to Sickles, February 27, 1935, ibid.
61 Main Street Crusader, July 27, 1935; "Proceedings o f a Conference o f Progressives," 
box 51, "Senate Career Progressive Conference 1931," Costigan Papers; George Rund 
to Roosevelt, February 18, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; 
Charles E. Miller to Roosevelt, January 24, 1934, p.2, ib id ; Howe to Miller, February 6,
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providing opportunity for the millions of citizens on the dole. They saw an 
attack on the chains as a basic, structural change that could be made to 
strengthen the economy. One of the most active anti-chain voices in this period 
was Ed Wimmer, of the Cincinnati area Wimmer worked along with George 
Schulte, of the Independent Merchant and representatives of the National
Association of Retail Druggists. Disillusionment with the NRA encouraged the
62NARD to embark on their first true anti-chain crusade. Although the rhetoric 
of the movement closely resembled earlier anti-chain campaigns, the campaign 
did include a distinctive new feature: an anti-chain movie entitled Forward 
America. Frank Wilson, the former publicity director for the NRA, produced 
the six-reel film with his own funds. The film attacked the chain system for its 
assaults on opportunity and effect on national purchasing power. According to 
Forward America, chains and their unfair techniques endangered America by 
depressing the economy and igniting the Depression. Although the film itself 
has disappeared, a detailed transcript exists. The film incorporated scenes of 
national despair and included the President's image and selected criticisms he
63made of the chains, which irritated chain companies. Chain store
1934, ibid.
62 Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement," 245, 316.
183
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
representatives resented the film’s depiction of their firms, and they 
complained that the use of the president’s image implied both that he 
supported the attacks on the chains and that Ihe thought chains were responsible 
for the Depression.64 Chain stores believed “that certain government legislation 
and regulations worked against their interests. They complained about, for 
instance, a provision in the AAA bill that exempted floor stocks of retailers 
from the processing tax for thirty days. Owners of smaller chains complained 
that they suffered at the hands of the codes more than competitors. The 
exemption for retailers in towns under 2,500 did not extend to them. They had 
to pay code wages and abide by code provisions and their competitors did 
not.65 The chains wrote the administration about their support for the NRA and
63 Caslow's Weekly, April 27, 1935, 1.
64 Palamountain, The Politics o f Distribution, 203; Ward Melville to Roosevelt, September 
21, 1934; Nystrom to Roosevelt, September 24, 1934; Joe Baker to Steve Early, November 
27, 1934; W. L. M  File Memo, November 27, 1934; Ewin Davis to Early, February 21, 
1935; H. M Kannee, “Memorandum for Mr. Early,”’ December 19, 1934; G. B. Stockton to 
Early, December 4, 1934; J. C. Penney to Roosevellt, September 28, 1934. All in OF 101a, 
'TJse of the President's Name for Advertising 1935 January-February," Roosevelt Papers.
65 J. H. Grande to Louis Howe, May 19, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934;" John M  
Hancock to Howe, April 6,1933, ibid. -, Seaman to Whiteside, October 24,1933, box 6, “S,” 
NRA Records; Dodd to Seaman, October 28, 1933; ibid; R. L. Brooks to Robert Houston, 
July 11, 1934, box 4953, folder 10, NRA; J. C. Smith to Long, July 10,1934; P. J. Reilly to 
Kirstein, March 17, 1934, box 84, "N.R.A," Kirstein Papers; Charles Lyon to Roosevelt, 
March 9, 1934, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-193-4," Roosevelt Papers; Loudon Pacldng 
Company to Roosevelt, July 18, 1933, ibid; D. M . Hall to A. R. Forbush, October 15, 
1933, pp. 3-4, box 6, “H,” NRA Records.
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urged the President to respond to the movie.66 Their vehement criticisms led to 
a request by the White House for a FTC investigation of violation of trademark 
on the President’s name and face (a difficult case to make for a public
A 7   0figure). Despite attempts to suppress Forward America, small retailers and
their supporters continued to promote the film. In Chicago, Balanow of the
68Progressive Food Dealers and the Piper Baking Company showed the film. 
The chains continued to follow the progress of the film, hiring the great public 
relations executive, Edward Bemays, the great nephew of Sigmund Freud, to 
keep the administration aware of the film.69
Forward America and other assaults in the Roosevelt years followed the 
model of past anti-chain campaigns. They attacked predatory practices that 
endangered American prosperity and opportunity. Wimmer pushed a 
passionate assault on the chains with his own newspaper and a radio program.
66 "Remarks by Robert E. Wood," October 1,1934, p.4, box 45, "Sears and Roebuck, 1933- 
35," Wood Papers; Sears Forum, March 22,1938,1-3; John Logan to Roosevelt, December
21,1934, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers.
67 Joe Baker to Early, January 14, 1935, OF 10 la, "Use o f the President's Name for 
Advertising," Roosevelt Papers.
68 National Grocery Bulletin, April 1935, p .l in box 302, folder 3, Lucas Papers; 
Caslow's Weekly, April 27, 1935, p .l, in box 302, folder 3, Lucas Papers; The Voice o f  
Progress Volume 2 Number 5 [1935], 1; Saturday Evening Post, January 19, 1935.
69 Edward Bemays to Early, October 9, 1934; Bemays to Early, October 5, 1934, 
telegram; Early to Bemays, October 13, 1934; Bemays to Early, October 15, 1934, All
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Wimmer wanted to “disprove the economy of the chains ”70 He condemned 
the chains for using predatory practices. Although chains might appear to offer 
better bargains, they actually practiced deception to fool the public into 
shopping with them. Wimmer and Forward America both complained about 
the housewife who had been duped into shopping with the chains. They 
warned that once chains eliminated independent retailers, they would charge 
exorbitant sums. Wimmer argued that the chains’ low prices shielded 
predatory price cutting71 Like earlier chain critics, he maintained that chains
72shortweighted and otherwise connived to offer apparently lower price. 
Forward America showed images of smaller-weight chain cans used in an era 
before net weight had to be printed on the sides of products; some chain 
bargains came because they sold less product. The movie also warned about 
tainted beef, especially pointing to Armour and Swift, who were accused of 
selling tainted beef during the S panish-American War.
in OF 101a, "Use of the President's Name for Advertising," Roosevelt Papers.
70 The Voice o f Progress, Volume 2 Number 5 [1935], 2.
71 ibid., 3
72 ibid., 2.
1 8 6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Anti-chain activists warned America that the unfair competition and 
growth of chain stores endangered American opportunity.73 Without the 
possibility of owning a small store, Americans would lose their incentive. 
Winfield Caslow argued the growth of chain stores undermined capitalism, 
following, without reference, Marx’s criticism that capitalism would destroy 
itself. He attacked Charles Walgreen for hypocrisy when Walgreen withdrew 
his niece from the University of Chicago because of the alleged communism of 
some of its faculty. Caslow accused Walgreen of fomenting communism 
through his business methods, which destroyed small business.74 Without 
freedom of opportunity, what would the future hold for America?75 America 
would be stripped of its wealth. The chain opponents emphasized that the 
depression developed because of the stripping of wealth from the 
community.76 Wimmer mocked the chains for pretending to care about the
73 ibid., 2 ,4
1A Caslow's Weekly, April 27, 1935, p.3 in box 302, folder 3, Lucas Papers; Studs Terkel, 
Hard Times, 64; Caslow's Weekly, April 20,1935.
75 William Wirt, "America Must Lose—by a "planned economy," the stepping stone to a 
REGIMENTED STATE" (New York: Committee For the Nation, n d ), 30.
76 Lee Tyler to Johnson, January 26, 1934, box 6, “H,” NRA Records; C. S. Walton to 
Roosevelt, March 30, 1933, p. 2, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; Dr. 
Walter H. Ferguson, December 12, 1933, pp.2-4, 6-7, box 6, “F,’ NRA; Paul Maunde to 
Louis McHenry Howe, February 28, 1934, p.2, box 6, “M,” NRA; Elmer Sorensen to 
Roosevelt, October 23, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; The
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community. On one occasion he even took exception to a Kroger charity drive,
77which gave food to orphans. As one merchant representing the Dixon 
Loyalty League from Dixon, Illinois, wrote, the chains had claimed they would 
boost the nation’s economy "positive advertised assurances it would make 
for prosperity, now stands as its own condemnation." He asked President 
Roosevelt, "Can there be any permanent return to prosperity with this cancer 
in our Nation's Life?"78
Critics of New Deal policy argued that relief spending would be futile 
as long as chains existed. Many retailers resented shouldering the burden of 
relief in the days before federal relief developed. Small grocers, in particular, 
had supported families by allowing them to purchase on credit—even when 
they had amasses substantial debts and were unemployed. One Texas grocer 
had even operated his own soup kitchen for a time. In their view, independents 
deserved a share of the federal relief dollar, which was, after all, their tax
Voice o f  Progress, Volume 2 Number 5 [1935], 4; The Wall Street Journal, May 19, 1934; 
The Voice o f  Progress, Volume 2 Number 5 [1935], 3; W. E. Fine to Robinson, August 9, 
1935, pp. 1-3, box 244, folder 3, Robinson Papers.
77 The Voice o f  Progress, Volume 2 Number 5 [1935], 3.
78 George Graham to Long, January 15, 1934, box 4966, folder 23, NRA Records;
Charles E. Miller to Roosevelt, January 24, 1934, p.2, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-
1934," Roosevelt Papers; Howe to Miller, February 6, 1934, ibid.
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79dollars at work. Instead, some small retailers complained, relief money
80flooded to the chains, building their sales at the expense of small retailers.
According to these critics, chain stores received an inordinate amount of chain
business because of the interference of relief workers, who suggested that
clients shop in chain stores. Lizabeth Cohen, who studied relief efforts in
81Chicago, validates this claim. In Minnesota and Colorado, complaints about 
the distribution of relief money grew to substantial proportions. A 
Minneapolis-St. Paul anti-chain newspaper investigated relief disbursement to 
stores in the state and concluded that chains had disproportionately benefited.
79 Caslow's Weekly, January 5, 1935, 6; Caslow, Sob Squad, 256; Caslow's Weekly, 
January 5, 1935, 6, 8; Rudolph Jensen to Costigan, February 18, 1932, box 47, "Senate 
Correspondence Unemployment Correspondence January-February 1932," Costigan 
Papers; Russell K. Parks, "Letter to the Editor," Denver Post, February 17, 1932, 12; 
Alice Van Diest, "Report to State Relief Committee," February 28, 1934, box 10, folder 
“Colorado State R elief Committee,” Colorado State Federation o f Labor; "Meetings of 
the State R elief Committee,” July 24, 1933, p.3 ibid.-, Caslow's Weekly, January 5, 
1935, 1; The Voice o f Progress, volume 2 number 5 [1935], 3; Chicago Retail Drug 
Association News, March 14, 1936, pp.3-4 in box 214, folder 1, Robinson Papers; "The 
Denver City Case," box 10, folder 1, Colorado State Federation of Labor; Irving Dilliard 
to Roche, August 18, 1934, box 10, folder 7, Roche Papers; St. Louis Post Dispatch, May 
28, 1934; Robert Cotner, Texas Cities in the Great Depression (Austin, Texas: The Texas 
Memorial Museum, 1973), 25.
80 American Progress, February 15,1934, 1; Epic News, August 28, 1934, 1,3.
81 Northwest Associated Merchants News Journal, March 1935, 3-4; Wall Street 
Journal, January 2, 1935; Floyd Johnson,”Open letter,” February 15, 1935, p.4; The 
Voice o f Progress, volume 2 number 5 [1935], 2; Henry S. McKee, Degenerate 
Democracy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1933), 99-100; Lizabeth 
Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 235-236.
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82The findings led to public meetings on the issue. A rumor circulated in some 
parts of the country that the President was going to respond to this crisis by 
forbidding relief workers to make purchases through mail order houses. An 
investigation by the White House, at the insistence of chain stores, determined 
that this rumor grew out of an editorial published in a rural South Dakota 
newspaper.83 In Colorado, the state investigated Safeway stores for falsifying 
relief reports in an effort to increase their revenues.
Small shopkeepers complained that government relief operations cost 
them business. They condemned the commissary system of government 
storehouses for taking money away from normal channels of trade and 
endangering “legitimate business.” In their minds government relief operations 
became yet another competitive threat to their business. How could they 
compete with a government supported by their own taxes? How could they
82 "Report on Conditions in Prowers County,” November 19, 1934, p.3, box 10, 
“Colorado State R elief Committee,” Colorado Federation o f Labor; “Minutes of 
Meeting of January 17, 1935," ibid.; Isador Lubin and Otto Mallery, "Can Public Works 
Stop the Depression?” February 18, 1933, ibid.', Hopkins to State R elief Committee, 
September 13, 1933, ib id; C. B. Nixon and John Gross to "The Officers and Members 
o f Organized Labor,” October 31, 1934, box 4, folder 18, Colorado Federation o f Labor.
83 Howe to Aubrey Williams, August 23, 1934, OF 101a, "Use o f the President's name for 
advertising August 1934," Roosevelt Papers; Howe to G. B. Stockton, August 31,1934, 
ib id ; H  Holwegner to Montgomery Ward, July 27,1934, ibid; Stockton to Howe, August
27,1934, ibid.
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turn a profit when the government gave away merchandise?84 The New Jersey 
Pharmaceutical Association worked with the state office o f emergency relief to 
ensure retail druggists received business from welfare clients. The association 
negotiated price schedules for prescriptions and worked to stop the 
development of commissaries.85
The retailers did not call for money, as the American Process 
remarked, they only hoped that the government would pass legislation to curb
84 Department of Public Welfare, Division o f Public Relief, "Clothing Commissary, 
1934-1941," p.7, 119 C 4. 4F, Minneapolis Public Welfare Board Papers, Minnesota 
History Center; Council o f Social Agencies, June 9, 1934, ibid.,- Sherburne to Russell 
Strain, August 31, 1933, box 6, folder 29, Sherburne Mercantile Co; H. A. Anson to 
Robinson, May 18, 1936, box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers; P. W. James to 
Roosevelt, December 29, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; 
Terkel, Hard Times, 34; "Prescott Transit Camp Business,” box 21, folder 6, Grace 
Sparks Collection, Arizona Historical Foundation, Tuscon, Arizona; D. Hodson Lewis 
August 22, 1935, box 244, folder 4, Robinson Papers; Joseph Markley to Roosevelt, 
March 6, 1934, box 261, folder 6, Robinson Papers; Wimglisnky to Robinson, May 25, 
1934; Aubrey Williams to Robinson, June 8, 1935, box 286, folder 4, Robinson Papers; 
Kim Durham to Robinson, May 27, 1935; W. F. Lynch to Robinson, March 29, 1935, 
p .l, box 234, folder 2, Robinson Papers; J. Goldenberg to Robinson, March 30, 1935, 
p .l, box 234, folder 1, Robinson Papers; T. M. Brown to Robinson, n.d., pp. 1-2; B. L. 
Russell to Robinson, March 23, 1935, p.l Mr. and Mrs. Fred D. Henry March 25, 1935; 
Melvin Gould to Robinson, January 15, 1935, box 244, folder 1, Robinson Papers; W. 
T. Dudley to Robinson, April 11, 1935; "Minutes o f Meeting o f Colorado State Relief 
Committee October 2, 1933, p. 3; Robinson to Mr. J. S. Shaddock, box 285, folder 4, 
Robinson Papers; Colorado State Relief Commission, “Minutes o f the Meeting o f the 
Colorado State Relief Commission, March 27, 1934, “Minutes o f  the Meeting o f the 
Colorado State Relief Commission March 27, 1934-June 14, 1934,” Colorado 
Federation o f Labor, John Carmody to Robinson, box 287, folder 3, Robinson Papers.
85 Henry D. Kehr to William E. Sutton, June 8, 1933, box 126, folder 6, Fischelis Papers; 
Graham McCloskey to Fischelis, n.d., box 114, folder 15, Fischelis Papers; "TO ALL 
PHYSICIANS AND DRUGGISTS," February 28, 193, ib id ; Graham McCloskey to
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the competitive excesses of the retail sector and return prosperity to the 
country. But some small retailers did ask for some sort of loans or other 
relief.86 A. D. Whiteside began a survey of retail trade in an effort to obtain 
money for retailers who wanted to modernize their stores.87
Other retailers pushed for an inflated currency supply as a way to build 
prosperity. They complained that the nation’s economy had been starved by a 
lack of cash. Roosevelt displayed the same concern for the level of purchasing 
power in the country, but he approached the problem through increasing wages 
and providing federal support for the unemployed. Roosevelt hoped federal 
spending programs would “prime the pump.” At times, retailers criticized the 
administration for this excessive spending, but, they still wanted government 
dollars. Wimmer urged the government to boost retail sales through an old age
Fischelis, nd., ibid.
86 American Progress, August 31, 1933, 3; W. C. T. Carter to Roosevelt, October 30, 
1933, pp. 1-2, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; D. G. Fish of 
Cleveland, February 27, 1934, p.2, box 5, “F,” NRA Records; Ollie Bannister to 
Costigan, March 16, 1935, p.2, box 43, folder 6, Costigan; C. C. C. Camp to Robinson, 
September 6, 1934, box 204, folder 1, Robinson Papers; Secretary to Prescott Camp, 
September 12, 1934, ib id \ Prescott Camp to Robinson, September 18, 1934, ibid.; 
Theodore Beckman, “Report to the National Emergency Council,” November 11, 1934, 
box 244, folder 4, Robinson Papers.
87 Dameron to Max Berk, March 22, 1934, box 4966, folder 23, NRA Records; E. D. 
Martin to Louis Shatz, June 7, 1934, ibid.
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88pension plan. The advocates of an expanded money supply reasoned that 
additional money in circulation would mean more sales for their companies 
and greater prosperity for the country. If the depression and retailing woes 
were caused by a failure in purchasing power, then the country needed more 
purchasing power. An organization known as the Committee for the Nation
89hoped to inflate the currency supply in order to restore American prosperity.
88 Harry A  Livende to Costigan, March 17, 1935, box 43, folder 6, Costigan Papers; Edwin 
Witte, "The NIRA What Is It?" p. 19, box 254, "Articles and Addresses," Witte papers, 
University of Chicago Archives; Retailers National Council to Amlie, May 13, 1932, box 
77, folder 4, Amlie Papers; William Hirth and Henry Wallace to Roosevelt, January 11, 
1935; Jesse Jones to McIntyre, November 11,1935; Chester Davis to Roosevelt, September 
23, 1936; Roosevelt to Hirth, February 2, 1936; Hirth to Roosevelt, January 4, 1936. All in 
PPF 69, Roosevelt Papers; The Voice o f Progress, Volume 2 Number 5 [1935], 2; Wilfed
B. Andrews to Roosevelt, February 26, 1935, p.2, Official File 288, “Chain Stores 1933- 
1936,” Roosevelt Papers.
89 William Wirt, "America Must Lose—by a "planned economy", the stepping stone to a 
REGIMENTED STATE," 1, 4, 5, 10-12,17, 24; Lessing Rosenwald, "Frozen Bank 
Deposits—A Drag on Recovery," August 25, 1933 (New York: Committee for the 
Nation Pamphlet), 2; Edward Rumely to G. F. Warren and F. A. Pearson, November 5, 
1937; Edward A  Rumely to Robert Wood, November 6, 1937, p.2; Edward A. Rumely 
to Wood, August 24, 1936; Edward Rumely to Henry Wallace, June 30, 1936; 
American Farm Bureau Federation, National Grange, and the National Cooperative 
Council to "Dear Senator," July 15, 1935; Edward Rumely to Henry Ford, July 15, 
1935; New York Times, July 7, 1935, pp.2-3, 5; E. A  Rumely to John Thomas Smith, 
July 19, 1935, p.2; Robert Wood to Rumely, February 26, 1935, p.2; Rumely to 
"Members Directing Committee," February 20, 1935, pp. 1-2. All in box 31, "Committee 
for the Nation Correspondence, 34-37," Robert E. Wood Papers; Rumely to Louis 
Howe, November 28, 1933, p.2; Edward Rumely to "Members o f the Directing 
Committee," November 28, 1933, pp.2, 4; Edward Rumely to Wood, October 2, 1933; 
J. Chester Cuppia to Wood, July 13, 1933; All in box 31, "Committee for the Nation, 
1933," Robert Wood Papers.
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This association included many leading chain retailers, who wanted to see 
purchasing power, and their sales, build.
Some anti-chain crusaders hoped to counteract the purported 
deflationary effects of the chains by promoting scrip programs.90 They 
believed that these local programs could build sales and combine with a host of 
similar programs to pump up the currency supply of the country.91 Winfield 
Caslow, an anti-chain broadcaster in Chicago, told his supporters that they 
needed to move beyond public education and boycotts to "actual business 
stimulation and control rather than speech-making and sentiment molding." He 
considered scrip to be practical action. As he explained the system, money in 
circulation could be used to promote spending. Caslow relied on the writing of 
Yale economist Irving Fisher to demonstrate the practicality of the initiative. 
Fifty-three customers went with dollar scrip certificates and bought 
merchandise. After it circulated 54 times, they made possible the conduct of
90 The Main Street Crusader, July 20, 1935, 1-4; Robert Cotner, Texas Cities in the Great 
Depression (Austin, Texas: The Texas Memorial Museum, 1973), 13.
91 Russ Alexander to Robinson, February 28, 1936, box 213, folder 15, Robinson 
Papers; G. P. Park to Costigan, February 29, 1932 ibid..
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$2,862 worth o f business. If one estimates a twenty-five percent profit that 
would ensure $715.50 in earnings.92
Caslow urged the mayor, Ed Kelly, to adopt the scheme and met with 
him on one occasion, although the city did not join the movement93 After 
about fifteen months in circulation, the scrip plan collapsed because too many 
individuals held onto the bills.94 Caslow then re-tooled, using a method of 
dating, which allowed him to provide for a more regular cash flow under the 
program.95
Caslow believed his scrip plan served as an alternative to relief. He 
alleged that relief benefited some who were not worthy, including bootleggers 
and other neer-do-wells Caslow also criticized the government for pursuing a 
policy of scarcity by refusing to inflate the currency supply.96 These comments 
demonstrate a similarity between Caslow’s thought and the sentiments of Huey 
Long and Father Coughlin, who also criticized the relief system and called for
92 Caslow's Weekly, January 5,1935,3,6.
93 Caslow's Weekly, January 5,1935, 1.
Q A
National Grocery Bulletin, April 1935, box 302, folder 3, Lucas Papers.
95 Caslow's Weekly, April 27,1935,3; Caslow's Weekly, April 27, 1935, 1.
96 Caslow's Weekly, January 5, 1935, 1-2; Caslow's Weekly, August 6, 1933, 1-3; Frank 
Renick to Roosevelt, May 9, 1933, p. 3, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt
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inflationary currency expansion. Although Caslow, Wimmer and the others 
did not support Long, many shopkeepers were attracted to him.97
Some small shopkeepers turned against Roosevelt. Because of their 
negative experience with the NRA, they concluded that Roosevelt would not 
act in their interests. As Alan Brinkley notes in Voices o f Protest, many of 
these shopkeepers became strong supporters of Huey Long and Father 
Coughlin.98 Sinclair Lewis had noted the same phenomenon in his classic 
work, It Can’t Happen Here." Small retailers wanted salvation, and they 
hoped that the federal government would provide the help they needed. 
Unfortunately, they held an unrealistic expectation of the capacity of federal 
power. As one retailer wrote to President Roosevelt, "It has been reported 
recently that Germany locked up its chain stores because they considered them
Papers.
97 Caslow's Weekly April 27,1935, 3.
98 Alan Brinkley, Voices o f  Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin and the Great Depression 
(New York Vintage Books, 1982), 54-56, 143-147, 154-159, 164-168, 176, 193, 223, 279, 
281; Longto "Dear Friend,” January 30, 1933, box 11, folder 107, Robinson Supplementary 
Papers; Lawrence Metz to Robinson, n.d., p. 2, box 203, folder, The Voice o f Progress, 
Volume 2 Number 5 [1935], 2.
99 Sinclair Lewis, It Can't Happen Here (New York: Signet, 1935, 1970), 80, 300; 
American Progress, February 15, 1934; W. F. Dombrow to Roosevelt, December 6, 1934, 
OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; Chicago Evening American, 
November 21,1934; The Voice o f  Progress, Volume 2 Number 5 [1935], 2.
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a bad thing for the country. Why shouldn't we lock up the chain stores in the
United States?"100 In America, no consensus existed to use government power
for dictatorial control over the economy. European countries proposed such
systems of strict control, but the United States proved wary of such
experiments.101 Other retailers called for a limit to the number of the chains.
They had an insight. Most likely it would take such extraordinary measures to
curb the growth of the chains, but the United States would not attack private
property in this fashion. If the National Recovery Administration fell because it
did not meet constitutional specifications, then these proposals stood no chance
of victory. Retailers and their supporters would need to find another way to
attack the chains and take away their advantages.
Caslow made positive comments about Long but held back from 
102endorsing the Senator. Neither Long nor Coughlin proved successful in 
building a relationship with the trade association leadership or created an
100 F. H. McKay to Roosevelt, April 13, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," 
Roosevelt Papers; William J. Ross to Roosevelt, April 21, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 
1933-1934;" Monod, Store Wars, 325-326; Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement," 
231; New York Times, May 5, 12, 13, 27, 34; Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f  
Monopoly, 81-5 95-97; William J. McGaw to Roosevelt, April 6, 1934, OF 288, "Chain 
Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers.
101 Brinkley, Voices o f  Protest, 279-281.
102 Caslow’s Weekly, April 27, 1935,3.
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independent political movement. In Canada, a Conservative minister named 
Harry Stevens became the voice of the small storekeeper. Stevens led the 
Canadian Price Spreads Inquiry, an investigation of retailing. Stevens 
attracted interest in both the United States and Canada because of his 
spirited denunciations of the chains. The study of the chains uncovered
103short weighing and other corrupt practices. Stevens organized a campaign 
built around small retailers and their Retail Merchants Association.104 He 
ultimately left the Tory Party and made an ill fated run for Prime Minister in 
conjunction with the radical, agrarian Social Credit Movement
Although the United States did not develop a movement on the scale of 
the Stevens campaign in Canada, critics of the NRA did attract attention. Long 
and other critics of the Roosevelt administration lashed out at a system, which 
they thought exploited small business to the benefit of the great corporations. 
William Borah and Gerald Nye condemned the NRA for fostering monopoly 
and crushing small business owners. Even Supreme Court Justice Louis
103 The Voice o f Progress, volume 2 number 5 [1935], 4; Monod, Store Wars, 315; 
Beardsley Ruml, "The Function o f a Retailer," pp.2-3, box 3, folder 2, Ruml Papers, 
University o f Chicago Archives.
104 Monod, Store Wars, 20-29, 120-121,138-185, 202-204, 243-272, 288, 298-302, 305-
311, 322,328, 330; Jeansonne, Messiah o f  the Masses, 157.
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Brandeis blamed big business for the depression and expressed concern for the 
effects of the NRA.105
At the suggestion of General Hugh Johnson, head of the National 
Recovery Administration, President Roosevelt responded to these criticisms 
by creating the National Recovery Review Board.106 The Board was usually 
called the Darrow Board, after its chairman Clarence Darrow, the famed left
107wing attorney, whom Johnson had recommended. It responded to 
widespread complaints that the NRA threatened the existence of small 
business and the pocketbooks of labor and consumers. It spent a good deal of 
its time investigating the effects of the NRA on the growth of chain stores. 
Perhaps the best known member after Darrow was Fred Mann, Jr. of Devil’s 
Lake, North Dakota. Mann's father had been in business in that town and built 
the business into one of the most successful in the country. He brought in trade
105 Josephus Daniels to Roosevelt, September 26, 1934, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 1933- 
1936," Roosevelt Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 232-234; H. E. 
Robertson to Roosevelt, May 11, 1934, OF 277, “Anti-Trust Laws 1933-1936,” Roosevelt 
Papers; E. J. Copeland to Robinson, April 5, 1935, box 262, folder 3, Robinson Papers; 
Charles Lauteibach to Roosevelt, February 8, 1934, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 1933-1936" 
Roosevelt Papers; American Progress, February 22,1934, 8.
106 Johnson to Roosevelt, December 12, 1933, OF 466, "NRA Codes Misc. 1933," 
Roosevelt Papers; F. D. R. to Johnson, December 18, 1933; New York Times, Feb 17, 
1935; New York Times, May 19, 1934; New York Times, January 17, 1934; New York 
Times, June 2, 1935; ibid., March 18, 1935; ibid., April 21 1934; New York Times, 
February 7, 1934; Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f Monopoly, 80.
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from throughout the country, managing to do $500,000 worth of business in 
Devil’s Lake. Mann himself had led several retailing groups. Other members 
of the board included John Sinclair, a banker, a lawyer, William Thompson 
and Samuel C. Henry, the head of the Cooperative Philadelphia Wholesale 
Dmg Association.108
Hearings of the board ran on for months.109 As a matter of fact, as if 
emblematic of the unwieldiness of New Deal administration, the staff 
continued to work for a few days after the conclusion of their project because 
no one officially notified them to conclude their work. The majority report 
harshly criticized the NRA for endangering small business.110 It did not,
107 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 232.
108 M. H. Cavanaugh to Huber, February 5, 1931, box "1931 February,” Huber Papers; 
Mann's Inc., “Minutes 20 January 1930,” box 1, folder 2, Mann’s Inc. Papers, University of 
North Dakota; Manns Trade, March 1931, p.3 in box 2, Mann's Inc. Papers; Hawley, The 
New Deal and the Problem o f Monopoly, 84; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 
233; LaFollette to John Sinclair, January 17,1933, PPF 1792, Roosevelt Papers.
109 A. T. Court to Henderson, March 2, 1934, “Subject: Summaries o f Complaints Against 
N.R.A;” Kiplinger and White House "Small Enterprises in the South Under NRA," p. 2; 
Memorandum R. A  Neary to R. H. Lansburgh “Subject: Field Investigation o f the Small 
Firm,” March 11, 1935, p. 3.
110 J. H. Landry to Roosevelt, May 22, 1934 Darrow; Senator Nye to the President May 16, 
1934; Roosevelt to Nye, May 18, 1934; A.R. Forbush to McIntyre June 5, 1934 "PWA 
National Recovery Review Board First Report 1934," 77-78 OF 466e; Erwin L. Davis to 
Roosevelt, December 27, 1933, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 1933-1936,” Roosevelt 
Papers; Majestic Theater to Roosevelt, June 16, 1934, ibid; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store 
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Munz, Jr. to Blackwell Smith Memo December 16, 1934 box 51 "Senate Correspondence-
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however, provide a model for reform, suggesting merely that the NRA be 
scrapped.111 Sinclair issued his own minority report to emphasize his rather 
acrimonious break from other members of the board, but even he suggested an 
independent board of review to survey the effect of the codes on small 
business.112
Many supporters of small business worried that the investigation by 
the board played into the hands of reactionaries, who wanted to stop
National Recovery Administration NRA" Costigan Papers Smith from the Legal Division, 
pp. 2-3; R. W. Jameson to Robinson May 2, 1935, box 262, folder 4, Robinson Papers; 
Herbert Sheets to Robinson, May 8, 1935; Ward Cheney to Robinson May 9, 1935 
"Industry and Business Committee for NRA Extension” p.2; Robinson to McClellan, 
February 12, 1935, box 262, folder 2, Robinson Papers; J. M  Burrow to Robinson 
February 21, 1935; J. E. Young to Robinson February 21,1935; W. E. Carson to Robinson 
February 6, 1935; Joe Robinson to his uncle Joseph Robinson February 7, 1935 box 262 
folder 2 Robinson Papers, p.2; Johnson to Robinson June 11, 1934; Frank Durham, “Radio 
Broadcast November 5 1934 over WTMS,” p.5 in Frank S. Durham to Costigan, November 
12, 1934, box 42, folder 19, Costigan Papers; Earl P. Hoage to Costigan, March 16, 1935, 
box 43, folder 6, Costigan Papers; Fr. J. J. Donelly to Costigan, February 22, 1932, box 47, 
"Senate Correspondence Unemployment Correspondence January-February 1932," 
Costigan Papers; William C. Alexander to Costigan, March 25, 1935, box 43, folder 6, 
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113experiments in government regulation of business. Some small retailers 
hoped to continue the National Recovery Administration.114 Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court’s Schecter decision ended the NRA, and it left chain 
opponents in search of new ways to control the chains. In a May 31 press 
conference, Roosevelt expressed concern about unfair practices by the 
chains. He even talked about the “desirability of regulating chain stores as a 
protection against unfair trade practices."115 His remarks attracted protests 
from the chains. John Logan of the Food and Grocery Chain Stores of 
America wrote Roosevelt that they had cooperated with the NRA in every 
way and had voluntarily maintained NRA standards for wages and hours
113 Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement," 234; Hany Yoken to Howe, January 16, 
1935, "NRA Codes 1933-35 F-K," Roosevelt Papers.
114 Armin W. Riley to "Deputies o f Food Division," April 18, 1935, box 6742, 'Deputies 
Folder," NRA Records; Hany Yoken to Howe, January 16, 1935, "NRA Codes 1933-35 F- 
K," Roosevelt Papers; Thomas Logan to Robinson, December 21, 1934, p.2, box 261, 
folder 2, Robinson Papers; Will Akers to Robinson, April 27, 1935, p.5, box 262, folder 6, 
ibid.; The Voice o f  Progress volume 2 number 5 [1935]; Saturday Evening Post, January 
19, 1935; Thomas Logan to Robinson, December 21, 1934, box 262, folder 2, Robinson 
Papers; OMahoney to C. C. Riley Sheridan, box 132, "Legislation, 1935 National Recovery 
Administration;" Samuel Asher to O'Mahoney, March 29, 1935, box 115, "Legislation 
National Recovery Act-1935;” W. H. Mclnemey, May 21, 1935, Tobacco dealers support 
the NRA extension; William Green to O'Mahoney, May 6, 1935, box 115, "Legislation 
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after the administration collapsed. Roosevelt asked for verification of this 
claim.116
Because of their experience with the NRA provisions, many 
wholesalers and small retailers were convinced that other measures needed 
to be taken against the chains. As one Long Island wholesaler wrote to 
President Roosevelt, the chains would always be able to undersell the 
independent retailer because they bought as cheap as or cheaper than 
wholesalers. The wholesaler warned about the real danger of retailers being 
pushed out of business. Those businessmen, he noted, acted as consumers 
as well. If they lost their stores, they would no longer be able to purchase. 
Their families would lose income, hurting the purchasing power of the 
nation. This economic devastation was not worth the efficiency of the 
chains. Supporters o f small retailers believed legislative protection of small
117retailers would lead to positive economic benefits. They wanted to see
116 John Logan to Roosevelt, June 1,1935; F. H. Massmann to "Members: Food and 
Grocery Chain Stores o f America," May 27,1935, p.2; Roosevelt to James L. O'Neill, June 
25,1935; Roosevelt to Logan, June 11,1935; Glenn Compton to Roosevelt, July 15, 1935; 
M. H. McIntyre to Compton, July 17,1935. All in OF 288, "Chain Stores 1935-1936," 
Roosevelt Papers; Unsigned from Georgetown, Illinois to Robinson, June 28,1935, p.2, 
box 244, folder 1, Robinson Papers; Roosevelt to Richberg, March 20,1935, OF 288, 
"Chain Stores 1935-1936," Roosevelt Papers.
117 M. Alkonto Roosevelt, March 19,1934, p.2, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," 
Roosevelt Papers; Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, 247.
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additional government regulation of chain rebates and discounts. 
Independents complained that they could not compete with chains under 
present conditions.118 When Johnson left the administration, he concurred 
and expressed strong support for such price maintenance principles. Yet 
other chain opponents suggested a federal tax on chain stores to match the 
growing number of state taxes. They believed that a chain tax would ease 
the burden of other taxes and also work to control the growth of the 
chains.119
Some supporters of the New Deal suggested the federal government 
should focus on ensuring fair wages and hours, allowing the rest of the
NRA to fall by the wayside. They doubted the usefulness or possibility of
120enforcing price codes and worried that the consumer would be injured. If
118 James Mott to NRA, May 7,1934, box 4969, folder 26, NRA Records; Kansas City 
Pharmacists Organization, box 5, folder “G,” NRA Records; Johnson to Carter Glass, April 
27, 1934, folder 1, NRA Records; M. Alkon to Roosevelt, March 19, 1934, p.2, OF 288, 
"Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers; Joseph M. Weber to Roosevelt, May 5, 1933, 
ibid.; Thomas Logan to Robinson, December 21,1934, p.2, box 262, folder 2, Robinson 
Papers.
119 James Mott to NRA, May 7, 1934, box 4969, folder 26 NRA Records; Morris 
Goodstein to FDR May 16, 1933, box 6682, folder “F-G,” NRA Records; M. W. 
Gordon to Roosevelt, August 27, 1934, p.2, ibid ', National Association o f Independents 
to "Independent Merchants and their Organizations," March 4, 1936, box 302, folder 6, 
Lucas Papers; The Voice o f  Progress, volume 2 Number 5 [1935], p.2; P. W. James to 
Roosevelt, December 29, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers.
120 John Burke to Kirstein, November 6, 1934, p. 2, box 89, "Widman," Kirstein Papers;
H. P Vose to C. E. Roos, “Memorandum subject: Twelve Point Program for the
204
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
prices remained high, they reasoned, fewer Americans would be able to
have the benefits of the new economy.
The struggle over the Robinson-Patman Act led to a collision between
121these two approaches to government intervention in the economy. The 
experiment with the National Recovery Administration convinced retailers 
that government would continue to play an important role in the economy. 
Retailers looked for ways to shape that role. As the National Recovery
Administration collapsed, retailers of all sizes attempted to structure the
122economy in a way that would benefit them.
N.R.A.,” March 1, 1934,2.
121 The Voice o f Progress, volume 2 number 5 [1935], p.3; Harold R. Young to McIntyre, 
January 26, 1935, OF 466, "NRA Codes 1933-1935 F-K," Roosevelt Papers.
122 New York Times, June 5, 1935.
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Chapter Six: The Robinson-Patman Act
In response to increased government regulation of business, large 
retailers created an organization they hoped to make an all-inclusive 
association for retailing: the American Retail Federation. Even after the 
Schechter decision ended the NRA, mass retailers pushed for a group to be 
their voice.1 Small retailers interpreted this as a threat They had their own 
plans for government action, and they wanted a set of laws to protect their 
position in the economy. Independent retailers hoped the Roosevelt 
administration would prevent chain stores from predatory practices and restore 
hope for the small storekeeper. The controversy over the ARF sparked a series 
of hearings and plans by small retailers to push for protective legislation.
1 Palamountain, The Politics o f  Distribution, 182-183; Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement in America," 238; Bruno Bum to Kirstein, April 20, 1935, box 89, "ARF Jobs," 
Kirstein Papers; Frederick Warburg to Kirstein, April 23, 1935, ibid; Lincoln Filene to 
Kirstein, April 18, 1935, box 89, "Letters o f Congratulations to LEK," ibid', David L. Rike 
to Fred Lazarus, May 2, 1935, box 89, "Widman," ibid ', Kirstein to P. G. Winnett-Bullocks, 
February 6, 1935, ibid; U.S. Congress. House. Special Committee on Investigation 
American Retail Federation. Investigation o f  the Lobbying Activities ofthe American Retail 
Federation. 74th Congress, 1st session. 1935: L 15,56, 102-106,112-115,124-129,144-145, 
167-172; ibid: n, 52-53; See also Charles Daughters, Wells o f Discontent: A Study o f the 
Economic, Social, and Political Aspects o f  the Chain Store (New York: Newson and 
Company, 1937).
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Ultimately, the turmoil led to the Robinson-Patman. Act—a piece of legislation 
designed to restrict buying practices by the chains.
The experience with the NRA had convinced many mass retailers that 
cooperation with government was necessary~at the very least to prevent 
attacks on business. They wanted to work with government to ensure that the 
administration followed policies favorable to them, and they recognized the 
necessity of lobbying Congress in their interests.2 In their opinion, existing 
business organizations, such as the United States Chamber of Commerce were 
dominated by the production sector and not sympathetic to their interests.3 
Other retail organizations did not represent the entire sector.4 A faction of mass 
retailers formed the ARF in 1935. As the group wrote in its first news release:
2 Jesse I. Miller to Sherill, May 30, 1935, box 89, "Washington LK Brought Back After 
Hearing," Kirstein Papers; Sherill to Kirstein, March 21, 1936, box 89, "Sherill ARF 1936- 
1937," ibid.
3 Fred Lazarus to Kirstein, November 9, 1934, box 89, "Widman," Kirstein Papers; Fred 
Lazarus to S. B. Walker, April 6, 1935, ib id ; Fred Lazarus to Aaron Frank, March 2, 1935, 
ibid', Aaron Frank to Lincoln Filene, February 28, 1935, ibid', Fred Lazarus to Clarence 
Strouss, February 21, 1935, p.2, ibid', John Burke to Kirstein, November 6, 1934, box 89, 
"Wash Folder," Kirstein Papers; Sherill to Kirstein, May 1, 1935, ibid; "Memo From J. .J. 
Kaplan to L. E. Kirstein," pp. 1-2, box 89, "Congressional Investigation," Kirstein Papers.
4 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 238; New York Times, April 16, 1935; 
"Statement of Purpose o f the American Retail Federation," pp.2-3, box 89, "Congressional 
Investigation ARF June 5, 1935;" John Burke to Kirstein, May 1, 1935, ibid, Kirstein to 
Van Dusen, February 4, 1935, box 89 "Widman," Kirstein Papers; Kirstein to William 
Ayres, February 8, 1935, ibid', Congressional Record August 7, 1935, 252; Kirstein to 
Sherill, July 29, 1935, box 89, "Sherill ARF 1935," Kirstein Papers; Clarence Strouss to
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"There should now be heard the voice of Main Street. . . .Mr. and Mrs. John 
Merchant. . . have paid the taxes while they have quietly watched groups 
numerically less and financially less important" get a greater voice in public 
affairs.5
The ARF hoped to promote legislation that would encourage mass 
consumption, something all retailers could support.6 The new organization 
would also provide research and factual information on the nature of retailing 
and coordinate state councils to play a similar role on a regional basis..7 These 
groups, modeled on the Ohio State Council, could fight adverse legislation, 
including taxes on chains.8
Fred Lazarus, February 18, 1935, box 89, "Widman,” Kirstein Papers.
5 Harvey Rummer to Kirstein, April 30, 1935, p.5, box 89, "Widman," Kirstein Papers; 
"Minutes o f the Subcommittee on Organization," Burke to Kirstein, January 25,1935, ibid
6 H. J. Tilly to Harry Cappel, [n.d., 1935], p.2, box 90, "T," Kirstein Papers; Kirstein to 
Tilly, June 8, 1935, ibid; Hugh Butler to Kirstein, June 26, 1935, ibid.
7 Fred Lazarus Lazarus to Kirstein, May 29, 1935, box 89, "Congressional Investigation;" 
Fred Lazarus to Kirstein, November 9, 1934, pp. 1-2, box 89, "Widman;" Fred Lazarus to 
Damon Frank, March 2,1935, ibid All in the Kirstein Papers.
8 Sherill to Kirstein, May 2, 1936, box 90, "V;” Fred Lazarus to Morrill, n.d., box 89, 
'Material Mr. Widman has;" Brownhill to Oscar Webber, April 25, 1935, ibid; Webber to 
Brownhill, April 30, 1935, ibid', Kirstein to Aldred, November 22, 1935, ibid box 90 "A"; 
Kirstein to Louis Wheel, October 2, 1935, ibid; Jeffrey Lazarus to Kirstein June 10, 1935, 
p.3 box 90 "L." All in the Kirstein Papers. Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 260- 
3; Grocers Association News, November 1935,1; Investigation o f the ARF: 1,90-91, 95-96, 
129,262; ibid: n, 42; ibid: IE, 4-7,46,53.
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Although the ARF sought to represent all of retailing, it began as a small 
club of leading retailers, their names familiar to many Americans. Thirteen 
members of the Retailers National Council formed the heart of the new 
organization: William Kirstein, president of Filene’s; Percy Straus, president of 
Macy’s; Lessing Rosenwald, president of Sears and Roebuck’s; E. C. Sams, 
president of Penney’s; A. H. Morrill, president of Kroger’s; C. W. Kress, 
president of Kress’s Company; H. J. Tilly, president of Strawbridge and 
Clothier’s and head of the Retailers National Council of code days; Fred 
Lazarus, Jr., Vice-President of the FTR Lazarus’s and George M. Gales, the 
president of Liggett’s.9
An executive for Kroger, Colonel C.O. Sherill, headed the new 
organization. In the initial publicity for the American Retail Federation, Sherill 
bragged that the federation had the support of all facets of the industry, 
claiming that other members of the Retailers National Council, like the
9 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 238,256; New York Times, April 16, 1935; 
"Statement of Purpose," pp.2-3 box 89 "Congressional Investigation ARF June 5,1935," 
Kirstein Papers; John Burke to Kirstein, May 1,1935, box 89, "Widman," Kirstein Papers; 
Kirstein to Van Dusen, February 4, 1935, ibid.; Kirstein to Ayres, February 8,1935, ibid; 
Congressional Record August 7,1935,252; Kirstein to Sherill, July 29,1935, box 89, 
"Sherill ARF 1935," Kirstein Papers; Clarence Strouss to Fred Lazarus, February 18, 1935, 
box 89, "Widman," Kirstein Papers. Logan to Fred Lazarus, April 24,1935, ibid; Bulletin 
ofthe Food and Grocery Chain Stores o f  America, Inc., Volume EL, Number 16,1; 
Telephone Call Mr. Lennihan to Kirstein, March 25,1935, p. 1, box 89, "Material Mr. 
Widman has," Kirstein Papers; Logan to Kirstein, April 15, 1935.
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National Association of Retail Grocers (NARGUS) and the National 
Association of Retail Druggists (NARD), were slated to join the ARF. 10 
Sherill and Kirstein appeared to believe that the ARF could and must unify all 
branches of retailing in order to represent the sector. They consciously chose to 
downplay the importance of large corporate interests.11
Unfortunately, the ARF had failed to include many of the members of 
the Retailers National Council in the planning of the organization, including 
the existing trade organizations it wanted to join the federation.12 The leaders 
of the National Retail Dry Goods Association (NRDGA), National Association
10 Lebhar, Chain Stores in America, 187; E. M. Schnadig to Lessing Rosenwald, May, 
1935, box 89, "Mr. Widman Has," Kirstein Papers.
11 Sherill to Kirstein, April 9, 1935, box 89, "Widman," Kirstein Papers; Fred Lazarus to 
Frank, May 20,1935, ibid.; Kirstein to Fred Lazarus, May 22,1935, ibid; E. L. Brownhill to 
Oscar Webber, April 25, 1935, ibid; Kirstein to Thomas Conroy, April 18, 1935, ibid, 
Kirstein to Thomas Conroy, April 22, 1935, p. 2, ibid:; Harry F. Cappel to Herbert Tilly, 
May 31, 1935, p. 3, box 90, "C," Kirstein Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement,” 257; Harvey Rummer to Kirstein, April 30, 1935, p.5, box 89, "Widman," 
Kirstein Papers; Oswald Knauth to Kirstein, November 27,1936, ibid; Bob Puckett Hackett 
to Kirstein, September 35, 1936, box 90, "Knauth," ibid; Lew Hahn to Kirstein, November 
28,1934, p.2, box 89, 'Material Mr. Widman has," ibid; Aldred to Kirstein, July 19, 1935, 
box 89, "Sherill ARF 1935," Kirstein Papers; Logan to Kirstein, April 15, 1935, p.4, box 89, 
"Material Mr. Widman has," Kirstein Papers; Allen Sinsheimer and Maurice Rothschild, 
"To Board of Directors o f the National Association of Retail Clothiers and Furnishers,” 
April 29, 1935, p.3, ibid; Claude W. Kress to Kirstein, March 12, 1937, box 90, "K," 
Kirstein Papers; Claude W. Kress to Kirstein, October 22, 1936, box 90, "K," Kirstein 
Papers;" Sherill to Kirstein, March 28, 1936, p.2, box 89, "Sherill ARF 1936-1937,” ibid; 
Kirstein to Fred Lazarus, December 21, 1935, box 89, "Fred Lazarus 1933-1938," ibid
12 Kirstein to Fred Lazarus, May 22, 1935, box 89, "Widman," Kirstein Papers; Fred 
Lazarus to Frank Neely, February 27, 1935, ibid; Kirstein to Thomas Conroy, April 22,
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of Retail Grocers (NARGUS), and National Association of Retail Druggists 
(NARD) worried that the new association would place more pressure on them 
to secure members and funds in a tight economic market, threatening the 
power and influence of the heads of existing trade associations.
The NRDGA, made up of many prominent retailers, condemned the 
development of the ARF, but the greatest indignation came from small 
retailers. J. J. Lookbaugh from Elmhurst, Illinois, wrote Kirstein a sarcastic 
note: “Considering what the Federal Government is getting away with due to 
mass ignorance and gullibility," he wrote, “ it is not surprising that you hoped 
to found the ARF on the same theory. So far as this insignificant 'little fellow1 
retailer is concerned,” however, “ your claims for the intents and purposes of 
the ARF amount to a direct affront to common sense." Lookbaugh noted that 
the executive committee is "made up of such little fellows" as Rosenwald of 
Sears and Roebuck’s, Sams of Penney's, Strauss of Macy's and Morrill of 
Kroger’s.13
Across the country, small retailers had a similar reaction. Some 
independents were initially suspicious that their trade association executives,
1935 ibid.
13 J. J. Lookbaugh to Kirstein, April 17, 1935, box 89, "Widman," Kirstein Papers; Pierce 
Butler to Kirstein, May 6, 1935, ibid.
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many of whom had been lukewarm to anti-chain agitation, might now be 
cooperating with large retailers. When trade executives assured their members 
they had not agreed to join, the ire of independent retailing came to be directed 
against the American Retail Federation itself. The reaction of small retailers 
was visceral. They believed SherilTs comments were indications of a 
widespread conspiracy to strip them of their voice in American politics.14
Their concerns prompted congressional supporters of small retailers to 
pass a resolution calling for an investigation of the ARF and its founders.15 
John Cochran of St. Louis, who was to head the investigating committee, had 
a heart attack, so Wright Patman of Texarkana, Texas, took over the 
chairmanship. He subpoenaed those responsible for creating the organization
14 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 242-246; Kirstein to Hugh Johnson, April 
19, 1935, box 89, "Material Mr. Widman has," Kirstein Papers; William Grant to Kirstein, 
December 18, 1934, ibid.; Morrill to Fred Lazarus, April 17,1935, ibid; Harry F. Cappel to 
Herbert Tilly, May 31, 1935, pp. 1-2, box 90, "C," Kirstein Papers; Harry F. Cappel to 
Herbert Tilly, p.2, ib id ; Fred Lazarus to David E. Moeser, April 22, 1936, pp. 1-2, box 90, 
"M," Kirstein Papers; Kirstein to Dr. Moeser, April 22, 1936, ibid', Moeser to Kirstein, 
April 20, 1936, pp. 2-3, ibid.
15 Kirstein to Jesse L Miller, April 27, 1935, box 89, "Congressional Investigation," Kirstein
Papers; Cochran to Fuller, April 29, 1935, pp. 1-2, ib id ; Stix, Baer and Fuller Company to
Kirstein, May 1, 1935, ibid.', Sherill to Kirstein, June 3, 1935, telegram, box 89,
"Washington LK brought Back After Hearing," Kirstein Papers; ARF Investigating
Committee to Kirstein, June 3, 1935, ibid', Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,”
247-249; Congressional Record, 74th Congress, 1st session, 1375-1376, 8646-8647;
Investigation o f the ARF: I, 11, 13-14, 15, 158-159; ibid: IU, 32-33, 45; “Merry-Go-
Round,” November 21,1935, box 89, "Sherill ARF 1936-1937," Kirstein Papers.
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and began hearings.16 Although the ARF officers were nervous about the
17investigation, they were certain they had done nothing wrong. They believed 
Patman simply wanted publicity for himself. In their minds the Texas 
Democrat had become accustomed to the national spotlight in agitation to 
make early payments on veterans bonuses, and he would do anything to retain 
his place in the newspapers and newsreels. Confident that he would absolve 
them, ARF officials cooperated with his subpoenas for papers and personal 
appearances at the hearings.18 One executive for S. S. Kresge wrote Kirstein 
that the investigation was “annoying and aggravating,” but that it would have 
no lasting influence. He hoped the ARF would brush off the criticism.19
16 Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement," 246; Lorrence, Gerald J. Boileau and the 
Progressive-Farmer-Labor Alliance, 92; Sheldon R. Coons to Kirstein, April 26, 1935, box 
89, "Congressional Investigation," Kirstein Papers; Sherill to Kirstein, May 24,1935, ibid.
17 Paul Findlay to Patman, November 24, 1935, p.2, box 303, folder 9, Lucas Papers.
18 Kirstein to Gentlemen, May 24, 1935, box 89, "Congressional Investigation," Kirstein 
Papers; "Patman Questionnaire," in Kirstein to John Burke, June 10, 1935, ibid; 
Kirstein to Fred Lazarus, telegram, June 10, 1935, p.2, ibid.; Kirstein to Aldred, May 
19, 1936, box 90, "A," Kirstein Papers; A. L. Block to Kirstein, April 30, 1936, box 90, 
"B," Kirstein Papers; A. L. Block to Patman, June 8, 1935, box 302, folder 4, Scott 
Lucas Papers, State Historical Society o f Illinois; Lucas to Patman, September 12,1935, 
ibid; Kirstein to Brandeis, October 4, 1937, box 22, “Brandeis,” Kirstein Papers; 
Kirstein to Brandeis, January 8, 1930, ibid; Bloom to Kirstein, May 28, 1936, box 22, 
"Sol Bloom Buy Now Campaign," Kirstein Papers; Bloom to Kirstein, June 10, 1938, 
ibid
19 C. B. Van Dusen to Kirstein, May 3, 1935, box 89, "Widman," Kirstein Papers.
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Despite his advice, the ARF temporarily suspended its membership 
campaign.20 As the committee’s focus shifted from the ARF to other aspects of 
the chain industry, the ARF tentatively resumed their recruitment efforts. All of 
the officers remained with the organization, even Colonel Sherill. They began 
to have some success with smaller retailers, but even many small chains 
distrusted the leadership.21
Patman eventually turned the attention of the committee to an 
examination of the rapid growth of chain stores and their control over the
20 "List of Kirstein Stock Holdings," box 97, "ARF," Kirstein Papers; Sherill to Kirstein, 
June 21, 1935, box 89, folder "Sherill Re: Financial," Kirstein Papers; Sherill to Mr. 
Walker, box 89, "Misc.," "Who pledged February 2, 1935," box 89, "ARF and NRDGA," 
Kirstein Papers; J. Curratsom to Kirstein, February 13, 1937, p. 18, ibid.; Sherill to Kirstein 
et al, July 5,1935, box 89, "Second and Third Questionnaires," Kirstein Papers.
21 C. O. Sherill, "Address before the Association o f New England Retail Secretaries,” 
September 24, 1935, p. 1, box 89, "Colonel Sherill's Addresses,” Kirstein Papers; Sherill 
to et al June 7, 1935, p.2, box 89, "Congressional Investigation ARF June 5, 1935," 
Kirstein Papers; Kirstein to Gentlemen, May 24, 1935, ibid.; Bloomfield to Kirstein, 
September 13, 1937, box 90, "B," Kirstein Papers; Kirstein to Frank, October 28, 1936, 
box 90, "F," Kirstein Papers; Gilbert Montague to Sherill, April 25, 1936, box 90, "M," 
Kirstein Papers; Kirstein to Sherill, November 20, 1935, box 89, "ARF Sherill 1935," 
Kirstein Papers; Sherill to Kirstein, November 30, 1935, p.2, ibid; Sherill to Kirstein, 
November 23, 1935, ibid; Sherill to Kirstein, October 22, 1935, ibid.; Sherill to 
Channing Sweitzer, October 12, 1935, ibid; Sherill to "Members," July 15, 1935, ibid; 
Kirstein to Aaron Frank, October 6, 1936, pp. 1-2, box 90, "C," Kirstein Papers; 
Grenville Clark to Kirstein, October 26, 1936, p.5, ibid.; Kirstein to Sherill, October 27,
1936, ibid; Sherill to Kirstein, August 12, 1936, pp. 1-2, box 89, "Sherill 1936-1937," 
Kirstein Papers; Sherill to Kirstein ibid; Sherill to Kirstein, June 25, 1936, ibid. ; Sherill 
to Kirstein, June 5, 1936, ibid;B . Earl Puckett to Kirstein, December 8, 1936, box 90, 
“N,” Kirstein Papers; Sherill to Kirstein, March 17, 1936, box 89, “Sherill ARF 1936-
1937,” Kirstein; McIntyre to Sherill, August 18,1936, ibid; Sherill to Roosevelt, August 7, 
1936, PPF 6002, American Retail Federation Roosevelt Papers; Hany Perlmutter to
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economy of the country.22 Patman made the transition to an in-depth study 
of the chain industry through a study of Kroger and its business practices. 
Patman interpreted the involvement of Kroger representatives as evidence 
chains dominated the ARF. He went after the files of the Food and Grocery 
Chain Stores o f America, which cooperated with the ARF. Patman's fishing 
expedition sparked controversy when the head of that association refused to 
turn over the materials. This resistance encouraged speculation that the ARF 
had been a front.23 As small retailers cheered his investigation of business 
conditions, Patman struggled to comprehend the complexities of the retail 
environment, especially the notion of price.24 He dissected information on 
shipping costs and unit costs. He took apart profit margins and looked at the 
mortality rate for small stores. His expanded study uncovered dubious
McIntyre, May 30, 1938, pp. 1-2, OF 288, “Chain Stores, 1937-1944,” Roosevelt Papers.
22 New York Times, April 17, 21, 25, 28 1935; Herman W. Frank to Howe, June 3, 1933, 
telegram, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers.
23 Sherill to et al, June 7, 1935, box 89, "Congressional Investigation ARF June 5, 1935," 
Kirstein Papers; John Guernsey to Kirstein, June 19, 1935, telephoned, p.2, box 90, "G," 
Kirstein Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 256, 267; Investigation o f  the 
ARF: I, 15,56, 102-106 112-115 124-129 144-145 167-172,355,389; ibid.: H, 52-53.
24 Sherill to et al, June 7, 1935, p.2, box 89, "Congressional Investigation ARF,” Kirstein 
Papers; James Greene to Kirstein, May 4, 1936, box 90, "G," Kirstein Papers; Kirstein to 
Gales, June 25, 1936, box 90, "G," ibid.', Aaron Frank to Robert Roos, April 27, 1936, box 
89, "Mr. Widman," Kirstein Papers; Lucas to William A. Quinlan, October 11, 1935, box 
303, folder Lucas Papers; Paul B. Maunde to Louis Howe, December 21,1934, Official File 
288, "Chain Stores 1935-1936," Roosevelt Papers.
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lobbying practices of the Kroger Corporation and other chains in their 
attacks on state anti-chain legislation. They had promoted letter-writing 
campaigns by employees and created fake farm activist groups to promote
their interests.25 Patman even uncovered information on attempts to turn the
26Roosevelt administration and NRA in favor of the chain store interests.
Chain opponents urged Patman to broaden his study to include the 
economic power of department stores and chain stores, looking in particular 
at the relationships between the boards of directors and the companies’ 
buying and selling practices. To the chagrin of the chains, Patman expanded 
his investigation.27 An attorney for Safeway, a corporation uninvolved with 
the ARF but implicated in this study, asked the committee why his company
25 Investigation o f  the ARF: I, 72-73, 191-194, 196-226, 355; Harper, “The Anti-Chain 
Store Movement,” 264-266, 268, 273; Investigation o f  the ARF: II, 95, 123-124, 131- 
132, 137-139; Lorrence, Gerald J. Boileau and the Progressive-Farmer-Labor Alliance, 
126; Main Street Crusader, July 27, 1935, 1; Main Street Crusader, July 20, 1935, 1; 
Sherill to Kirstein January 15, 1936, box 89, "Sherill ARF 1936-1937," Kirstein Papers; 
Kress to Kirstein, March 24, 1936, box 90, "K," Kirstein Papers. Kress to Kirstein, 
March 24, 1936, box 90, "K," Kirstein Papers; Kirstein to Kress, March 25, 1936, ibid. ', 
Dakota Farmer, June 8, 1935, p .l in box 90, "L&K Misc.," Kirstein Papers; Fred 
Lazarus to Kirstein, January 3, 1936, "Fred Lazarus 1933-1938" Kirstein Papers.
26 Stephen Early to McIntyre, August 5, 1935, pp. 3-4; William Park to Logan, April 13, 
1935; Logan to Park April 15,1935. All in Official File 288, "Chain Stores 1935-1936," 
Roosevelt Papers.
27 A California Owned Institution to Patman, box 37C, folder 6, Patman Papers; Jellico 
Grocery Co to Patman, May 6, 1935, box 37C, folder 5, ibid; Harper, “The Anti-Chain
Store Movement,” 250,258; Investigation o f the ARF: 1 ,160-161.
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should, ”have to suffer for the public relations disaster of Filene's of Boston 
and Kroger?” In this new study, Patman searched for rebates granted to the 
chains by manufacturers. A recently completed FTC Report had concluded 
that chains received illegal rebates although they were not considered
<% o
responsible for the growth of the chains. Patman probed further, asking 
chains to draw up lists of rebates granted to them by companies, many of 
them listed as “advertising allowances” for promoting products in stores. 
This list of concessions proved to be less than comprehensive because many 
of the rebates came to individual stores, carried out on an invoice-by-
29invoice basis, rather than any sort of formal agreement. His examination 
of retailing and the development of the chain systems brought many of the 
practices of the chain stores to public attention. Some chain executives 
objected to Patman’s handling of witnesses and what they considered to be 
grandstanding tactics in an ever-expanding investigation. They also
28 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 39,235; Caslow's Weekly, April 27, 1935,1; 
Caslow's Weekly, April 27,1935,3; Facts, February 1,1937, 8,18.
29 Kirstein to Patman, June 12, 1935, p.l, box 97, "ARF oversized material taken from 
the Investigation file," Kirstein Papers; National Brokers Division of the American Fruit 
and Vegetable Shippers Association to Patman, June 10, 1935, box 37C, folder 5, 
Patman Papers; New York Times, March 23, April 5, 1936; Investigation o f  the ARF: I, 
442; Investigation o f  the ARF: II, 14; National Conference o f Independent Business 
Men," March 4, 1936, 81-82.
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complained that Patman leaked information on the hearings to an independent 
wholesalers organization.30
Patman’s investigation agitated many small retailers, who blamed 
unfair practices for the brutality of the Depression.31 Because of the ferment 
over chain practices, Patman sought a larger appropriation to support his 
investigation in the summer of 1935. His study required the assistance of 
economists and other employees of the FTC, and he could not continue it 
without this assistance, even with the funds earned by selling copies of the 
proceedings. Patman, however, failed to win this appropriation, and the
32investigation eventually concluded with two reports on the chains. Neither
30 Paul Findlay to Patman, November 24, 1935; Logan to Patman, August 14, 1935; 
Alexander Holtzoff to Patman, August 8, 1935. All in box 303, folder 9, Lucas Papers; 
National Grocers Bulletin, October 1935,2-3.
31 St. Louis Wholesale Drug Company to Patman, July 19, 1935, box 37C, folder 4, 
Patman Papers; National Grocery Bulletin, April 1935, p .l in box 302, folder 3, Lucas 
Papers.
32 Sherill to Kirstein, July 2, 1935, box 89, "Second and Third Questionnaires," Kirstein 
Papers; “A Bill to Amend H.R. 226 on July 2, 1935,” box 90A, folder 2, Patman Papers; 
Robert E. Woco to Patman, July 21, 1935, box 37C, folder 4, Patman Papers; Sherill to et 
al, July 22, 1935, box 89, "Sherill ARF 1935," Kirstein Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain 
Store Movement,” 251; New York Times, June 5, 1935; Sherill to Kirstein, August 2, 1935, 
pp. 1-2, box 89, "Sherill ARF 1935," Kirstein Papers; Sherill to Lyons, August 12, 1935, 
ibid.; Sherill to Kirstein June 15, 1935, p.2 ibid; Sherill to et al June 26,1935 ibid.-, Sherill 
to Kirstein September 18, 1935 box 89 "Sherill ARF 1935" Kirstein Papers; Sherill to 
Kirstein October 11, 1935 ib id; Sherill to Kirstein October 14, 1935 ibid; Kirstein to 
Sherill December 5, 1935 ibid; Sherill to Kirstein November 29, 1935 ibid; Sherill to 
Kirstein July 20,1935 box 89 "Sherill ARF 1935" Kirstein Papers.
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accused the American Retail Federation of any wrongdoing but the majority 
report argued that chains used improper buying practices to extort lower
33prices.
The Patman investigation, following the difficulties experienced under 
the NRA, convinced many retailers that the chief threat came from chain 
buying privileges, or rebates. Although some retailers and wholesalers, 
especially in the drug industry, continued to push for price maintenance 
legislation, most began to focus their calls for reform on rebates.34 A case by 
the National Association of Independent Tire Dealers (NAJTD) against a 
Goodyear contract with Sears encouraged the new approach. When Goodyear
33 Bloom to Kirstein, April 8, 1936, box 90, "B," Kirstein Papers; Kirstein to Bloom, April 
10,1936, ibid. ; Kirstein to Gales, October 19,1935, box 90, "G," Kirstein Papers; Bloom to 
Kirstein, March 26,1936, box 90, "B,” Kirstein Papers; Bloom to Kirstein, November 1,
1935, ibid ; Bloom to Kirstein, November 25,1935, ibid, Kirstein to Bloom, January 29,
1936, ibid; Bloom to Samoff, October 16,1935, ibid, Kirstein to Bloom, October 19,
1935, ibid, Samoff to Bloom, October 12, 1935, ibid.; Bloom to Kirstein, October 8,1935, 
telegram, ibid; Sherill to Kirstein, March 12,1936, box 89, "Sherill ARF 1936-1937," 
Kirstein Papers; Fred Lazarus to Aaron Frank, May 24,1935, box 89, "Widman,” Kirstein 
Papers; Fred Lazarus to A  B. C. Dohrmann, May 24, 1935, ibid.
34 William Ingersoll to Capper, January 13, 1936, p.2, box 39, "Fair Trade 1936-1939," 
Capper Papers; William H. Ingersoll to Robinson March 19, 1936; Dargavel to Capper 
February 18, 1933 ibid.; Gilbert Montague to Capper February 26, 1936 ibid', Levitt 
Parsons to Borah April 1, 1936, pp.2-3 box 39 "Fair Trade 1936-1939" ibid.; C. ML 
Sandstron to Capper, December 14, 1936, box 39, "Fair Trade 1936-1939," ibid; 
Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 254; J. W. Rufsnider to 
Robinson, [n.d.], pp. 1-3, box 214, folder 2, Robinson Papers; Wichita Shopping News, 
January 26, 1936, 1.
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offered the chain a much lower price per tire than independent stores, the 
NAITD, led by George Burger, protested the contract to the Federal Trade 
Commission.35 Retailers and wholesalers hoped the federal government could 
intervene to eradicate chain rebates. Their experience under the retail codes 
convinced them that federal regulatory power could have a positive effect on 
the retail economy—if it were focused on the right problems and not controlled 
by the chains. As seen in chapter five, statements by President Roosevelt 
encouraged them to believe the government would intervene. In both 
February and May of 1935, Roosevelt complained that chains used unfair 
business practices to force small merchant out of business.36
35 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 275, 278-282; Goodyear Tire and 
Rubber v. FTC, 101 Fed, 2D 620 1939; H. Bain to Robinson April 7,1936, p. 2 box 214 
folder 2 Robinson Papers; Marvin Williams to Burger April 4, 1936 ibid', M. H. 
McIntyre to National Association o f Independent Tire Dealers, April 23, 1936, OF 277, 
"Anti-Trust Laws 1933-1936," Roosevelt Papers; Burger to Roosevelt, April 8, 1936, 
p.2, box 214, folder 1, Robinson Papers; G. J . Burger to Robinson, March 16, 1936, 
box 213, folder 14, Robinson Papers; National Independent Tire Dealer News, February 
14, 1936, 2; Burger to Robinson, April 13, 1936, box 214, folder 2, Robinson Papers; 
Burger to Robinson, April 7, 1936 ibid.; Voice o f  Progress Volume 2 Number 5 [1935], 
2; Roosevelt to Burger, October 19, 1936, PPF 4015, National Association o f 
Independent Tire Dealers; Burger to Roosevelt, October 15, 1936, telegram, ibid.; 
Burger to Paul Aiken, October 15, 1936, ibid; Burger to Roosevelt, October 23, 1936, 
ibid; The N.AJ.T.D. News, October 31, 1936, 3; Roosevelt to Burger, October 25, 1940, 
ibid; Burger to Roosevelt, October 23, 1940, ibid; George Burger to Roosevelt, July 23,
1936, ibid; McIntyre to Burger, August 18, 1936, ibid; Burger to McIntyre, October 12,
1937, ibid; George Burger to Roosevelt, March 13, 1939, ibid; Burger to McIntyre, 
November 24, 1937, ibid; Morgenthau to McIntyre, December 7, 1937, ibid; Burger to 
Roosevelt, January 21, 1937, ibid.
36 American Progress, March 8, 1934, 1; Kirstein to Miss Meredith, February 21, 1935,
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An attorney for the United States Wholesale Grocery Association 
(USWGA), Henry Teegarden, wrote the bill. It targeted chain rebates, setting 
upper limits for quantity discounts. In this way it acted as an amendment to
37price discrimination clauses in the Clayton Antitrust Act. The USWGA bill 
also confined brokerage payments to brokers, preventing chains from claiming
38these price discounts. In this way, it would help small retailers secure a level 
playing field, enabling them to remain in business.39 The bill allowed buyers
Official File 288, "Chain Stores 1935-1936,” Roosevelt Papers; Merrell Sickles to Early, 
February 13, 1935,. Early to Sickles, February 27, 1935, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1935- 
1936,” Roosevelt Papers; “FDR Press Conference,” May 31, 1935; John Logan to 
Roosevelt, June 1, 1935, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1935-1936,” Roosevelt Papers; F. H. 
Massmann to "Members, Food and Grocery Chain Stores o f America,” May 27, 1935, 
pp..2-3 ibid.-, FDR to James L. O'Neill, June 25, 1935, ibid; Roosevelt to Logan June 11, 
1935 ibid.; Glenn Compton to Roosevelt July 15, 1935 ib id ; M  H. McIntyre to Compton 
July 17, 1935 ibid; Unsigned from Georgetown, Illinois to Robinson June 28, 1935, p.2 box 
244 folder 1 Robinson Papers; Roosevelt to Richberg March 20, 1935 OF 288 "Chain 
Stores 1935-1936" Roosevelt Papers; Palamountain, Politics o f  Distribution, 192-193; 
Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement," 235, 237, 291; Hawley, The New Deal and the 
Problem o f  Monopoly, 249; OMahoney to Arnold December 6, 1935 box 9 
"Correspondence: 1935 General May-December” Arnold Papers; USWGA Bulletin, 
November 1936,1.
37 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 280-281, 283-284; Investigation o f  the 
ARF: HI, 76; New York Times, March 1, 1936; Charlie Switzer’s Drug Store, [n.d.], box 
214, folder 1, Robinson Papers; Palamountain, The Politics o f  Distribution, 203.
38 Sinclair Manufacturing Company to Robinson, May 5, 1936, box 214, folder 4, 
Robinson Papers; Paul M . Cooter to Robinson, May 4, 1936, ibid; Robinson to Paul M. 
Cooter, May 7, 1936, ibid; Kansas Fruit and Vegetable Association to Capper, February 
29, 1936, Capper Papers, Kansas State Historical Society, National Food Brokers 
Association, "Uniaimess in the Food Industry” November 1935, report, p.99, box 261, 
folder 6, Robinson Papers.
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who had been unjustly discriminated against to sue sellers for triple damages.40 
Supporters of the bill compared it to the Interstate Commerce Act of the 
nineteenth century, which set out to control improper rebates railroads granted 
Standard Oil and other firms. In fact, Teegarden included an amendment 
setting carload limits for rebates, which mirrored die Interstate Commerce Act 
Anti-monopoly politicians from the South and West later added an anti-basing 
point provision to the bill in an attempt to eliminate unnecessary costs to their 
products. Under the basing point systems, delivery prices of products were set 
according to their distance from Pittsburgh or other Nothem cities, even if the 
product actually traveled a much shorter distance. This provision, not vital to 
the purposes of the bill, attracted tremendous opposition and was dropped.41
A constituent who was a member of the United States Wholesale 
Grocer's Association contacted Patman to serve as a sponsor for the new
39 Palamountain, Politics o f  Distribution, 197, 205; Josh Rogers to Robinson, February 28, 
1936, box 213, folder 15, Robinson Papers; Teegarden to Robinson, February 27, 1936, box 
213, folder 5, Robinson Papers.
40 Harper, “The-Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 311.
41 Palamountain, Politics o f  Distribution, 188; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 
295, 318; Business Advisory Council to Robinson, April 30, 1936, box 214, folder 4, 
Robinson Papers; Lorrence, Gerald J. Boileau and the Progressive-Farmer-Labor Alliance, 
128; Teegarden to Brewer, May 23, 1936, box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers; M  J. 
OMalley to Robinson, May 1,1936, p.2, ibid.
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legislation.42 At first, Patman did not understand the nature of the bill, and he 
thought that it might be a sort of price maintenance bill, similar to the old 
Capper-Kelly measure. But the USWGA explained the measure to him and 
inspired him to action.43 Patman requested that Senate Majority leader, Joe 
Robinson co-sponsor the bill, which he did.44 Representatives of state and 
national retailers associations struggled to get the message about the bill to 
congressmen. They rallied behind the legislation as the only salvation from a 
desperate situation.45 They could not survive if chains paid less for their 
products than they did. If that continued, as one wholesaler put it when writing 
Senator Joe Robinson of Arkansas about supporting the bill, "we are whipped 
before we start."46 If the retailers could control chain price advantages,
42 Palamountain, The Politics o f  Distribution, 200,218; W. HI Caven to Patman, April 17, 
1935, box 37C, folder 4, Patman Papers, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library; Young, 
“Wright Patman,” 191.
43 Patman to Cochran, April 20,1935, box 37C, folder 5, Patman Papers.
44 Patman to Robinson, June 22, 1935; Thomas E. Logan Wholesalers to Robinson, 
June 25, 1935; Robinson to Logan, June 28, 1935; Patman to Robinson, January 7, 1936. 
All in box 244, folder 1, Robinson Papers.
45 The Reliable Drug Company to Amlie, March 26, 1936, box 77, folder 8, Amlie Papers; 
Frank Livick to Amlie, March 20, 1936, ibid; Prince A  Willma to Robinson, May 29, 1936, 
box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers.
46 W. H. Caven to Robinson, June 19,1935, box 215, folder 1, Robinson Papers; H. Chester 
Johnson to Robinson, n.d.; F. M. Vinson to Robinson, June 24, 1935.
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however, they stood an excellent chance of survival. George Schulte, the St. 
Louis based publisher of the Independent Grocer newspaper, saw the bill as a 
chance to strike a decisive blow against the chains, and he urged independents 
to act at once to make sure that the bill did not fail. Schulte had created a 
counter-organization to the ARF, Independence, Inc., Schulte also changed the 
name of his paper to the Independent Merchant to symbolize his attempt to 
unify many fields of business. Schulte hoped his new organization would rival 
the American Farm Bureau Federation and the American Federation of Labor 
in size. The inaugural convention of Independence, Inc was held in St. Louis 
on March 1, 1936, with at least two thousand opponents of the chains in 
attendance. They came from all over the Midwest and represented eighty lines 
of business, which showed the growth of the movement since the 1930 
Minutemen meeting in Shreveport. The organization would serve a similar 
purpose to the old chain store association, which had acted as an information 
clearinghouse and otherwise coordinated chain public relations efforts. In the 
face of press opposition, the retailers needed to find other ways to spread their 
message.47
47 "National Conference o f Independent Business Men." from Constitution Hall 
"Independents Day in the Nation's Capital March 4, 1936, 29, 46, 90; “Announcement of 
the Independent Merchant's Association of Arkansas,” n.d, March 24, 1936, box 214, 
folder 1, Robinson Papers; Home Owned Stores Magazine, January 22,1936, p. 1 in box 77,
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The NARD and NARGUS, which had avoided participation in the early 
chain boycotts and chain taxation battles, wanned to Patman’s effort to use 
federal power to control the chains.48 They represented the largest numbers of 
small retailers and the businessmen most threatened by chain competition.49 
The National Association of Independent Tire Dealers also played a role.50 The 
NARGUS, the NARD and their state and local organizations pushed forward 
with letter writing campaigns, urging congressmen to pass the bill. Some of 
these organizations had memberships of four to five hundred merchants, 
rivaling the size of groups during the heyday of the boycotts.51
Overjoyed by the enthusiastic response, Patman bragged that he had 
been in contact with almost every independent trade group in the country 
and made speeches in at least fifteen or twenty states since Congress
folder 8, Amlie Papers.
48 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 303-304; Palamountain, The Politics o f  
Distribution, 92, 105, 163, 172, 202; Indiana Food Merchant, March 1936, pp. 1, 3, 5 
in box 216, folder 1, Robinson Papers; D. A. Afleck to Lucas, October 24, 1935.
49“National Conference o f Independent Business Men," March 4,1936, 85.
50 "National Conference o f Independent Business Men," March 4,1936, 117
51 Dargavel to Amlie, February 27, 1936, box 77, folder 8, Amlie Papers; Lacrosse 
Retail Druggists Association to Amlie, May 25, 1936, ibid; John H. Robinson to 
Amlie, May 9, 1936, ibid.; R. N. Farrar to Robinson, March 6, 1935, box 203, folder 5, 
Robinson Papers; Frank Galloway to Robinson, March 6, 1935, ibid.-, Max Frolich, Jr. 
to Robinson, March 5, 1936, box 213, folder 15, Robinson Papers.
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adjourned. He wrote the President that he knew Roosevelt had an interest in 
the fate of small business and the use of “excess profits” to destroy less 
prosperous competitors. His remark built on the older criticism that chains 
used superior financial resources to starve out opponents, and it also 
expressed hope that Roosevelt’s corporate taxation plan could be adapted to 
fight corporate retailing52 Patman urged FDR to join the campaign. He 
wanted to bring trade association officers from around the nation to 
Washington to speak with the President about saving business from "banker 
controlled corporate chains." In Patman’s opinion, the meeting could have 
positive political effects for the embattled president because "The 
Republicans would quickly forget politics and follow the President, who 
made a step in the direction of protecting their business." Martin McIntyre, 
the President’s secretary, mentioned to FDR that the same suggestion had 
come from several sources but that he did not think the movement headed 
by Patman would work very well.53
52 Patman to Roosevelt, November 16,1935, pp. 1-2, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1935-1936," 
Roosevelt Papers.
53 Patman to McIntyre, November 30, 1935, p.2, ibid.; McIntyre to the President 
memorandum December 13,1935; F.D.R. Memorandum to McIntyre, November 26,1935; 
McIntyre to Patman, December 21,1935, telegram. All in OF 288, “Chain Stores 1935- 
1936,” Roosevelt Papers.
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Nevertheless, independents sponsored a mass rally in Washington, D.C., 
to promote the bill.54 Retailers from all over the country made arrangements to 
attend. Some even chartered rail cars for the event. A group of Chicago 
druggists, for example, took the B&O Railroad into Washington, making 
certain, in true American road trip fashion, that “liquid refreshments” were 
placed on board.55 At the rally, John Dargavel and J. A. O. Preus of the 
National Association of Retail Druggists presided. The delegates listened to a 
series of speeches in favor of the Robinson-Patman Act, including major 
addresses by William Borah, Joseph Robinson, and Patman.56 A central theme 
of the day was that the delegates present represented only the most prosperous 
of independent retailers, businessmen able to turn over control of their store, or 
stores and travel to Washington for such a meeting. As John Polhause 
reminded them, hundreds of thousands of other retailers wanted to support the 
bill. "Their hearts are with us. They look up to us, and let me at this time say 
that through the history of years it has been, and always will be, the duty of the
54 Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Association to Robinson, March 28, 1936, box 214, 
folder 2, Robinson Papers; McMurtry to Robinson, February 26, 1936, box 213, folder 
15, Robinson Papers; Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 251.
55 Chicago Retail Drug Association News, March 14,1936, pp. 1,5-6 in box 214, folder 1, 
Robinson Papers.
56 New York Times, March 5, 1936.
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strong to fight for the weak.. . . . "  Underscoring this idea, organizers of the 
event read letters of congratulation from all over the country.57
Perhaps the most effective speech was delivered by Mrs. H_ J. Holmes, 
who represented the Women’s Club of Omaha, Nebraska. She enthralled the 
audience with her maudlin description of supporting her husband and son 
through difficult competition with the chains. At the conclusion o f  her speech, 
she said, "Oh, my friends, this is our Valley Forge, and let us not only strive 
but let us pray." The delegates broke into sustained applause. Preuis remarked: 
“There are certain jobs that the women can do that we men can't do. I guess we
58just heard one." Following the emotional oratory, the delegates to the 
convention had an opportunity to meet with their congressmen. The organizers 
of the convention reminded the delegates that every one of them could and 
must be a lobbyist because lobbying is just a form of salesmanship.59
Retailers urged legislators to end special rebates given Eo chains.60 
Their criticism of rebates had two major components. First,, and most
57 "National Conference o f Independent Business Men, " March 4, 1936,1 l- .l 2.
58 "National Conference o f Independent Business Men," March 4, 1936,53-67.
59 Chicago Retail Drug Association News, March 14, 1936, pp. 1, 5-6 in box 214, folder 1, 
Robinson Papers; "National Conference o f Independent Business Men," Marclh 4,1936,99.
60 W. E. Fine to Robinson, August 9, 1935, box 244, folder 3, Robinson Papers; E. P
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obvious, rebates made it difficult, if not impossible, for independent 
retailers to survive. According to small retailers, they could compete as 
effectively as the corporate chains, but price breaks extorted by their larger 
competitors made competition impossible. They wanted a fair playing field. 
Second, rebates, like loss leaders, hurt more Americans than just the small 
retailers. They also endangered the profits of farmers and manufacturers. If 
this sort of competition continued, these citizens would be impoverished. 
Combined with the centralizing effect on credit and wealth, the downward 
pressure on profits and wages threatened to crush prosperity, opportunity 
and democracy in the nation.
The retailers pointed to rebates that threatened them. In letters similar to 
those mailed to the NRA, firms sent their congressmen documentation of 
dubious buying practices. Some of the small retailers provided evidence of 
the challenges they faced, sometimes in unconventional ways.61 One broker
Moore to Robinson, July 1, 1935, box 213, folder 13, Robinson Papers; H. L. 
Hoechsetter to Robinson, May 29, 1936, box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers; 
Palamountain, The Politics o f  Distribution, 196; Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement in the United States," 51-52; Journal o f  Marketing, January 1938.
61 Dargavel to Robinson, February 27, 1936, box 213, folder 15, Robinson Papers; C. 
Schoenherr to Robinson, February 9, 1936, box 213, folder 13, Robinson Papers; C. 
Schoenherr to Robinson, February 7, 1936, box 213, folder 13, Robinson; W. H. McMurtry 
to Robinson February 26, 1936 box 213 folder 15 Robinson Papers; Independent 
Shoemakers of Marion, Ohio to Mayor Dr. F. C. Smith and the City Council, March 7,
1936, box 213, folder 13, Robinson Papers; Mr. C. Shoenherr to Robinson, February 9,
229
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
wrote Joe Robinson that canners gave Kroger tremendous discounts,
enabling them to sell cans of peas and com for about the price the brokerage
firm charged wholesalers. He enclosed ads from the Kansas City Times to 
62prove his point Another wrote that Safeway bought most products for five 
percent cheaper than did wholesalers.63 A? government bureaucrat wrote 
Robinson about a wholesale firm that inadvertently received an invoice for a 
chain’s soap order. Although they ordered an identical amount of the same 
product, the chain received an advertising allowance the wholesaler did not.64 
In a keynote address before the National Association of Retail Grocers, Charles 
March, the chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, told about the 
problems a friend of his was having back home in Minnesota. When March 
visited home, the friend told him that he was being pushed to the brink by a 
chain store across the street. Whenever he lowered prices, the chain would 
undercut him. Upon his return to Washington, March met with the head of a
1936, ibid.-, G. W. Maston to Robinson March 31, 1936 box 215 folder 2 Robinson Papers; 
N. C. Puryear to Robinson March 30, 1936, p. 1 box 214 folder 2 Robinson Papers; Wilfed 
B. Andrews to Roosevelt February 26, 1935, p.2, Official File 288, "Chain Stores 1935- 
1936," Roosevelt Papers.
62 Fred Heryer to Robinson, April 4, 1936, box 214, folder 2, Robinson Papers; Kansas City 
Times, April 4, 1936,2; Julienne Falk to Robinson, March 22,1936, pp.2-3, box 214, folder 
1, Robinson Papers.
63 W. H. Down to Robinson, box 213, folder 15, Robinson Papers.
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large manufacturing firm. The man wanted to speak with March about the 
Robinson-Patman Act. Since the manufacturer wanted to live by the law, 
March asked him what discounts he gave to large distributors. By chance the 
executive mentioned that his firm gave a 32 percent rebate to .the firm in 
competition with March’s friend. March asked him how long the small retailer 
. could stay in business under such conditions. The man replied, “Not very 
long.” 65
Many storekeepers wondered how they could possibly stay in 
business, no matter how skilled, if they purchased goods from wholesalers 
who paid more than the chains! As Wisconsin Congressman Gerald Boileau 
summarized the problem, "We can stand here and philosophize until doom's 
day about the advantages of you and me as consumers in our community 
patronizing independent business, but as long as ....[chains have advantages 
and sell at lower prices] the rank and file of the American citizens are going to 
continue to patronize the chain stores of this country...."66 Small retailers 
focused on the danger to the independent merchant and the actions that
64 Homer Adkins to Robinson, May 31, 1936, ibid.
65 Charles H. March, “Address Before the National Association of Retail Grocers, June 22, 
1937,” pp. 1,3,110 E. 6. 8. F, Benson Papers.
66 "National Conference o f Independent Business Men," March 4,1936,78; E. H. W olff to
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67government could take to preserve their way of life. One retailer from Ada, 
Ohio wrote that seventy-year old businesses in his town had been forced 
into bankruptcy.68 At times, the retailers seemed certain that they were being 
destroyed by chain competition. They cautioned congressmen that chains had 
made such inroads that the age of the independent retailer had come to an end 
unless decisive action were taken.69
Independents could only compete with chain power if rebates ended. 
Their quarrel was not with more efficient, modem and scientific methods of
70distribution, but with a system of unjustly gained advantages. 
Independents claimed to be efficient retailers. They argued that the large 
chains bullied producers to obtain ridiculously low, undeserved prices and.
Robinson, February 27, 1936, box 213, folder 15, Robinson Papers.
67 O. M. Shreeves to Robinson, March 16,1936, box 214, folder 1, Robinson Papers; G. A. 
Primm to Lucas, May 1936, box 303, folder 7, Lucas Papers; Dean Corsa to Lucas, May 18, 
1936, ibid.; Leff and Golden to Robinson, February 20,1936, p. 1, box 213, folder 4, 
Robinson Papers.
ro
B. N Lemer to Robinson, February 4,1936, pp. 1-2, box 213, folder 13, Robinson Papers; 
Ward Goodloe to Robinson, April 18, 1936, box 214, folder 3, Robinson Papers; J. L Carter 
to Robinson, ad, box 213, folder 13; "National Conference of Independent Business Men," 
March 4, 1936,77.
69 T. A. Fulghum to "Members o f Congress," December 31, 1935, box 303, folder 8, Lucas 
Papers; G. W. Maston to Robinson, [ad., March, 1936], p. 3, box 215, folder 2, Robinson 
Papers; Harry Goldberg to Robinson, May 29,1936, box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers.
70 "National Conference o f Independent Business Men." from Constitution Hall," March
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could, therefore, provide low prices to the consumer. Firms used their 
superior purchasing power to threaten smaller firms, in addition to buying in 
large amounts and storing the inventory.71 Given fair competition, the 
independent could sell as cheaply as the chains. They believed that 
government studies, including the St. Louis Drug Study proved this
72contention. In their minds, the independent dealers promoted honest 
competition by protecting the number of outlets against monopoly by a few 
corporate chains.73 They might need protection from powerful chains in 
order to survive, but they did not believe themselves to be inferior retailers. 
They did worry, though, that consumers would consider them to be inept or 
even thieves because of the higher prices they charged.74 Some small
4, 1936,4,7,61-62.
71 S. A. Holme.to Robinson, February 11, 1936, box 213, folder 13, Robinson Papers; 
William H. Ingersoll to Robinson, March 19, 1936, p.2, ibid; W. H. McMurtiy to 
Robinson, February 26, 1936, box 213, folder 15, Robinson Papers; Caslow's Weekly, 
April 27, 1935, 3.
72 Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f Monopoly (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1966, 1995), 247; H. Bain to Robinson, April 7, 1936, p. 1-2, box 214, folder 2, 
Robinson Papers; 'National Conference o f Independent Business Men," March 4, 1936,36- 
37, 98, 101-103, 108; Our Country, March 4, 1936, p.l in box 302, folder 3, Lucas Papers;
C. C. McKellip to Robinson, box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers; D. N. Webb to Robinson, 
May 25, 1936, ibid. Dr. E  H. Thornton to Robinson, [n.d.], box 244, folder 2, Robinson 
Papers.
73 National Conference o f Independent Business Men" March 4,1936, 8.
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retailers pointed to continuing allegations of chain short weighting as 
evidence that the corporations and not independents cheated their 
customers.75 Storeowners spoke of their modernity and efficiency and 
emphasized that they were trained professionals, performing needed 
services for the community. The druggists, in particular, believed that they 
served the community in this way and should be considered more than mere 
businessmen. One pharmacist wrote Robinson that a cut-rate chain grocery 
had just opened next door to him in Little Rock. The prices on their patent 
medicines, Epsom salt, and castor oil, which they sold as deliberate loss leader 
products, were less than the pharmacist could purchase them for from the drug 
jobber. The grocery did not have to make a profit from these items. It could 
simply use them to attract business. When the manager’s wife stepped on a
76nail, however, he was quick to come next door and purchase tetanus serum.
74 H. C. Petersen, "The Effect o f Anti-Price Discrimination Legislation on Consumer 
Prices before the 1936 NARGUS Convention," folder 7, Lucas Papers; F. .J. Schmuck 
to Robinson, July 1, 1935, box 244, folder 2, Robinson Papers; W. H. Caven to 
Robinson, June 11, 1935, box 244, folder 2, Robinson Papers; Teegarden to Robinson, 
February 27, 1936, box 213, folder 15, Robinson Papers.
15 Interstate Grocer, August 10, 1935.
76 L. M. Culpepper to Robinson, July 2, 1935, box 213, folder 13, Robinson Papers.
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The retailers bragged that they had become stronger over recent years.77 
Supporters of the bill compared it to a set of rules for fighting, which 
prohibit unfair tactics but still allow for competition. If they could not 
compete after the special rebates disappeared, they deserved to be placed out 
of business, as one retailer put it. The sponsors of the Act denied charges 
that the bill was "class legislation" designed to help one small group of 
inefficient retailers. They argued that the bill was not anti-chain but simply 
designed to create an even playing field in distribution. It was even 
described as “An Equal Business Opportunity Bill.”78 Despite increased 
costs for certain chain products, the Robinson-Patman Act would lower prices 
overall. According to the retailers, independents subsidized chain rebates by 
paying higher prices.79 An end to chain rebates would enable manufacturers 
and farmers to charge independent retailers less for products and ultimately
77 Indiana Food Merchant, March 1936, pp. 1,2,12 in box 216, folder, Robinson Papers.
7R Vernon Green to Robinson, [April, 1936], box 214, folder 2, Robinson Papers; H. W. 
Stade to Robinson, March 23, 1936, box 214, folder 1, box 214 folder 4 Robinson 
Papers; Scott Mayer Commission Company to Robinson n.d ibid.', A. J. Kaiser to Lucas 
March 7, 1935, box 303, folder 7, Lucas Papers; M. C. Pessin to Lucas, April 29, 1936, 
box 37A, folder 10, Patman Papers; "National Conference o f Independent Business 
Men.," 21; A. J. Koepsell to Amlie, May 4, 1936, box 34, folder 4, Amlie Papers; 
“History of the Robinson-Patman Act,” box 20C, folder 1, "Mimeographed Statements 
and Letters-1937" Patman Papers.
79 'National Conference o f Independent Business Men" March 4,1936, 80.
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on __
lead to a general lowering of prices. The retailers also maintained that the 
end of rebates would widen the profit margin for retailers and allow them to 
pay higher wages and employ more workers.81
The Robinson-Patman bill would not only protect small retailers from 
destruction but help the rest of America as well. Consumers thought they 
were saving money by shopping with the chains, but they really paid hidden 
costs.82 Retailers argued that prohibitions against rebates would increase 
employment and lower prices in the economy; they would also raise wages 
for labor and earnings for farmers who had been forced to sell goods for 
costs at, or below, the cost of production. Prohibitions on rebates would 
certainly help manufacturers. Even prominent brand names feared the 
actions of a firm like A&P, which then had about sixteen thousand stores. 
For example, Standard Brands, the maker of Fleischmann’s Yeast, had its 
products yanked from A&P’s shelves because it refused to grant a ten
80 Dargavel to Robinson, February 27, 1936, p. 2, box 213, folder 15, Robinson Papers; G. 
W. Maston to Robinson, [n.d. March 31, 1936?], pp. 3, 5, box 215, folder 2, Robinson 
Papers; A. H. Gufler to Robinson, May 16,1936, box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers.
81 Dargavel to Robinson, February 27, 1936, box 213, folder 15; Scott Mayer Commission 
Company to Robinson, n.d., box 214, folder 4; McIntyre to Robinson, May 27, 1936, p.2, 
box 214, folder 3. A ll in Robinson Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 
318; T. A. Fulghum to "Members o f Congress," December 31, 1935, box 303, folder 8, 
Lucas Papers.
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percent rebate to the firm. The company went to private label goods,
83produced exclusively for it by smaller manufacturers. Manufacturers faced 
a real threat from the chains.84 Unemployed workers—cut as attempts to 
lower costs—would be re-hired and factories forced out of business might
85 86resume production. Money would return to the community.
Small retailers warned the public that chain take-over meant devastation 
for America America would lose opportunity, its citizens would become 
subjects of the powerful few and prosperity would drift away as communities 
had their wealth stripped from them. The retailers believed that prosperity 
would end as the rich sucked money out of the countryside and concentrated it 
in New York. They blamed the chains for the depths of the depression and
87  __accused them of adding to the relief burden. The chains would not assist with
82 Indiana Food Merchant, March 1936, pp. 1,11 in box 216, folder 1, Robinson Papers.
83 Fishback to Robinson March 12, 1936, box 214, folder 1, Robinson Papers.
84 "National Conference o f Independent Business Men," March 4,1936,110-111.
85 Indiana Food Merchant, March 1936, p. 1 in box 216, folder 1, Robinson Papers.
86 Robinson to Bert Berry, February 4, 1937, box 245, folder 6, Robinson Papers.
87 T. A. Fulghum to "Members o f Congress," December 31, 1935, box 303, folder 8, 
Lucas Papers; Jacob Finkelstein to Robinson, March 2, 1936, box 214, folder 4, 
Robinson Papers; Emers Drug Store to Lucas, May 10, 1935, box 303, folder 10, Lucas 
Papers; Ed Wimmer, "A Call For Pioneers," n.d., in Mortenson to Lucas, May 22,1936, 
box 303, folder 7, Lucas Papers; J. S. Yeager to Robinson, July 19, 1935, pp. 1-2, box
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88local needs by contributing to charity efforts or helping people through credit 
Instead, they centralized wealth in the hands of an elite few. The era of 
American opportunity, the era that led to American greatness, would come to
89an end if chains continued their growth.
In congressional hearings, representatives of independent business 
declared that without federal help, Wall Street would dominate the country.90 
They cautioned that the power of the chains threatened to lead to monopoly, an 
end to opportunity in America and the collapse of American prosperity. Once 
chains obtained monopoly, Patman and others warned, they would raise their 
prices to exorbitant levels, bilking a defenseless public.91 Retailers warned that
244, folder 2, Robinson Papers; "National Conference o f Independent Business Men," 
118; Frank Mortenson to Lucas, May 22,1936, box 303, folder 7, Lucas Papers.
88 Allen Beall, Jr. to Robinson, March 14, 1936, box 214, folder 1, Robinson Papers; 
"National Conference o f Independent Business Men," 63; Harry Miller to Robinson, March 
7, 1936, box 214, folder 1, Robinson Papers; Palamountain, The Politics o f Distribution, 
168; Guy Allott to Senator Beenson, [n.<L], box 214, folder 3, Robinson Papers.
89 Palamountain, The Politics o f  Distribution, 208; M. C. Hutton to Robinson, March 26, 
1936, box 214, folder 2, Robinson Papers; M  J. Pessin to Lucas, April 29, 1936, box 303, 
folder 7, Lucas Papers; S. T. Shaw to Robinson, May 29,1936, box 214, folder 4, Robinson 
Papers; Mortenson to Robinson, April 16, 1936, box 214, folder 3, Robinson Papers; H  N. 
Ruud to Amlie, May 12,1936, box 77, folder 8, Amlie Papers.
90 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 294.
91 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 319.
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92chain stores threatened to destroy American opportunity. At the mass rally, 
speakers emphasized that the small retailers would only be the “first victims of 
monopoly.”93 After the demise of retailing, the youth o f the nation would have 
little chance of becoming business owners.94 The retailers believed that this 
change, in turn, endangered American democracy as self-sufficient 
businessmen became pawns of corporations and lost their connection to the 
community and nation. These changes might, as one wholesaler wrote, cause 
disturbing developments in American society. "We are in no ways radical but 
believe that unless a check is put on big business we are headed straight for the 
maelstrom of revolution. . . .The average wage earner is ready for revolution
92 R. A. Crowder to Robinson, March 18, 1934, box 151, folder 1, Robinson Papers; 
The Liberty Bell volume 2 number 9, 1, 2, 4; American Progress, February 15, 1934; 
Caslow’s Weekly, January 5, 1935, 6; H. C. Petersen, "The Effect o f Anti-Price 
Discrimination Legislation on Consumer Prices." NARGUS 1936, box 303, folder 7, 
Lucas Papers; L. W. Oswald to Lucas, March 27,1936, box 303, folder 8, ibid; Dagavei to 
Robinson, February 27, 1936, box 213, folder 15, Robinson Papers J. H. McLaurin to 
"Member o f the U.S.W.G.A." box 213 folder 13 Robinson Papers; R .L. Hammond to 
Robinson, July 8, 1935; C. C. McKellip to Robinson box 214 folder 4 Robinson Papers; 
W. J. Zbomick to Robinson, February 24,1936, box 213, folder 14, ibid; Abraham Landau 
to Robinson, February 10, 1936, box 213, folder 13, ibid; B. O. Sprague to Charles Crisp, 
February 10, 1936, box 213, folder 13, Robinson Papers; Charles Juneau to Robinson, 
February 11, 1936, p. 2; Hardware Trade Journal, February 1936, 24; Leff and Golden to 
Robinson, [n.d. February 1936?], box 213, folder 4, Robinson Papers; George A. Spannon 
to Robinson, February 29,1936, box 213, folder 15, Robinson Papers.
93 "National Conference o f Independent Business Men," 15-17; Chicago Retail Drug 
Association News, March 14,1936, pp.3-4 in box 214, folder 1, Robinson Papers; S. E.
Kidd to Robinson, February 22,1936, box 213, folder 14, ibid.
94 Dargavel to Lucas, February 27, 1936, box 302, folder 4, Lucas Papers.
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now and with the business man put out some Mussolini will appear and all will 
be chaos.”95
In the face of such severe criticism, the chains complained the ARF did 
not vigorously defend them against the Robinson-Patman legislation. They 
accused department store interests of abandoning them because of fears of bad 
publicity. Claude Kress, for example, asked why the ARF did not work to stop 
the “hampering of progress.” He wrote Kirstein that some of his executives 
wondered why Kress’s was even part of the ARF.96 Because the ARF 
remained silent, only two umbrella organizations represented industry interests 
in the battle in Congress: the National Association of Food Chains and the 
Institute for Distribution, a chain funded think tank, led by Wheeler Sammons. 
Despite the existence o f these organizations, chain executives did most of their 
own lobbying for the bill. Historian Ellis Hawley argues the chains suffered at 
the hand of small merchants. "The chains, unlike the small merchants, lacked
95 “National Conference o f Independent Business Men," March 4, 1936, 75-76; Wish 
Brothers Wholesale Grocers to Robinson, February 29, 1936, box 213, folder 15, 
Robinson Papers.
96 Kress to Kirstein, March 24, 1936, box 90, "K;" Claude W. Kress to Kirstein, October 
22, 1936, p.2, ibid; George Gales to Kirstein, April 15, 1938, box 90, "G;" Dr. David 
Cra,ig to Kirstein, April 22, 1938, box 90, “C.” All in the Kirstein Papers.
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the necessary political strength and political symbols."97 Hawley's acceptance 
of this argument proves befuddling. The image of efficiency and service 
offered the chains an important symbol with which to defend themselves. In 
addition, the chains possessed political contacts at the highest levels of 
government. A number of prominent retailers had close ties to the 
administration. Two of the best known urged the President to oppose the bill:
goEdward Filene of Filene’s and Robert Wood of Sears. General Wood, 
President of Sears and Roebuck, and a member of the administration’s 
Business Advisory Council, had previously shunned remarks on legislation 
directly influencing Sears. He did not want to be suspected of “selfish 
motives.” The General, however, decided to make an exception for the 
Robinson-Patman bill. Wood warned that the bill would turn the “economic 
clock backward.” In his words, linking “mass production to mass distribution” 
had many positive effects. In a similar way, Filene condemned the bill for
97 Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 268.
98 Edward A. Filene to Roosevelt, April 1, 1936, Official File 288, "Chain Stores 1935- 
1936," Roosevelt Papers; Boston Herald, March 24, 1936; Secretary o f the Commerce 
to McIntyre, February 18, 1936, PPF 5694, Roosevelt Papers; Kress to Roosevelt, 
December 12, 1938; Roosevelt to Kress, July 7, 1939; Kirstein to McIntyre, March 18, 
1935; Roosevelt to Rose Kirstein, December 11, 1942, PPF 7678; A. L. McIntyre to 
Sherill, August 18, 1936; SheriU to Roosevelt, August 7, 1936, PPF 6002, American 
Retail Federation, Roosevelt Papers; A. L. Rafifa to Early, August 31, 1936, ibid.,-, 
Roosevelt to Robinson, May 4, 1936, ibid.; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,”
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undermining progressive retailing and threatening the buying power of 
consumers. At the direction of the President, his aides informed Robinson of 
these significant criticisms."
Spokesmen for the chains made three criticisms of the bill. First, the 
chains argued that independent retailers exaggerated the threat to them. Chains 
still represented only a fraction of retail stores, and chains, themselves, split up 
into hundreds of fiercely competing firms. With the exception of A&P, no 
chain even bordered on monopoly, and even A&P fell well below the one-third 
market-share needed for charges of monopoly. It and all other chains faced 
tremendous competition. The most likely eventuality would be that many 
chains would remain in business, even in the unlikely case that all 
independents would collapse. America, in other words, was in no danger of 
monopoly. To the contrary, stiff competition had produced tremendous 
improvements in retail distribution and promised to do so for years to come. A 
second major argument put forward by chains and their sympathizers was that 
the proposed bill was a subsidy for inefficient retailers and wholesalers, those 
incapable of competing in the open market Instead of providing a level playing
304.
99 R.H. Wood to McIntyre, February 21, 1936, Official File 288, “Chain Stores 1935- 
1936;” McIntyre to Robinson, March 7,1936; McIntyre to Wood, June 3, 1936, ibid.
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field, the bill erected barriers to full competition. Their third argument was that 
the bill was impractical, impossible to enforce and perhaps unconstitutional.
The chains argued that Patman exaggerated their growth and their 
control over the industry. As the Institute of Distribution, the major voice for 
the chains, suggested, independent claims to a chain takeover ridiculously 
exaggerated the situation. Arguments based on extrapolating from past growth 
curves could not be trusted. "By carrying out Mr. Patman's novel concept of 
national statistics, it could be argued that the state of Texas has suddenly gone 
heavily Chinese and that we are over-night favored with 5,600,000 Japanese in 
this country, to say nothing of 2,700,000 Indians!"100 Chains only occupied a 
small fraction of the market.101 Chains reminded Americans that shopkeepers 
had once predicted that mail order would destroy all competitors. When better 
roads made it possible for farmers to come into the city more regularly, mail 
order firms had been forced to enter retailing or be destroyed. Now, chains 
faced tough competition from early supermarkets and low cost drug stores 
called pine boards. Nothing guaranteed the survival of these chains against
i/y%
Institute o f Distribution to Lucas, May 22,1936, box 303, folder 7, Lucas Papers.
101 "Keeping Up With the Consumer This Business o f Retailing—Where Is It," “Speech 
File,” box 9, June 30,1936, Kirstein Papers.
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107tough independent competitors. ~ The current market position of chains in no
103way indicated the possibility of monopoly.
Chain stores alleged the United States Wholesale Grocer’s Association 
represented a group of profiteering middlemen, intent on extorting money from 
the American people. They attacked the brokers groups for trying to get special 
privileges through government action, exactly the sort of monopoly that most 
critics had opposed in the nineteenth century.104 Newspaper columnist and 
savage wit Dorothy Thompson called Robinson-Patman bill the “Cracker 
Barrel Bill,” which was a mocking reference to old style retailing. Because of 
the bill, she and others argued, the cost of living would rise and millions of 
consumers would find their shopping bills increased to fund 1,000 
wholesalers.105 Wheeler Sammons and other chain advocates even suggested 
that the bill was more for wholesalers and other middlemen than retailers. They
102 New York Evening Star, June 30, 1936; New York Post, March 24, 1936; Grover T. 
Owens to Robinson, February 28,1936, box 203, folder 5, Robinson Papers;
103 J. Spencer Smith, "Meeting Before Washington Chamber of Commerce," October 1935, 
box 303, folder 8, Lucas Papers.
104 Paul Fishback to Lucas, March 19, 1936, box 303, folder 7, Lucas Papers; Harper, 
“The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 285; Logan to Patman, August 15, 1935, p.3, box 
303, folder 9, Lucas Papers.
105 Wheeler Sammons to Robinson, May 8, 1936, box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers; 
New York Herald Tribune, May 5, 1936; New York Times, May 3, 1936; Kress to 
Kirstein, March 24, 1936, box 90, "K," Kirstein Papers; Wheeler Sammons, box 213,
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suggested that wholesaler advocates pushed the bill in order to get a 
classification scheme. In the end, these firms would ensure their own profits at 
the expense of the small retailers foolish enough to aid them. After all, as had 
been the case for years, wholesalers already dominated many independents.106
Sammons told legislators that the bill would not cure the problems of 
retailing.107 In fact, he warned legislators that this radical action would be “as
t nobig of a flop as the "Townsend Plan or the Share-the-Wealth." The chains 
pointed to two major problems with the bill. First, the bill attacked rebates in 
quantity buying that were neither as important as suggested by the wholesalers 
nor confined to retailing. The chains suggested the bill was too broad. In 
hearings, both chain and independent witnesses disagreed as to the relative 
effect of buying advantages and advertising allowances. They could not agree 
to the extent of the practices or give a percentage of savings for the chains or 
determine a dollar amount Charles Adams, for example, the treasurer of the
folder 13, Robinson Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement” 297.
106 National Retail Dry Goods Association, "A Bill to Establish Complete Dictatorship 
Over Competition" in David E. Moeser to Scott Lucas, April 3, 1936, box 303, folder 8, 
Lucas Papers; Wheeler Sammons to Lucas, May 14, 1936, box 303, folder 7, Lucas 
Papers.
107 Wheeler Sammons to Lucas, May 15, 1936, ibid.
108 Wheeler Sammons to "Congressman," May 18,1936, box 77, folder 8, Amlie Papers.
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First National stores, told the House Judiciary Committee that rebates no 
longer played an important role in chain advantages. The atmosphere of stores 
and superior merchandising accounted for any differences in price. Still, he 
claimed that the Robinson-Patman Act would amount to a sales tax of from 8-
10915 percent The retail industry was willing to admit certain difficulties, but 
leading figures attacked the Robinson-Patman bill for poorly defining the 
problem.110 In addition to attacking an amorphous problem, the bill, although 
aimed at retailing, struck at all areas of business.111
Since the bill affected all of the economy it would generate tremendous 
problems in enforcement. Emmanuel Celler, who had written a proposed New 
York state chain tax, surprised retailers when he came out against the bill. 
Among his other criticisms, Celler wanted to know how anyone could enforce
109 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 292-296; O. A. Taylor to Robinson, March 
30,1936, box 214, folder 1, Robinson Papers.
110 Paul Willis to Kirstein, November 18, 1935, "Fred Lazarus 1933-1938," Kirstein Papers; 
Fred Lazarus to Kirstein, January 3,1936; .J. S. Leff to Robinson, March 26,1936, box 214, 
folder 1, Robinson Papers; Walter White to Joe Brewer, March 24,1936, box 214, folder 1, 
ibid.; Paul Willis to Robinson, box 214, folder 1, ibid; United States Wholesale Grocer 
Association Bulletin, no. 126 November 18, 1936, p.2, box 215, folder 2, ibid; Charles 
Wesley Dunn, "Patman and Mapes Bills: A Consideration o f the Problem o f Amending 
Federal Law Against Price Discrimination November 15, 1935,” in Dunn to Lucas, 
November 29, 1935, box 303, folder 9, Lucas Papers; Wood to McIntyre, April 24, 1936; 
James L. Donnelly to James Lewis, February 8,1936, box 213, folder 13, Robinson Papers.
111 Wood to McIntyre, April 24, 1936; Wilbur Willey to A. V. Donahey, [n.d., 1936], 
box 203, folder 5, Robinson Papers; E. Ingraham to Robinson, March 9, 1936, p.2, box
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the bill for all 48,000 items in the Sears Catalog.112 Business groups, such as 
the National Association of Manufacturers, criticized the Robinson-Patman 
bill because they believed the legislation meant more regulation, and thus more 
interference from the federal government. They worried the bill interfered with 
basic economic laws and well established practices.113 In general, businessmen 
wondered how government could propose to legislate against long-standing 
business practices. As one put it, "The right to give a Baker’s dozen is as old as 
Business itself." How could the government stop companies from disposing of 
their property as they saw fit? In order to enforce the bill, the FTC would need 
to be given tremendous powers. Wood warned about the expansive powers 
given to the FTC, and the Business Advisory Council joined him in this
214, folder 1, ibid.
112 Lucas to Dargavel, box 303, folder 7, Lucas Papers; Paul Carlsen to Lucas, March 28, 
1936, box 303, folder 8, Lucas Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 316.
113 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 282, 284, 300; Illinois Duster Company 
to Lucas, June 17, 1936, box 303, folder 7, Lucas Papers; Turner Brass Works to Lucas, 
May 21, 1936, box 303, folder 8, ibid; Domely to Lucas, April 13, 1936, ibid; George 
T. Delacorte to Lucas, March 9, 1936, ibid; Harry Rubens to Lucas, May 12, 1936, 
ibid.; Harper, 282-284; Michael Leo to the Aristocrat Clock Company, February 15, 
1936, box 303, folder 7, Lucas Papers; M L R off to Leo, February 17, 1936, ibid. 
Business Advisory Council, April 30, 1936, box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers; 
Business Advisory Council, April 30, 1936, pp.2-4, box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers; 
Nation, November 28, 1936.Frank Carnahan to Lucas April 29, 1936 box 303 folder 7 
Lucas Papers National Retail Lumber Dealers Association; Eau Claire Pioneer Furniture 
Company to Amlie, May 12, 1936, box 77, folder 8, Amlie Papers; Hawley, The New
Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 251-2, 312.
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criticism.114 Chain representatives and lawyers questioned the constitutionality 
of such steps. As one writer remarked in a letter to Scott Lucas, “"Mussolini 
and Hitler can stop changes in buying and selling methods." It was unclear 
how a government agency, in a free market economy could hope to have 
influence in such a far-reaching way.115 In addition, the bill would prove easy 
to evade because the chains could produce their own private label goods and 
buying the entire output of a factory. Even the drafter of the bill, the USWGA 
counsel Teegarden, admitted this might occur.116 For their part, newspaper 
columnists and economists seconded these criticisms of the bill and its
1 yj
potential impact on America.
114 R.H. Wood to McIntyre, February 21, 1936, Official File 288, “Chain Stores 1935- 
1936.” New York Herald Tribune, July 1, 1936; Leo Herrick to Robinson, March 17,
1936, box 214, folder 1, Robinson Papers; Business Advisory Council, April 30, 1936, 
p.2, box 214, folder 4, ib id  J. N. Mueller to Lucas, May 5, 1936, box 303, folder 8, 
Lucas Papers; David E. Moeser to Lucas, April 3, 1936, ibid.; "Statement o f the 
N.R.D.G.A.: A Bill to Establish Complete Dictatorship Over Competition," p .l in Kress 
to Kirstein, March 24, 1936, box 90, "K," Kirstein Papers; George Delacorte to Lucas, 
March 9, 1936, box 303, folder 8, Lucas Papers; "Why the New Patman Bill will Fail o f 
its purpose," New York World Telegram, February 8, 1936; Sammons to "Congressman," 
May 13,1936, box 302, folder 6, Lucas Papers; Hubert Boidt to Amlie, April 26, 1938, 
box 77, folder 8, Amlie Papers; Pioneer Furniture Company to Amlie March 23, 1936 
ibid.
116 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 296; Teegarden to Robinson, n.d., 
pp. 11-12, 14, 19-21, box 213, folder 15, Robinson Papers.
117 Watchman Union, (Monroe,West Virginia), April 30,1936, p. 4, box 215, folder 4, 
Robinson Papers; Wheeler Sammons to Robinson, May 8,1936, box 214, folder 4,
Robinson Papers; New York Herald Tribune, May 5,1936; New York Times, May 3,1936.
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In addition to the chains’ own opposition, other groups expressed 
their doubts about the bill. The National Grange and the American Farm 
Bureau argued that the bill threatened a vital sector of distribution. Although 
the convention of the National Cooperative Council, another major farm 
group, endorsed the bill, its leadership reversed its position because of 
functional discounts. These discounts allowed wholesalers to get rebates but 
would have deprived farm cooperatives of the same savings.118 The hostility 
of the farm cooperatives succeeded in wiping out the classification clause, 
which gave special privileges to wholesalers and adding a provision 
allowing price changes made to meet competition in good faith.119 In 
addition to concerns about the technical wording of the bill, farmers worried 
about the loss of markets for their products. They believed that the chains 
offered efficient, low cost distribution for their products. C.C. Teague, of
118 Palamountain, The Politics o f Distribution, 223; Frank Rice to Amlie May 4, 1936, 
pp. 1-2, box 77, folder 8, Amlie Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Stores Movement,” 319.
119 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 285, 325; Palamountain, The Politics o f  
Distribution, 191; Milwaukee Drug Wholesale to Amlie, May 25, 1936, box 77, folder 
8, Amlie Papers. Lorence, Gerald J. Boileau and the Progressive-Farmer-Labor 
Alliance, 128; American Farm Bureau Federation, National Grange, National 
Cooperative Milk Producers, Northwest Farmers Union to Lucas, n.d., box 303, folder 
7, Lucas Papers; Congressional Record Vol. 80, 8114, 8229-31. Javitz to M. M. Logan, 
June 2, 1936, p.3, box 215, folder 1, Robinson Papers; Hawley, The New Deal and the 
Problem o f Monopoly, 266.
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the orange growers association, a prominent Republican farmer, emphasized 
the value of modem retailing systems.120
Supporters o f the legislation urged farmers to recognize the 
deflationary impact o f the chains. Patman encouraged farmers to shake 
themselves from the belief that the chains offered efficient distribution. 
Another supporter of the independents declared that farmers suffered from a 
“delusion” that the chains benefited them.121 A Colorado farmer reported to 
Robinson that chains had a dangerous effect on farm prices. He, like many 
farmers, tried to offset grocery bills by selling eggs to the store. In his 
experience, however, a farmer could buy back the eggs for less than he had 
sold them to the chain. The chains, at least in Colorado, are the farmer's worst 
enemy and every fanner knows it The farmer can take a case of eggs to a 
chain store and buy them back for less than the chain paid him. The next 
farmer is told that eggs are selling for below market price. He had the same 
problem with potatoes: "chains and chiseling go hand in hand." Despite his
120 Hoover to Teague, June 24, 1929, box 891, “C. C. Teague file,” Presidential Personal 
Files, Hoover Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library; Lwellyn A. Banks to Hoover, 
April 8, 1929, ibid.
121 Patman to "Dear Friends," box 20C, folder 3, 1936, Patman Papers; W. J. Zbomick 
to Robinson, February 24, 1936, box 213, folder 14, Robinson Papers; Harper, “The 
Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 319; John W. Geraty to Patman, July 18, 1935, p. 2, box 
213, folder 3, Robinson Papers; John Geraty to Smith, July 17, 1935, p. 3, ibid.
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attitude, the majority of farmers remained confident that chains offered 
essential help in distributing goods.
Although organized labor traditionally endorsed anti-monopoly 
activities, it worried about the implications for their members if chains went 
out of business.122 Small merchants attacked the chains for paying low wages. 
But critics of the bill claimed, as had the chains, that it was a replacement for 
the NRA replacement, without needed wage and hour provisions to offset
123higher prices. In addition, some union leaders attacked the bill in hopes of 
prompting chains to support unions out of gratitude for their support The 
failure to win strong union support for the anti-chain store movement stunted 
its growth. 124
122 J. S. Hoffmann to Robinson, May 14,1936, box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers.
123 Sherill to Kirstein, March 17, 1936, box 89, “Sherill ARF 1936-1937,” Kirstein Papers; 
Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 316; Sammons to "Congressman," May 13, 
1936, box 302, folder 6, Lucas Papers; Wheeler Sammons to Lucas, May 15, 1936, box 
303, folder 7, Lucas Papers; Wheeler Sammons to Lucas, May 15, 1936; Labor World, 
[n.d., 1936], Advance Proof in box 303, folder 7, Lucas Papers; Institute of Distribution to 
Lucas, May 22, 1936, box 303, folder 7, Lucas Papers; Wheeler Sammons to 
"Congressman," May 18, 1936, box 77, folder 8, Amlie Papers; Terry Berger to Robinson, 
February 5, 1936, p .l, box 213, folder 13, Robinson Papers; Reuben Posner to Robinson, 
June 24,1936, box 215, folder 1, Robinson Papers.
124 "Brief on ARF," p. 1, box 302, folder 2, Lucas Papers; Claude W. Kress to Kirstein, 
October 22, 1936, box 90, "K," Kirstein Papers.
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Although consumers' groups were still relatively weak, they also 
protested the bill.125 The chains created some of these groups, and the majority 
of consumer protests came from letters written by chain customers. Groups 
such as the Consumers Union argued that the provisions would force 
consumers to pay more at the checkout stand, labeling the bill a discriminatory 
bit of legislation created to guarantee exorbitant profits to retailers. Progressive 
commentators argued that the government failed to recognize the importance 
of mass purchasing power but instead bowed to special interest groups, 
subsidizing the few at the expense of the many. If government catered to 
special interests, undercutting the power of the market, American consumers 
would not obtain the highest living standard possible. A report prepared by the
Brookings Institution with assistance from government bureaucrats, supported
126this view. As one writer to Wisconsin congressman Thomas Amlie put it, "It 
certainly isn't justice to pat one on the shoulder who has been holding up the
125 C. D. Beebe to Robinson, March 27, 1936, box 214, folder 2, Robinson Papers; 
Daily Progress, June 30, 1936; Economic Justice Newsletter, February 1935, p. 3 in 
box 38, folder 15, Brooks Hays Papers.
126 Witte,"The Challenge to American Democracy," box 99, Witte Papers, University of 
Chicago; Martha Wamecke to Amlie, April 28, 1936, box 77, folder 8, Thomas Amlie 
Papers; E. Chas. Evenson to Amlie, April 24, 1936, ibid.; T. Blair Wilson to President 
Roosevelt, May 7,1936, box 303, folder 7, Lucas Papers; Thomas Bailey to Robinson, n.d, 
box 214, folder 3, Robinson Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 301; New 
York Times, February  16,1936.
252
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
consumer and kicking the other that gave the consumer his dollars [sic]
177worth.” For their part, consumer cooperatives attacked the classification 
provisions as well.
In a similar way, many cooperative marketing groups, including
voluntary chains, attacked the bill. Voluntary chains run by retailers
complained that the language of the bill discriminated against them by
undercutting their ability to compete along with the tremendous rebates granted
to the chains. They suggested thal the classification scheme gave undue power
to wholesalers and food brokers;. The bill legally protected the existence of
these middlemen and protected discounts given to them. Ellis Hawley, whose
The New Deal and the Problem o f Monopoly is the seminal work on the
economics of the period, concurred. He thought that the act prevented change
and hurt the consumer. Instead o f  such bills, he thought the government should
have promoted chain growth and encouraged small merchants to join voluntary
chains. In this way the government could encourage positive economic change
128m the mterest of the entire nation.
127 W. R. Wyss to Amlie, May 20,1936, box 77, folder 8, Amlie Papers.
128 Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f Monopoly, 268; Logan to Robinson, 
April 17, 1936, box 214, folder 3, Robinson Papers; R. E. Plunkett to Robinson, March 
2, 1936, p.2, box 213, folder 15, ibid\ F. A. Steccker to Robinson, April 27, 1936, box 
214, folder 3, ibid.
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Edward Filene and Robert Wood assured the administration that 
retailers could protect themselves in a positive way from economic collapse by
129forming voluntary chains. It appeared the administration did not even know 
what a voluntary chain might be. A bureaucrat from the Bureau of Foreign and 
Domestic Commerce had to explain that local businessmen owned them.130 
Frank Grimes, founder of IGA, bragged about his organization to the 
administration: "IGA came into being when a small group of men banded 
together to whip collectively the problems we could not whip as 
individuals.” At that time it was commonly accepted that the independent 
merchant was doomed because of the great inroads being made by his 
highly organized corporate competition. Grimes credited the IGA with a 
revival of independent retailing. Because of his firm, “the independent is 
stronger than ever before,” and this anniversary marks the, "triumphant 
closing of a hazardous period in which the independent merchant who ten 
years ago was facing commercial oblivion has waged the battle and won. 
Only in our country can such things happen."131 One exception to this rule is
129 Edward A. Filene to Roosevelt, April 1, 1936, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1935-1936," 
Roosevelt Papers; Wood to McIntyre, June 5,1936, ibid.
130 A. J. O'Leary to Early, June 16, 1936, PPF 3614, Roosevelt Papers.
131 J. Frank Grimes to Roosevelt, September 29,1936, PPF 3977, Independent Grocers'
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the National Retailer-Owned Wholesalers organization, which switched to
132supporting the bill at the last moment
Despite criticisms of the bill for undermining corporate efficiency and 
favoring independent wholesalers, the Robinson-Patman bill sailed through 
Congress. Congressmen from both parties believed the bill would eliminate 
many of the injustices of the marketing system and give small retailers the edge 
they needed to stay afloat in the highly competitive retail market. In part, the 
ease of passage reflected the power of Joseph Robinson, the Senate majority 
leader. Because of his involvement, Congress and the general public believed
133the bill to be an administration measure. Some retailers from Forrest City, 
Arkansas, in the delta of the state, put it best when they met to consider the 
measure. According to one of the merchants, a delegate “swept the meeting off
Alliance, Roosevelt Papers.
132 Palamountain, The Politics o f  Distribution, 204, 215; W. C. McConaughy to Robinson, 
July 2, 1935, box 213, folder 13, Robinson Papers; Mermen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed 774; 
National Biscuit Company v. FTC, 299 Fed 733; Senate Report 1502 74th Congress 2d 
Session February 3, 1936. House Judiciary Committee Hearings, 206-207; Robinson to M. 
M. Logan [nd.?] 1936; John Block to Robinson, April 13, 1936, p. 3, box 214, folder 4, 
Robinson Papers; Plunkett to Joe Brewer, May 7,1936, ibid. -, Brewer to Plunkett, May 12, 
1936, ibid-, Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 286-288; HR. Rept 2287, 1-2; 
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on S.4171 74th Congress second session 41-43, 45, 
90, 110 HR. Report 2287, 10; United States Wholesale Grocer Association Bulletin 
November 18,1936 in box 215, folder 2, Robinson Papers.
133 Teegarden to Lucas, October 24, 1935, box 302, folder 4, Lucas Papers; Hawley, The 
New Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 251-252; Business Week, March 7, 1936.
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its feet,” when he exclaimed, "Hell! ask Joe Robinson to have it passed; he 
introduced it and he can put through Congress anything he wants." Robinson 
wrote a polite note back, reminding the retailer that his powers did have certain 
limits. 134 Such enthusiasm from retailers, however, proved to be another 
reason that the bill passed. The activity of small merchants in past political 
campaigns on a state level brought them to the attention of legislators, and 
congressmen were willing to act in a way that would assist small merchants. 
But hectoring by retailers anxious for action even annoyed Robinson. The head 
of the USWGA had to beg retailers to slow their lobbying efforts and allow 
him to decide the best time to bring the bill before a Senate vote.135
The only real opposition came in the Senate, where critics of the
136Robinson-Patman bill suggested other ways to attack rebates. These
134 A. B. Nimocks to Robinson, March 30, 1936, box 214, folder 2, Robinson Papers; 
Robinson to Nimocks, April 4,1936, ibid.
135 McLaurin to Wholesale Grocers o f Arkansas, April 25, 1936, box 214, folder 4, 
Robinson Papers; C. K. Lincoln to Robinson, March 31, 1936, box 214, folder 2, 
Robinson Papers; F. R. Trigg to Lucas, March 10, 1936, box 303, folder 7, Lucas 
Papers; Ward Goodloe to Robinson, April 18, 1936, box 214, folder 3, Robinson 
Papers; E. W. Rollow to Robinson, April 9, 1936, box 214, folder 2, Robinson Papers; 
Craven to Robinson, April 13, 1937, box 214, folder 2, Robinson Papers; A. B. 
Nimocks to Robinson, n.d., [April 23, 1936], box 214, folder 3, "Petition-El Dorado, 
Arkansas,” April 23, 1936, ibid. ', Paul M  Cooter to Robinson, April 28, 1936, box 214, 
folder 4, Robinson Papers; Southern Fruit Company; Bulletin 108 o f  the United States 
Wholesale Grocer Association, 2. Willis Johnson to Robinson, April 29, 1936, box 214, 
folder 3, Robinson Papers; Paul Fishback to Robinson, March 12, 1936, box 214, folder 
1, Robinson Papers; Bloom to Kirstein, May 2, 1936, box 90, "B," Kirstein Papers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
alternative bills gained support from some parties. Farmer and consumer 
groups, for example, endorsed them. But most commentators believed they
137would not have as powerful an effect as the Robinson-Patman bill. The final 
Senate version of the bill included provisions from one of these bills, the 
Borah-Van Nuys bill. Because it varied from the House version, a compromise 
committee met to reconcile the versions. It responded with an equitable 
decision, simply combining the two despite contradictory provisions. Of these, 
the most significant conflict was that Borah-Van Nuys set criminal penalties 
for violations and used the courts for enforcement, while the Robinson-Patman
138bill operated through the FTC and had only civil penalties.
136 'TsTational Conference of Independent Business Men." March 4,1936,24; Leo Herrick to 
Robinson, March 17,1936, box 214, folder 1, Robinson Papers.
137 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 301, 312, 314; Sherill to Kirstein, March 
24, 1936, box 89, "Sherill ARF 1936," Kirstein Papers; Kirstein to Sherill, March 27,1936, 
box 89, "Sherill RF 1936-1937," ibid.; Sherill to Kirstein, March 25, 1936, ibid', National 
Retail Dry Goods Association Bulletin, March 26, 1936, 2; Kirstein to Sherill March 26, 
1936; “National Conference o f Independent Businessmen," 109-110; Ingersoll to Capper 
March 19,1936 box 39 'Fair Trade 1936-1939" Capper Papers; Business Advisory Council 
to Robinson April 30, 1936, p.3, box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers; Palamountain, The 
Politics of Distribution, 223; Leavitt Parsons to Capper, April 3, 1936, box 39, "Fair Trade 
1936-1939," Capper Papers; Matthew Karres to Robinson, May 1, 1936, box 214, folder 4, 
Robinson Papers; Wood to McIntyre, June 5, 1936, Official File, "Chain Stores 1935- 
1936,” Roosevelt Papers; McIntyre to Wood, June 19, 1936, ibid', Harry Totten to 
Robinson, May 1, 1936, telegram, box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers; New York Times, 
February 16,1936.
Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 253; Celler to McIntyre, June 5, 
1936, Official File 288, "Chain Stores 1935-1936," Roosevelt Papers; Mcintyre to President 
Roosevelt, memo, June 7,1936 ibid', Young, “Wright Patman,” 209.
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Although many observers had initially interpreted Robinson-Patman as 
an administration measure, the President had never promoted it In fact, when 
the bill came to his desk he hesitated before signing it.139 During the time he 
held the bill, General Robert Wood wrote him, urging him not to sign it into 
law. Robinson-Patman, he argued, would hurt the consumer, voluntary 
organizations, and farmer co-ops. Because of the influence of farm 
organizations, Wood suggested that the bill might even hurt the administration 
in rural sections during the 1936 Presidential campaign. Despite these 
criticisms, Roosevelt signed the bill.140 He maintained it provided an important 
clarification of anti-trust laws and served as needed protection for small 
retailers.141 And Roosevelt used the Robinson-Patman Act to political 
advantage in the 1936 campaign. In speeches in Arkansas and Texas,
139 New York Times, April 18, 1935; M. C. Hutton to Robinson, March 26, 1936, p .l, box 
214, folder Robinson Papers.
140 Wood to McIntyre, June 3, 1936, Official File 288, "Chain Stores 1935-1936," 
Roosevelt Papers; DeWitt Reed to Robinson July 24, 1936, p.2, box 215, folder 1, 
Robinson Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 302; L. W. Oswald to 
Roosevelt, June 21, 1936, Official File 288, "Chain Stores 1935-1936," Roosevelt 
Papers; William Rutherford to Roosevelt, June 26, 1936, Official File 288, "Chain 
Stores 1935-1936," Roosevelt Papers; Charles G. Ajax to Roosevelt, July 3, 1936, ibid. -, 
E. Chat. Shanks to Roosevelt, July 7, 1936, ibid', J. H. RufFolo to Roosevelt, [n.d., 
August 1936], ibid. ; Marvin McIntyre to RufFolo, August 22, 1936, ibid; Dargavel to 
Roosevelt, October 1,1936, ibid.
m New York Times, May 24, 1936 in box 216, folder 1, Robinson Papers.
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Roosevelt praised the bill, saying it guaranteed opportunity for small 
retailers.
The signing of the law left many questions. First, what, after all, did the 
bill mean for retailing? How would it affect retailers and their suppliers? 
Second, could the FTC, which had responsibility for the act, enforce the law? 
Would it get the appropriations necessary to control purchasing practices? In 
the early days after passage, retailers and manufacturers complained that the 
act was confusing and near incomprehensible. Patman and Robinson found 
themselves besieged with inquiries about the implications of the bill.142 Critics 
claimed the bill reached too far. A series of critical articles about the Robinson- 
Patman Act appeared in Raymond Moley’s Today Magazine. The articles 
developed the thesis, previously articulated by the chains in the campaign, that 
the law favored wholesalers and brokers at the expense of more progressive 
distributors.143 The Federal Trade Commission received a similar barrage of
142 Assistant Secretary for Robinson to Midge Stem, M y 17, 1936, box 216, folder 1, 
Robinson Papers; New York Times, M y 9, 1936; Wieboldt Department Store, "Report to 
Directors," July 16, 1936, Wieboldt Department Store Papers, Chicago Historical Society; 
Montague to Sherill, June 29, 1936, box 90, "M," Kirstein Papers; Montague to Kirstein, 
June 18, 1936, ibid.', Willis to Robinson, February 2, 1937, box 215, folder 2, Robinson 
Papers. Cecil B. Winsborough to Capper, January 22, 1937, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1936- 
1939," Capper Papers.
143 Kirstein to Sherill, November 7, 1936, box 89, "ARF 1936-1937," Kirstein Papers; 
Today Magazine, June 15, 1936; Todag^  Magazine, November 14, 1936; Today
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questions. For example, a representative of a voluntary chain wrote his 
congressman about the ramifications for his form of retailing In response, a 
representative of the FTC informed the congressman that the cooperative 
clause of the act seemed “in general,” to permit purchases through a general 
agent. At the same time, he warned that his comments are only his own and 
that he cannot make a more definitive statement without access to more 
information on the buying group. He said he did not want to endorse actions 
that might violate other provisions of the act He also asked, in a rather
■ i . . .  144innocent way, why they were inquiring.
Businessmen wrote Roosevelt, encouraging him to push the FTC to set 
down clear and specific rules of conduct. As it stood, they complained, it 
benefited no one but lawyers. They also argued the bill was vague.145 The FTC
Magazine, November 21, 1936, box 49, "Legislation-Robinson-Patman Act 1937," 
O'Mahoney Papers; O. M. K ile to OMahoney, January 21, 1937, ibid. -, C. A. McKay to 
Robinson, August 8, 1936; Montague to Arnold, April 26, 1941, p.2, box 23, "General 
April 11-30, 41," Arnold Papers; Frank Levy, "The Robinson-Patman Act: A Year's 
Retrospect," May 12, 1937, box 216, folder 1, Robinson Papers; Roland Morris to 
Robinson; United States Wholesale Grocer Association Bulletin, no. 126, November 18, 
1936, p.2, box 215, folder 2, Robinson Papers; R. H. Rowe December 29, 1936, box 
215, folder 2, Robinson Papers; Guy Allott to Robinson, January 14, 1937, box 215, 
folder 2; Today Magazine, November 18, 1936; Today Magazine, January 14, 1937, 
p.2, box 215, folder 2, Robinson Papers.
144 j  £  Rademaker to O'Mahoney, March 23, 1937, p. 2, box 49, "Legislation-Robinson- 
Patman Act 1937," OMahoney Papers.
145 Moriss Belitz to Roosevelt, August 10, 1937, OF 200Q, box 232; Harper, “The Anti-
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and Patman spent a great deal of time trying to explain how the act was 
supposed to be enforced. Many letters poured in asking for interpretations of 
provisions of die act Both Patman and the FTC put out pamphlets designed to 
explain its significance.
In addition to the ambiguities of the Robinson-Patman Act, the 
legislation required the FTC to monitor the buying practices of many 
organizations. It became immediately clear that the FTC would have a difficult 
time enforcing any of the provisions of the bill. As America: A Catholic 
Review o f the Week, a Jesuit publication, had warned: "enforcement of the 
provisions of the Robinson bill will be harder than Prohibition enforcement, 
and in the end, perhaps no more successful.”146 The demands of enforcing the 
legislation on millions of transactions were immediately a strain on the 
resources of the Federal Trade Commission. The act’s passage, in other words, 
hardly ensured its enforcement or the accomplishment of desired ends. Small 
retailers and the FTC urged Congress to provide additional appropriations for
Chain Store Movement,” 329; Business Week, June 13,1936 and June 20, 1936 Newsweek, 
June 27,1936; Newsweek, July 18,1936; Gilbert Montague, "Merchandising Under the 
Robinson-Patman Act before the Boston Conference on Retail Distribution, “ p. 1; J. C.
Felter to Robinson, May 28,1936; Robinson to Felter, June 9,1936; L. Hermon to 
Robinson, July 27, 1936, pp. 1-3, box 215, folder 1, Robinson Papers; W. E. Stephenson to 
Robinson, October 27,1936 ibid..
146 America: A Catholic Review o f  the Week, May 16,1936 55 (6): 122-123; New York
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enforcement of the act147 In practice, the FTC applied the act to the brokerage 
provisions, restricting the use of a central buying agency. The FTC liked to use 
the provision because it offered solid, easily winnable cases. These cases could 
be used for statistics to demonstrate the effectiveness of the agency. Despite 
the fact that these cases were often won, the abuses continued for years in 
some cases because of stalling tactics by the offender. The company could 
drag the agency through a series of appeals. If they lost these appeals through 
the federal court system they faced no further repercussions148
Times, May 17,1936.
147 McIntyre to Robinson, May 27, 1936, p.4, box 214, folder 3, Robinson Papers; R. L. 
Morris, June 1, 1936, box 215, folder 1, Robinson Papers; J. H. McLaurin to 
O'Mahoney, February 9, 1937, box 49, "Legislation-Robinson-Patman Act 1937," 
OMahoney Papers; Arthur E. Gesch to Roosevelt, November 12, 1936, Official File 
288, "Chain Stores 1935-1936," Roosevelt Papers; Harry Walker to Roosevelt, 
November 12, 1936, ibid.; Dargavel to Roosevelt, November 11, 1936, ibid.; W. A. 
Ayres to Robinson, July 13, 1936, box 216, folder 1, Robinson Papers; Hector Lazo to 
Robinson, January 15, 1936, box 257, folder 1, Robinson Papers; George J. Burger to 
Robinson, January 21, 1937, box 257, folder 2, Robinson Papers; M. Horowitz to 
Robinson, May 20, 1936, box 214, folder 4, Robinson Papers.
148 Modem Marketing Service, Inc. v. FTC, 149 Fed (2d) 970; Harper, “The Anti-Chain 
Store Movement,” 290; 334-336; Biddle Purchasing Company v. FTC, 96 Fed. (2d)
687; Oliver Brothers, Inc. v. FTC, 102 Fed 92d 763; Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 
Fed 2d 667; James A. Horton to Robinson, August 31, 1936; Garland Ferguson to 
Robinson, October 8, 1936, box 215, folder 1, Robinson Papers; Lucas to Dargavel, 
[n,d„ 1936], box 303, folder 7, Lucas Papers; George Goldsmith to Robinson, June 25, 
1936, box 215, folder 1, Robinson Papers; Walter Knight to Robinson, July 9,1936; 
Kirstein to Fred Lazarus, February 8, 1938, box 30, "Robinson Patman bill," Kirstein 
Papers; Fred Lazarus to Kirstein, February 6,1937; Willis Johnson to Robinson, January 
15, 1937, pp. 1-3, box 215, folder 2, Robinson Papers; Investigation o f  the ARF: 1,465- 
470; Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, 266; IGA Distributing Co. v.
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Despite these failings, the USWGA believed independent retailers 
gained strength from the Robinson-Patman act They disputed claims that the 
bill failed in its purpose. They also denied that it unfairly attacked chain 
stores.149 Independent retailers, and their allies, believed that the bill brought 
necessary change to the retail sector. One of the best summaries of this attitude 
came from Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois, when he responded to the 
complaints of a constituent. The man from tiny Alsey, Illinois, an executive of 
a brick and tile firm, attacked Robinson-Patman for being vague. Senator 
Lucas admitted that the act proved confusing, and he called for courts to clarify 
its meaning. But he denied that it was a nuisance. “Unless something is done 
in the near future to curb the monopolistic tendencies of chains and large 
department stores, as well as some other of the larger businesses of this 
country, the small independent business of a community like Alsey owned and 
operated by citizens who own property and who are vitally interested in the 
welfare of the community, will be a thing of the past"150
FTC 203 Fed (2d) 941; March, “Address before the National Association o f Retail 
Grocers, June 22,1937,” pp. 3 ,9  in 110 E. 6. 8. F, Benson Papers, Minnesota State 
Archives, Minnesota Historical Society, Young, “Wright Patman,” 211.
149 United States Wholesale Grocer Association Bulletin, November 18, 1936, p.3 in 
box 215, folder 2, Robinson Papers; "Remarks o f Robinson," August 5, 1936, p.3, box 
215, folder 3, Robinson Papers; Nation, November 28, 1936.
150 N. H. McLaughlin to Lucas, December 4, 1936, box 302, folder 1, Lucas Papers;
263
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Small retailers hoped to bring stability to their sector by preserving the 
quantity provisions and limited competition of the National Recovery 
Administration without, of course, the more troublesome wage and hour 
provisions. They opposed government interference, in other words, unless it 
worked to their advantage—hardly surprising.151 The Robinson-Patman Act 
promised to be one of the most important amendments to the Clayton Act. 
However, it proved difficult to enforce, and the Federal Trade Commission has 
allowed the act to linger, rarely enforcing it in any consistent way.
Lucas to N. H. McLaughlin, December 11, 1936, box 307, "Robinson-Patman Act,” 
Lucas Papers; "Report on the Relations o f Government to Industry as adopted by the 
National Association o f Manufacturers Congress,” box 99, Witte Papers; Harper Sibley 
to O'Mahoney, January 8, 1937, box 49, "Legislation-Robinson-Patman Act 1937," 
O'Mahoney Papers.
151 Frances Kneitel to Kirstein, February 11, 1935, box 89, "With Widman," Kirstein 
Papers.
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Chapter Seven: Referendums and Fair Trade Acts
Federal responses to the economy took center stage in the 1930s, but 
states continued to legislate against the chains as well, particularly with chain 
taxes. But chains responded with increasing opposition in the latter half of the 
decade. In a number of referendums in the West, most importantly one in 
California in 1936, the voting public rejected higher taxes on corporate 
retailers. After that, few states passed tax laws, and other anti-chain measures 
replaced them as means for controlling the chain threat. Because the NRA had 
demonstrated the prevalence of trade abuses, the states tried to attack these 
practices through fair trade legislation, particularly price maintenance 
legislation, which allowed manufacturers to set the prices for their products. 
Although the Capper-Kelly bill had failed on a national level in the early 
1930s, its approach found widespread success in the states.
As the Roosevelt years began, state chain tax measures continued to 
pass. In fact, small retailers and their supporters in many states pressed with 
renewed vigor for legislation to slow the growth of the chains. Supporters of 
chain taxes promoted more damaging taxes against the chains, eventually
265
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provoking a significant counter-attack from corporate retailers. This opposition 
began with lobbying in the state legislatures but eventually extended to the 
series of referendums in the West.1 Chain taxes became important political 
issues throughout the country but particularly in Wisconsin, Minnesota, Texas, 
Louisiana, Florida, Iowa, California and Colorado. Strong support from chief 
executives proved an important element in most chain taxes. Many of the 
states where the chain taxes passed had activist governors. Phil La Follette in 
Wisconsin, Floyd Olson in Minnesota; George Earle in Pennsylvania, and E. 
D. Rivers in Georgia each promoted chain taxes in their states. All of these 
governors stand out for their strong reform efforts, which were often framed as 
“Little New Deals.”2 In those states with strong gubernatorial support, these 
taxes were, along with increased income taxes, part of an effort to raise funds 
to pay for unemployment relief and other social projects. The taxes continued 
to be a popular response to the demands of the Depression economy. Without
1 George Rund to Roosevelt, February 18, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1933-1934,” 
Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York; Harper, “The 
Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 223-224; Hardware Trade Journal, April 1936, p. 22, 
box 215, folder 4, Robinson Papers.
2 James T. Patterson, The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), 129-167; Harper, “The Anti-Chain 
Store Movement,” 381, 406-407; Harrisburg Patriot, May 13, 25, June 2, 1937; 
Pittsburgh Press, May 11, 1937; New Republic, August 18, 1937, 38-40; Time 
Magazine, June 14, 1937, 70; New York Times, June 2,3, 1937; Pennsylvania Grocer,
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support from governors, however, chain taxes often failed because they were 
allowed to remain in committee or otherwise die.
An example of the importance of gubernatorial backing cam be seen in 
Kansas. In the 1932 election Alf Landon had supported anti-chaim legislation, 
as had many of his opponents. Kansas had been a hotbed o f  anti-chain 
sentiment since the 1920s. One of the most popular anti-chain newspapers, the 
Wichita Booster, was printed in the state, and it appeared probable that the 
state would pass an anti-chain tax. Small retailers believed that Landon, an 
independent oil producer, would support them in their push for am anti-chain 
proposition.3 Supporters of the chain tax argued, as they had done in other 
states, that the chains did not pay their fair share of taxes and draiined money 
from the economy. 4 They showed the film Forward America to generate 
public support for their cause.5 Landon claimed to support the legislation, but
July 1939, p. 4, 18-21 November 1939, 4-6.
3 C. M  Sandstron to Landon, February 21, 1935, 27-11-03-06, folder 4, Landon Papers, 
Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas; Orville O. Fulk to Landion, March 1, 
1935, ibid.
4 Raney-Davis Mercantile Co. to Landon, February 25, 1935, ibid', L. IL. Whitely to 
Landon, February 26,1935, ibid
5 Dibble Grocery Co to Landon, ibid.; H. Everett and Company to Landom, December 
15, 1934, ibid.
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he never made the bill a priority.6 He worried, in part, about taxing Kansas 
corporations and adding another tax to the retail sector. Chains also lobbied 
him, arguing that a tax on them benefited wholesalers.7 Rumors spread that 
Landon hoped to squelch the bill. Landon denied tihem and suggested he was 
doing all he could to help the bill.8 In response to delay, A. H. Gufler, a 
hometown acquaintance of Landon and a wholesaler, assured Landon that the 
bill was needed to protect the state from being defrauded.9 He failed to 
convince the governor. Without the support of Landon, the bill floundered and 
ultimately failed.10 Despite failing in Kansas, chain taxes spread to over half of 
the states and the District of Columbia. They appeared in every region of the 
country. Although the strongest support came from Southern and Central
6 Ford Wright to Landon, February 21, 1935, ibid.
1 Sam Heller to Landon, February 8, 1935; W. S. Leake to Landon, March 7, 1935; W. C. 
Grigg and A. L. Duckwall to Landon, February 14, 1935. All in 27-11-03-06, folder 4, 
Landon Papers.
8 Harold McGugin to Capper, December 18, 1930; Landon to Fulk, March 6, 1935; 
Nusbaum to Landon, March I , 1935; Landon to Nusbaum, February 22,1935; Joseph L. 
Willemetz to Landon, February 25,1935. All in 27-11-03-06, folder 4, Landon Papers.
9 AH . Gufler to Landon, February 18, 1935, pp. 1-2; A. H. Gufler to Willard Maybum, 
n.d., [March, 1935]; Landon to Paul Tucker, March 5, 1935; Gufler to Landon, February 
18, 1935, p.2; Leo Nusbaum to Landon, February 19, 1935. All in 27-11-03-06, folder 4, 
Landon Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement, “ 224.
10 Secretary to the Governor to A. H. Gufler, Chairman o f the Wholesalers' Legislative
Committee, March 2, 1935, 27-11-03-06, folder 4, Landon Papers.
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states, even New Englanders showed a healthy support for these taxes.11 
According to a national poll conducted by the American Institute of Public 
Opinion, a majority of Americans supported special taxes on the chains.12
In addition to spreading to more states, the chain taxes increased in 
severity during the mid-1930s. Higher tax rates were encouraged by the case of 
Fox v. Standard Oil o f New Jersey, in which the Supreme Court addressed the 
West Virginia chain tax law. In that case Standard Oil refused to pay the West 
Virginia tax because, the company argued, it proved prohibitive. If a chain 
operated more then seventy-five stores in the state, it paid a yearly tax of $250 
for each location. According to Standard Oil’s attorneys, the average profit for 
its filling stations was only $89.75. The company therefore complained that the 
tax was unfair because it would force it to close some of its stores. In the 
Supreme Court decision, Justice Cardozo, ruled that a state’s right to tax 
chains extended to the level of taxation as well. If a state chose to set a 
prohibitive tax, it could do so. A commissioner of the Federal Trade 
Commission, Charles March, argued that this decision permitted any level of 
chain taxation. As he put it: “Whatever the social and economic wisdom of
11 Palamountain, The Politics o f Distribution, 172.
12 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 367.
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taxing out of existence all the competitive advantages of the chain store, the 
way to that goal now seems open from a legal and constitutional standpoint.”13 
Fox v. Standard Oil encouraged many states to press for more revenue 
from their chain taxes. 14 Floyd Olson, the charismatic Governor of Minnesota, 
broadcast spirited attacks against the chains and made the anti-chain tax an 
important element of his governorship.15 Because of Olson’s influence, 
Minnesota strengthened an existing tax.16 In Louisiana, Governor O.K. Allen, 
the handpicked successor and puppet of the King Fish, Huey Long, promoted 
one of the strongest pieces of legislation against the chains. The 1934 
Louisiana Chain Tax, written by Long himself, marked the first practical step
13 Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement," 154-155, 200-203, 371; Fox v. Standard 
Oil o f  New Jersey, 294 U.S. 87; Attorney General to Everett, December 20,1934; Paroe 
to Everett, January 22, 1935; Charles H. March, “Address Before the National Association 
of Retail Grocers, June 22, 1937,” p. 2, 110 E. 6. 8. F, Benson Papers, Minnesota State 
Historical Society, St Paul, Minnesota.
14 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 191.
15 “Radio Speech by Floyd Olson over WCCO,” April 12,1934, pp. 15-16, box 9, folder 78, 
Alfred Bingham Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University, “Minnesota Conference for 
Progressive Social Legislation,” August 1, 1936, p.3, box 9, folder 79, Bingham Papers; 
"Declaration o f Principles and Platform of the Farmer-Labor Party of Michigan," ibid; 
"The Specific Demands o f the New Hampshire Farmer Labor Party,” p.3, ibid -, Bingham, 
"America's Future," n,d, pp. 1-2, box 9, folder 94, Bingham Papers.
16 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 213-214; E. J. Halverson to Benson, 
July 22, 1937, F 110 E 6 8, Benson Papers; W. A. Ayres to Roosevelt, April 14, 1937, 
ibid.
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his machine had taken to fight the chains. The bill proved to be the most 
radical in the nation, taxing stores based upon the number of units nationwide. 
A &P faced taxes of more than $500 per store. 17
As the rate of taxation increased, chain stores dropped their passive 
response to taxation. In Texas, as the Patman hearings had revealed, chains 
lobbied to stop the passage of a strong anti-chain tax. According to testimony 
in the inquiry, George Lyons of the Kroger grocery chain had operated a 
sophisticated machine to lobby legislatures. He hired attorneys, or former 
legislators, who were believed to be close to governors or otherwise 
influential.18 In Texas, Lyons contacted a former state senator, George Purl. 
Purl decided that the best plan was to encourage speedy passage of bills 
tightening the collection of existing taxes, thereby delaying consideration of the 
chain tax bill and ultimately sabotaging it, despite the support of Governor 
James Allred. Purl then bragged to Lyons that he had taken legislators out to 
lunch three at a time to accomplish this ploy. Lyons praised it as a good
17 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 193,230; Louisiana Progress, August 14, 
1930, 1; Colorado Springs Gazette, November 8, 1934; New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 
8,1934; Great A&P Tea Company v. Grosjean, 15 P. Sup.499,501-503.
18 U.S. Congress. House. Special Committee on Investigation American Retail Federation. 
Investigation o f  the Lobbying Activities o f the American Retail Federation. 74th Congress, 
1st session. 1935: I, 394-397; ibid.: n, 113-118; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement,” 223.
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achievement When made public, the Lyons correspondence prompted an 
investigation by the Texas state senate. Although the Lieutenant Governor said 
that Purl had nothing to do with the legislation and Purl testified that he had 
just been bragging to Lyons, one pro-chain-tax Senator said that his bragging 
seemed to indicate a great deal.19 After the revelation had been made, 
Governor Allred campaigned on a platform that complained about the 
influence of vested interests on the Senate and promoted a stiff chain tax of 
$750 on every store over fifty. When the bill came before the Senate, Allred sat 
at the presiding officer's desk. One anti-tax legislator complained about this 
sort of minding. Anti-tax senators attempted to escape to prevent a quorum on 
the bill but the sergeant at arms found many of them although he missed the 
Senator in a movie theater who put on a fiir and woman's hat to escape 
attention. Nonetheless, the bill passed with the highest rate of taxation ever 
approved by a state.
An even more ambitious anti-chain bill in Florida sparked a stronger 
reaction from the chains. The so-called “Recovery Act” targeted chains and 
sought to return money to circulation. Robert Givens, a Tampa Bay attorney, 
argued that corporate retailers sucked money out of the Florida economy,
19 Houston Post, October 1 ,4,5 ,11,1935.
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stripping the final margin of profit from the local community and 
concentrating wealth in major cities. As an example, he and other supporters 
pointed to towns like Ocala, Florida, where chains had displaced independent
merchants on the courthouse square and displayed no interest in community
20affairs, refusing even to donate money to charity. Givens wanted to ensure 
that Florida retained the profit on transactions so that it could develop. Such 
fears of sectional piracy had long roots in the populist tradition, as did its 
legislative sponsor, Henry Tillman, the son o f‘Titchfork” Ben Tillman.21
The bill enforced a strict licensing system for retailers. No firm could 
receive a permit for sales if it were not wholly owned in Florida, and no 
individual or corporation could own more than one store.22 The Recovery Act 
was also intended to attack the commissary and itinerant merchant “evils” 
because no permit would be issued to peddlers or corporations intending to sell 
merchandise to their employees.23 The radical nature of the proposal shocked
20 Business Week, June 1, 1935, 217; Florida Times Union, April 5, 1935; J. E. Davis, 
Don't Make A&P Mad (Montana: J. E. Davis, 1990), 94.
21 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 219; Florida Times Union, April 10, 11, 12 
16,26,27,29 30,1935, May 2 ,15 ,16 ,17 ,24 ,25 ,29 ,30 , June 1 1935.
22 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 199.
23 Ciro di Palma to Gerald OMahoney, August 4, 1935, box 197, "Legislation 1935 
Federal Licensing-Correspondence #1," O’Mahoney Papers, University o f Wyoming
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many observers. Newspaper columnist Roger Babson, well known for his 
financial column, said in a speech that he was stunned that the state would 
even discuss such radical legislation out loud. Even J. H. McLaurin, the head 
of the United States Wholesale Grocers Association and ghostwriter of the 
Robinson-Patman Act, regarded the bill as outrageous. He compared it to only 
allowing a person to own a single set of clothes.24 The bill languished in 
committee until 1937, when it was killed on the floor of the Senate.25 An 
opponent of the Recovery Act offered a chain tax as an alternative to the bill. 
He hoped that it would prove less damaging and yet placate independent 
retailers. It passed with a top fee of $400 plus five percent of gross sales 
although the Supreme Court later reduced the sales tax to a maximum of one- 
half percent of gross sales.26
In the west the controversy over chain stores involved referendums. The 
referendum and initiative had been a force in western politics since the
Archives, Laramie, Wyoming; Givens, Outlawry o f  Chain Stores.
24 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 199.
25 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 377, 379; Florida Times Union, May 
5,6,14,18, 27, 1937; Florida Times Union, May 25, June 5,1937; J. L. Stevens to Roosevelt 
June 5,1939, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 1939-1943," Roosevelt Papers.
26 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 223; J. E. Davis, D on’t Make A& P Mad, 
96.
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progressive era. They gave the public a chance to vote on pressing issues, and 
forced political campaigns with interesting consequences. Three states held 
referendums on chain taxes: Colorado, California and Utah. The chains made 
the mistake of underestimating their opposition in the first of the referendums— 
that in Colorado. In 1934, Colorado chain stores hoped to eliminate the tax 
on them, but they tunneled very few resources into the battle because they 
thought their popularity with the public ensured the death of the tax. 27 
Small retailers, in contrast, pushed for the tax with tremendous zeal. The 
Colorado Civic Association, funded in large part by grocery and drug 
wholesalers in Denver, publicized the value of the tax. Several of these 
wholesalers sponsored their own voluntary chains, including the Red and 
White Stores. Voluntary chains played an important role in the campaign, 
emphasizing that they protected the local community better than chains or 
under-financed independents.28 The Colorado Civic Association promoted the 
chain tax as a way to ensure that outside corporations bore the full cost of 
government in the state. In their campaign rhetoric, they stressed that the
27 ibid, 192.
28 W. W. Schapplerto Landon, March 1, 1935; C. M. Brown to Landon, March 1, 1935; 
Landon to Fulk, March 6, 1935; T. C. Whiteker to Landon, March 1, 1935,- Paul A. 
Crowell to Landon, March 5, 1935. All in 27-11-03-06, folder 4, Landon Papers.
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expense of state government could be spread to outsiders, a powerful incentive 
in the cash-starved 1930s. Their campaign also recycled the anti-chain themes
29of the pre-Roosevelt years. In a little noticed election, the Colorado Civic 
Association won the battle against the chains. Colorado citizens had 
succumbed to the Mississippi syndrome described by Will Rogers, where 
people vote dry if they have to stagger to the polling booth to do it. Although 
Coloradoans shopped in the chains, they still wanted to tax them. The 
Colorado Civic Association used the victory to push several anti-chain 
measures through the legislature in succeeding years. The acts related to
30selling below cost and other trade abuses. But the chains’ defeat in the 
election encouraged them to develop sophisticated public relations campaigns 
to fight taxes. Their efforts resulted in success in the later referendums.31
The Colorado victory set the stage for the most famous of the 
referendums: the 1936 California battle over chain taxes. Some compared the 
furor over the California referendum to the EPIC controversy that occurred
29 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law: A Reference 
Book o f  Fully Documented Facts, 64; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 193.
30 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law, 1; R. B. 
Lamoreaux "To President and Members o f the FTC,” May 4, 1935, OF 288, “Chain 
Stores 1933-1936,” Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York.
31 “Fortune Quarterly Survey,” January 1937, box 37A, folder 8, Patman Papers.
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two years before. The EPIC campaign, promoted by famed author Upton 
Sinclair, pushed for fundamental economic change in California Sinclair 
hoped to transform the golden state into a socialist republic, promoting 
production for use and otherwise disrupting capitalism. Many small business 
owners feared the Sinclair movement and its radical prescriptions for economic 
reform.32 Although Sinclair condemned the growing corporate economy, 
including the chains, his socialism undermined his support from retailers, who 
feared he might take their property.33 Even more problematic, Sinclair 
suggested cooperative stores as an alternative to the chains, hardly the sort of 
proposal small retailers found encouraging.34 Sinclair’s leftist program 
alienated too many other middle class interests.
32 Studs Terkel, Hard Times: An Oral History o f  the Great Depression (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1979, 1986), 32; George W. Inglish to Robinson, March 25, 1935, box 
234, folder 1, Robinson Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 350; Epic 
News, December 24, 1934, 1; Sheridan Downey to Sinclair, March 14, 1934; Downey to 
Sinclair, March 14, 1934, pp. 2-3; Arnold to Royal H. Balcon; Downey to Arnold, April 3, 
1934; Downey to Arnold, March 21,1934; Arnold to Downey, March 26, 1934. All in. box 
9, "Correspondence: 1934 General January-May," Arnold Papers
33 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 349-350; New Republic, July 18, 1934, 
255-259; "The Lament o f the Independent Merchant,” Utopian News, March 18, 1935,
1.
34 United for California League, "Cost Analysis o f Sinclair's Epic Plan," p. 2, box 39, 
folder 40, Brooks Hays Papers, Special Collections, University of Arkansas,
Fayetteville, Arkansas.
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In 1935, he endorsed the passage of a chain tax.35 When a powerful 
group of corporations and wealthy Californians allied to fight the chain tax 
through the referendum, the ensuing campaign dredged up many of the EPIC 
concerns about corporate growth in California. And the connection deepens 
because Sinclair's running mate in 1934, Sheridan Downey, played an 
important role in the referendum on the chain tax.36 Despite this support from 
Downey, the EPIC campaign distanced itself from the chain tax in the 1936 
referendum. The Epic News argued that the retail grocers association opposed 
labor.37 The chains had begun to cooperate with radicals, even advertising in 
the newspapers of the growing Townshend movement. Safeway, in particular, 
argued that it promoted purchasing power by lowering retail prices. They said 
that they looked forward to a day when the elderly would receive pensions and, 
presumably, spend their checks in a Safeway store.38 An organization known
35 National Epic News, June 24,1935, 1; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 354.
36 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 355; Epic News October 5, 12, 19, 1936.
37 National Epic News, September 23, 1935, 1; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 
356.
38 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 350,358-359; Jerry Voorhis to Robert E. 
Clements, February 12, 1936, box 83B, folder 2, Jerry Voorhis Collection, Claremont 
Colleges; Voorhis to W. L. Blair, April 17, 1935, ibid. ', Epic News, June 18, 1934, 1; 
Epic News, October 29, 1934, 1; Winslow Carlton, "Survey o f Proposed Plan for Self- 
Help Cooperatives in California, 1936," Division o f Self-Help Cooperative Service, 
n,d„ pp. 17,23, box 114, folder 22, Voorhis Collection.
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as the Anti-Monopoly League formed in August of 1935 to fight for the chain 
tax. This group received national attention because of the importance of the 
state. They cooperated with the Allied Independent Merchants of California.39 
The retailers received donations from the National Association of Retail 
Grocers.40
Despite these resources, independent retailers, spent only a fraction of 
the money of the chains. The California Chain Store Association, refusing to 
be over-confident like chains in Colorado, ran an excellent campaign against 
the tax. A representative of the California Retail Association, Samuel Leask, 
wrote Colonel Sherill of the American Retail Federation that a powerful battle 
had begun in the state. "Unfortunately, however, we are just now confronted in 
this state with a chain-store bill fight of unprecedented bitterness. The 
legislature last summer. . .passed a graduated tax till the chains, in turn, got 
sufficient signatures to get a referendum on the ballot. In the meantime, 
newspapers and radio have been employed by both sides to such an extent that 
the controversy which has been developed approaches in intensity the EPIC
39 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 346; Albert L. Walters to OMahoney,
August 36,1935, box 197, "Legislation 1935 Federal Licensing-Correspondence #2," 
OMahoney Papers.
40 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 366.
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battle of two years ago.” Leask wrote that the California Retail Association 
could not consider joining the ARF because of the tension between 
independents and chain in the state. 41 An August poll showed that 42 percent 
of Californians supported the tax with 28 percent opposed and another 30 
percent undecided.42
But the chains did an excellent job with public relations in the fall. A 
group called the California Consumers Conference, subsidized by chain 
contributions, paid for newspaper advertisements attacking the store license 
bill. The prominent advertising firm Lord and Thomas drafted the 
advertisements, which warned of the threat posed by the chain tax.4j One of 
the ads featured a mild mannered couple confronted by two immense 
gentlemen tagged "Powerful Wholesaler and Middleman." The two figures are 
stroking a rather innocuous looking sheep, but underneath the sheepskin or 
clothing lurks a hungry wolf: “Higher Prices for Food.” The California
41 Samuel Leask, Jr. to Sherill, August 6, 1936, box 89, "Sherill ARF 1936-1937," Kirstein 
Papers; Sherill to Kirstein, August 12, 1936, pp. 1-2, ibid.; Nation, December 11, 1937; A. 
W. Hughes to Kirstein, December 8, 1941, box 90, "H," Kirstein Papers; Hardware 
Retailer, January 1937; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 346; Sedgley, History 
o f Owl Drug Co, 31.
42 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 366; New York Times, November 5,6,
1936; New York Times, November 15,1936.
43 Edward J. Perkins, From Wall Street to Main Street: Charles Merrill and Middle
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Consumers Conference returned to this theme time and again, always 
emphasizing its slogan "22 is a Tax on You." The group pointed to research by 
the Federal Trade Commission and the Business School at Harvard that 
concluded the tax would be passed on to consumers and lower the standard of 
living. They complained that taxes were high enough already, particularly on 
foods, and urged consumers to “vote NO and keep prices low.” Furthermore, 
they claimed that the tax, which topped out at $500, was more than the net 
profit of four out of five chain stores. 44 Another advertisement showed a voter 
yanking the whiskers of the retail store license from a dastardly looking figure 
straight from a melodrama. The cartoon warned Californians that they would 
pay for the tax if it were not repealed. The EPIC organization also accepted the 
argument that the tax benefited wholesalers, not small retailers 45
The chains produced a statewide radio broadcast of a variety hour and 
trained their managers to promote a grassroots campaign against the tax in
Class Investors (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 119-121.
44 “It’s a New Tax on Your Food,” “Braun and Company, Proposition #22 Retail Store 
Licensing, 1936,” Secretary o f State Papers, California State Archives, Sacramento, 
California.
45 California Chain Store Association, The Fifty Thousand Percent Tax (Sacramento,
California: California Chain Store Association, 1936), 22.
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their stores.46 In addition to these initiatives, the chains sought to show their 
practical benefit to the community. The chains promoted better relations with 
farmers through surplus campaigns. One of the challenges that farmers faced 
was a sudden onslaught of perishable goods. Farmers could lose a portion of 
the value of their crop if  they could not sell their goods. The chains proved 
their ability to market goods when they promoted peach and lamb campaigns 
for farmers desperate to sell a surplus of those products. The chains cooperated 
by advertising the goods and selling them to the consumer at the lowest 
possible price. The campaigns won support from farmers 47
The California referendum proved to be a devastating blow to 
independent forces. Buoyed by these advertisements, fears of inflation and a 
letter-writing and publicity campaign by chain employees, the chain forces 
won a crushing victory in the referendum Only one county supported the
46 Sedgley, History o f Owl Drug, 31.
47 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 360-362, 364-365; Printer's Ink, 
November 19, 1936; Nation, December 11, 1937; Nation's Business, October 1936; 
Lebhar, Chain Stores in America, 247, 320-325; "Inside Story o f the California Chain 
Tax War," Advertising and Selling, February 11, 1937, 53-54; "Nation's Chains Unite in 
Drive to Move Surplus Fruit Crop," Chain Store Age, May 1936, 363; Sacramento 
Union October 28, 1936; Business Week, March 7, 1936, 10; Paiamountain, The 
Politics o f  Distribution, 174.
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tax—San Francisco, where a radicalized population, recently involved in a 
longshoreman strike, hoped to fight back against corporate America.48
The victory for chain forces in California encouraged another fight in 
Colorado. In the second referendum, a number of important groups, including 
farmers and labor, turned against the tax.49 The chains chose to fight the tax 
this time, using an industry group similar to that in California. The group in 
Colorado pointed to the California referendum and the repeal of chain taxes in 
four other states to argue that the taxes had lost favor throughout the nation.50 
They also pointed out that because of the relatively low rate, the tax brought in 
little revenue and proved difficult to enforce, as government bureaucrats had to 
identify chain units in the state.51
In their major attack, however, the chain stores argued that the bill 
helped large wholesalers, exempting them from the same taxes paid by
52corporate chains. Some small retailers criticized the chain store license for
48 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law, I.
49 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law, 12, 19-20, 23, 25; 
"Round Table," March 20, 1938,30-31,35.
50 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law, 1.
51 Mrs. George P. Gibbs to Colorado Chain Store Association, April 22, 1938 in 
Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law, 6-7.
52 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law, 42; Facts,
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adding to their own tax burden to help wholesalers compete with the chains.53 
Building on the point, the chains called the license tax “class legislation” 
because it benefited a few businesses at the expense of the rest of the 
population. They condemned such laws for being un-American because they 
used government to support a minority of the population.54 The chains also 
claimed they could not pay the taxes out of their profits.55 If the chain tax 
remained, they would have to close their stores.56 The burden of the chain tax, 
according to the chains, would therefore fall on the lower-income shoppers 
who patronized their stores. The rich could afford to pay higher prices for 
luxuries like credit and delivery, but those with a more difficult time needed 
the lower prices provided by the chains.57
March 1, 1936, 5.
53 Facts, February 15, 1937, 1; Carl Byoir and Associates, "Current Trends in Chain 
Store Taxation," 3, 5; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 379; Pennsylvania 
Grange News, February 1937, 5; Pennsylvania Grocer, February 1937, 14, 28 June 
1937; Harrisburg Patriot, February 27, 1935.
54 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law, 35.
55 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law, 72.
56 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law, 70.
57 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law, 71, 76.
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Chains argued that they were the targets of misplaced anger. Instead of 
blaming them for the failure of small stores, retailers should look to their own 
under-capitalization and the plethora of retailers in the sector.58 The chains 
complained that voluntary chains dwarfed them in size and did not pay the 
chain taxes. Safeway, according to the chain store operators, had the largest 
corporate chain in Colorado with 193 stores. Yet the Red and White had 246 
stores and Home Owners, another voluntary chain, had more than 200 outlets 
along with 100 IGA affiliates in the state.59 Colorado chain stores addressed 
also the claim that they endangered opportunity. They pointed to the number of 
executives in their organizations who had reached tremendous heights despite 
humble beginnings. Of three division presidents for A & P, one started as a 
shipping clerk, another as a potato weigher, and the third as an errand boy.60
Despite stronger chain store efforts, the pro-tax plurality nearly doubled 
in the state. Frederick Harper credits the victory to the Colorado Civic 
Association and its well-organized campaign and to the relatively mild nature
CO
Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law, 40,63.
59 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law: A Reference Book 
o f  Fully Documented Facts, 3-5, 42-43.
60 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law: A Reference 
Book o f Fully Documented Facts, 35.
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of the tax.61 Despite the independents’ victory in Colorado, the fate of chain 
taxes seemed bleak. The struggle over the taxes and the split over their 
usefulness, contributed to a turn against these taxes, as did a series of court 
rulings. The number of proposed tax bills dropped, and no new states stepped
forward to consider these taxes in 1939. But several states did repeal their
62taxes and others lowered the rate of chain taxation.
A number of factors explain the decline of chain taxes. First, many 
Americans doubted the effectiveness of the taxes to control chain store growth. 
There were several available means to fight the taxes. Among the possibilities, 
other than simply closing less productive stores, was to sell units to local 
managers and become wholesalers. Another option was to re-incorporate firms
61 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 403; "Colorado No," Time Magazine, 
November 21, 1938; New York Times, November 10,1938; New York Times, November 25, 
1938.
62 Victor Schiff to John Gross, August 8, 1939, box 18, "Areas o f Study Pertinent to 
Labor Economics," Colorado State Federation o f Labor; Carl Byoir and Associates, 
"Current Trends in Chain Store Taxation," 3, 5, 8-9, 15, 22; Harper, “The Anti-Chain 
Store Movement,” 211, 374, 406-408; New Republic, May 6, 1940, 599-601; Stratton 
Shartel to Capper, July 19, 1939, p.2, box 38, "Chain Stores," Capper Papers; Dunbar S. 
McLaurin, "Prolegonoma Considerations on the History o f the Chain Store 1938," box 
282, folder 3, Barnett Papers; Phil Anderson to Capper, July 11, 1939, box 38, “Chain 
Stores,” Capper Papers; Capper to F. B. Cunningham, July 23, 1939, box 38, "Chain 
Stores;" Capper to Shartel, July 26, 1939; Shartel to Capper, August 1, 1939; Carl Byoir 
and Associates, "Current Trends in Chain Store Taxation," p.3, box 18, "Areas of Study 
Pertinent to Labor Economics," Colorado State Federation o f Labor; A&P v. Kentucky 
Tax Commission, 128 SW  (2d) 581; Stewart Dry Goods Company v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 
550.
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in each individual state, as Standard Oil had done. In Florida, the parent 
company of Winn-Dixie incorporated itself into five different firms so that it 
could m inim ize the effects of the chain tax. Yet a third was to open 
supermarkets, so that the chains could minimize the effects of the tax on
63themselves by lowering their number of stores. Second, some retailers 
worried that passing taxes would lead to a cycle of dangerous taxation on 
retailers.64 This argument proved accurate when 1939 Supreme Court 
decisions over Colorado and North Carolina laws determined that voluntary 
chains would be subject to chain taxes. In both states, voluntary chains had 
played a vital role in passing the laws. Now they were subject to the same 
taxes. The plan had backfired.65 Third, certain independent retailers believed
63 Roger Babson, "Chain Store Tax Not Fatal," June 14, 1937 in 110.E.6 8 F, Benson 
Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 371, 373; A & P  v. Grosjean; J. E. 
Davis, Don’t Make A&P Mad (Montana: J. E. Davis, 1990), 96.
64 Carl Byoir and Associates, "Current Trends in Chain Store Taxation," 3, 5; Harper, 
“The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 379; Pennsylvania Grange News, February 1937, 5; 
Pennsylvania Grocer, February 1937, 14, 28; Pennsylvania Grocer, June 1937, 4-5; 
Harrisburg Patriot February 27, 1935.
65 Kansas Business, March 1939, 5, 13; Stratton Shartel to Landon, October 8, 1935, 27- 
11-03-06, folder 4, Landon Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 409- 
411; M. W. Lee, "Recent Trends in Chain Store Tax Legislation” in Journal o f Business 
vol. 10 (1940): 253-74, 266; Newsweek, June 12, 1939; "Blow at Voluntaries; they're 
liable to chain tax, Colorado Supreme Court Rules,” Business Week, June 3, 1939, 14; 
Belk Brothers v. Maxwell, 200 S.E. 915; Bedford v. Gamble-Skogmo Inc. 91 Pac. (2d) 
475; New York Times, June 21, 1938, January 6,1939.
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the push for chain taxes hurt their image because it made them look desperate
for protection from superior competition.66 Moreover, as the 1930s
progressed, and the chains had not destroyed their independent competitors,
the claims of the 1930s seemed more and more unreal. The 1935 Census of
Distribution showed a halt in chain growth, and new institutions, like the
independent supermarket, appeared to be the future of retailing  67 A  few state
politicians promoted the issue at the close of the decade, but the force of the
68anti-chain crusade had been spent. In 1941, a referendum in Utah resulted in 
an overwhelming defeat for the chain tax in that state. The era of anti-chain 
taxation had reached its end.69 Even in Colorado, the chains enjoyed a brisk 
business. Americans had made their decision about chain stores and their value 
to the economy.70
Although chain taxation had become unpopular, fair trade legislation, 
which seemed to be less radical and without obvious expense to the consumer,
66 Kansas Business, March 1939, 5, 13-14.
67 Monod, Store Wars, 338-339, 347; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 375-376, 
379; Pennsylvania Grange News, February 1937, 5; Pennsylvania Grocer, February 1937, 
14, 28 June 1937, 4-5; Fischelis to DargaveL, April 26, 1939, box 35, folder 14, Fischelis 
Papers.
68 The Commercial Bulletin, April 1938,2.
69 Utah Labor News, March 17, 1939, p.l, box37C, folder 1 Patman Papers.
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was more palatable. Fair Trade legislation built on federal efforts to pass price 
maintenance legislation. Although the National Recovery Administration took 
Capper-Kelly’s place on a federal level, state supporters of price maintenance 
pushed for so-called “Junior Capper-Kelly” bills to acquire certain safeguards 
in the states. In California, independents, chains, and manufacturers, 
particularly in the drug industry, cooperated to produce the first in a series of 
fair trade laws. The law permitted firms to set retail prices for the products— 
with or without the permission of retailers.71 California’s fair trade law became 
the model for dozens of state laws, passed between 1933 and 1937. These 
efforts became more widespread after a 1936 Supreme Court decision ruled 
them constitutional. In that decision, the Court ruled that a company had a 
right to set prices for products it produced. According to the majority opinion, 
cut-rate pricing damaged manufacturers because it made their products appear 
cheap or shoddy.72 Another sort of fair trade law was the unfair practices act,
70 Casiow, The Sob-Squad, 210.
71 Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement," 61-62, 374-375; Facts, February 15, 1937, 
21 .
72 Palamountain, The Politics o f  Distribiction, 172; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement,” 196; Nebbia v. People o f  New York, 291 U.S. 502.
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which specifically targeted sales of products below cost These bills targeted 
supermarkets, which had grown at an impressive clip since the mid-1930s.73
Although many manufacturers had supported such bills, retailers 
proved to be some of their strongest advocates. Retailers hoped fair trade 
acts would provide stability, stopping the price wars that had characterized 
the Depression years.74 They believed that the problems of business 
stemmed from dishonest and predatory actions by a few. If businessmen 
could be forced to behave in an above-board fashion, sanity could return to 
the economy.75 Many supported fair trade bills because they feared the 
impact of supermarkets and reckless independent retailers.76 Druggists
73 Harper, ‘The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 65-68; Taggart, Michigan Business 
Studies vol. 7 no. 3, 69; Bender, A History o f  Arizona Pharmacy, 99-100, 104; Fischelis 
to Dunn, March 21, 1935, box 28, folder 3, Robert Fischelis Papers, Wisconsin State 
Historical; Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 259; Fischelis to 
Dunn, April 24, 1933, box 28, folder 3, Fischelis Papers; Robert Tannenbaum, Cost 
Under the Unfair Practices Acts (Chicago: Universiy o f Chicago, Studies in Business 
Administration volume DC number 2, 1939), 60.
74 Rowland Jones to Roosevelt, May 18, 1937, OF 277, “Anti-Trust Laws January-April 
1937,” Roosevelt Library; James Farley to James Roosevelt, May 18, 1937, box 68, 
“Tydings-Miller Bill,” James Roosevelt Papers; Fischelis, "Radio Address Sponsored by the 
Federation o f Citizens Associations," p.3, box 27, folder 13, Fischelis Papers; Fischelis to 
Dargavel, December 13, 1935, box 57, folder 12, Fischelis Papers; Fischelis to the 
Secretary o f the Retail Drug Trade Alliance, May 2, 1934, box 114, folder 15, Fischelis 
Papers; Wm. G. A. Rruenmelbein to Fischelis, February 23, 1934, box 114, folder 15, 
Fischelis Papers; William H. Stein to Louis Howe, April 12, 1933, OF 288, "Chain Stores 
1933-1934," Roosevelt Papers.
'5 Facts, February 15,1937, 8-12,18-19.
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provide enthusiastic and organized support for the bills, leading a nationwide 
charge to pass fair trade legislation. Booksellers and tobacco dealers proved to 
be another important source of support77
Opposition to chain tax bills stemmed from consumer groups and 
farmers. Consumer groups feared that they would raise prices at the checkout 
counter. Farmers worried that only manufactured products would rise and, as a
78result, they would lose the battle against a rising cost of living. Although 
these groups complained, they mounted minimal opposition to this legislation 
on a state level. Some opposition developed to the operation of the laws, but no 
substantial dissent.79 Because of the limited opposition, these bills swept 
through the states in 1937, setting the stage for a federal price maintenance
o n
law: the Miller-Tydings Act.
76 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 63, 65; Bender, A History o f  Arizona 
Pharmacy, 98; J. H. Foley to Landon, July 12, 1935,27-11-03-06, folder 4, Landon Papers; 
K. J. M. Cooper to Landon, August 8,1935, ibid.
77 Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 254-5; Crichton Clarke to 
McIntyre, September 17, 1936, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 1933-1936," 
Roosevelt Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 65.
78 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 63.
79 Bender, A History o f Arizona Pharmacy, 104.
Q Q
Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 256; W. A. Ayres to 
Roosevelt, April 14, 1937, F 110 E 6 8, Benson Papers; FDR to Elmer Benson, May 6, 
1937; Roosevelt to the President o f the Senate, April 24, 1937; Benson to Roosevelt,
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The success of fair trade and the failure of chain taxes show the limits 
of the anti-chain campaign in the United States. Americans wanted to see 
controls on chains. They fretted about the growth of the corporate economy 
and worried that small business might be crushed by corporate monopoly. At 
the same time, tfciey wanted to pay lower prices for goods and distrusted 
government taxation. They showed no willingness to destroy corporate chains 
as such. The attacks on the chains would have stark limits in the American 
system.
April 27, 1937; Rowland Jones to Roy A. Paulson April 23, 1937; Dargavel to Benson, 
May 10, 1937 MaryLand Governor to Roosevelt, May 6, 1937; Harry Nice to Roosevelt, 
May 16, 1937; Maryland Governor Cummings to Roosevelt, May 19, 1937; C. M. 
Brown to McAdoo, June 8, 1937; ‘Trank Mortenson and the President,” file memo, 
June 18, 1937; Leslie Jensen to Roosevelt, June 2, 1937; E. D. Rivers to Roosevelt, 
June 5, 1937, 1; Independent Druggists o f Idaho to Roosevelt, June 22, 1937; Mayor 
Walter A. Griffin to  Roosevelt, June 22, 1937 Peyton Hawes to Roosevelt, June 22, 
1937; Board o f Trade o f Boston Book Merchants to Roosevelt, June 30, 1937; Elmer 
Benson to Roosevelt, July 16, 1937. All in OF 277, “Anti-Trust Laws May-July 1937,”
Roosevelt Papers; Harvard Law Review, February 1937.
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Chapter Eight: Miller-Tydings and the Patman Death Tax
Encouraged by the burst of fair trade victories at the state level, retailers 
sought further federal solutions to their problems during the Roosevelt 
recession of 1938. They argued that the chains still used illegal sales and 
purchasing practices, and they called for the government to put an end to this 
behavior. The resulting Miller-Tydings Act enabled state legislatures to pass 
fair trade acts and required out of state firms to conduct business according to 
their provisions. In other words, it extended state laws on price maintenance to 
products involved in interstate commerce. As such, the act served as a new 
version of the defunct Capper-Kelly bill. Pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
the National Association of Retail Druggists were enthusiastic about the 
potential of price maintenance legislation. Although retailers took its success 
and the increasing attacks by the administration on corporations to be a signal 
to push for further and more radical legislation against the chains, the most 
drastic anti-chain bill, the Patman Chain Store Tax bill, failed utterly. It would 
have levied a federal tax on chains, designed to eliminate interstate chains by 
taxing them out of business. The fates of these very different pieces of
293
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legislation marked the limits of anti-chain reform in the United States. Small 
retailers could persuade legislators to support minor taxes and federal and state 
regulations designed to ensure fair competition. They could not convince them 
to destroy the chains.
The Miller-Tydings Act developed out of earlier price maintenance 
legislation: the Capper-Kelly bill, which had been supported by small retailers 
since the mid-1920s. Desperate retailers hoped for protection from ferocious 
price competition.1 When the Capper-Kelly bill failed to pass on a national 
level in the early 1930s, small retailers in California sought to secure a “junior 
Capper-Kelly bill” in their state. The bill permitted manufacturers to sign 
contracts with retailers to stabilize prices and required non-signers to live by 
the terms of the contract. In effect, manufacturers could set the price for their 
products. After a Supreme Court decision upheld the contracts, twenty-five 
state legislatures enacted similar laws. Although these state acts promised relief 
for small retailers, they did not extend enough coverage since they only applied
1 Dargavel to Fischelis, September 16, 1935, box 57, folder 12, Fischelis Papers, 
Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin. See also William Ayres to 
Robinson, February 1, 1937; G. R. Massey to Robinson, January 20, 1937; Dargavel to 
Robinson, January 26, 1937, 3; William Ayres to Joseph Pyle, March 2, 1937. All in box 
257, folder 2, Robinson Papers.
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to intra-state trade. Retailers therefore sought federal legislation that would 
authorize state legislatures to protect goods in interstate commerce.2
Some retailers hoped Arthur Capper would re-introduce the Capper- 
Kelly bill. For example, H. C. Petersen of the National Association of Retail 
Grocers, begged the Kansas senator to resume work on price maintenance.3 
Instead, the National Association of Retail Druggists sponsored new legislation 
written by their counsel, Herbert Levy, and introduced by his former law 
partner, Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland.4 The bill worked as enabling
2 C. M. Sandstron to Capper, December 14, 1936, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1936-1939," Capper 
Papers; Ingersoll to Capper, January 26, 1937, box 39, ‘Tair Trade, 1936-1939,” Capper 
Papers; Ingersoll to Capper, January 30, 1937; Ingersoll to Capper, March 5, 1937, box 39, 
'Tair Trade 1936-1939,” Capper Papers.
3 Ingersoll to Capper, January 26, 1937, box 39, "Fair Trade 1936-1939," Capper 
Papers; H. C. Petersen to Capper, June 27, 1935, box 39, "Fair Trade 1933-1935," 
Capper Papers; Petersen to Capper, July 3, 1935; Moffett to Capper, August 6, 1935; 
Frank Collins to Capper, January 27, 1937, box 38, "Chain Stores," Capper Papers; 
Collins to McCollum, January 27, 1937, p.2; Patman to "Dear Friend," January 16, 
1937, p.2; Dargavel to Capper, January 26, 1937; Parsons to Capper, January 27, 1937; 
Capper to Dargavel, January 29, 1937; Capper to Parsons, January 29, 1937. All in box 
39, "Fair Trade 1933-1935," Capper Papers.
4 Frank Mortenson to Arthur Capper, January 3, 1933, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1933-1935" 
Capper Papers; Joe Demain to Capper, January 17,1933; E. C. Brockmeyer to Capper; 
Henry B. Joy to Capper, April 6,1933; L.W. Faber to CapperApril 12,1933; Whittier to 
Nelson Gasidll, April 14,1933; Whittier to Capper, April 13,1933; Gaskill to the American 
Fair Trade Association, April 11, 1933; Phil Anderson of the Kansas Book Dealers 
Association to Capper, May 8,1933; Mrs. A  J. Rowlands to Capper, May 12,1933;
Kansas City Star, May 2, 1933; The Paris Dry Goods Company of Great Falls, Montana to 
Wheeler, May 27,1933, pp. 1-2; New York Pharmacist, April 1933 ,7-8; E. A  Raymone to 
Capper, August 29,1934. All inbox 39, 'Tair Trade 1933-1935," Capper Papers; Crichton 
Clarke to Capper, December 6,1934; Kelly to Capper, December 17,1934; Weeks to
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legislation, permitting state laws that would control the price of products sold 
in interstate trade. Because of the structure of the Constitution, the state bills 
could only govern prices for products manufactured by companies 
incorporated in the state. If they attempted to control the prices for other goods, 
they were regulating interstate commerce, something the Constitution 
specifically confined to the United States Congress. Under the Miller-Tydings 
Act, legislatures could regulate prices in their states because the final sale came 
within their borders and was not, therefore, an interstate purchase.5
Supporters of price maintenance argued that the bill should be passed so 
that state legislatures could maintain prices in their states.6 They also 
encouraged the passage of additional state fair trade laws to create a 
bandwagon effect for the federal law. If forty-three legislatures were in session,
Capper, January 25,1935; E. Moffett to Capper, June 5, 1935; Ingersoll to Capper, January
26,1937, pp. 4-5, box 39, "Fair Trade 1936-1939," Capper Papers; Ingersoll to Capper, 
January 13, 1936; Frank Collins to Capper, January 20,1937, box 39, "Fair Trade 1936- 
1939,” Capper Papers; Dargavel to Capper, October 23, 1935; W. E. Moffett to Capper, 
November 26, 1935; Dargavel to Capper, December 10,1935; Printer's Ink, June 27,1935; 
Wm. H. Ingersoll to Capper, January 13,1936, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1936-1939," Capper 
Papers; Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 256-257.
5 Ingersoll to Capper, January 26, 1937, p.2, box 39, "Fair Trade 1936-1939," Capper 
Papers; Ingersoll to Capper, January 26,1937, p.3, ibid
6 Ingersoll to Capper, February 8, 1937, box 39, "Fair Trade 1936-1939,” Capper 
Papers.
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some hoped to see thirty new acts passed. By the time the bill was promoted, 
over forty percent of the population lived in states with price maintenance bills. 
John Dargavel, executive director of the National Association of Retail 
Druggists, wrote Capper that the Miller-Tydings bill would become the 
equivalent of the Capper-Kelly bill with accompanying state legislation if it 
passed.8 Although some price maintenance supporters worried that the act 
exempted states without fair trade laws, and wanted to wait for more complete 
legislation, many small shopkeepers supported the bill because of their 
concerns about retail stability.9
Small retailers flooded the halls of Congress with telegrams and letters 
expressing their support for the bill.10 The National Association of Retail
7 “Resolution in Support o f Dies HR11167 Fair Trade Enabling Act,” February 26, 1937 
box 213, folder 14, Robinson Papers; Dargavel to Lucas, December 10, 1935, box 303, 
folder 7, Lucas Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement, “ 385; Ingersoll to 
Capper January 26,1937, p.3, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1936-1939," Capper Papers.
8 Dargavel to Capper, February 2, 1937, pp. 1-2, box 39, "Fair Trade 1936-1939,” Capper 
Papers; OMahoney to Louise J. Thompson, April 9, 1937, p.2, box 49, "Tydings-Miller 
Bill—Letters Committing on It," OMahoney Papers.
9 Ingersoll to Capper, February 6, 1937; New York Times, January 31, 1937; Ingersoll to 
Capper, March 31, 1938; Ingersoll to Capper, April 5, 1938; Collins to McCollum, 
February 2, 1937; Ingersoll to Collins, February 10, 1937. All in box 39, 'Tair Trade 
1936-1939,” Capper Papers.
10 Ray Wellens to U.S. Senate, March 10, 1937, pp. 1-2, box 257, folder 2, Robinson Paper; 
E. W. Pelley to Amlie, n.d, box 81, folder 5, Amlie Papers; Winsborough to Capper, 
February 14,1937, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1936-1939,” Capper Papers; "Price Maintenance,"
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Druggists developed a “captain plan.” In every congressional district, a 
pharmacist took responsibility for drumming up letters of support for the 
Miller-Tydings bill.11 The retailers argued that the Miller-Tydings Act would 
have a positive effect on the nation because it would delay the growth of 
corporate retailing and, thus, ensure American prosperity and the equality of 
opportunity, which had, in their opinion, characterized the United States from 
the beginning. Some supporters of price maintenance feared the specter of 
government intrusion and argued that the bill brought a quick solution to the 
threat of corporate America without creating a bureaucracy.12
Supporters of price maintenance warned that America’s prosperity and 
independence stood in jeopardy because of inadequate policing of chain 
retailing. These retailers continued the complaint that the chains deceived the 
public into purchasing inferior products. Apparent bargains actually disguised
March 17,1937, box 81, folder 5, Amlie Papers; Charming Sweitzer to "Dear Sir," February 
3,1937; Retailing, January 25, 1937; A. L. Nasauto Amlie, February 8,1937, box 81, 
folder 5, Amlie Papers; Milwaukee Drug Company to Amlie, February 6,1937, ibid.
n Dargavel to OMahoney, February 18, 1936, box 242, "Legislation 1936 Tydings Fair 
Trade Bill," OMahoney Papers; John P. Tripeny to OMahoney, June 23, 1937; Dale G. 
Kilbum to OMahoney, April 29, 1937; Nick Duzik to OMahoney, January 28, 1937; 
Afton, Wyoming to O’ Mahoney, February 9, 1937; Mrs. Geo. R Keeney to OMahoney, 
April 3,1937. All in box 49, "Tydings-Miller Bill," OMahoney Papers.
12 Collins to Capper, February 1, 1937, p.2, box 39, ‘Tair Trade, 1936-1939,” Capper 
Papers; French C. Jones to Borah, March 10, 1938, p.2, box 33, folder “Borah,” Pat
McCarran Papers, Special Collections, University o f Nevada-Reno.
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deceptive pricing schemes and shoddy products.13 Even if they offered real 
savings, however, chains drained money from the local economy and sent their 
profits to Eastern cities. But small retailers also told of how they felt crushed 
by competition. A California retailer lamented that his products were being 
used as “footballs” by large corporations, with these corporate giants playing 
games with his livelihood.14 One Little Rock, Arkansas, gas station owner 
complained that his chain competitors received rebates from the oil companies, 
which amounted to the total profit on a gallon. His complaints resemble those 
of the gas station owner in the Grapes o f Wrath. In that novel, a small gas 
station owner complained that no one stopped by his store. Instead, he 
lamented, they passed him by to shop at one of the big “company stores” in 
town. Tom snapped at him, breaking off his complaints. Why wouldn’t they 
shop at those stores, he asked. Why didn’t the station owner try to improve the 
quality of his service? 15
13 OMahoney to Louise J. Thompson, April 9, 1937, p.2, box 49, "Tydings-Miller Bill— 
Letters Committing on It," OMahoney Papers; E. R. Richer to Retailers, September 9,
1936, Dave Jones Collection, American Heritage Center, University o f Wyoming, Laramie, 
Wyoming.
14 Frank Havener to McIntyre, May 5, 1937, p.2, OF 277, “Anti-Trust Laws May-July
1937,” Roosevelt Papers.
15 John Steinbeck, The Grapes o f  Wrath (New York: Penguin Books, 1939, 1976), 161- 
164; Bert Berry to Robinson, February 1. 1937, pp. 1-2, box 245, folder 6, Robinson
299
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Even some chain drug stores, however, felt the brute force of 
competition and embraced the price maintenance solution.. The searing effect 
of competition from so-called pineboard shops hurt many of the chains. These 
stores, which received their name because of cheap shelving, offered products 
at cut-rate prices, hoping to sell enough products to survive on a tight margin. 
Many of them could not survive, but they often took established chain and 
independent stores down with them. In October of 1932 Owl Drug went into 
receivership and its officers later supported fair trade legislation and the Miller- 
Tydings legislation as important responses to a threatening retail environment. 
They felt pineboard stores promoted dangerous and destabilizing 
competition.16
The effects of corporate retailing would be devastating to American 
notions of opportunity. As one retailer expressed it, the chain store "rides 
rough-shod down Independent Avenue." According to him, they interfered 
with the freedom of America by their size, power and ability to control the 
economy. He begged for an end to the monopoly control over “money, life,
Papers.
16 Sedgley, History o f Owl Drug, 12.
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17liberty and the pursuit of happiness. . . One Wyoming retailer wrote 
President Roosevelt that the independent retailer was “ . .apparently destined 
to follow the Indian and the buffalo over the horizon." He argued that it was 
better to have thousands of merchants and their clerks voting than “ . millions 
of employees dominated by, and dependent for their living upon the whims of 
a few Algeresque tycoons or the doubtful leadership of labor executives."18 
Crichton Clarke, an attorney for the American Booksellers Association, 
suggested that the Sherman Anti-trust Act, as interpreted by the courts, had led 
to considerable danger to small business. Corporate chains continued to grow 
in the absence of price contracts, but small retailers could not respond by 
cooperating to maintain prices. As an Assistant Attorney General from New 
Orleans wrote, the Supreme Court had eviscerated protection under the laws. 
The effect had been devastating: "Since then the small storekeeper and 
individual entrepreneur have progressively disappeared from the scene, [sic] It 
is too late to go back, it cannot be done, all that can be done now is to regulate 
these gigantic corporations and monopolies and make them give back to the
17 Arnold Craft, "Human Necessity vs. Monopoly," pp. 2,4, 8 in Arnold Craft to 
Roosevelt, January 11, 1937, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws January-April 1937," Roosevelt 
Papers.
18 A. E. Roedel to FDR n.d., pp.2 -3 , box 49, "Tydings-Miller Bill," OMahoney Papers.
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people, in taxes, wages, hours, etc, what they illegally acquired or wrested 
from the people who now need such assistance.".19
Despite the defection of chain drug stores, most mass retailers continued
to oppose price maintenance. Miller-Tydings met predictable resistance from
20large retailers, who had been long opposed to the chains. Macy’s, for 
example, and the National Retail Dry Goods Association challenged any bill 
depriving retailers of the right to determine the price of their products. They 
warned the administration that the bill threatened to undermine other economic 
achievements of the New Deal.21
As had been the case with the Robinson-Patman bill, mass retailers
22found support from the National Grange, consumers, and labor. All of these
19 Crichton Clarke to McIntyre, September 17, 1936, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust 
Laws 1933-1936," Roosevelt Papers; William Boizelle to FDR, June 12, 1937, OF 277, 
“Anti-Trust Laws May-July 1937,” Roosevelt Papers.
20 Dargavel to Capper, February 21, 1939, pp. 1-2, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1936-1939,” Capper 
Papers; Dargavel to Capper, March 16, 1937, box 39, "Fair Trade 1936-1939,” Capper 
Papers.
21 Ayres to Roosevelt, April 14, 1937; Percy Straus to Maurgerite LeHand, April 20, 1937; 
Percy Straus to Roosevelt, April 20, 1937, pp.2-3; FJD.R Memo to McIntyre, April 21, 
1937. All in OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws January-April 1937," Roosevelt Papers.
22 Harold R. Young to McIntyre, March 17, 1937, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws January- 
April 1937," Roosevelt Papers; Maury Marks to OMahoney, [n.d., 1937], box 49, 
"Tydings-Miller Bill—Letters Committing on It," O’Mahoney Papers; Celler to 
Roosevelt, April 14, 1937, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws January-April 1937," Roosevelt 
Papers; Teague to Taylor, February 8, 1937, box 25, folder 1, Henry Charles Taylor
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groups worried about die rise of consumer prices. William Green, the president 
of the American Federation of Labor, protested that the bill would increase 
prices for the consumer. Under the National Recovery Administration, he 
wrote, fair labor and wage standards had balanced provisions to stabilize 
prices. Since the demise of the NRA, he had witnessed a sustained rise in 
prices with the cost o f living 22 percent higher than that of March 1933, 
reducing the purchasing power of the consumer's dollar. If this continues, he 
wrote, gains from wage increases would be completely wiped out—a 
catastrophe for the vast majority of the consuming public.23
Because the Miller-Tydings bill simply enabled legislatures to control 
prices in their states, it should have been easy to pass. It certainly had better 
prospects than the old Capper-Kelly bill because of the mandate from state 
legislatures. Nevertheless, concern for consumer prices led to some resistance 
in the Judiciary Committee. Another delay resulted when the Supreme Court 
Packing controversy, Roosevelt’s controversial attempt to expand the size of 
the Court, occupied most of the attention of the committee 24 Opposition to
Papers; Teague to Taylor, March 27, 1937, box 25, folder 1, Henry Charles Taylor 
Papers.
23 William Green to Roosevelt, April 29, 1937, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws May-July 
1937,” Roosevelt Papers.
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Miller-Tydings grew when word came that President Roosevelt did not support 
the legislation. For its part, the FTC weighed in with its own opposition. In the 
view of W. A. Ayres, the chairman of the commission, the Miller-Tydings Act 
ran counter to the Sherman Anti-trust Act and other anti-trust measures. It 
threatened to raise prices to the consumer and use government power to benefit 
small retailers. In addition, Ayres warned that the fair trade acts passed by the 
states differed in form and would, therefore, create a patchwork set of pricing 
laws, undermining the uniformity of national economic policy. Perhaps worse, 
the bill turned over price setting to the whim of private corporations, 
endangering the public interest.25 Henry Morgenthau, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, also condemned the bill for raising prices.26 The Attorney General, 
Homer Cummings, responsible for the Anti-trust division, believed the bill to
24 Ingersoll to Capper, February 5,1937, telegram, box 39, 'Tair Trade 1936-1939,” Capper 
Papers; Sales Management, February 1,1937 in box 39, "Fair Trade 1936-1939,” Capper 
Papers; O' Mahoney to Louise J. Thompson, April 9,1937, box 49, "Tydings-Miller Bill— 
Letters Committing on It," OMahoney Papers.
25 W. A  Ayres to Roosevelt, April 14,1937, p.3; W. A  Ayres to Roosevelt, April 14,1937; 
FDR to Benson May 6, 1937; Roosevelt to the President o f the Senate April 24,1937. All in 
F 110 E 6 8, Benson Papers.
Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 257; Secretary o f the Treasury 
to Roosevelt, April 6, 1937, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws January-April 1937," Roosevelt 
Papers; Morgenthau to Roosevelt, April 6, 1937, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws January- 
April 1937," Roosevelt Papers.
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be ill-advised.27 Because of the advice of these administration figures, 
Roosevelt worked through Senate Majority leader, Joe Robinson to delay the 
bill28
When word leaked about the president’s actions, retailers looked for 
ways to change Roosevelt’s mind on the matter. John Dargavel of the National 
Association of Retail Druggists, wrote the President in protest. Reports blame 
the delay of the vote on the President, Dargavel wrote. "We hope these rumors 
are untrue and unfounded because we cannot conceive of you taking this 
position. This legislation is in the interest of the small business man and the 
consumer.” Dargavel cited what had happened in California law, where prices 
had declined since passage of a price maintenance law. He warned Roosevelt 
that he spoke on behalf of 54,000 independent druggists. In response, the 
president’s secretary, Martin McIntyre replied that FDR wanted to check the 
effect the bill would have on living costs and its implications for anti-trust 
policy.29 This letter incensed Dargavel.30 The trade executive wrote back that
27 Homer Cummings to McIntyre, September 23, 1936, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust 
Laws 1933-1936," Roosevelt Papers.
28 Joe Robinson to Roosevelt April 26, 1937; W. A. Ayres to Roosevelt April 14, 1937; 
Chester Gray to McIntyre April 29, 1937. All in Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 
1933-1936," Roosevelt Papers.
29 McIntyre to Dargavel, May 1, 1937; Joe Baker to McIntyre April 28, 1937; Dargavel
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the President’s actions might spark a rebellion against the administration by 
small retailers. Dargavel complained that he was getting the run-around in 
classic ‘Tinker to Evers to Chance fashion, preventing him from getting his 
thoughts before the President31 In reply to Dargavel’s second letter, Roosevelt 
wrote that, "Quite frankly, I am entirely sympathetic to much of the viewpoint 
expressed, and we are working toward an equitable solution of the whole 
problem involved." But Roosevelt reiterated that he wanted to look at the 
effects of the bill and the way in which it related to the nature of anti-trust The 
“scope and perplexities of this problem,” in his view, required more cautious
32action.
For the next two months, supporters o f the bill tried to sway the 
President. They worked, in particular, through senators and governors to get 
an audience with the President.33 James Roosevelt, the President’s son and
to Roosevelt April 26, 1937. All in OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws January-April 1937," 
Roosevelt Papers.
30 Dargavel to Roosevelt May 3, 1937, pp. 3-4, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws January-April 
1937," Roosevelt Papers.
31 Dargavel to McIntyre, May 14, 1937, pp.2-3, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws January-April 
1937," Roosevelt Papers.
32 Roosevelt to Dargavel, May 21, 1937; R. B. to McIntyre, May 15, 1937; Rowland Jones 
to Roosevelt, May 18,1937, pp.2-3. All in OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws January-April 1937," 
Roosevelt Papers.
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secretary, knew some advocates of the bill, and the younger Roosevelt 
encouraged his father to sign the bill.34 But retailers also intensified the 
telegram and letter campaign by average retailers. Administration members 
bristled at these mass mailings because of the strain it put on their clerical 
staff. W. A. Ayres, chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, complained 
that the FTC had answered six hundred letters protesting the President's 
stand on this legislation when another six hundred arrived. Ayres 
immediately suspected that they came from an organized lobbying effort
33 Dargavel to Fischelis, May 5, 1937, box 35, folder 14, Fischelis Papers; Elmer 
Benson to Roosevelt, April 27, 1937, F 110 E 6 8, Benson Papers; Rowland Jones to 
Roy A. Paulson, April 23, 1937; A. B. Chandler to Roosevelt May 10, 1937; W. A. 
Ayres to Harry Totten, April 30, 1937. A ll in OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws May-July 
1937," Roosevelt Papers; Farley to James Roosevelt, May 18, 1937, box 68, "Tydings- 
Miller Bill," James Roosevelt Papers; John Cummings to Roosevelt, May 6, 1937; 
Harry Nice to Roosevelt, May 16, 1937; Maryland Governor Cummings to Roosevelt, 
May 19, 1937; C. M. Brown to McAdoo, June 8, 1937; ‘Trank Mortenson and the 
President,” file memo, June 18, 1937; Leslie Jensen to Roosevelt, June 2, 1937; E. D. 
Rivers to Roosevelt, June 5, 1937, 1; "Independent Druggists o f Idaho to Roosevelt, 
June 22, 1937; Mayor Walter A. Griffin to Roosevelt, June 22, 1937; Peyton Hawes to 
Roosevelt, June 22, 1937; Board o f Trade o f Boston Book Merchants to Roosevelt, 
June 30, 1937; Theodore Christianson to Roosevelt, June 29, 1937, Elmer Benson to 
Roosevelt, July 16, 1937; All in OF 277 “Anti-Trust Laws May-July 1937,” Roosevelt 
Papers; Dargavel to Benson, May 10, 1937, F 110 E 6 8, Benson Papers; Harvard Law 
Review, February 1937.
34 James Roosevelt to Attorney General, June 22, 1937; A. G. to James Roosevelt, June 
23, 1937; James Roosevelt to Parsons June 2, 1937; J. A. Latimer to James Roosevelt, 
June 18, 1937; Latimer to Farley, June 14, 1937; Parsons to J. R., May 27, 1937, p.2; 
James H. Allen to Roosevelt, June 29, 1937. All in box 68, "Tydings-Miller Bill," James 
Roosevelt Papers.
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because of their similar wording. He later wrote McIntyre that an informant 
had confirmed this suspicion.35
Despite the retailers’ efforts, Roosevelt remained firm in his opposition 
to the bill.36 In order to push the bill through Congress, Millard Tydings 
attached it as an amendment, or rider, to the appropriations bill for the District 
of Columbia. Roosevelt could not veto Miller-Tydings without cutting funds to 
the District of Columbia.37 Needless to say, the President resented the 
maneuver. In order to reach an agreement with the administration, Tydings 
negotiated some revisions of the bill. After a conference with the President, 
arranged with the help of Wright Patman, Tydings agreed to include qualifiers, 
limiting the bill to goods of the same class in “free and open competition.” In
35 W. A. Ayres to McIntyre, May 24, 1937; John Ashmore to "My Fellow Druggists," 
May 20, 1937; Charles Martin to Roosevelt, May 4, 1937; Henry Morgenthau, Jr. to 
Early, May 14, 1937; George Burger to McIntyre, May 12, 1937; Oberta Barrows to 
Burger, May 13, 1937; Joe Baker to McIntyre, May 13, 1937; McIntyre to the President 
April 18, 1937. All in OF 277 "Anti-Trust Laws January-April 1937," Roosevelt Papers; 
Joseph Spivak to Roosevelt, August 12, 1937; Celler to Roosevelt, August 6, 1937; 
Celler to McIntyre September 16, 1937; Roosevelt to McIntyre, September 21, 1937, 
memorandum; All in OF 277, “Anti-Trust Laws August-December 1937, Roosevelt 
Papers; “File Memo,” OF 277, “Anti-trust Laws, 1937,” Roosevelt Papers.
j6 OMahoney to Tripeny, June 25, 1937; Charles Heale to OMahoney, June 30, 1937; 
Greybull Market to OMahoney, February 19, 1937. All in box 49, "Tydings-Miller Bill- 
-Letters Committing on It," OMahoney Papers; James Roosevelt to John Miller, July 7, 
1937, box 68, "Tydings-Miller Bill," James Roosevelt Papers.
37 Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f Monopoly, 257-8.
308
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
other words, inferior merchandise could be sold for lower prices. Tydings also 
included an amendment that prohibited horizontal price contracts, or contracts 
between retailers, which would stabilize prices. Only price maintenance 
schemes from manufacturers to retailers, or wholesalers to retailers would be 
approved.38
More letters came to the President in an attempt to sway his opinion. 
Perhaps the most interesting correspondence came from a Denver bookseller. 
H. E. Bellamy, who wryly noted that he sold several books by the President 
and the First Lady, including Looking Forward, On Our Way; and Eleanor 
Roosevelt's When You Grow Up to Vote, said he was thankful those books had 
not been used as price leaders by local department stores.39 Even after these 
changes, the President hesitated to sign the bill submitted to him by the 
Congress.40 While the bill sat on Roosevelt’s desk, Wright Patman, Rowland
38 Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f Monopoly, 258; Parsons to J. Roosevelt, June 
23, 1937; Louis Filadoro to James Roosevelt July 2, 1937; James Roosevelt to S. L. 
Antonow, July 6,1937; Henry C. Levick to James Roosevelt, July 19, 1937; J. Roosevelt to 
Parsons June 29, 1937; James Roosevelt to Parsons July 14, 1937. All in box 68 "Tydings- 
Miller Bill" James Roosevelt Papers.
H. E. Bellamy to Roosevelt, August 9, 1937; Morris Behtz to Roosevelt, August 10, 
1937; Percy Goldman to Roosevelt, August 10, 1937; Mrs. Tager to Roosevelt, August 6, 
1937. All in OF 200Q, box 232, Roosevelt Papers.
40 Straus to Roosevelt, July 26, 1937; Roosevelt to Percy Straus, July 29, 1937; Herman 
Oliphant to Roosevelt, July 27, 1937. All in OF 277 Anti-Trust Laws May-July, 1937,”
Roosevelt Papers; M. L. Wilson to Roosevelt, July 26, 1937; McIntyre to Rayburn, August
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Jones and other supporters o f small retailers wrote to the president, imploring 
him to take positive action.41 At this point, the correspondence between 
Herbert Parsons, a pharmacy trade magazine editor from Boston, and James 
Roosevelt, the President’s son, played a role. Parsons wrote the younger 
Roosevelt that he was worried about rumors that the President might still 
withhold his signature from the bill, despite the amendments to the bill 
approved by the Attorney General. From Parson’s perspective, this action 
threatened to undermine support by small retailers for the President.42 The 
younger Roosevelt spoke with his father about the bill and Parson’s concerns. 
In reply to Parsons, Roosevelt indicated he did not want to throw the power of 
the federal government behind one particular group of Americans. He said he
2, 1937; Gordon Browning to Roosevelt, August 4, 1937; O. M  Kile to Roosevelt, August 
5, 1937; Chester Gray to McIntyre, August 6, 1937. All in OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 
August-December 1937," Roosevelt Papers.
41 Patman to McIntyre, August 9, 1937, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Laws August-December 
1937," Roosevelt Papers; Crichton Clarice to McIntyre, October 18, 1937, ibid.; Rowland 
Jones to Farley, July 29, 1937 Crichton Clarke to McIntyre October 18, 1937; McIntyre to 
Roosevelt, July 31, 1937, memorandum; Roosevelt to McIntyre, July 28, 1937; E. Chat 
Shankes to Roosevelt, June 21, 1937; Lord to Roosevelt, July 16, 1937. All in OF 277, 
“Anti-Trust Laws May-July 1937,” Roosevelt Papers.
42 Parsons to James Roosevelt, August 2, 1937, box 68, "Tydings-Miller Bill," James 
Roosevelt Papers.
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continued to harbor suspicions about the overall economic effects of antitrust 
legislation.43
In the end, Roosevelt relented, signing the appropriations bill and 
allowing the Miller-Tydings Act to become law. Small retailers thanked 
Roosevelt for putting aside his criticisms of the Miller-Tydings amendment. 44 
Many pharmacists bragged that James Roosevelt obtained the President’s 
signature for the act. James Roosevelt worried about the notoriety he gained in 
regard to the President’s acquiescence to the Miller-Tydings Act45
Even after the bill passed, some small retailers feared amendment to 
the acts because of the opposition of consumer advocates.46 The Miller-
43 M. A. Durand to James Roosevelt, August 11, 1937, memorandum, box 68, "Tydings- 
Miller Bill," James Roosevelt Papers; Roosevelt to Parsons, August 6, 1937, OF 277, 
"Anti-Trust Laws August-December 1937," Roosevelt Papers.
44 George Burger to Roosevelt, August 19, 1937; Michael Kerwin to Roosevelt, August 19, 
1937; Jessie B. Slocumb to Roosevelt, August 19, 1937; Paul Heckman Burgess to 
Roosevelt, August 19, 1937; Louis W. Oswald to Roosevelt, August 23, 1937. All in OF 
277, “Anti-Trust Laws August-December 1937,” Roosevelt Papers; James H. Allen to 
James Rosevelt, June 29, 1937; James Roosevelt to Leavitt C. Parsons, September 3, 1937; 
Parsons to James Roosevelt, September 1, 1937. Ail in box 68, "Tydings-Miller Bill," 
James Roosevelt Papers.
45 James Roosevelt to Early, September 3, 1937, box 68, "Tydings-Miller Bill," James 
Roosevelt Papers.
46 Tripeny to OMahoney, November 13, 1937, box 49, "Tydings-Miller Bill—Letters 
Committing on It," OMahoney Papers; OMahoney to Tripeny, November 17, 1937, 
ibid.-, Paul Fishback to Robinson, March 4, 1937, box 245, folder 6, Robinson Papers; 
“Aim Death Sentence at Chain Stores,” Business Week, February 5, 1938, 17-20.
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Tydings Act raised serious problems. Many manufacturers worried about 
setting sales prices—for fear giant retailers would dump their products.47 
Supporters of price maintenance had to work with representatives of 
agriculture to convince them o f the effectiveness o f price maintenance for 
their business48 In addition, pharmacists and others struggled with the 
logistics of establishing prices for goods and arranging contracts in more 
than forty states. Some advocates of the bill wanted to establish a national 
board to oversee these contracts, but the enormity of the task and wrangling 
between states resulted in independent systems in each state.49
Although there were problems implementing the bill, its passage 
thrilled retailers, who saw it as the culmination of decades of work. In 
response to this euphoria, Wright Patman proposed a federal anti-chain tax 
that he hoped would slow the growth of interstate chains and prevent them 
from destroying independent retailing. Patman demonized the chains,
47 Ingersoll to Capper, November 13, 1937, box 39, Tair Trade 1936-1939,” Capper 
Papers.
48 Parsons to James Roosevelt, September 1, 1937, box 68, "Tydings-Miller Bill," James 
Roosevelt Papers.
49 Robert Fischelis to A. R. Granito, September 5, 1936; Fischelis to Dargavel, 
September 7, 1937; Dargavel to Fischelis, September 10, 1937; Fishelis to Dargavel, 
September 16, 1937; Dargavel to Fischelis, September 21, 1937; Fischelis to Dargavel, 
September 23, 1937; Dargavel to Fischelis, September 25,1937; Fischelis to Dargavel,
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painting them as dangerous agents of social destruction.50 He had at first 
contemplated a bill that would prevent manufacturers from selling their 
products to the retail public at outlets. In a time before gargantuan outlet malls, 
the bill targeted the large tire makers, which had begun a thriving business, 
squeezing out their independent competitors through aggressive pricing.51 
When Patman determined that he needed a broader-based attack on the chains, 
he proposed a tax, which targeted multiple outlet stores and would have had 
devastating consequences for interstate chains. Patman’s tax followed a tax 
proposed by Martin Dies for the District of Columbia, the first suggested on a 
federal level since Emmanuel Celler had promoted a bill in 1932.52
November 1, 1939. All in box 35, folder 14, Fischelis Papers.
50 "Federal Trade Commission Reports on Agricultural Income Investigation," March 2, 
1937, p. 18, box 113, "Federal Trade Commission Legislation 1938-1939," OMahoney 
Papers; Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, June 10, 1937, p. 11 in box 18, 
"Areas of Study Pertinent to Labor Economics," Colorado State Federation o f Labor; 
Victor Schiff to John Gross, August 8, 193[9], ibid.; J. L. Stevens to Roosevelt, June 5, 
1939, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 1939-1943," Roosevelt Papers,
51 R. H. Bond to Robinson, February 26, 1937, box 245, folder 4, Robinson Papers; 'Report 
on the Relations o f Government to Industry as adopted by the National Association of 
Manufacturers Congress,” box 99, Witte Papers, University of Chicago Archives, Chicago, 
Illinois; Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement in the United States," 306, 383; Patman 
to Robinson, August 31, 1936, box 215, folder 1, Robinson Papers; Crichton Clarke to 
Robinson, November 9, 1936, box 215, folder 2, Robinson Papers; William Hager to 
Kirstein, January 29, 1937, box 90, "G," Kirstein Papers; George J. Burger to McIntyre, 
June 15,1937, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1937-1944,” Roosevelt Papers.
52 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement in the United States,” 225.
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Patman proposed his bill because he believed that the Robinson-Patman 
Act and Miller-Tydings Act offered inadequate protection for small retailers.53 
Written with the assistance from the Department of Commerce and a professor 
from the University of Virginia, Patman’s bill placed sharp taxes on interstate 
chains, multiplying the tax by the number of states in which they operated. The 
system modeled itself on the Louisiana tax, which had been ruled 
constitutional by the Supreme Court.54
The boldness of Patman’s tax contrasts with most anti-chain measures. 
Although the rhetoric of the movement implied that chains posed an obnoxious 
and potentially fatal assault on American civilization, the proposed remedies 
raised marginal tax rates, dithered around the edges of chain purchasing 
practices and controlled loss leader tactics, which small retailers had used as 
much as their chain competitors. With the Patman tax plan, the hysteria of 
independent retailers met its match in legislation. Patman seemed to have 
responded to the cries of the small tire dealers and other retailers, who felt
53 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 385-387,427; House Ways and Means 
Hearings on House Resolution 1 76th Congress 3d Session, 1940, 115; Business Week, 
February 5, 1938, 18. Nancy Beck Young, “Wright Patman: Congressman o f the Nation, 
1893-1953,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1995), 227-228.
54 Journal o f  Business, January 1940, 398; Charles H. March, “Address Before the 
National Association of Retail Grocers, June 22, 1937,” p. 2 in 110 E. 6. 8. F, Benson 
Papers, Minnesota History Center.
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frustrated by continued chain growth. At its heart the Patman bill contained the 
small businessman’s dream for anti-trust: it offered a sort of handicapping 
system, which would have enabled the little store to exist. It is not “disguised” 
as anti-trust. It represents the heart of the movement.55 Patman tossed 
legislation into the ring that mirrored growing anti-chain sentiment and 
matched the anti-monopoly sentiment found in 1938. After all, President 
Roosevelt had signaled an attack on monopoly and encouraged small 
businesses to believe he would support them in efforts to stabilize their position 
in industry. With the profound support of small retailers, and the new-found 
enthusiasm of a popular president, Patman believed it to be time to act in a 
profound fashion. The bill, however, became the death throes of the 
movement, a fiery outburst that spelled the last gasp for the anti-chain 
movement.56
The Patman Bill won strong initial support. An eighty-five member 
caucus supported the bill. Most of the members hailed from the South and 
Midwest, traditional homes of populist sentiment. In addition, the caucus fell
55 Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 266.
56 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 409.
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into enthusiasm for President Roosevelt’s anti-monopoly crusade.57 This issue 
offered them a way to express themselves in support of the average American. 
Of course the 1938 election year offered another incentive for them to act. In 
the more conservative Senate, however, the bill found few supporters. Only 
William Borah, the rabid anti-monopoly Senator from Idaho, supported the bill 
with real ardor.58
Retail Trade Associations endorsed the Patman bill. This support proved 
unusual because the trade associations had opposed chain taxes on a state 
level. Because of the anti-monopoly spirit of the day, the success of past 
legislation and the strength of radical forces in the conventions, the major 
associations gave their approval to the Patman bill. The National Association 
of Retail Druggists (NARD), National Association of Retail Grocers 
(NARGUS), National Retail Hardware Association (NRHA), United States 
Wholesale Grocers Association (USWGA) and the National Association of
57 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 400; New York Times, July 12, 1937; 
Newsweek, September 5, 1938; Robert C. Allen, Jerry J. O'Connell, Heniy G. Teigan and 
McIntyre to Burger, June 19, 1937; Patman to Roosevelt, April 24, 1938; FDR to Mr. 
McIntyre or Mr. Early, April 16,1938. All in OF 288 "Chain Stores 1937-1944" Roosevelt 
Papers.
c o
Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 315, 396; Kirstein to Bloom, February 
16, 1938, box 22, "Sol Bloom Buy Now Campaign," Kirstein Papers; New York Times, 
February 15, 1938.
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Independent Tire Dealers (NAITD) all supported the bill.59 When Charles 
March of the Federal Trade Commission addressed the NARGUS convention 
in the summer of 1937, he expressed the anti-monopoly sentiment afoot at the 
time. According to March, major corporations had stripped the nation of its 
economic freedom by major corporations, not the socialism, which had once 
been feared. In the eyes o f March, and many active in liberal politics, the 
grocers represented the last bulwark of free enterprise in the nation. He urged 
them to resist and not capitulate as the small manufacturers had done. March 
warned them that concentration of wealth threatened to destroy American 
ideals and force the country into economic dictatorship. If concentration of 
wealth continued in the way it had, he warned, small retailers would be 
adversely affected. As it stood, sixty percent of the nation had an income of 
under $1,500 a year. Since they spent one-third of their income on food, which 
meant about eight dollars a week per family for food, March warned that 
prosperity would be difficult. "You retailers, as the channel through which 
consumers' goods flow into consumption, can appreciate the importance of 
maintaining purchasing power at a high level and having it widely spread
59 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 389; Institute o f Distribution, Keep 
Market Street Open, 390; New York Times, February 15, 1938; Business Week, August
28,1937, 42.
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among the families of your respective communities. Your economic interests 
as independent retailers are bound up in the outcome of the struggle with 
monopoly.” If they lost their fight with competition, he warned the effects 
could be wide ranging. He pointed out that competition had died before the 
takeover of the Nazis in Germany and argued that, even in America, iron- 
handed economic control led to fascism As an example, he pointed to 
experiences in Harlan County, Kentucky, where mine owners kept strict 
control over workers attempting to unionize. As war approached in Europe,
chain opponents increasingly voiced fears of fascist control over the
60economy.
The bill found additional support from small business organizations that 
sprouted up in response to an administration conference of small businessmen. 
As part of the administration assault on monopoly, the Department of 
Commerce organized a Conference of Little Business. Roosevelt called the 
conference in an attempt to isolate big business corporations from public 
support. The administration hoped the small businessmen would support the 
Roosevelt program and discredit large corporations, portraying them as greedy
60 Charles H. March, “Address Before the National Association o f Retail Grocers, June 
22, 1937,” pp. 1-46, 110 E. 6. 8. F, Benson Pajjers; Young, “Wright Patman,” 217.
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and out of touch with the American people.61 Unfortunately, the selection of 
representatives of small business led to a string of hurt feelings and political 
bids. One small businessman, who had hoped to attend the conference, wrote 
James Roosevelt that he had been a tad disappointed. '"Naturally, I was 
disappointed and chagrined to find no Navy patrol plane at my front door, with
motors idling ready to bring me down for a special conference. I thought
62maybe the pilot had sat down at the wrong address.” He was glad, however, 
that he did not attend when he heard about the antics at the meeting. Many 
small retailers at the conference believed that the administration had turned 
away from their interests and intended to support big business. They criticized 
the president and urged reform by the administration.63 These groups
61 R. V. Koupel to OMahoney, December 22, 1937, box 231, "Legislation Federal 
Licensing #6," OMahoney Papers.
62 Ernest Draper to James Roosevelt, January 25, 1938; Roper to Invitees to Conference o f 
Smaller Businesses, January 26, 1938; J. H. R. to James Roosevelt, January 28, 1938, 
memorandum; M. A. Durand to Margaret Rauber, January 31, 1938; Nelms Black to James 
Roosevelt, February 3, 1938; Edwin Venneman to Roosevelt, January 31, 1938; Donald 
Blake to McIntyre, February 10, 1938; Kenneth McKellar to James Roosevelt, January 31, 
1938; Dan Hanley to Mabel Durand, February 4, 1938; Ray Howland to Roosevelt, 
February 7, 1938; Louis Johnson to McIntyre, February 7, 1938; O. E. Geppert to 
Roosevelt, February 11, 1938; C. E. Wofford to LeHand, February 11, 1938; R. M. Sykes to 
Roosevelt, February 14, 1938; McIntyre to Harold J. Fishbein, June 15, 1938; F.D.R. to 
McIntyre, June 15, 1938, memorandum. All in Official File 172a, "Small Business Men 
Jan-Feb 1938," Roosevelt Papers.
63 Vera Montgomery to LeHand, February 8, 1938, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Files 1938,”
Roosevelt Papers; V. W. Denen to Roosevelt, June 18, 1936, Official File 172a “Small
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supported the Patman bill as a vigorous assault on the forces of monopoly.64
Despite the approval from the conventions of small retailers, a sizeable 
minority questioned the wisdom of the bill because they believed it to be 
extremist Pharmacists, in particular, were satisfied with the operation of the 
Miller-Tydings Act. Many rank-and-file pharmacists felt that price 
maintenance served to protect them from chain growth and the dangers of cut­
throat competition. And they remembered that chains had cooperated with 
them to get that protection from supermarkets and “pineboards” as discount
Business M en 1933-1937,” Roosevelt Papers; Fishbein to Roosevelt, June 13, 1938, 
telegram; W. A. Zwicke to Roosevelt, April 7, 1938; K. to Mr. McIntyre, April 25, 
1938, memorandum; John B. Sebrell to Roosevelt, April 4, 1938; K to General Watson, 
March 25, 1940, memorandum. All in Official File 172a, "Small Business Men March 
1938-1945” Roosevelt Papers George William McDaniel, Smith Wildman Brookhart: 
Iowa’s Renegade Republican (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1995), 293.
64 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 402, 408, 430; Business Week, 
September 24, 1938, 28-29; Alan Brinkley, The End o f  Reform (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995), 90; Charles Daughters to Arnold September 13, 1939, box 18, 
"Correspondence 1939 General September,” Arnold Papers; Roper to Arnold, n.d., 
[June 1941], box 24, "Correspondence General June 16-30 1941,” Arnold Papers; 
Daughters to Arnold, June 16, 1941, i b i d Daughters to Arnold, March 28, 1941, box 3, 
"Correspondence General March 19-31 April 1-10," Arnold Papers; Charles Hofrichter 
to Arnold, April 3, 1941, ibid.; “Fair Trade Plan at the St. Louis Convention o f the 
National Association o f Retail Druggists,” box 22, folder 3, Fischelis Papers; Wimmer 
to Arnold, box 15, "Correspondence 1939 General February," Arnold Papers; Hawley, 
New Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 182-183; New York Times, February 3, 4, 
1938; Progressive, April 9, 1938; Facts, February 15, 1937, 20; Wright Patman and 
James E. Murray to "Members o f Senate Committee for Educational Survey o f Small 
Business Problems;" "Memo to Senator Murray, Chairman" pp.5-6; Capper to Murray, 
October 10, 1940; Whiteside to Murray October 10, 1940; Flint Garrison to Roosevelt, 
May 26 1939. All in box 23 "Small Business" Capper Papers.
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pharmacies were called.65 The NARD had supported initially the Patman bill, 
but it soon recanted. As the First Vice-President of the National Association of 
Retail Druggists wrote in a letter to Congressmen,”. . . it is our belief that it is 
not good judgment, in the interests of independent retail druggists, to advocate 
at this time any legislation designed to force existing organizations out of 
business." Although he and other druggists knew and resented the 
underhanded tactics used by the chains, he argued that the general public did 
not support the legislation and would not react well to businessmen 
manipulating government to destroy their opponents. 66 Several retailers told 
Congress they did not want to force chains out of existence. They argued, 
however, that chains needed to pay their fair share of taxes to support the 
community. In addition, taxation should aim to prevent the stripping of wealth
67from the community. Many small town merchants worried their homes, 
where chains chose not to locate, would be wiped off the map. Consumers, 
they worried, would take their trade to areas where chain stores were
65 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law, 11; Harper, 
“The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 390-392.
66 Prescott Loveland to Dargavel, February 21, 1937, p.2, box 245, folder 6, Robinson 
Papers.
67 Dave Jones to OMahoney, March 14,1939; OMahoney to Dave Jones, March 20,1939; 
A. L. LaClair to OMahoney, February 10,1939. All in box 71, "Legislation Chain Stores,"
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68represented. Because of the opposition of significant numbers of retailers, the 
major trade associations did not push the Patman Bill with the same 
enthusiasm as the Robinson-Patman Act or the Miller-Tydings Act They 
sponsored no great rallies and even pulled back from state anti-chain taxes.69 
Some small retailers believed chain stores brought trade to their town and
70supported them for that reason.
For obvious reasons, the Patman bill attracted considerable criticism 
from the chains. For the first time, the nation’s largest chain, A&P, assailed an 
anti-chain measure. Although the company had believed political involvement 
to be counter-productive, the nature of the Patman Bill, which appeared to
OMahoney Papers.
68 C. L. Schwartz to Capper, July 3, 1939, box 38, "Chain Stores," Capper Papers.
69 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 393, 414, 419; E. F. Hunter to Patman 
January 19, 1940, box 37A, folder 3, Patman Papers; Union Saw Mill Company to 
Robinson, February 12, 1937, box 245, folder 4, Robinson Papers; Walter Davidson to 
Robinson, February 15, 1937, ibid.-, Frank Mortenson to Patman, October 24, 1938, box 
37B, folder 1, Patman Papers; W. F. Powers to Patman, box 37A, folder 5; Kansas 
Wholesale Company to Capper, July 3, 1939, box 38, "Chain Stores," Capper Papers; 
E. F. Hunter to Patman, January 19,1940, box 37A, folder 3, Patman Papers; J. A. Todd 
to Laughlin Currie May 5, 1940, ibid. -, Business Week, May 27,1939,14; Business Week, 
July 8, 1939, 30; New York Times, June 23,1939; Hardware Retailer, August 1939,48, 51; 
Hardware Retailer, February 1940, 6; New York Times, November 23, 1939; Journal o f 
Retailing, December 1939; McCormack Committee Hearings House Ways and Means 76th 
Congress 3d Session. May 16-May 17 1940,143 also June 22-29,1940,423
70 C. O. Downing to OMahoney, December 26, 1939, box 71, "Legislation Chain 
Stores," OMahoney Papers; Walter A. Schultz to OMahoney, July 21, 1939, ibid.
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spell doom for major interstate chains, convinced the Hartford Brothers to 
reply to Patman’s claims. The brothers, who had shunned the spotlight in other 
anti-chain wars, hired Carl Byoir, a public relations executive in Washington, 
to spearhead an attack on the Patman bill. Along with other chain lobbyists, the 
attacks echoed those against the Robinson-Patman Act and Miller-Tydings. 
First, Byoir and A&P criticized Patman for promoting legislation that would 
reward well-paid middlemen at the expense of the consuming public. The 
chains emphasized that they offered strong, efficient retailing to the country. 
They had no intention of destroying independent retailing. If local stores 
combined with others in voluntary chains, they could withstand competition 
and provide the same excellent service as the chains. Second, chain retailers 
argued that the bill confiscated property and undermined the constitution of the 
United States. Third, they warned about massive unemployment if chain stores 
were shut down.71
A&P responded to the Patman bill with a simple and effective 
advertising campaign. They bought space in newspapers and periodicals to 
decry an assault on the American consumer. Following past success, they
71 Kirstein to Bloom, February 16, 1938, box 22, "Sol Bloom Buy Now Campaign," 
Kirstein Papers; Washington Daily News, September 15, 1938; Edwin Marks to 
Kirstein, September 21, 1938, box 90, "M," Kirstein Papers; Hyman Lewis to Arnold, 
June 16, 1938, box 13, "Correspondence General June 1938," Arnold Papers.
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cooperated with women’s groups and promoted food campaigns, to ease over­
supplies of certain foods. In addition, they worked with real estate owners, 
who feared the loss of stable and profitable clients if the Patman bill became 
law. This tactic had been useful in Colorado and California during the 
referendums over chain taxes in those states.72
The chains’ attacks on the Patman bill found strong support throughout 
the nation. Newspapers savagely attacked it  The Dallas Morning News, for 
example, condemned Patman for demanding the death sentence of a “mild- 
mannered chain grocer.” Other Texas newspapers concurred, even passing a
73resolution against the tax at their annual meeting Newspapers throughout the 
country reacted in the same fashion. The Los Angeles Times wrote that 
Patman’s bill lacked merit. Although he has “the rhetoric and emotion” on his 
side, the realities of the new economy made his bill an impracticality.74
72 Palamountain, The Politics o f Distribution, 180; Hawley, The New Deal and the 
Problem o f M onopoly, 263; J. H. Peters to O’Mahoney, n.d., box 133, "Legislation, 
1938 Taxation #1," OMahoney Papers; Colorado Chain Store Association, The 
Colorado Store License Law, 14-15; Patman to George M  Roberts, November 19, 
1938, box 37C, folder 4, Patman Papers; Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement," 
413.
73 Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1940 in box 37B, folder 4, Patman Papers;
Independent Merchant, May 28, 1938, p. 1, in box 37B folder 5 Patman Papers.
74 Los Angeles Times, October 17, 1938.
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Consumer, labor and farm groups opposed the bill as well. During the 
1930s, the strength of consumer groups increased significantly. Although these 
groups could not mobilize tremendous resources, they could secure the 
attention of certain politicians and business leaders. Consumer groups opposed 
the bill as an attack on efficiency and a danger to low consumer prices.75 
These attacks irritated some independents. One Kansas independent wrote 
Capper, "Do not allow some little cookies to make you believe that they 
have saved anything in the long run by patronizing the large interstate
76corporate chains." Like the consumer groups, labor representatives 
condemned the Patman Bill. Although it had been at odds with some chains, 
particularly A&P, organized labor offered a more receptive response. Although 
one can still detect hostility toward mass retailers, the opposition pales in 
comparison to that of the past.77 Some union members hoped to swell their
75 ‘‘Bulletin o f the Consumer's Counsel Division Federal Department o f Agriculture,” 
September 1938, box 97, Edwin Witte Papers, University o f Chicago Archives, Chicago, 
Illinois; Edwin Witte, "The Challenge to American Democracy," March 23, 1938, box 99, 
Witte Papers; Barnett to Holsey, February 22, 1939, box 252, folder 4, Barnett Papers, 
Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois. Holsey to Barnett, March 6, 1939, box 252, 
folder 4, Bamett Papers; Benjamin D. Riegel to CMahoney, October 28, 1938, box 200, 
"Legislation 1937-1938-Robinson Patman Act," O'Mahoney Papers; Edward A. Filene to 
Roosevelt, April 19, 1937, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1937-1944," Roosevelt Papers; Roy 
Walker to Stephen Early, June 23,1937, ibid.
76 A.H. Gufler to Capper, July 8,1939, box 38, "Chain Stores," Capper Papers.
77 Wieboldt Department Store, "Minutes o f the Board o f Directors,” March 18, 1937,
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ranks by bringing along chain employees. They worried, as well, that an attack 
on the chains would increase the rate of unemployment and depress wages for 
everyone.78 As had been the case since 1936, major farm groups opposed the 
Patman tax as an assault on efficiency and danger to the price of agricultural 
products. The only farm group to support the bill came from Louisiana A 
strawberry farmer’s union from an area north of Lake Pontchartrain supported 
the bill because they believed that their prices had been depressed because 
chains used their crops as loss leaders. Nonetheless, their support represented a 
pathetic presence next to the combined opposition of the National Grange and 
American Farm Bureau.79
Patman attacked such criticisms of his bill as chain inspired 
propaganda. He believed that chain operatives had poisoned these groups
Wieboldt Department Store Papers, Chicago Historical Society.
78 Palamountain, The Politics o f Distribution, 180; “AFL Resolution Condemning H R . I,” 
October 22, 1938, box 37A, folder 8, Patman Papers; Carl Byoir and Associates, "Current 
Trends in Chain Store Taxation," 2; Victor Schiff to John Gross, August 8, 1939, box 18, 
"Areas of Study Pertinent to Labor Economics," Colorado Federation of Labor Papers; 
Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 432-433, 435; McCormack Hearings, 1105- 
U l, 1841, 1843; New York Times, September 17, 1938; United Rubber Worker, October 
1938,2; Joseph P. O' Shaughnessy to Roosevelt, February 14, 1938, pp.1-2, OF 288, "Chain 
Stores 1937-1944," Roosevelt Papers.
79 Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 431; Testimony Related to H. R. I, 1399- 
1407; Martin Ungerleider to M. H. MacIntyre, n.d. [April 1938], OF 288, "Chain Stores 
1937-1944," Roosevelt Papers; The Farmers' Friend, April 1, 1938,1,6-7.
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against him and distorted true public sentiment against their growth.80 The 
1938 campaign proved to be a challenge for co-sponsors of the bill. 
Although the tax did not prove to be an issue in the campaign, sponsors of 
the legislation fell throughout the country. Patman faced opposition in his 
1938 race for the house. George Blackburn, his opponent, criticized the 
Robinson-Patman Act as class legislation passed to bail out wealthy 
wholesalers. Patman denied this allegation and pointed to the President’s 
support of the bill and legislation that had been added to the 1936 
Democratic platform, praising the act and its protection for small retailers.81 
His opponent criticized the Robinson-Patman Act as a give-away to wealthy 
wholesalers and attack on American consumers. The opponent argued that 
Patman was out-of-touch with his constituency and out-of-favor with the 
President, who had not met with Patman when he passed through Texas on 
a campaign swing. Although Congressman Sam Rayburn of Texas 
explained to Patman that the president had not even met with him on the 
trip, Patman fretted that his opponent would make political ammunition
RflPatman to “Dear Friend,” n.cL, box 20B, folder 5, Patman Papers.
81 "Who is this man, George Blackburn, who has announced that he will oppose our 
congressman, Wright Patman, at the Democratic primary, M y 23, 1938," p.5, box 20B, 
folder 6, Patman Papers.
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from the incident. Despite these criticisms, however, Patman won re- 
election and continued his fight for the chain tax.
To make his problems worse, he faced charges of corruption based on 
his relationship with powerful drug wholesaler McKesson and Robbins. 
McKesson sponsored a lecture tour he took throughout the country. Patman 
argued that other prominent citizens had made such trips.82 Patman won his 
quest for re-election, buoyed by his incumbent status, but a conservative 
swing in the off-year elections meant that twenty-five of his seventy-four
83co-sponsors met defeat. Despite the loss of so many of his colleagues, 
Patman pressed forward with his bill, hoping to build a coalition for the tax. 
However, he never succeeded in developing such a coalition or bringing the
84-bill to the House floor. Although Patman worked feverishly to win a hearing
82 Wright Patman to C. T. Habberger, April 12,1940, box 37B, folder 1, Patman Papers; 
Harper, “the Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 416-418; Business Week, December 24,1938, 
30-31; Business Week, July 8, 1938,29; New York Times, January 25,1939; “Associated 
Press interview o f Patman in Texarkana, Texas,” Dec. 22,1938, box 20B, folder 5, Patman 
Papers; Young, “Wright Patman,” 216-217.
Patman to Roosevelt, July 15, 1938, telegram; McIntyre to Patman, July 16, 1938, 
telegram; Sam Raybum to Roosevelt, July 15, 1938, p.2; Roosevelt to Patman, August 
7,1939; Patman to Roosevelt, May 29, 1940; J. Romagna, “Memorandum for General 
Watson,” October 1, 1941; Patman to Roosevelt, January 5, 1940. All in box 20B, 
folder 5, Patman Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 394; Young,
"Wright Patman,” 209.
84 Des Moines Tribune, November 27, 1939 in box 42A, folder 4, Patman Papers; The
Friendly Dollar, July 4, 1939, p. 1 in box 37B, folder 1, Patman Papers; Hawley, The
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for his bill, it continued to falter. His attempts to interest the party hierarchy in 
such radical legislation failed utterly.85 Patman hoped he could cultivate a 
better relationship with the popular president and counteract this opposition. 
He tried to lobby the President with the help of Donald Foster, the president of 
McKesson and Robbins. As had been the case with the Miller-Tydings Act, 
however, the President proved unsupportive of attacks on the chains.86 The 
administration continued to criticize the anti-chain measures as a restriction on 
free enterprise and a danger to the health of a struggling economy.87
In his frustration, Patman increasingly stooped to harassing chain 
figures, particularly those of A&P. That company’s public relations efforts 
infuriated him. On one copy of a public letter issued by A&P, Patman
New Deal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, 262.
o c
Wright Patman, ‘"Weekly Letter,” April 11, 1940, box 20B, Patman Papers; R. L. 
Doughton to Roosevelt, November 17, 1939, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1937-1944,” 
Roosevelt Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 424.
ozr
McIntyre to Patman, March 22, 1938, PPF 3982, Roosevelt Papers; Patman to 
Roosevelt, June 15, 1938 ibid.-, Roosevelt to Patman, June 16, 1938, ibid-, Patman to 
McIntyre, August 24, 1938, PPF 5507 National Association o f Retail Druggists, Roosevelt 
Papers; Roosevelt to Thomas Smith, September 6, 1938, ibid; Roosevelt to Leon LascofF, 
September 8, 1938, PPF 5508, National Pharmaceutical Association, Roosevelt Papers.
87 Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f Monopoly,.263; Patman to Schulte, 
October 17, 1939, box 37C, folder 1, Patman Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement,” 394; New York Times, March 13, 1935; Business Week, July 2,1938, 21.
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scrawled “Bunk” across the bottom.88 He urged an investigation of the income 
tax paid by the Hartford Brothers. And, in the case of Carl Byoir, the A&P 
lobbyist, he encouraged an investigation of him as a Nazi sympathizer. The 
Dies Committee, headed by a well-known chain opponent, investigated 
Byoir’s public relations work for German railroads in the United States, but
89nothing came of this investigation.
Patman found himself deserted by most supporters. His crusade for the 
bill had failed, leaving him one of the few champions of radical anti-chain
90action. A variety of small business organizations formed and continued to 
promote the gospel of free enterprise.91 In particular, Theodore Christianson
88 “Public Statement by A&P” in box 37C, folder 3, Patman Papers.
Q Q
Wright Patman, “Weekly Letter,” April 11, 1940, box 20B, Patman Papers; R. L. 
Doughton to Roosevelt, November 17, 1939, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1937-1944;" Wright 
Patman to Walter Rice, [n.d, 1940], box 37B, folder 1, Patman Papers; AMT to Voorhis, 
n.d., box 1, folder 12, Jerry Voorhis Collection; .box 20 B folder 3 Patman Papers; F.D.R. 
to McIntyre February 4, 1935; McIntyre, “Confidential Memorandum for Col. E. M. 
Watson,” November 6,1935; Lieutenant E. S. Hartshorm, “Memo for Watson,” November 
8, 1935; Carl Byoir to Roosevelt, June 3, 1940; Franklin Roosevelt, “Memo for Miss 
Durand, August 24, 1936; Peter Van Horn to Early, August 11,1936. All in OF 288 “Chain 
Stores 1933-1936,” Roosevelt Papers; Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 440- 
441; New York Times, October 2, 1945; Business Week, April 25,1936, 9.
90 Palamountain, The Politics o f Distribution, 180; W. F. Powers to Patman, July 27 
1940, box 37B, folder 1, Patman Papers; C. R. Beck to Capper, July 3, 1939, box 38, 
"Chain Stores," Capper Papers; C. E. Beck to Capper February 16, 1939 box 38 "Chain 
Stores" Capper Papers. A  H. Gufler to Capper, July 8, 1939, box 38 "Chain Stores" 
Capper Papers.
91 “Freedom of Opportunity Foundation,” July 16, 1939, box 20B, file 4, Patman Papers;
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and other advocates for small retailers continued the old argument that 
absentee firms threatened the economy of the community through price cutting 
and sucking its wealth from it In his opinion, the chains knocked the 
underpinnings out of prosperity by lowering the cost of products, forcing 
business to operate at a close margin. As he put it in a 1939 speech, "We can't
92hope to make capitalism, which is a profit system, work without profits." 
Growing out of the small businessman’s conference, these groups organized a
93modest number of retailers. Small retailers and their supporters continued 
their attacks on the chains and their dangerous influence on American life. 
According to small retailers, giant corporations undermined prosperity. They 
threatened to choke the life out of the economy and destroy the equality of 
condition, which had made American society unique. 94 As the struggle 
continued, the movement turned increasingly to images from Europe to 
describe the influence of corporations on American life. They warned that
Crusaders fo r Economic Liberty, March 4,1937,1.
92 Des Moines Tribune, November 27,1939 in box 42A, folder 4, Patman Papers.
93 Ralph Burton Public Markets to Capper, July 4, 1939, box 38, "Chain Stores," Capper 
Papers; Bulletin o f the Newton Independent Business Men's Association, July 4, 1939, 
1; G. M. Booth, Sr. to Capper, July 3, 1939, ibid.
94 Mortenson to the President, January 23, 1940, box 37B, folder 1, Patman Papers; 
Mortenson to Patman, July 10, 1939, box 37B, folder 1, Patman Papers; M. H, Biemer to
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economic developments threatened to strip freedom from America as had been 
done in Europe. In a resolution by the Iowa Pharmaceutical Association, the 
druggists complained that “chains keep regimented groups goose-stepping to 
the bidding of New York executives."95 Storeowners warned America that the 
future of democracy depended on small business. The basis of die American 
dream in their minds was the small store and free competition. If only a few 
could own a business, Americans would lose a sense of responsibility for their 
communities. Americans worried about the survival of democracy. They had 
survived years of economic and political crisis. Surely the American state had 
survived the worst threats imaginable. Yet the forces of tyranny and 
democracy loomed ever larger on the world scene. Even large retailers believed 
that small business was vital to the strength of the nation although they did not 
support attempts to interfere with full competition.96
Patman and other anti-chain activists attacked Roosevelt for failing to 
address the structural failures of the economy. As these retailers had argued for
Patman, February 23, 1940, box 37A, folder 3, Patman Papers.
95 E. F. Hunter to Patman January 19, 1940, pp.2-3, box 37A, folder 3, Patman Papers; Des 
Moines Register, February 16, 1938; Mortenson to President, January 23, 1940, OF 288, 
“Chain Stores, 1937-1944,” Roosevelt Papers; Harry Perlmutter to McIntyre, May 30, 1938, 
p.2, ibid.
96 Beardsley Ruml, “The Protection of Individual Enterprise,” p. 1, series 2, box IV, folder
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a decade, the chains caused economic devastation in America. As long as they 
were allowed to strip money from the communities of the nation, prosperity 
would be unobtainable. In the later years of the movement, Patman developed 
more of a sectionalist critique of the growth of chain stores. He argued that 
Northeastern interests threatened to drain the South and West of their wealth, 
turning them into colonies of New York. Putman’s adoption of this criticism 
found support from Walter Prescott Webb, a well-known historian of the 
American Southwest. Webb authored Divided We Stand, an examination of 
the growth of industrialization and the relentless expansion of the consumer 
economy.97
As had been the case in the early 1930s, some anti-chain activists 
promoted the use of scrip as a way to inflate the currency supply and return the 
United States to prosperity. They hoped to break the stranglehold of big 
finance. 98In Sioux City a group labeled dollar bills in order to determine how
4, Ruml Papers, University o f Chicago.
97 Patman, “Address before the South Carolina Legislature,” March 10, 1938, box 37B, 
folder 5, Patman Papers; Claude Westerfield to Walter Prescott Webb, January 25, 
1938, box 2-22/793, "Folder 1938-39,” Walter Prescott Webb Papers, Texas State 
Archives, Austin, Texas. Also see New England Newsletter, November 1938, p .l and 
Patman to the Dallas Morning News, April 11, 1940, in box 37B, folder 5, Patman 
Papers.
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often they circulated in a week. They estimated that the city lost two million
99dollars a year to absentee owners who removed the money from town.
The more radical critics of New Deal economics called for an. all-out 
assault on chain retailing to correct this situation. As some retailers had argued 
since the early 1930s, nothing would change until the government addressed 
the structural changes in the economy. Existing attempts to boost th.e GNP 
were mere palliatives. Roosevelt needed to address the economic essentials. 
Instead of taxing and relief, the United States needed to attack the o*ctopus. 
Concentration of wealth caused the Depression. It must be attacked to 
rejuvenate the economy. Retailers complained also that the chains received 
preferential treatment from social workers.100 After the bill failed to jpass in 
1938, Patman proposed a more relaxed version, which would freeze chains at
Anti-Chain Store Movement," 306; "Mimeographed Statements and Letters-1937," box 
20C, folder 1, Patman Papers; Congressional Record, January 23, 1933, box 15, 
"Monopoly," Capper Papers; F. J. Miller to Patman, April 1938, box 90B, folder 2„ Patman 
Papers.
99 J. A. Todd to Laughlin Currie, May 5, 1940, box 37A, folder 3, Patman Papers.
100 “Consumers Tax Commission of Pennsuken Township” to Patman, n.d. [1940], box 
37B, folder 1, Patman Papers; E. F. Hunter to Patman, January 19, 1940, box 37A, 
folder 3, Patman Papers; Union Saw M ill Company to Robinson, February 12, 1937, 
box 245, folder 4, Robinson Papers; Walter Davidson to Robinson, February 15, 1937, 
ibid., Robinson Papers; Frank Mortenson to Patman, October 24, 1938, box 37B , folder 
1, Patman Papers; W. F. Powers to Patman, box 37A, folder 5, Patman Papers; C. J. 
Doherty to Patman, box 37C, folder 1, Patman Papers; Kansas Wholesale Company to 
Capper, July 3, 1939, box 38, "Chain Stores," Capper Papers; J. A. Todd to Laughlin
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their current size, rather than destroying them. He argued that the President 
needed small business on his side if he hoped to confront the excesses of 
monopoly capital. Although Patman succeeded in gaining hearings for the 
revised bill in 1940, it never moved in the House.101
The anti-chain movement had broken apart from its own momentum. 
Without careful attention to bureaucratic operations or the complexities of 
antitrust law, the small storekeepers could not find another, more positive 
response to the chains. In the end, they had little alternative to the Patman tax. 
Their attempts to control prices and purchasing had proved inadequate and 
they could not control the chains. Moreover, many Americans had come to 
accept the place of the chains in the community. Sears, Walgreen’s and A&P 
had established themselves on Main Street for over twenty years and employed 
many people. Shoppers found a wide variety of goods at them. Surely they 
were not the threat that they were said to be. How could America justify
Currie, May 5, 1940, box 37A, folder 3, Patman Papers.
101 Patman to Roosevelt, November 25, 1938; Roosevelt to Patman, November 30, 1938; 
M. H. McIntyre, Memorandum to President”, n.d.„* Patman to Roosevelt, July 3, 1940. All 
in OF 288, "Chain Stores 1937-1944," Roosevelt Papers; Young, “Wright Patman,” 177; 
U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee. Excise Tax on 
Chain Stores. 76th Congress, 3rd session. 1940.
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destroying them through excessive taxation? The efforts of small retailers had 
hit an impasse.
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Conclusion
The film Our Neighbors the. Carters tells the story of Fred Carter, a 
good family man whose small town drugstore is destroyed by an invading 
chain.1 Carter has all the hallmarks of a well-meaning independent retailer. 
He knows the people of the community, extends credit liberally, and delivers. 
Nevertheless, when the chain comes to town, Carter’s customers defect, his 
business fails, and he is forced to work as a day laborer in a quarry. 
Fortunately for Carter, his humiliation is only temporary. The cavalry arrives 
in the form of his long-lost multi-millionaire friend (a hometown boy made 
good), who threatens the chain with a price war, closes down its local outlet, 
and puts Fred back into business. The story thus ends on a happy note, with 
Fred’s life returned to him. For most retailers, however, the Hollywood 
ending never came. If they lost their store, they faced bankruptcy and lifetime 
economic hardship. Although Our Neighbors the Carters shows sympathy 
for the plight of independent retailers, it displays a general skepticism about 
their prospects for the future. Although a flurry of anti-chain and anti- 
monopoly interest built in the late 1930s, a consensus developed that chains
1 Our Neighbors the Carters, Paramount, 1939. Available at the Film and Television 
Library o f the University o f California at Los Angeles.
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promoted retail efficiency and were important contributors to the economy. 
Since consumers had long ago decided that chains provided better prices and 
did not significantly differ from hometown stores, the period for significant 
anti-chain action had passed. Many Americans felt sympathy for small 
retailers like Fred Carter. Few thought that anyone could do anything to help 
them.
As Alan Brinkley shows in The End o f Reform, a spirited anti- 
monopoly campaign developed in the late 1930s. New Dealers, like Robert 
Jackson and Thurman Arnold, reacted to the Roosevelt Recession of 1937- 
1938 by blaming big business for a “capital strike.” According to Jackson 
and Arnold, leading businessmen had deliberately used their power to drive 
the economy into recession, distort the mass media, and discredit the 
Roosevelt administration. President Roosevelt enthusiastically supported 
their assault on monopoly, accepting the notion of the capital strike and 
employing it in his State of the Union address. Some leading corporations felt 
they had been directly attacked. Roosevelt pledged to root out the causes of 
economic turbulence and restore the nation to prosperity. For many small 
retailers, the President’s address signaled a resurrection of anti-trust concerns
2 Philip Dunbar to Roosevelt, April 30, 1938, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 
1938," Roosevelt Papers; Robert Frank, “Memorandum for the President,” May 11, 
1938, i b i d Donald Richberg to Roosevelt, October 28, 1937; F.D.R. to Richberg, 
October 30, 1937; Cummings to Roosevelt, April 21, 1938. All in Official File 2277, 
"Monopoly Message Folder 1938," Roosevelt Papers.
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in the administration.3 They hoped, in addition, that Roosevelt would try to 
destroy mass retailers. Wright Patman specifically requested that the 
President condemn chain stores in his monopoly message, but the President 
did not comply.4 Instead, the ensuing discussion of economics pushed the 
anti-trust movement in a new direction—one that accepted the importance of 
big business and offered little hope for chain opponents. In the new anti-trust 
policy, government intervened to ensure the maintenance of consumer 
purchasing power. 5
Robert Jackson, the Attorney General in Roosevelt’s second term, 
began the anti-monopoly campaign in a way that seemed to bode well for 
small retailers. In a speech before the Trade and Commerce Bar Association
3 Alan Brinkley, The End o f Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 58; J. L. 
Stevens to Roosevelt, June 5, 1939, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 1939-1943," 
Roosevelt Papers.
4 Ralph Easley to Stephen Early, January 6, 1938; Walker C. Davis to Roosevelt, January 
5, 1938; Wm. Tobias Butler to Roosevelt, January 28, 1938, telegram; Edmund Walsh to 
Roosevelt, April 19, 1938; Edmund Walsh to McIntyre, April 30, 1938, Drake Watson to 
Roosevelt, April 23, 1938; J. E. Bistor to Roosevelt, April 27, 1938; J. E. Bistor to 
LeHand, April 27, 1938. All in OF 277, "Anti-Trust Files 1938,” Roosevelt Papers.
5 Brinkley, The End o f Reform, 48-49, 88-89; Edgar Dale to McIntyre, June 13, 1938; 
Sidney Kent to McIntyre, June 29, 1938; Clarence Mills to Roosevelt, June 24, 1938. 
All in Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 1938,” Roosevelt Papers; E. J. Schulte to 
OMahoney, March 25, 1938, pp. 1-2, "Legislation Motion Picture Films, 1937-1938," 
Roosevelt Papers; Mrs. Mary T. Bannerman to Capper, July 20, 1939, box 3, "Block 
Bookings (Motion Picture),” Capper Papers; Harry Brandt to F. D. R., September 25, 
1939; Will Hays to Roosevelt, n.A, [October 1939]; James Fly to General Watson, March 
13, 1941. All in Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 1939-1943," Roosevelt Papers; 
Colorado Labor Advocate, May 11, 1933; Jeanne Stevens to Roche, [n.d], box 10, folder 
5, Roche Papers, University o f Colorado Archives, Boulder, Colorado.
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in New York City, Jackson lashed out against chains, which he identified as a 
particularly dangerous element of the new economy. He remembered his 
small town boyhood with tremendous nostalgia, and he worried that this 
world would be destroyed forever by the development of the chains.6 
Insisting that chains had grown in power and influence until they threatened 
to become private governments, Jackson warned that the American small 
town and the freedoms identified with it stood in danger of destruction. 
Along with them, democracy teetered on the brink. Ownership of property, in 
Jackson’s view, provided a host of benefits. "My observation is that no 
employee ever has the same degree of interest in our system, as a proprietor 
of a small business.” Jackson pledged to fight the chains and their iron hold 
on the American economy.
In 1938, Jackson promoted anti-monopoly causes with even more 
fervor, attacking business concentration and the accompanying centralization 
of wealth. His concern was that the nation’s patent laws, tax laws and tariff 
laws placed more and more wealth in the hands of the few. He explained that 
he wanted to fight the centralization of wealth and work to provide assistance
<7
to the poor of the nation. Jackson, like many New Dealers believed the
6 Brinkley, The End o f Reform, 57-60.
7 Jackson to Bruce Barton, July 15,1937, box 33, “Robert Jackson,” Barton Papers;
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disparity in wealth stunted the national income. If, as studies indicated, the 
top sixty thousand families had as much saved as the bottom twenty-five 
million families, then serious ramifications might exist. How could those top 
families spend the exorbitant sums they had amassed? Jackson longed for 
policies designed to redistribute wealth and “place buying power back into 
the hands of the people”8 He worried that American values of independence 
and rugged individualism would be undermined by economic developments 
and cautioned against “balance sheet values” being substituted for moral 
virtue.9
Jackson went on to argue that government needed to protect American 
ideals by attacking the concentration of business. According to Jackson, the 
growth of big business promised centralization. He believed this 
amalgamation of power and influence ran counter to the best legacy of this 
country, a nation where power was divided in order to ensure liberty and 
prosperity for all. "We want no economic or political dictatorship imposed 
upon us either by the government or by big business," Jackson said before a 
group of trade association executives. He opposed the growth of big
Jackson, "Should the Antitrust Laws Be Revised?" 9.
8 W. D. McFarlane "Capital News Letter," January 6, 1938, OF 277, "Anti-Trust Files 
1938,” Roosevelt Papers.
9 Robert Jackson, "Should the Antitrust Laws Be Revised?" 9,10.
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government and regulation as much as that of big business, but if one or the 
other had to be chosen, government influence would be superior. 10 The 
government, at least, sought the best interests of the nation. It represented all 
o f the people of the United States. Corporations, in contrast, threatened to 
become “private governments,” with tremendous and sinister influence over 
millions of Americans.11
In an effort to fight these evils, Jackson selected an unlikely but 
brilliant candidate to lead the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Department, 
Thurman Arnold. Jackson believed Arnold could bring reform to the sleepy 
division. Arnold, bom in Wyoming, had been Dean of West Virginia School 
of Law and Professor at Yale Law School. While at Yale, Arnold wrote two 
works on the American anti-trust system.12 In Arnold’s view, anti-monopoly 
agitation had degenerated into name-calling and ineffectual rhetoric. His 
commentary on this situation exhibited the same characteristics, actually 
unleashing a barrage of rather un-academic invective that perhaps explains 
the curious friendship between the New Dealer and conservative curmudgeon
10 Robert Jackson, "Should the Antitrust Laws Be Revised?".2-3
11 Robert Jackson, "Should the Antitrust Laws Be Revised?" 12
12 Montague to Arnold, June 6, 1936, box 13, "June 1938,” Arnold Papers.
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H. L. Mencken.13 Arnold mocked Western radicals for their caustic 
comments against the chains. In one particularly sarcastic passage, he 
lampooned William Borah, the Progressive Senator from Idaho, for his 
vociferous condemnations of monopoly. This passage came back to haunt 
Arnold, when he was forced to appear before Borah and the rest of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee after Jackson nominated him for Assistant Attorney 
General.14 Arnold struggled through the hearings, weakly apologizing to 
Borah for his intemperate statements. Arnold had to dance around his 
statements in order to explain why a critic of the anti-trust laws should be 
appointed to enforce them. In the end, however, even Borah voted to approve 
Arnold for the position.15
When Arnold took control of the anti-trust division, he initiated a 
tremendous expansion of the division and its activities. As he explained the 
situation, the problem with United States anti-trust policy was that the laws
13 Arnold to Robert Hutchins, May 11, 1938, box 12, "Correspondence General May 1- 
18," Arnold Papers; Arnold to H. L. Mencken, box 14, "Correspondence 1938 General 
November 1-18," Arnold Papers.
14 Robert Jackson to Arnold, April 18, 1936, box 9, "Correspondence: 1936 General 
January-May;" Arnold to Douglas Maggs, April 30, 1937, p.2, box 10, "Correspondence 
1937 General February-April” Roosevelt Papers; Montague to Arnold, March 9, 1938, 
box 11, "March 9-19;" Arnold to Montague, March 19, 1938, ibid.; Arnold to Jackson 
January 6, 1938; Arnold to Jackson, January 13, 1938. All in the Arnold Papers.
15 Arnold to Borah, March 16, 1938, box 11, "Correspondence 1938 March 9-19," 
Arnold Papers. Simon Olins to Arnold, September 6, 1938, box 14, "Correspondence 
General September," Arnold Papers.
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were not adequately enforced. The United States did not require additional 
laws to create a less concentrated, free market system. Instead, the country 
needed simply to marshal its forces and wage war on a relatively small 
number of corporations.16 The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice lacked the necessary resources to 
thoroughly police the economy of the nation.17 At the time Arnold took office 
in 1938, the Roosevelt administration had revived the anti-trust division from 
its sabbatical during the National Recovery Administration, but it was still 
understaffed and underfunded. Roosevelt and Jackson authorized an 
expansion from fifteen attorneys at the start of the administration to ninety by 
1938. Although more substantial, this number paled in comparison to 
departments with ostensibly more restricted responsibilities, such as the
1 QMaritime Commission, which claimed over one thousand employees.
Rather than preaching about the evils of monopoly, the country 
needed hard-eyed experts, who could monitor the growth of large
16 Arnold, "The Policies of the Antitrust Division," September 3, 1938, pp.2, 9, 10; Arnold, 
“What is Monopoly," p.l 1, box 1, folder 2, Arnold Papers.
17 Thurman Arnold, "The Antitrust Laws, their Past and Future," p .l, box 1, folder I, 
August 9,1938, Arnold Papers.
|Q # __
Ellis Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem o f Monopoly (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1966, 1995), 432; Frank Nebecker to Arnold, March 23, 1938, pp. 2- 
3, box 12, "Correspondence 1938 General March 20-31,” Arnold Papers; M. L. Toulme 
to Arnold, December 5, 1941, box 26, "Correspondence 1941 General December" 
Arnold Papers.
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enterprises.19 His department prosecuted a growing number of cases and 
found a good deal o f success. Arnold’s anti-trust campaign not only 
increased the size of the department but, through successful prosecutions and 
fines, began to make money for the government In a 1940 speech, Arnold 
bragged that the anti-trust division had brought in 2.4 million dollars in fines 
against a total appropriation of 1.3 million dollars. Arnold believed, in 
addition, that his department improved the stability of the economy, allowing 
it to function along rational lines. Instead of constantly debating what actions 
the Anti-Trust division might take, he argued, businessmen knew his 
approach.20 Arnold believed lax enforcement had pushed businessmen into 
lazy habits regarding the law. If the anti-trust division were to more vigilantly 
enforce the law, businesses might be more likely to obey it, and the economy 
would become more stable. Some business people supported this idea and
19 Capt. Bruce Q. Nabers to Arnold, August 20, 1938, box 13, "General 1938 August 1- 
20," Arnold Papers; Arnold, "What is Monopoly," p.3, box 1, folder 2, Arnold Papers; 
Brinkley, The End o f Reform, 46-48; 158-9; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement,” 428; Arnold, “August o f 1938 Speech on Antitrust Laws,” 8-9; W. Howard 
Chase to Kirstein, September 13, 1939, pp. 1-2, box 90, "V," Kirstein Papers.
20 Brinkley, The End o f Reform, 111; Arnold, "Free Trade Within the Borders o f the 
United States,” March 9,1940, p. 15, box 2, Arnold Papers.
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praised Arnold for making the rules available to the businessman on the 
street.21
Arnold believed the purpose of antitrust policy was to spread the 
benefits o f enterprise to all of America's people. He hoped to use antitrust 
laws to maximize the production of the nation’s economy. No firm should 
be destroyed because of its sheer size, Arnold argued, working from 
principles enunciated by Teddy Roosevelt. Instead, firms should be 
chastened if they were having a warping effect on the market and 
threatened the standard of living of the American people.22 Small 
businesses, specifically associations of these businesses, might have a 
harmful effect on the economy. Arnold believed he needed to root out 
restraints of trade. In short, the anti-trust division needed to ferret out any 
force hampering the efficiency of the U.S. economy. The department would 
not attack a company for simply being big. If a firm improved the 
productivity of the nation, it deserved to reap rewards. On the other hand, 
threats, no matter how small their size, would face prosecution under the 
laws. Arnold specifically condemned small town trade groups for enforcing 
trade agreements and maintaining prices at a high level. In Arnold’s mind, he
21 Arnold, "The Policies o f the Antitrust Division," 2, 13; Montague to Arnold, July 28, 
1938, box 13, "July 1938,” Arnold Papers.
22 Jackson "Don’ts and Dos For Businesses," p.6 in Barnett to Holsey, July 17,1941, 
box 283, folder 6, Barnett Papers.
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had a solemn commitment to protect the purchasing power of the nation by 
attacking any impediment to trade.23 Arnold, as Alan Brinkley shows in The 
End o f Reform, sought to raise the level of consumption of the American 
public. He believed that only this step could ensure the future prosperity of 
America and the continued existence of its way of life. 24
Like Jackson, Arnold praised small business as the backbone of the 
nation. According to the head of the anti-trust division, small business still 
made up the majority of the American economy. Arnold supported positive 
assistance for small businessmen, hoping the government would support 
efforts to encourage independent business. If they did not receive aid, Arnold 
warned, an “economic dictatorship” might result.25 Arnold’s statements won 
positive responses from many small business organizations. Small retailers 
hoped his aggressive pursuit of monopoly would result in attacks on the
23 Arnold, "Do Monopolies Retard or Advance Business Recovery? (over NBC Town 
Meeting o f the Air,)" January 30, 1938, p. 8, box 2, Arnold Papers; Arnold, "Free Trade 
Within the Borders o f  the United States” March 9, 1940, pp. 12, 14, 19, box 1, folder 1, 
Arnold Papers; Arnold, “Speech before the South Carolina Bar Association,” pp.7, 14; 
Arnold “Speech before the IBA,” 15, 16, 17; Arnold "What the Antitrust Division 
Means to the Consumer," November 4, 1939, pp. 2-5, People's Forum, box 1, Arnold 
Papers; Arnold to Mrs. Harold Winterhalter, May 2, 1940, box 20, "Correspondence 
1940 General May,” Arnold Papers.
24 Beardsley Ruml, "The Protection of Individual Enterprise,” 4; Arnold "Fair and 
Effective Use o f Antitrust," 1,8, 11,12,13,18.
25 Arnold "Labor Racketeering, Small Business and Defense Production,” June 13,1941, 
p.l, box 3, "Addresses, Speeches, Statements: 1941," Arnold Papers; Arnold "What is 
Monopoly," p. 13, box 1, folder 2, Arnold Papers; Arnold "What can Government Offer- 
What can Business Expect?," May 22, 1939, p.2, box 1, Arnold Papers.
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chains.26 Unlike these independent forces, however, Arnold insisted that the 
control of prices represented a similar threat to freedom. In Germany, he told 
an audience of trade association executives, the government developed price 
commissars responsible for setting the retail value of products.27
Arnold worried that anti-monopoly forces, especially independent 
retailers, had injured the economy through legislative enactments, such as the 
Miller-Tydings Act, which interfered with the competitive system and free 
pricing. Arnold concurred with leading retailers, such as the heads of the 
National Retail Dry Goods Association and American Retail Federation, who 
hoped to see the law repealed.28 In a speech before the Missouri Bar 
Association, Arnold told the story of a recent sealed federal bid for cement in 
Maryland. Of twenty-one bids, he said, most were “identical to the last 
decimal.”29 Arnold wondered why the American public tolerated price fixing 
of this sort but complained about government taxation. For some reason, he 
wrote, “our ‘peculiar mythology’ makes higher prices a better tax than direct
26 Ben DuBois to Arnold, July 23, 1938, box 13, “July 1938,” Arnold Papers; Arnold, 
"The Policies o f the Antitrust Division," 2-3.
27 Arnold, "Business and the Antitrust Laws," 7, 10; Arnold, "Denver Bar Association ,” 
May 15, 1939, pp. 7, 8, 10,12, box 1, Arnold Papers; Arnold to Mrs. Harold Winterhalter, 
May 2, 1940, box 20, "Correspondence 1940 General May,” Arnold Papers; R. A. Copple 
to Arnold, August 20,1938, box 13, "Correspondence General 1938,” Arnold Papers.
28 Q. Forrest Walker to Arnold, October 31, 1938, box 14, "October 1938," Arnold Papers.
29 Arnold, “Speech Before the Missouri Bar Association,” p.9, box 1, folder 1, Arnold 
Papers.
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government.30 In Arnold’s opinion, the Miller-Tydings Act jeopardized the 
future of the nation.31 Many small businessmen criticized Arnold and the 
administration for turning against the Miller-Tydings Act. One writer accused 
Arnold of parroting the old Macy’s lines on price maintenance. President 
Roosevelt had never supported the act in the first place, simply signing it as 
an unpleasant rider on the District of Columbia Appropriations bill, of 
course.32
So Arnold’s concern about trade restraints in the economy found 
strong support in the A dm inistration. Because of the anti-monopoly 
movement, Roosevelt authorized the creation of an unusual collaboration 
between the executive and legislative branches: the Temporary National 
Economic Committee. On it, representatives and senators sat side-by-side 
with representatives from the Commerce, Labor and Justice departments. 
Economists and lawyers from these executive agencies staffed the probe.
30 Arnold, "Fair and Effective Use o f Present Antitrust Procedure," 2.
31 Henry Morgenthau to Roosevelt, May 20, 1938, p.2, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust 
Laws 1938,” Roosevelt Papers; Eugene Rostow to Arnold, "Dear General," n.d., box 11, 
"Correspondence 1938 General," Arnold Papers.
32 Crichton Clarke to Henry Canty, n.d., pp. 1-3, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 
1938," Roosevelt Papers.
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Many government bureaucrats expressed a great deal of enthusiasm about its 
possibilities, which had been discussed since late 1937.
A variety of other groups also had high hopes for the TNEC. Anti­
monopolists, particularly small retailers, hailed the committee as an 
opportunity to demonstrate the power of monopoly capital in the United 
States.34 Thurman Arnold believed this support stemmed from deep-seated 
fears that centralization of the economy imperiled democracy.35 According 
to Gerald O’Mahoney, the senator from Montana who chaired the 
committee, numerous retailers wrote him about their concerns for the 
future of the American way of life. O’Mahoney believed monopoly issues 
loomed as one of the great questions of the twentieth century. As Roosevelt 
had argued, the collapse of the old frontier left individual liberty and freedom
33 Homer S. Cummings to Arnold, June 11, 1938, box 13, "June 1938," Arnold Papers; 
Roosevelt to Jackson, October 22, 1937, OF 277, “Anti-Trust Laws, 1937,” Roosevelt 
Papers; “Memo o f Mr. Holtz on discussion with Congressman Celler” in Huston 
Thompson to Roosevelt, September 7, 1937; Roosevelt to W. A  Ayres, September 10, 
1937; W. A. Ayres to Roosevelt, September 15, 1937; Arnold "The Unsolved Problem of 
Monopoly, draft in Gordon Dean to Early, November 24, 1937; Hassett to Early, 
November 24, 1937; Francis Culkin to Roosevelt November 22, 1937; Roosevelt to 
Culkin, December 4, 1937. All in OF 277, “Anti-Trust Laws, 1937” Roosevelt Papers; 
Early to Hassett, July 5, 1938, Official File 2277, "Monopoly Message Folder 1938," 
Roosevelt Papers; Robert E. Wood to Roosevelt, June 1, 1937, OF 277, “Anti-Trust Laws 
May-July 1937;” Arnold, “Address to the Independent Bankers Association,” 18.
34 Brinkley, The End o f Reform, 94,126-127; New Republic, October 26,1938, May 3, 
1939.
35 Arnold "The Enforcement o f the Sherman Act before the Missouri Bar Association,” 
October 1,1938, 1-3.
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of opportunity in jeopardy. The United States needed to articulate new ways 
of protecting old values. If it did not succeed, individual freedom and the 
distinctive American way of life might be lost forever. Even old opponents of 
small retailers, however, endorsed the committee. Consumer advocates 
supported the TNEC and hoped that the study would uncover the reasons for 
a declining economy. Organizations like the League of Women Shoppers 
wrote Roosevelt in support of the monopoly investigation. A “New York 
Conference on the High Cost of Living” sent a petition signed by consumers’ 
organizations throughout the country.36
With broad support, the TNEC studied the American economy sector 
by sector, breaking down the market conditions within each industry. The 
staff members, including many economists, studied the level of concentration 
in the various sectors and the health of trade in different industries. New 
Dealers hoped the survey would enable them to improve the efficiency of the 
economy by uncovering areas of unfair competition. If blocks to the free 
circulation of goods could be removed, then, they believed, the nation could 
build its economy to new heights of consumption.37 Representatives of
36 Milton Davidoff and Louis Weil to Roosevelt, February 1, 1938; Kathleen Mclnemy to 
Roosevelt, January 27,1938. Both in OF 277, "Anti-Trust Files 1938,” Roosevelt Papers.
37 Thurman Arnold, "The Anti-Trust Laws, their Past and Future," August 19, 1938, p. 
4, box 1, folder 1, Arnold Papers; Brinkley, The End o f  Reform, 68,75.
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several industries begged for investigations o f their fields.38 Many 
businesses wanted a detailed study of their industry so they could learn 
more about their operations and how they could increase efficiency and 
profitability. Other companies demurred, particularly retailers, who were 
reluctant to reveal the level of mark-up in the industry.39
The TNEC cooperated with the FTC to survey the state of the 
economy. These agencies studied large trends in the economy and sought to 
understand the intricacies of supply and demand and to identify possible 
reasons for the slow recovery of the economy. They collected tremendous 
amounts of information, although, as William Borah once prophesied, the 
reports have spent most of their existence gathering dust on library shelves.40 
In the reports, the committee identified continuing unfair practices but 
indicated that corporate efficiency promoted prosperity. The report 
specifically criticized fair trade laws and other attempts to fix retail prices. 
Gilbert Montague, an antitrust lawyer who had an array of prominent friends,
38 S. M. Heimlich to Roosevelt, April 23, 1938, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 1938,"
Roosevelt Papers.
40 I. H. Nakdimen to O' Mahoney, November 10, 1941, box 45, "TNEC-15," 
OMahoney Papers; Brinkley, The End o f  Reform, 123, 124; R. E. Freer to Roosevelt, 
April 27, 1938, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 1939-1943," Roosevelt Papers; 
Forster to Freer, July 21, 1938, ibid.-, Nina Wasserman to Roosevelt, June 27, 1938, 
ibid\ Joseph Kolodny to Roosevelt, February 2, 1938, ibid.', “Washington Merry Go 
Round,” December 5, 1937; Retailing, April 18, 1938 in box 35, folder 17, Fischelis 
Papers; Roosevelt to Bankhead, May 24, 1939, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 
1939-1943," Roosevelt Papers.
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including Louis Brandeis and Thurman Arnold, praised the TNEC and its 
investigation for laying bare the state of the economy and preventing 
runaway inflation through its focus on price and competitive efficiency.41
Small retailers were disappointed by the results of the investigation. 
Rather than getting a condemnation of the chains, independent retailers 
found themselves attacked.42 The TNEC reflected the long-held view of the 
FTC professional staff that the chains did not endanger the American 
economy. After the findings of the TNEC, the government clearly 
supported chains. Although a later set of hearings, led by Congressman John 
McCormack of Massachusetts, criticized the chains, these hearings proved 
anti-climatic and failed to draw the same attention as did those of the TNEC 
or Patman’s in 1935.43
41 Arnold to Mrs. Gilbert Montague, September 2, 1938, box 14, "Correspondence 
General September 1938," Arnold Papers; O. M. Kile to Arnold, September 26, 1938, 
ibid.; Montague to Arnold, January 9, 1940, box 19, "General January 5-29, 40," 
Arnold Papers; Montague to Arnold, August 11, 1938, box 13, "Correspondence 
General 1938 August 1-20," Arnold Papers; Montague to Arnold, December 23, 1939, 
box 19, "December 15-31, 39 and January 1-4,40," Arnold Papers.
42 Fred Huntington to OMahoney, November 13, 1939, "TNEC Correspondence #2," 
OMahoney Papers; N. H. Engle, "The Struggle for Marketing Control," box 201, 
"Committees 1937-1941 TNEC," O'Mahoney Papers; Helen Pierce to OMahoney,
April 30, 1940, box 201, "Legislation, 1940 Taxation #2," O'Mahoney Papers; Lawane 
Yeatmanto to O’Mahoney, April 30, 1940, ibid; Mildred Walker to OMahoney, April 
30, 1940, ibid. ; Nate Koontz to Capper, February 20,1941, p.2, box 23, "Small Business" 
Capper Papers.
43 Harper, "The Anti-Chain Store Movement," 436-439, 444; U.S. Congress. House. 
Subcommittee o f the Ways and Means Committee. Excise Tax on Chain Stores. 76th
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Because of concerns about efficiency and increasing consumption, the 
national government moved to cooperate with big business. The 
administration sought to increase consumption. Many leading New Dealers 
believed the crash of the national economy, and its continuing woes, came 
from a lack of purchasing power. In order to protect consumption, Roosevelt 
hoped to increase the efficiency of distribution, as he suggested in a speech 
before the Conference on Retail Distribution in 1937.44 Retail distributors 
like Beardsley Ruml, the President of Macy’s, responded enthusiastically to 
the administration push. Borrowing from Stuart Chase and other economic 
writers of the period, Ruml wrote that the nation’s economy revolved around 
consumption instead of savings. If Americans could be convinced to spend 
more of their hard earned money, the economy could grow by fifty percent. 
"I think it is generally agreed that the material standard could be fifty percent 
higher without a strain on our resources. It’s hard to realize what fifty percent 
means "instead of four rooms you would have six; instead of smoking two
Congress, 3rd session. 1940, 418-419, 849-850, 1115-1116; C. P. Brown to Capper, 
December 3, 1940, box 23, "Small Business;" C. P. Brown to John McCormack, March 
9, 1940, box 23, "Small Business," Capper Papers; Brown to James Murray, October 17, 
1940, p.3, ibid.
44 Colorado Chain Store Association, The Colorado Store License Law: A Reference 
Book o f  Fully Documented Facts, 11; W. S. Elliot to Taylor, December 31, 1937, p.5, 
box 30, folder 9, Henry Charles Taylor Papers, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York; 
Charles R. Eckert to Ben Cohen, n.d., box 13, "Correspondence General June 1938," 
Arnold Papers.
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packs o f cigarettes, you would smoke three; instead of having four suits of 
clothes you would have six. . . ."45 Much as the Patman bill represented the 
last gasp of anti-chain legislation, the anti-monopoly crusade heralded an 
important transition in government policy. Although the government 
continued to monitor big business for restraints of trade, it showed no 
willingness to attack corporations for mere size. Two examples show this 
development in the late 1930s and early 1940s. First, the development of 
food stamps demonstrates a new level of cooperation between government 
and industry that aimed at promoting purchasing power and American 
prosperity through the action of government and industry. Second, Thurman 
Arnold initiated a series of campaigns against fair trade laws.
The National Association of Food Chains suggested the idea of food 
stamps to the Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace. Wallace liked the 
idea because it appeared to provide an important market for surplus farm 
products. The Roosevelt administration had been sensitive to early 
accusations that the AAA slaughtered hogs unnecessarily and demonstrated 
indifference to the plight of the hungry. The food stamps plan followed the
45 Brinkley, The End o f  Reform, 135-136; Beardsley Ruml, "The Functions of a Retailer," 
p.6, March 18, 1940 in Series n, box I, folder 21, Ruml Papers; Ruml, "Memo to Harry 
Hopkins when Secretary o f Commerce," draft, November 24, 1938, pp.2-3, ibid.', Chicago 
Bee, October 13, 1935 in box 149, folder 4, Barnett Papers; Chicago World, February 25, 
1939; Colored Merchant and Caterer, January 1935,7; Chicago Whip, January 28, 1939, 
p.l in box 149, folder 4, Barnett Papers.
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example of the Surplus Commodity Corporation, which developed in the 
New Deal and continues to provide surplus farm goods to the needy.46 This 
program began as a way of aiding farmers by purchasing their crops. Inspired 
by experience with surplus crop campaigns during the California referendum, 
the National Association of Food Chains suggested that the government 
distribute surplus dairy products and flour through regular retail stores, using 
food stamps to allot products. The program began on a trial basis in six 
cities.47 Government economists studied the effectiveness of the plan in 
distributing commodities to the general public48 President Roosevelt and 
Secretary of Agriculture Wallace praised the chains for developing a plan 
that helped the urban poor and struggling farmers 49
Although small retailers had criticized the chains for attempting to win 
popular support through the surplus campaigns, small retailers, including
46 Patman, “Food Stamps,” p.2, box 37A, folder 7, Patman Papers.
47 Holsey to Barnett, May 23, 1939, box 252, folder 4, Barnett Papers; Barnett to Holsey, 
November 29, 1939, ibid.
48 Montague to Arnold, July 18,1940, box 65, "Food Industry," Arnold Papers; Montague 
to Arnold, November 29,1939, box 22, "November 26-December 14," Arnold Papers; 
Montague to J. Warren Madden, January 13,1941, box 22, "January, 1941," Arnold 
Papers.
49 Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Logan, September 30, 1939, OF 288, "Chain Stores 
1937-1944," Roosevelt Papers; Henry Wallace to Roosevelt, September 29, 1939, ibid. ', 
Logan to Roosevelt, September 22, 1939, ibid.; "The Chain Food Store Policy" in 
Logan to Wallace, September 1, 1939, p.2; Logan to Roosevelt, October 7, 1939; Henry 
Wallace to Doughton, April 2,1940, box 37B, folder 1, Patman Papers.
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members of voluntary chains, wanted to participate in the food stamp 
program.50 They sent President Roosevelt their assurances that they would 
cooperate in the government program. Retailers realized that the food stamp 
program would bring them substantial revenue by routing commodity 
distribution through retail stores instead of hated government distribution 
warehouses.51 Although many small retailers had criticized people on relief 
and their dependence on the government, federal funds might make the 
difference for a marginal store. As the program expanded, the government 
monitored sales and reported that independents received an appropriate share 
of the volume benefits from the stamps.52
Despite reaching out for federal funds, small retailers complained 
about the growth of government bureaucracy and the responsibilities it placed 
on them. As they saw the situation, the complexity of government had made 
their lives far more difficult. As one Wyoming retailer wrote to Senator 
O’Mahoney, "We are now nearly crazy with trying to keep up with the
50 Charles Daughters to Arnold, March 28,1941, box 23, “Correspondence 1941 
General March 19-31 April 1-10,” Arnold Papers.
51 T. Blair Willison to Roosevelt, October 20, 1939, PPF 6314; John Fitzgerald to 
Roosevelt, November 6, 1940, PPF 7122; Roosevelt to Fitzgerald, January 4, 1940, PPF 
3977. All in the Roosevelt Papers.
52 The Wichita Shopper, February 28, 1940, 7; The Wichita Shopper, March 14, 1940,7- 
8; T. Blair Willison to Roosevelt, October 20, 1939, PPF 6314, Roosevelt Papers; 
Roosevelt to Willison, November 9,1939, ihid.
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reports, etc., etc., we are asked to fill out If any more are needed we will 
throw up our hands and go out of business, before we are forced." Another 
small retailer wrote the senator that he and his firm could not handle the 
responsibilities because they did not have a “legal and expert accounting 
staff...” required by his bill.53 O’Mahoney agreed with them, blaming the 
growth of government on the power of modem corporations. For many 
bureaucrats, however, this was one more example of inefficiency in the retail 
sector.54
When Thurman Arnold began his assault on restraints of trade, he 
specifically targeted fair trade acts because he believed that the laws 
diminished purchasing power.55 The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce of the Department of Commerce assisted Arnold in his attacks. In 
the opinion of its bureaucrats, these measures interfered with the free flow of
53 F. H. Bresee to O'Mahoney, March 23, 1938, box 231, "Legislation Federal Licensing 
#6," OMahoney Papers; Irving McHenry to "Dear Sir," March 10, 1938; S. C. Leiser to 
OMahoney, March 11, 1938. Herbert Leich to OMahoney, March 24, 1938; Frank Jones 
to Borah, March 10,1935, box 231, "Legislation 1938: Federal Licensing-Correspondence 
General #1," O'Mahoney Papers. W. B. House to O'Mahoney, March 16, 1937, pp. 1-2, 
box 231, "Legislation 1938: Federal Licensing-Correspondence General #1"; W. L. 
Hathaway to Vic Donahey, February 1, 1938, box 231, "Legislation 1938: Federal 
Licensing-Correspondence General #1," O'Mahoney; Richard Giss to O'Mahoney, March 
2, 1938, box 231, "Legislation: Federal Licensing #2," OMahoney Papers; F. P. 
Smithmeyer to Murray, December 16,1940.
54 O'Mahoney to Lewis C. Hall, January 11, 1936, box 197, "Legislation 1936-Federal 
Licensing Correspondence," O'Mahoney Papers.
55 Pugh to Arnold, July 14, 1942, box 28, "July '42," Arnold Papers.
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goods and endangered the American economy.56 Arnold vowed to eliminate 
practices that raised prices for the consumer.57 Arnold argued that unions 
could interfere with the market58 Arnold’s criticism of unions excited a great 
deal of controversy. Big labor, which had prospered under the New Deal’s 
Wagner Act, bristled at Arnold’s suggestion that they raised prices to the 
consumer.
Arnold’s investigation rooted through important industries in an 
attempt to uncover the causes of economic problems in the United States. 
One of the most important studies focused on food. Arnold announced the 
investigation to study the margin between retail food prices and the money 
paid to farmers. Small grocers were enraged when Arnold blamed them 
instead of big business for the price spread59 According to Arnold, retail
56 New York Times, August 12, 1940.
57 John Bainbrdge to Arnold, May 27, 1940, box 20, "May 1940," Arnold Papers;
Montague to Landis, May 31, 1940, box 20, "July 1-28, 40," Arnold Papers; Roosevelt to 
Leon Strauss, June 20, 1940, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 1939-1943," Roosevelt 
Papers; Roosevelt to Bella Dodd, August 24, 1940, ibid.; Los Angeles Times, January 20, 
1943; Roosevelt to Ed. A. O' Neal, March 3, 1941, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust Laws 
1939-1943," Roosevelt Papers; Richard Yukes to Arnold, August 20, 1938, p.2, box 13, 
"Correspondence General 1938 August," Arnold Papers.
58 Arnold, "The Antitrust Laws and Labor" January 27, 1940, pp.2-4, 7, box 2,
“Speeches,” Arnold Papers; Arnold, "The Antitrust laws and Agriculture," February 1,
1940,4, 18.
59 Nate Koontz to Capper, February 20,1941, p.2; James Murray to Capper September 20, 
1941; "Special Committee to study problems o f American small business” in R. B.
Stratton to Capper, September 29,1941; J. M. Keller to Capper, October 18, 1941; Frank
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grocers had used fair trade laws to set artificially high prices and bilk the 
public.60 His probe targeted grocers groups in California, Washington, 
Colorado, Oklahoma, Texas and the District of Columbia. Among the 
indicted groups was the H. A. Marr Company of Denver, which had been 
integral to the Civic Improvement Association and the passage of the store 
license tax in that state.61 A similar study targeted the high price of 
prescription drugs. The NARD and New Jersey Pharmaceutical 
Association faced charges in that probe, dragging Robert Fischelis, a 
passionate fair trade advocate, into the fray.62 Although Arnold also 
investigated A&P and unions for their role in raising prices, many retailers 
felt betrayed.63
Warren to Capper, February 22,1941. All in box 23, "Small Business," Capper Papers.
60 Publisher of Chicago Daily News to Arnold, May 2, 1940, box 20, "Correspondence 
1940 General May,” Arnold Papers; “DOJ press release, November 25, 1940,” box 65, 
"Legal Case File 1939-1941," Arnold Papers; Harper, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement,” 
70.
61 U.S. v. Western Washington Wholesale Grocers'Association, pp. 9-11, 15; U.S. v Food 
Distributors Assoc, o f Colorado, pp.3-7, 9-10; U.S. v A&P, pp. 10, 15; U. S. v Food and 
Grocery Bureau o f Southern California, pp. 2, 8. All in box 65, "Food Industry," Arnold 
Papers
62 "Pharmaceutical Industry," June 10, 1940 Press Release, “Jan 1-1935 to present,” 
Arnold Papers; U.S. v Eli Lilly and Co., pp. 2, 5, 17-19, box 65, "Pharmaceutical 
Industry," Arnold Papers.
63 Arnold to Montague, August 6, 1940, box 6, “General August 6-September 30 1940,” 
Arnold; Harry F. Chrysler to Roosevelt, March 7, 1941, Official File 277, "Anti-Trust 
Laws 1939-1943," Roosevelt Papers; Brien McMahon to McIntyre, January 7, 1943; 
Arnold, "Labor Racketeering," pp. 7-9; Arnold to Wesley Stout, December 16, 1941, p.2,
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In the late 1930s, the food stamp experiment and Arnold’s attacks on 
small retailers had made clear the government’s passion for efficiency and 
its hopes to increase consumption through mass distribution. In the case of 
World War n, government needed the assistance of big business more than 
ever. In a wartime economy, with many goods in short supply, America 
needed products brought to the consuming public as cheaply and easily as 
possible. In an attempt to promote this efficiency, the government created 
the Office of Price Administration, a new wartime agency, which fought to 
control inflation in the red-hot economy. In April of 1942 President 
Roosevelt issued the General Maximum Price Regulation. The measure 
called upon merchants to keep as their ceiling the price for which they had 
sold a product in March of that year. The act also said that prices should be 
"generally fair and equitable."64 The OPA enforced this act and targeted price 
maintenance agreements and other inflationary influences. Mass distributors 
like Macy's, which had long opposed price maintenance, supported the
box 26, "Correspondence 1941 General December," Arnold Papers; Arnold to F. C. 
Kendall, December 16, 1941, ibid. ; Brinkley, The End o f  Reform, 119.
64 Meg Jacobs, "'How About Some Meat?’ The Office o f Price Administration, 
Consumption Politics, and State Building from the Bottom Up, 1941-1946." The 
Journal o f  American History 84 (December 1997): 914, 916, 929-30; W. Bruce 
Macnamee to Early, June 27, 1944, OF 288, "Chain Stores 1937-1944," Roosevelt 
Papers; Bowles to Early, July 3, 1944, ib id ; Early to Paul Porter, July 6, 1944, ibid
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agency 65 Many small retailers resented the OPA, however, because it 
advised consumers that they could obtain lower prices in the chain stores. 
Comments such as those reopened old wounds from the National Recovery 
Administration.66 As had been the case with the NRA, the OPA experienced 
tremendous difficulty when it attempted to monitor retail prices. The sheer 
volume of the task overwhelmed them. Of course many retailers did not want 
to accept the ceilings so they tried to find ways around them. They would sell 
shoddy merchandise at regular prices or close down and reopen with higher 
prices or refuse to sell regulated price items unless unregulated items were
£ 7purchased as well. In an interesting twist, the OPA organized community 
based groups of shoppers, over 300,000 in almost six thousand towns, to 
monitor prices.68
The war acted as a watershed for the anti-chain movement. After the 
conflict, the old anti-chain spirit died.69 Not only had the superior efficiency
65 Beardsley Ruml, "Macy's Place in the Scheme o f Things," pp. 14-15 in Series IT, Box 
I, folder 21, Ruml Papers.
66 Jacobs, "'How About Some Meat?"’ 917.
67 Marvis Hogen, Fifty Years on Main Street (Kadoka, South Dakota: Marvis T. Hogen, 
1996), 42,50.
68 Jacobs, "'How About Some Meat?"’ 923-925,937-939; Business Week, April 3,1943, 
931,934,936.
69 Ralph Tucker to O1 Mahoney, January 22, 1950, ibid. ', Weldon Lloyd to O'Mahoney, 
January 24, 1950, ibid', Laurene Howard to O'Mahoney, July 27, 1948, box 144,
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of the chains played an important part in swaying the Roosevelt 
administration to the side of the chains, but small retailers had lost their 
passion. Even Wright Patman appeared to have relaxed his opposition to the 
chains. Although he worked to get more contracts for small business during 
the war, his attitude toward the chains appeared to have improved through 
contact with Don Nelson, a top executive from Sears.70 Nelson supported 
efforts to protect small business and otherwise ingratiated himself with small 
business supporters. Nelson did such an excellent job that even Patman, the 
supposed bane of the chains, wanned to the executive, even writing a mutual 
friend that Sears was not at the root of the chain problem.71 One New 
England trade association executive wrote Thurman Arnold during the war 
that, “We find, among our neighbors, some chain store men who are fair 
and decent..." He said that he had a pleasant relationship with chain store
"Speeches 1948," O’Mahoney Papers; Harry J. Knapp to O'Mahoney, January 23, 1950, 
box 146, "Speeches, 1950-Speech Comments-Debate on the A & P case,” O'Mahoney 
Papers; Capper to Penney, August 4,1949, box 31, "P," Capper Papers.
70 Frederick A. Verkus to Capper, January 6, 1942, box 23, "Small Business," Capper 
Papers; Patman to Roosevelt, February 6, 1942, PPF 3982, Roosevelt Papers; Patman to 
Roosevelt, December 16, 1942, ibid’; Patman to Roosevelt, February 21, 1943, ibid. ; 
McIntyre to Patman, February 24, 1943, ibid, George Havell to Arnold, October 31, 
1941, box 25, "General October 14-31, 41,” Arnold Papers; Free America, November 
10,1941; Brinkley, The End o f  Reform, 192-193,268; Gerald Tusler to Capper, January 3, 
1941, box 23, "Small Business," Capper Papers.
71 Kirstein to Nelson, June 3, 1940, box 31, "Sears Roebuck," Kirstein Papers; Patman 
to Hunter Tayloe, box 37B, folder 1, Patman Papers; O'Mahoney, "Little Business in the 
World,” p.2, box 269, "Speeches November 4, 1941," O'Mahoney Papers.
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men and didn’t want to jeopardize it—even if he still considered A & P to 
be a “menace.” 72
For their part, the public had long ago accommodated itself to the 
chains. Most Americans could identify with the customers in Our 
Neighbors the Carters, who started shopping with the chain when it came 
to town, despite their sympathy for the independent retailer. Their 
experience is revealed by correspondence over the chains between Bruce 
Barton and Robert Jackson. Barton, best known for his biography of Jesus, 
The Man Nobody Knows, bristled at Jackson’s contention that the chains 
threatened American life. He had held similar views about the chains for 
many years, Barton wrote. He had tried to show hometown loyalty to 
merchants in Foxboro, Massachusetts, outside of Boston, where he had 
summered for over forty years. When chain stores made their way to 
Foxboro, in fact, Barton and his wife refused to patronize them, preferring to 
stay with the neighborhood merchants they knew and trusted. Barton liked 
them and their contributions to the community, which included serving on 
the school board and acting as deacons at the church. Despite this loyalty, the
72 Richard Cook to Arnold, March 2, 1942, box 26, "Correspondence February, March 
1-11, 42," Arnold Papers; Leo Horigan to Arnold, May 3, 1942, i b i d Arnold to 
Horigan, March 25, 1942, box 27, "March 25-31, 42,"; Horigan to Arnold, April 2, 
1942, p .l, box 27, folder "April 1-18, 42" Arnold Papers; Arnold, "Monopoly and the 
South," pp.2-3, box 3, "Addresses, Speeches, Statements: 1941," Arnold Papers; Arnold 
to Don Nelson, March 1, 1942, box 26, "Correspondence February, March 1-11, 42," 
Arnold Papers.
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chain stores gained more and more strength until, finally, they eliminated 
their local competitors. Then and only then, Barton wrote, his wife entered a 
chain store. What she discovered appalled her. The chains substantially 
undersold their independent competitors. Now, Barton’s wife saved on her 
food purchases and received a fine quality of service form the A&P manager, 
whom she knew and trusted. From Barton’s perspective, the issue came 
down to a simple question, and one that summarized neatly the concern he 
held for the New Deal: "We would like to have the independent merchant 
back in Foxboro, but we would like to have the prices charged in the A&P. 
Can we have both? Is there any real way to turn the clock back?" How, in 
other words, could the government control business, while still ensuring low 
prices and economic development to the American people? "These and many 
others are the questions of a perplexed American. I wish I could talk them 
over with you some time." 73
As far as the record indicates, Jackson never discussed these matters 
with Barton. Without proof that the chains threatened them, many 
customers would continue to shop with the chains. Actually, the percentage 
of Americans shopping with chain and independents remained fairly stable 
with slightly over 20 percent of sales being conducted by chains into the
73 Barton to Jackson, June 28,1937, box 33, "Robert Jackson," Barton Papers.
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1940s. At no point did they command more than 25 percent of total sales. 
In certain fields, such as grocery sales, the chains had a larger share of 
business, about 38.5 percent in 1929 and 43 percent of the market by 
1954.74 But the number of chain stores actually dropped in the period, as 
grocery chains, encouraged by chain taxes, built new supermarkets around 
the country.75
For the past decade, independents had based their attacks on the 
claim that chain stores threatened to become a monopoly and drive 
independents out of existence. This scenario had not come to pass, 
however, and consumers had to wonder why shopping with the chains 
endangered freedom of opportunity. During the Depression, many 
unemployed workers had turned to operating their own small businesses, 
undercutting claims that corporations dominated business.76 With that 
rationale for attacking chains gone, government would no longer interfere 
with the evolution of retailing, and chains could continue their slow capture 
of the market.
74 Palamountain, Politics o f  Dsitrihution, 160; Lebhar, Chain Stores in America, 34.
75 Broadus Mitchell, Depression Decade: From New Era to New Deal, 1929-1941 (New 
York: Rinehart and Company, 1947), 262.
76 Robert Cotner, Texas Cities in the Great Depression (Austin, Texas: The Texas 
Memorial Museum, 1973), 39.
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Other battles against the chains would develop over the course of 
decades, and these battles continue to this day, but the ultimate result is 
clear. Independent retailers thrive in fields avoided by chains, such as high- 
end retail and specialty shops. Some small grocery and drug stores continue 
to exist, but the power in retailing has shifted to corporations. Americans 
wanted to support their hometown stores. In propaganda films, such as Frank 
Capra’s “Why We Fight” Series, the American ideal of free enterprise and 
individual opportunity played a critical part Capra’s seventh film in the 
series shows the Main Street Market as an example of this spirit. A narrator 
praises free enterprise as part of the American heritage endangered by Nazi 
and Japanese aggression.77 Despite this nostalgia, small retailers faced a 
difficult time during the war and the years to follow. In the film The Best 
Days o f Their Lives, selected as Best Picture in 1946, the returning heroes 
arrive intheir hometown and smile in a manic fashion as they survey it 
Conspicuously present as they take their first tour back home since the war is 
the local Woolworth store. The chains have become part of hometown 
business. They had come to symbolize the healthy standard of living that
77 "Why We Fight," American Information Film #7, War Department Army Picture 
Service.
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Americans desired and were part of the fabric of American life.78 Chains had 
demonstrated their efficiency and their staying power. Although independent 
retailers remained in America, and still exist, chains had become a familiar 
sight on American streets and the dominant force in retailing. A&P had not 
acquired a monopoly, and most Americans identified chains as helpful 
additions to economic life. The chains participated in the amazing economic 
growth of the post-war period, and independent retailing waned. Although 
locally owned shops continue to exist, chains have replaced them as the 
dominant force in retailing.
•70 ____
The Rest Days o f  Their Lives, Goldwyn Pictures Corporation, 1946.
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